Grasp the pattern, read the trend
Asia in Review
No. 34, August/2020, 4
Brought to you by CPG
Dear Readers,
Welcome to this week’s AiR providing you with comprehensive information on what goes on in Asia in terms of domestic politics, constitutional law, human rights, international relations and security and geopolitics.
I wish you an enjoyable read and extend special greetings to readers in Ukraine and Uruguay who have celebrated Independence Day this week.
With best regards,
Henning Glaser
Director, German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG)
Webpage: www.cpg-online.de, Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CPGTU
Main Sections
Law and Politics in East Asia
Law and Politics in South Asia
Law and Politics in Southeast Asia
International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia
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Law and Politics in East Asia
China: Has Xi Jinping started a new purge to secure a third term as President?
(dql) The Shanghai police bureau director, and concurrently one of city’s vice mayors, has been put under investigation over accusations of “serious violations of discipline and the law”.
The case is the latest in a recent string of investigations and punishments against high-ranking officials – including one of the vice-ministers of the Public Security Ministry and the police chief of Chongqing – and comes amid the implementation of a new "education and rectification" campaign that kicked off last month and aims to get rid of corruption in the country’s police and other security bodies as well as the judiciary and to purge “two-faced” officials believed to only pay lip service to the Chinese Communist Party’s rules and orders. Dozens of officials were investigated or sacked within the first week of the campaign. [Epoch Times] [AiR No. 28, July/2020, 2]
Observers interpret the campaign – compared within the party with the Yan’an Rectification Campaign from 1942-1944 under Mao Zedong in which according to scholars more than 10000 had been executed – as the begin of a new purge of President Xi Jinping to stabilize his position for a third term as president in the face of growing criticism of his leadership within the party. [WION] [Foreign Policy] [New York Times] [AiR No. 28, July/2020, 2]
A case in point, reported by AiR, is the expulsion from the party of Cai Xia, a retired professor of the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party, the party’s cadre factory, for publicly criticizing the party and the party leadership. [AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3]
The Guardian, meanwhile, has published an interview with Cai, taken in June, in which she – referring the 2018 constitutional amendment to abolish the term limits of the presidency – stated that Xi “forced the third plenum of the national congress to swallow it like dog shit. He first completed it and then forced everyone to accept it. […] That shows that the Communist party of China has become a political zombie. The party has no ability to correct errors. So, he singlehandedly killed a party and a country, showing that even when confronted with such a major question of altering the constitution, the party has no power to stop him.” [The Guardian]
In a related development, and with explicit reference to Cai’s case, the School has ordered department heads and senior officials to carry out “meticulous work” to keep staff, and especially former staff, toeing the party line, and to ensure “there is absolutely no diversion of opinions that violates the party’s theories and direction, and absolutely no public statements that are different from the decisions of the party leadership.” [Central Party School, in Chinese]
China: Human rights lawyer's license revoked
(dql) Chinese authorities have revoked the professional license of a prominent human rights lawyer Xie Yang. He was sentenced three years ago for "inciting subversion against the state" after he had been arrested in 2015 in a security operation called "709" – as the crackdown kicked off July 9 of that year – which targeted over 200 other colleagues.
Xie rose to prominence for defending various political activists, especially members of the New Citizens' Movement, which advocated for a democratic transition in China for years. [South China Morning Post]
China/Hong Kong: Split among Hong Kong’s pan-democrats over serving or boycotting extended legislative term
(dql) Beijing’s recent decision to extend the current term of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo) following the Hong Kong government’s decision to postpone the LegCo election – initially planned for 5 September – for one year, has caused an internal debate within the pan-democratic camp, with a majority of opposition lawmakers expressing their intention to serve the extended term while others from the camp calling for a boycott.
Amid this debate, two opposition parties holding 12 out of the 22 LegCo seats of the opposition announced that they will rely on the results of a citywide poll which will be conducted prior to the end of the regular term on 30 September to decide to serve or to boycott the term. [Asia Times] [South China Morning Post]
China/Hong Kong: Civil service probationers can be dismissed for partaking in illegal demonstrations
(dql) Responding to civil servants having participated in last year’s anti-government demonstrations and gatherings, Hong Kong’s Civil Service Bureau issued new guidelines for the recruitment of civil servants under which – among others – civil servants serving an initial probationary period can be fired if arrested for attending illegal anti-government assemblies, regardless of whether they are subsequently charged.
Commenting on them, Chief Executive Carrie Lam stressed that the guidelines aim at “monitoring and observing not only the performance of the probationers on the job but also their conduct, their other behaviours to make sure that they will be good enough to continue to serve the people of Hong Kong, being an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China.” [Hong Kong Free Press 1] [Hong Kong Government]
In a separate statement, she fiercely rejected warnings from a former Hong Kong Minister that the new national security law for Hong Kong could be abused as a weapon against political dissent arguing that the law does not clearly define which concrete actions constitutes a breach of the new law. Lam, instead, called the new law “righteous legislation” and a “weapon of the rule of law.” [Hong Kong Free Press 2]
Is China facing a capital flight of its citizens?
(dql) Suggesting massive breach of Chinese capital rules, a report of Chainanalysis, a software company providing data analysis and blockchain intelligence, has revealed that Chinese citizens moved more than 50 billion USD of cryptocurrency out of China to other countries over the past 12 months, with parts of the amount believed to constitute capital flight as a response to the worsening of Sino-US trade relations and yuan-fluctuations as well as to the government’s crackdown on channels for offshoring capital through foreign real estate investments and other assets. [CNBC] [Cointelegrapgh]
Japan: Party merger
(dql) The Democratic Party for the People, Japan's second-largest opposition party, has decided to disband and to merge with the largest opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party, to establish a new party which will command around 150 seats in both chambers of the Diet.
Due to persisting differences between the two groups over several crucial policy areas – including nuclear power, the consumption tax and constitutional revision –, analysts doubt that the new party will be able to form a serious alternative to the ruling coalition of Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito. [Japan Times]
Taiwan: Victims of White Terror era exonerated
(dql) Taiwan’s Transitional Justice Commission exonerated two victims of political persecution during the White Terror era who were sentenced in 1954 to 17 and 10 years in jail. [Focus Taiwan]
The term White Terror the period of suppression of political dissidents from 1947 to 1987 during which saw around 140,000 Taiwanese imprisoned and about 3,000 to 4,000 of them.
Mongolia: China censors and threatens Mongolian language policy critics
(ef) After plans for the elimination of teaching in the Mongolian native languages were leaked, widespread protests in the Southern Mongolian society have ensued. As a consequence, the only social media application in Mongolian-language available in China was shut down by Chinese authorities as it was used to discuss this so-called “bilingual education” policy which entails the elimination of teaching in Mongolian language starting on September 1. Some have suggested that a school strike should be carried out to boycott this new policy. Others have called this policy part of “the trend of Chinese cultural genocide against Southern Mongolians”. [UNPO] [Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center] [Radio Free Asia]
Law and Politics in South Asia
India: Advocate refuses to apologize for tweets criticizing the judiciary
(lm) In a case testing the judiciary's openness to criticism – in particular to comments which are critical of Hindutva (Hindu nationalism) and the sustained cowering of democratic institutions – famous advocate and rights activist Prashant Bhushan refused to offer an apology to the Supreme Court on Monday for tweets against the judiciary. [Times of India] [The Tribune] [read the full supplementary affidavit here: The Wire 1]
On August 14, the Supreme Court had ruled that Mr. Bhushan, by sending two tweets critical of the judiciary, was engaged in an “attempt to shake the very foundation of constitutional democracy” in India. At the sentencing hearing on August 20, then, the bench had given Mr. Bhushan until August 25 to reconsider his statements and apologise. The Supreme Court, in its 108-page order in the case, noted it is "required to be magnanimous" to criticism - though it said "such magnanimity cannot be stretched". [The Straits Times]
More than 3,000 people, including 12 former judges, have signed a statement extending solidarity and support to Mr. Bhushan, arguing that his tweets were a bona fide expression of concern regarding the functioning of the top court. [read the full statement here The Wire 2] [The Hindu]
Prashant Bhushan is facing another contempt case related to allegations of corruption in the Supreme Court he made during an interview with a magazine in 2009. The Supreme Court on Tuesday adjourned the hearing to September 10 and requested the Chief Justice of India to take to an “appropriate bench” the question of conflict between the freedom of speech and suo motu contempt powers of the court. [Hindustan Times]
In a case similar to Mr. Bhushan`s, India`s Attorney General K.K. Venugopal refused his consent to initiate contempt proceedings against aBollywood actress Swara Bhasker who is a prominent critic of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led federal government. [The Wire 3] [Hindustan Times]
The petition had been filed by pro-government activists before the Attorney General of India (AGI), in which they alleged that Mrs. Bhasker had scandalized the court by claiming that “courts are not sure if they believe in the constitution ”while referring to the Supreme Court’s ruling to grant ownership rights of the disputed land at Ayodhya to the Hindu parties involved in the case last year. [see AiR No. 31, August/2020, 1, AiR No. 46, November/2019, 2]. It is worth noting that one of the lawyers involved is also a complainant in the Prashant Bhushan case.
India: Government orders withdrawal of 10,000 paramilitary troops from Jammu and Kashmir
(lm) After reviewing “the deployment of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs)”, India`s Ministry of Home Affairs ordered 10,000 Indian paramilitary soldiers to be withdrawn out of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. An official from the regional administration said the decision was “in consonance with an overall view on the improved situation in Jammu and Kashmir right now.” [Anadolu Ajansı] [The Hindu] [The Economic Times]
The order comes amid a rising number of terror attacks on Indian security forces and episodes of encounters between them and terrorists in the valley. One of the deadliest and longest retaliatory gunfights, continuing for two days, left four Indian security forces and three militants dead. [AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3]
Nepal: Months-long political imbroglio continues
(lm) After weeks of wrangling between Prime Minister Oli and his party co-chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the country`s ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) doesn`t seem out of the woods, despite a panel set up earlier this month suggested a formula to end the infighting. On Thursday, Mr. Dahal called on the Prime Minister to withdraw recent political appointments, claiming that Mr. Oli had made the decision unilaterally without prior approval from the party Secretariat. [The Kathmandu Post 1] [The Himalayan Times]
High-profile political appointments are made on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council - a key agency that recommends the appointment of officials at various constitutional bodies. In April, the Prime Minister had introduced an ordinance to amend the Constitutional Council Act, allowing the Constitutional Council to take its decision on the basis of majority, instead of unanimously. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Oli had to revoke the ordinance after coalition partners and some Cabinet members opposed the move. [AiR No. 17, April/2020, 4]
On August 14, Prime Minister Oli and Mr. Dahal appeared to have reached a tactical understanding to resolve the ongoing intra-party rift within the NCP, which saw Prime Minister Oli to complete his five-year tenure, while Mr. Dahal would be allowed to exercise full executive power over party affairs. Further, both leaders reportedly agreed on a cabinet reshuffle and to set up a six-member task force to provide a formula for the road ahead. The panel, which was endorsed by the party`s Secretariat three days thereafter, submitted its report on Saturday, in which it confirmed the deal made earlier in suggesting that party leaders should adhere to the one-man-one-post principle. Shortly thereafter, however, NCP key figure Madhav Kumar Nepal voiced his disappointment of the report, saying that it would merely postpone the problem instead of resolving it. [The Economic Times] [The Kathmandu Post 2] [The Kathmandu Post 3] [The Kathmandu Post 4] [Setopati]
While the appointments may be seen as an attempt by Prime Minister Oli to test the waters, it seems he also wants to leave the door open, in case his rivals backtrack. On Wednesday, the Election Commission gave the re-registered Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist–Leninist (UML) its own election symbol making an eventual split of the currently governing party more probable. [AiR No. 18, May/2020, 1, see also AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2].
Sri Lanka: President Rajapaksa says country is going to roll back 19th amendment of the constitution
(lm) Sri Lanka is going to remove the 19th amendment to the constitution (2015), which curtails presidential powers and limits the presidential term to two, and will then work on a new constitution, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa said while addressing legislators during the inaugural session of the parliament on Thursday. His address followed the recently concluded parliamentary election in which the Rajapaksa family-led Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) was able to secure 145 seats in the 225-member parliament. [Al Jazeera] [Arab News] [Foreign Brief]
Introduced by President Rajapaksa`s predecessor, Maithripala Sirisena in 2015, the 19th amendment strengthened the role of parliament in order limit the ability of presidents to amass extensive powers. During its electoral campaign the SLPP has vowed to roll back the amendment, positioning themselves as stalwarts of national security and decisiveness. Earlier this month, Mahinda Rajapaksa, older brother of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, was sworn in as the country’s new Prime Minister, after Sri Lanka People's Freedom Alliance (SLPFA), of which the SLPP is a majority stakeholder, won in a landslide. [AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2]
Law and Politics in Southeast Asia
Cambodian monk forced into exile by state-sponsored smear campaign
(jn/dql) A Buddhist monk and political activist, Luon Sovath, has left Cambodia for Switzerland after falling victim to a disinformation campaign by a Cambodian government cyber task force that framed him as a sexually deviant predator with the help of reportedly manipulated video material and fake Facebook profiles. Mr. Sovath was allegedly targeted by the government for becoming a celebrated political activist and for preaching human rights from his pagoda.
As the New York Times has uncovered, the rather amateurishly edited chats intended to expose Mr. Sovath were created by the so-called governmental Press and Quick Reaction Unit which also employs a “cyber war team”. The unit’s purpose was reported in local media in 2018 as to “carry out media work and react to content with a negative character coming from national and international media”. After being alerted to the fraudulent character of both the profiles and their content several times, Facebook ultimately took them down.
The incident illustrates some of the rougher methods of state-sponsored smear campaigns in the modern media age, but also the role of Facebook as the main, and sometimes sole, source of information and communication. Fake news, such as in this case, could spread relatively unchecked because the social media giant had not overseen the Cambodian user traffic with enough content moderators despite the known risk posed by disinformation campaigns and low digital literacy. [The New York Times]
The practices uncovered here are, however, in principle neither new nor limited to the region although they appear to be more dangerous with an entrenching digitalization of public and private life, the dominance of single social media corporations and with regard to countries providing a rule of law standard that is as compromised as the Cambodian.
For matters of context though: In 2014, Glenn Greenwald published on the British GCHQ’s Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group’s practices to manipulate and control online discourse with tactics of deception and reputation-destruction by injecting “all sorts of false material onto the internet in order to destroy the reputation of its targets”. See the intercept with examples from leaked intelligence documents. [The Intercept]
Shortly after, it has been reported how the British military and intelligence establishment worked on stopping Jeremy Corbyn from winning elections by unleashing dozens of scandals casting the Labour leader as a threat to national security. These leaks became the basis of 440 articles in the press. [Mint Press News]
A classical book on Russian disinformation is “Dezinformatsia: The Strategy of Soviet Disinformation“ by Richard Shultz and Roy Godson.
Coming back to Cambodia, and given the general conditions there, the country’s November 2017 banned opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), said Wednesday, the EU should go one step further after implemented its withdrawal of duty-free, quota-free access to its market under the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) scheme for some 20 percent of Cambodia’s exports. Similar to its reaction on the developments in Belarus, the EU should now consider to sanction also Cambodian officials responsible for human rights abuses.
Regarding Belarus, the EU announced to prepare a list of Belarusian officials to be hit with sanctions following a post-election crackdown on demonstrators. According to the CNRP “[t]he events in Belarus remind us of the oppressive methods used by the Cambodian regime, which has captured the state in the hands of limited circle of people close to the dictator Hun Sen through abuse of institutions and sham elections without participation of the opposition.” Claiming “the situation in Cambodia, just as the situation in Belarus, requires the immediate attention of the international community,” the CNRP statement underlines “just like in Belarus,” authorities in Cambodia have in recent months been arresting critics and driving much of the opposition into self-imposed exile to avoid politically motivated charges and convictions. [Radio Free Asia]
Indonesia: Bill liberalizing employment provokes workers’ protests
(ls) Hundreds of Indonesian workers protested in Jakarta last week against a bill that aims to liberalize labor law in order to stimulate the economy. The so-called omnibus bill has been drafted to make it easier for companies to hire and fire employees, to eliminate minimum wages, curtail severance benefits and allow outsourcing of certain works. [Straits Times]
Indonesia: Intelligence agency involved in Covid-19 drug trials
(ls) Indonesia's Intelligence Unit (BIN) and the Army are involved in efforts to find a cure for Covid-19, the Indonesian army chief confirmed last week. This has provoked some backlash from doctors and medical experts who criticized that a BIN financed research consortium that was formed with the University of Airlangga failed to report its clinical trials to the World Health Organization so that they could be accessed by academics and researchers worldwide. The case illustrates potential conflicts between national interests and international cooperation in the global effort to find drugs and vaccines against Covid-19. [Straits Times]
Indonesia: Protracted anti-terror operation leads to arrest of Indonesia’s most-wanted terrorist’s wife
(dql) A woman believed to be the wife of terror fugitive and leader of East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) Ali Kalora has been arrested in Central Sulawesi as she was on her way to deliver some money and food to MIT. The woman is charged under the anti-terrorism law for concealing information about a terror fugitive and could face a lifetime in prison if convicted.
Following a series of recent attacks police and
army units have intensified man-hunt operations in the province in ‘Operation Tinombala’ to capture the remaining members of the MIT, most notably Ali Kalora following a series of recent attacks.
After at least 72 suspected militants have been arrested in a series of operations in 13 provinces between June and August, mostly alleged members of homegrown terror network Jemaah Ansharut Daulat, National Police Chief Idham Azis has extended Operation Tinombala until Sept. 30. [Jakarta Globe]
Laos: The missing link in the fight against drugs
(ls) Over the course of the last five years, the production of synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine has increased seven-fold in Southeast Asia. The majority of those drugs are from the Golden Triangle, the border region where Myanmar, Laos and Thailand meet. As Thai and Chinese anti-drug efforts concentrated mostly on the border to Myanmar for the past years, large parts of the drug production has been moved to Laos. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Southeast Asia and the Pacific therefore demands stronger efforts with a focus on drug syndicates operating there. [CNN]
Malaysia: Formation of party coalitions may see UMNO regaining ground after PAS joins PN
(ls/dql) Malaysia’s ruling coalition Perikatan Nasional (PN), led by Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, has been joined by Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS). PN came to power in late February when several blocs of lawmakers joined to oust the then governing Pakatan Harapan administration.
UMNO, which is the biggest party supporting PN with 38 federal lawmakers, still refrains to become an official coalition member, though. Rather, the party created its own Muafakat Nasional coalition, which PAS and PM Yassin’s Bersatu joined as well. Observers consider that Muafakat Nasional may become UMNO’s vehicle to swallow Bersatu entirely. Bersatu, under the leadership of former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, was initially part of the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition. [Straits Times 1] [Channel News Asia]
Less positive news for BN come from Sabah where a split of the state’s UMNO seems possible with state elections ahead. If BN would lose in Sabah, UMNO supporters could question the party’s leadership on the federal level in times of a highly volatile party chemistry in the country. [Free Malaysia Today]
Mahathir, for his part, has submitted an application to register his newly founded Malay-based Parti Pejuang Tanah Air (Pejuang) as a political party. If Pejuang can win enough votes in the next general election and if votes are split evenly among the Malay electorate as they were in 2018, Pejuang and Mahatir may become an important power broker. [Straits Times 2]
Malaysia: High profile corruption case
(dql) Abdul Azeez Abdul Rahim, a lawmaker from Kedah and a member of the powerful Umno supreme council, is standing trial over charges of taking bribes totalling RM5.2 million ($1.3 million) involving road projects spanning Perak and Kedah states, and of money laundering, involving nearly RM140 million. In a related second case, his brother is accused of abetting him to receive a bribe from a director of a construction company in return for support in securing road projects.
The case adds to a number of cor ruption cases in the recent past involving members of UMNO including most prominently former Prime Minister Najib Razak. [Straits Times]
Malaysia: Politically motivated misuse of sodomy accusations confirmed
(dql) A man who made a sworn declaration that he allowed a politician for a sum of money to sodomise on four occasions in 2013 has now filed a police report accusing the head of an NGO of deceiving him into doing so by saying he would be rewarded by a senior member of the current Cabinet if he made the declaration about the minister’s rival.
He also accused the NGO leader of pressuring him to obtaining a backdated medical report on the sodomy claim. Anal sex is criminalised under Section 377A of the Penal Code as carnal intercourse against the order of nature, punishable by up to 20 years’ imprisonment, whipping, or both upon conviction. Such a conviction once eliminated Malaysia’s then rising political star Anwar Ibrahim who served almost four years in jail on charges of sodomy. [Malay Mail]
Myanmar: Peace conference wrapped up
(jn) The fourth session of Myanmar’s peace conference was concluded on Friday with 230 representatives of the government, military, ten ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and political parties agreeing on key principles to advance the stagnating peace process and to achieve a democratic federal union of Myanmar. The signing of the so-called Union Accord Part III that tops the fourth round of the Union Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong was envisaged to breathe new life into the peace process that has stalled since the last year.
The agreement clears up misunderstandings on the already existing Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and on its implementation, and details steps for a union-building process after 2020. It also assures equal rights without discrimination based on race, religion, culture or gender. One key principle calls for a “union identity”, namely a national identity that recognizes the histories and cultures of the many nationalities of Myanmar. Other provisions govern military issues like troop deployments, the demarcation of territory and the handling of skirmishes between the military and EAOs.
The negotiators could not agree, however, on the issue of granting the power of (regional) constitution-making to ethnic groups. Still, it is regarded as remarkable that the Tatmadaw, the military, reversed its 70-year old stance of rejecting federalism as a constitutional principle on which the country’s political future should rest.
Finding a consensus on what shape the peace process and NCA will take in the future was important for the participating signatories of the NCA before the looming November elections, even though the current administration of State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi is widely expected to win another term. Given the boycott of seven EAOs in protest of the government excluding the Arakan Army (AA) of Rakhine state, the whole NCA process remains fragile and its viability in doubt.
Aung San Suu Kyi hailed the agreement as “a new plan for building a Democratic federal union beyond 2020” and urged the present stakeholders to continue participating in the peace process, now that it stood on firmer footing. In what was seen as rebuke to the military and as a sign of a personal rift between her and army chief Min Aung Hlaing, Aung San Suu Kyi said that peacebuilding was “aimed at rooting out the underlying attitude that caused the 'bad politics' which focused on the power of weapons to gain impact, get respect and achieve success". She also pointed out that an amendment of the military-drafted constitution was necessary. The relationship with the army chief had become severely strained after the brutal military crackdown against the Rohingya minority, and after he had refused to talk to her about amending the military-authored 2008 constitution.
A representative of the Tatmadaw said he now saw better prospects for the peace process and the agreements reached were proof of the collective longing for peace in the country. The military explicitly did not call on EAOs to disarm, which they took as a positive sign. [The Irrawaddy] [Myanmar Times 1] [Myanmar Times 2] [Radio Free Asia] [Nikkei Asian Review]
For insights to the role China is playing for the tribal factions in the North of Myanmar, in particular the Wa - ethnic Chinese living on both sides of the Chinese-Burmese border - see [StrategyPage].
Myanmar: Election observers finally accredited – Rohingya candidates likely to be rejected
(jn/ls) In an about-face, Myanmar’s Union Election Commission (UEC) eventually gave permission to the People’s Alliance for Credible Elections (PACE) to monitor the conduct of the upcoming November 8 elections. After having applied to serve as an official election observer the group had received a letter from the UEC in which the accreditation was rejected causing an outcry among rights groups [see AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3]. PACE plans to deploy up to 2,900 observers in the elections. [Myanmar Times]
At the same time, however, at least a dozen Myanmar citizens from the Rohingya Muslim minority who have applied to be candidates in the election are likely to be rejected due to a lack of proof that their parents were Myanmar citizens. Successive military governments have stripped the Rohingya of identity documents, leaving many with no proof of their origins. In 2015, President Thein Sein announced that so called white cards were nullified as well, preventing Rohingya from voting in the 2015 election that brought Aung San Suu Kyi to power. [Reuters]
Myanmar: HRW on stifling free-speech and internet shutdowns
(dql) HRW commented on the ongoing case against free-speech activist and poet Maung Saungkh who had to appear in court on August 21 to face accusations of organizing a protest by demanding an end to internet restrictions in the conflict-affected Rakhine and Chin states. For hanging a banner reading “Is the internet being shut down to hide war crimes in Rakhine and killing people?” at an overpass in Yangon, he was charged under Section 19 of the Peaceful Assembly and Peaceful Procession Law, which criminalizes unauthorized protests and carries a maximum three-month prison sentence, a fine, or both.
June 21, the day when he spread the banner, was the one-year anniversary of internet shutdowns in Rakhine and Chin states. On this and other cases revealing Myanmar’s authorities' inclination to increasingly stifle civil protest and dissent, while restricting access to information critical on the government see the detailed HRW report here: [HRW]
Myanmar: Buddhist monk granted bail in military critic case
(dql) A Buddhist Monk, sued by a military officer for a post on Facebook criticizing military leaders for abusing their power for personal gains, has been granted bail.
The monk, known as an outspoken military critic, is scheduled to stand trial in September over charges of Sect. 66 of the country's Telecommunications Act ("extorting, coercing, restraining wrongfully, defaming, disturbing, causing undue influence or threatening any person using a telecommunications network") as well as of various articles of the penal code on intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace and statements conducing to public mischief. [Irrawaddy]
Myanmar: Civilians arrested over suspicion of ties to Arakan Army
(dql) Government forces in Myanmar’s Rakhine state detained six civilians suspected of having ties to the rebel ethnic Arakan Army (AA) after they refused to answer questions whether AA soldiers were present in their village, out of fear that AA soldiers might actually be there. Four of theme were later released. [Radio Free Asia]
The case draws attention to the dangerous situation of civilians living in combat zones.
Meanwhile, two senior members of the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) and three civilian medics, abducted earlier this month by the Rakhine ethnic armed group Arakan Army (AA), have been released last week. Since 2017, twelve members of the ALP, a signatory to the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and participant in the peace conference, have been detained by the AA. [Irrawaddy]
Philippines: IS-linked bomb attacks in Jolo
(ls) Two bombs exploded in Jolo, Sulu province, in the southern Philippines on Monday, killing at least 14 people and injuring dozens more. Among the dead were seven soldiers, six civilians and one police officer. The second of the two explosions was carried out by a female suicide bomber. Jolo is the main town on Jolo island and a stronghold of the Abu Sayyaf militants, who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. For several months, the Philippine military has been conducting an offensive against the group. [DW]
Monday's explosions happened near the place where a suicide attack in January last year killed at least 23 people and wounded 109 others. The bombers were an Indonesian couple with links to the Abu Sayyaf. [Rappler]
Monday’s bomb attacks are seen in connection with events less than two weeks ago when one of Abu Sayyaf’s top leaders, Abduljihad “Idang” Susukan, was handed over to the police by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a Muslim political organization in the southern Philippines which has negotiated an increased level of autonomy with the Duterte administration. In 2018, the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was passed. It provides for the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.
Philippines: Human rights lawyer and peasant activist killed
(ls) A legal worker for a human rights group and a peasant activist have been killed in the Philippines over the course of the last four weeks. The two cases illustrate the practice of so called red-tagging. Both worked in leftist grassroots organizations. Authorities often allege these to be linked to the communist insurgency and label them communists. Red-tagging often results in the death of the persons so labelled. In this particular case, the Department of Justice had even listed the victims on a terrorist list, though their names were subsequently removed. [Human Rights Watch]
Thailand: More arrests as student protests continue
(ls) Several activists, including two popular rappers, have been arrested by the Thai police as student protests continued across the country. They were charged with breaching sedition laws and defying the emergency decree on the prevention of the spread of the coronavirus. Also, the lawyer and activist Anon Nampa was arrested and charged over a protest in Bangkok at which he had called for reform of the monarchy. It was his second arrest for sedition after an earlier one in July. Student activist Panupong Jadnok was arrested, as well. All have been released on bail. [Reuters 1] [BBC] [Bangkok Post 1]
On Monday, Facebook complied with a governmental request to block access within Thailand to a Facebook group with about 1 million members over critical remarks about the monarchy. Facebook announced to take legal action. Earlier this month, Facebook has already been ordered to restrict access to what the authorities deemed criminal content. [Reuters 2]
The student protests meanwhile extended to Northeastern Thailand where demonstrations took place in Khon Kaen and Korat. In Bangkok, student groups met with representatives of the Education Ministry and demanded action against intimidation of students by teachers. The students said they were bullied for expressing their political views at school. [Khaosod English 1] [The Thaiger]
At the other side, protesters set a new tone by making use of ‘cancel culture’ tactics. After a journalist of the pro-establishment Nation TV station misinformed an interviewee over her affiliation to the media outlet, protesters urged people over the cheat to not read or watch Nation news coverage and, more importantly, to even boycott products of those companies advertising with the group while sharing lists of the advertisers’ names over Twitter. Some Twitter users even called on related parent companies abroad to “acknowledge their Thailand branch is supporting dictatorship”. [Bangkok Post 2]
The current wave of protests exposes both a growing challenge to the hegemonic social contract and a stark generational divide. As issues related to the Thai monarchy have been raised by some of the protesters, especially parts of the older generation view them as traitors. Khaosod English has spoken to young protesters and their parents, tracing the current inter-generational discussions in Thai families. [Khaosod English 2]
Meanwhile, the government coalition announced the proposal of a constitutional amendment draft after having reached an initial agreement on the structure of the drafting body which shall comprise 200 members, 150 elected by people from across the country and 50 others appointed by academics, student representatives and parliamentarians. Under the current Thai constitution of 2017, constitutional amendments also require the support of at least one-third of the all-appointed Senate, which is widely seen as a major obstacle. [Bangkok Post 3]
International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia
China-USA relations: Washington halts extradition treaty with Hong Kong
(dql) Marking another blow to currently high running tensions in Chinese-US relations, the USA last week announced that it has halted its extradition treaty along with two other treaties with Hong Kong to end cooperation in "the surrender of fugitive offenders, the transfer of sentenced persons and reciprocal tax exemptions on income derived from the international operation of ships." [Independent]
The termination of these treaties is the latest in a string of recent measures taken by the Trump administration to pressure China over its imposition of the national security law for Hong Kong. Earlier measures included the termination of Hong Kong's preferential trade and diplomatic status with the US as well as the imposition of sanctions against high-ranking Hong Kong and mainland Chinese officials on grounds of their involvement in undermining the autonomy of Hong Kong. [AiR No. 29, July/2020, 3] [AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2]
Cross-strait relations: Beijing’s military muscle flexing in the South China Sea
(dql/ef) China is concurrently conducting four military exercises in various coastal regions in this week amid high tensions with the US and Asian countries over territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Among them are drills in the Taiwan Strait which - according to statements of the Chinese military - are held in the South China Sea in express response to recent US military activities in the Taiwan Strait and aimed to deter separatist forces in Taiwan and the USA. [Global Times][Radio Free Asia]
The drills are the latest in an almost consecutive series of military activities of the People’s Liberation Army in the South China over the past months accompanied by aggressive rhetoric, further pushing speculations about Beijing preparing for re-unification by force. The speculations have been reinforced by the former vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the former acting CIA director under President Obama who argued that China’s invasion of Taiwan could happen as soon as next year and warned that China would be capable of seizing Taiwan in three days and that the USA would be too paralyzed by political turmoil to stop it. [Forbes]
In this light Robert Kagan at [Brookings] assumes that China – seeing that economic and diplomatic pressure have not yielded the goal of re-unification – might opt for a military takeover of Taiwan, and raises the question whether in such a case the USA would respond, adding that “American policies in the two decades before World War II were shaped by what in retrospect looks like a stunning naïveté about other nations’ willingness to resort to force. One wonders if we are any less naive today”.
The drills come after the de facto U.S. ambassador in Taiwan attended on Sunday for the first time a ceremony commemorating a key military clash between Chinese and Taiwanese forces back in 1958, a highly symbolic move reflecting currently deepening US-Taiwan relations while worsening already frosty US-China/cross-strait relations. [Focus Taiwan]
Cross-strait relations: Mutual accusations over infiltration and payed critics
(dql) Taiwan last week accused China of “omnipresent infiltration” specifying that since 2018 at least ten government agencies and thousands of email accounts of government officials have been hacked by groups related to the Chinese government to steal important data. [Reuters]
Meanwhile, images of a welcoming ceremony showing China’s Ambassador to Kiribati walking over a row young men laying face-down on the ground has prompted international criticism over alleged Chinese colonialism.
Beijing rejected this accusation stating the Chinese ambassador was acting on request on the local government and people and “out of respect for Kiribati’s culture and customs,” while accusing Taiwan of paying social media critics to boil up the ceremony to damage China-Kiribati relations. [The Guardian] [Taiwan News]
Last year, Kiribati – a country of 115,000 people spread across 32 low-lying atolls and one high island in the South Pacific – severed ties with Taiwan and established formal relations with China. [AiR No. 39, September/2019, 4]
Taiwan-USA relations: Deepening economic ties
(dql/ef) Following the conclusion of the first-ever memorandum of understanding between Taiwan and the USA on health cooperation earlier this month [AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2], Taiwanese President Tsai last week reiterated her call on the USA to engage in talks for a bilateral trade agreement to further deepen economic ties, adding that Taiwan would liberalize conditions for foreign investment. The move is an attempt of export-dependent Taiwan to reduce its reliance on trade with China. [Focus Taiwan] [Reuters 1]
Such a trade deal has been debated for at least two decades, but the discussion has recently been revived due to Washington’s new aggressive take on US-China relations. Picking that new trend up, the Kurt Tong at [CSIS] argues that three aspects make such a trade deal desirable: Taiwan’s role in strategic trade, being an alternative to China to secure supply chains in the area of technology; the possible rebuild of the importance of the US in the Indo-Pacific's political economy; and the establishment of precedents for new trade policies, such as incorporating data privacy principles or cross-border data flows.
In a related move, Taiwan has announced that it plans to stop local sales of Chinese internet television streaming services by preventing Chinese companies from using indirect methods to bypass rules and regulations to operate in the island’s market, including operating on the island indirectly, via middlemen or overseas investment vehicles.
Earlier last week, Taipei also announced that it is preparing to ban the Chinese firms iQiyi, one of the world's largest online video sites, and Tencent from operating streaming video services on the island arguing that both have been "operating illegally" in Taiwan by partnering with local broadcasters and distributors to provide their video content through streaming services. [Reuters 2][CNN]
China set to establish indigenous tech ecosystem amid concerns over tech decoupling from USA
(dql) Amid a ongoing discussion about a decoupling between China and the USA in the area of technology in the face of Washington’s attacks on Chinese tech firms including Huawei, Tencent, and Bytedance [AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3] [AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2], an index tracking Chinese IT stocks has jumped close to 30% this year as investors are betting on announcements from Chinese local governments and state firms of plans and procurements aimed at fostering indigenous applications to run networks in the state sector and to replace U.S. technologies with a home-grown tech ecosystem. [Reuters]
Meanwhile, TikTok, the video-sharing application owned by China-based ByteDance, which is facing an executive order of President Trump banning its operation in America, has filed a lawsuit against the U.S. government. The company argues that the ban violates the company’s right to due process and insisted that it does not engender US national security. [CNBC]
China-Australia relations: Economic tensions rise
(dql) Signaling rising economic tensions between China and Australia, Canberra has blocked a proposed 600 million AUSD takeover of some of the Australia’s biggest milk brands by a Chinese state-owned manufacturing and distribution company of dairy products and ice cream.
The move comes shortly after Beijing last week launched an anti-dumping investigation into Australian wine exports, making wine the third industry after beef and barley to face trade sanctions.
The economic tensions come on the top of strained diplomatic between both countries over Australia’s call for an independent inquiry into the origins of the Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan, its criticism of Beijing’s Hong Kong policy and well as its recently intensified efforts to deepen security ties with Japan. [AiR No. 17, April/2020, 4] [AiR No. 28, July/2020, 2]
In a latest Hong-Kong related development, Australia last week enforced new visa arrangements for holders of Hong Kong passports, paving the way for an easier route to permanent residency for students, temporary graduates, and skilled workers. [Hong Kong Free Press]
For a critic of Australia’s failure to properly weigh increasingly close diplomatic, economic and security relations between China and Russia for the country’s geopolitical strategy. [The Conversation]
For a general critic on American and Western studies and analyses on China and its’ strive for global leadership see Mark Tischler at [The Diplomat] who argues that when analyzing China, too often China’s “never again” mentality – born out of the experience of the ‘century of humiliation” (1839-1949) in which imperial and republican China collapsed in the face of occupation, oppression and exploitation by foreign powers – is ignored as ultimate driving force for China’s domestic as well as foreign policies.
China-Russia relations: Joint military exercises and COVID-19 vaccine trial
(dql) China and Russia are holding their first joint military exercises since the coronavirus pandemic began, with Chinese troops participating in this year's International Army Games, an annual tournament organized by the Russian Defense Ministry and called "War Olympics" as it combines traditional military drills with sports-like competitions. The joint drill displays increased joint military trainings between countries over the past decade, amid their growing tensions with the USA. [Nikkei Asian Review]
The exercises are held as at the same time the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific international maritime exercise, the world’s largest ocean exercise, is taking place, with participation of ten countries including – besides the USA – Canada, France, Australia, Japan, Brunei, New Zealand, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Korea, and Singapore. Former participants China and Russia are not taking part in this year. [USNI News]
Meanwhile, a joint China-Russia COVID-19 vaccine trial is scheduled to have all test persons vaccinated by the end of September, with results will to be released by late autumn. The vaccine, co-developed by Russian and Chinese biopharmaceutical firms, is under the Phase III clinical trials in Russia. [Global Times]
With COVID-19 being a geopolitical object of dispute, the joint vaccine trial is a further demonstration of both countries’ strategic partnership against the West.
China-South Korea relations: Chinese top diplomat meets South Korean top national security advisor
(dql) Last week, China’s top diplomat Yang Jiechi met South Korea’s Director of the National Security Office Suh Hoon in Busan to discuss trade, denuclearization and the coronavirus response, with both sides confirming “ a very good conversation” as well as a visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to South Korea schedule for “an early date" once the COVID-19 situation is stabilized. [Reuters] [Yonhap]
The meeting comes amid a stalemate in denuclearization talks between the USA and North Korea as well as an impasse in inter-Korean relations. In this situation improving ties with Beijing, which have been rather stuck for the recent years following Seoul’s agreement to the deployment of U.S. missile defense system on South Korean soil in 2017, is one possible for Seoul to make diplomatic and economic gains, Gabriela Bernal argues in [The Diplomat].
Japan-USA relations: Show of military force against China
(dql) In a clear show of force directed against China, the USA and Japan last week conducted joint large-scale military exercises in the waters and airspace near Japan which involved warships, heavy bombers, advanced fighter jets and an aircraft carrier. The drills were held when at the same time Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono met the Chinese Ambassador to Japan to express Tokyo’s strong concern over China's military activities around the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, claimed also by Beijing which calls them Diaoyu islands, and to demand that China refrain from those military activities. [Japan Times]
In a related move, US B-1B Lancers and two B-2 Spirit Stealth Bombers flew over waters between the Korean peninsula and Japan. [Korea Herald]
For a discussion of Japan’s efforts to deepen its relations with the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence sharing group consisting of the USA, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, see Ankit Panda in [The Diplomat] who point to Japan's counter-intelligence capabilities and argues that unless Japan can convince these five members “that its accession to the group would not greatly expand the attack surface for adversarial countries seeking to compromise intelligence shared among the group,” Tokyo will only maintain its status as a close Five Eyes partner but not become a formal “sixth eye.”
Bangladesh-China-India: Dhaka to receive $1billion loan from Beijing for irrigation project on Teesta river
(lm) Talks between Bangladesh and China on a loan deal to implement a proposed irrigation project on the Teesta River have reportedly entered an advanced stage, leaving flat India which had initiated a series of measures to regain long-standing good relations with its eastern neighbor [see e.g. AiR No. 27, July/2020, 1, AiR No. 30, July/2020, 4, AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3]. In July, Bangladesh`s Ministry of Water Resources had disclosed that it was trying to secure a $983.27 million loan from China to implement a “Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project”. Dhaka is reportedly seeking to conclude the loan agreement before year`s end. [NewAge Bangladesh] [The Indian Express]
In September 2016, the Bangladesh Water Development Board entered into a MoU with the Power Construction Corporation of China to carry out a feasibility study to better manage the Teesta for the benefit of northern Bangladesh’s greater Rangpur region. While the region suffers flash floods during the monsoon for lack of necessary protective measures, it battles an annual two-month-long water crisis in winter, as India is holding most of the winter supplies of the river’s water. [The Daily Star 1]
Dhaka has long been pressing New Delhi for signing off a deal on the sharing of Teesta River water. Negotiations were expedited in 2009 and, since 2011, have aimed at ensuring that the river would get the necessary water during the lean season to ensure a minimum level to help the agriculture sector of north Bangladesh. However, as India uses dams upstream to generate electricity and needs water to irrigate farms in West Bengal state, West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee has so far refused to sign off a respective agreement. [The Hindu]
Earlier this month, India’s Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla paid a two-day visit to Dhaka on and discussed a two-year road map for bilateral relations. However, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said on Thursday that the issues of Teesta river water-sharing had not been raised during Mr. Shringla's meeting with Bangladesh`s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. [India Today] [The Daily Star 2]
While the rejuvenation project will mark the first time that China will construct a mega river management project in Bangladesh, it is just the latest in a series of events making Beijing Dhaka`s largest investor. For a start, in June, China announced it would provide duty free market access for 97% of Bangladeshi goods. Outdoing India, China then won the tender to build an airport terminal at Sylhet last month, and was able to conclude several defense agreements — which include an ultra-modern submarine base, a new naval base in Patkhauli and the delivery of a Chinese Corvette. [IANS] [AiR No. 25, June/2020, 4]
India-China relations I: New Delhi considers border talks with Beijing “useful”
(lm) While their troops continue to be locked in a simmering stand-off at several points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), India and China have agreed to resolve all outstanding problems in an “expeditious manner” and in accordance with the existing protocols, New Delhi announced on Thursday after the latest meeting of the India-China Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC). [Al Jazeera]
The last meeting between the two countries to discuss disengagement along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh was held last month, but talks to restore peace and smoothen bilateral relations have hit a roadblock since then, as both countries in July deployed additional weapons and troops, seemingly preparing for the long-haul on their disputed Himalayan frontier. [AiR No. 30, July/2020, 4]
So far, Chinese troops have disengaged and retreated from the Galwan Valley and Hot Springs, but are yet to move out from the Pangong Tso Finger area, where they have been camping for over three months now and have even started reinforcing physical infrastructure and airlifting troops. [Times of India]
Notwithstanding this readout, India sees last week`s meeting as “useful” and is hoping that it will lead to some progress on the ground. A follow-up meeting between Indian and Chinese military commanders is expected to take place this week. [One India]
India-China relations II: New Delhi steps up pressure on Beijing, adding extra scrutiny for visas
(lm) India`s concerns about safeguarding its security in the face of its growing confrontation with China have spilled into the academic sphere, as New Delhi is adding extra scrutiny for visas and reviewing Beijing’s links with local universities. [Bloomberg]
To begin with, India`s Ministry of External Affairs has reportedly been instructed by letter in July that visas for Chinese businessmen, academics, industry experts, and advocacy groups will need prior security clearance. Further, activities of India universities with educational partnerships with Chinese institutions are likely to be drastically scaled down, after an initial assessment has revealed that many Indian educational institutions entered into educational partnerships with universities in China without mandatory approval from the federal government. The Indian government initiated a review of 54 cooperation agreements signed between Indian institutions of higher learning and others with links to the official Chinese language training office, known as Hanban. [The Indian Express]
With regard to Chinese influence on academic campuses in particular, concerns are growing that the cultural and linguistic centers called Confucius Institutes may be used as political vehicles for Hanban - which is itself affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education - to spread a more positive view of China abroad. Beijing denies these charges and considers a stigmatization of a language program. [Hindustan Times]
For insights into the Chinese Communist Party's use of big data collection, smart city and AI technologies as tools to shape global governance which generates positive sentiments to the Party not only within the country, but across the globe, see Samantha Hoffman's report in [ASPI].
India-China relations III: Draft agreement with Nepal on Mount Everest measurement raises red flags in Delhi
(lm) In October 2019, when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Nepal, both sides agreed inter alia on jointly announcing the re-measured height of the Mount Everest, which was then described as an “eternal symbol of the friendship between Nepal and China”. A draft agreement now revealed that Beijing wants Nepal to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which raises red flags within the Indian government. [AiR No. 42, October/2019, 3] [read the full joint statement here Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People`s Republic of China] [DNA India]
New Delhi, which is already worried about the wider presence of China in Nepal, is now concerned about a clause that calls for Beijing and Kathmandu to jointly collaborate on “surveying, mapping and geo-information management”. While China and India are currently engaged in heightened border tensions in the Himalayas [see above], bilateral ties between New Delhi and Kathmandu have been strained since November last year, over border-related issues. India already perceives Prime Minister K.P. Oli’s government to be more friendly towards Beijing. [The Wire]
Adding to the impression is a report by the Survey Department of Agriculture Ministry of Nepal, which claims that China has been slowly and gradually encroaching on Nepali land at multiple locations spreading over seven bordering districts. [Wion]
India, Japan, Australia: Increasing supply chain resilience to reduce dependence on China
(lm) As the coronavirus pandemic has already brought to the fore the importance of diversification away from trade and supply chain dependence, Japan, India and Australia are now moving towards a new trilateral effort, in face of simmering trade and political tension with China. Informal talks have been ongoing since Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry first broached the idea of a “Supply Chain Resilience Initiative” with the Indian government around a month ago. Because Tokyo is eager to bring the talks to a higher level, the proposal is expected to be discussed further during the India-Japan summit in early September. [The Economic Times] [The Print]
The proposal centers around a two-stage plan, which aims at attracting foreign direct investment to turn the Indo-Pacific into an “economic powerhouse” by linking up all the separate existing bilateral relationships, such as the recently established Indo-Japan Industrial Competitiveness Partnership. Moreover, the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) may be brought into the loop to establish new “China+1” strategies for supply chains outside China and build momentum towards a new trade-based quadrilateral alliance. [South China Morning Post]
In light of China`s aggressive moves on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, New Delhi is also keen to improve political ties with leaders in the neighborhood and may fast track the proposal, which it would otherwise treat more cautiously due to the signaling effect towards Beijing. Joining the initiative would be in line with both Australia`s and India`s mission to follow-up on their recently launched Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. In June, both countries had agreed to develop new supply chains in key industries, such as rare earths and minerals, while launching the partnership. Shortly thereafter, India made public its intentions to invite the Australian Navy to join the annual instalment of the Malabar exercise (together with the US, Australia, Japan and India form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or “Quad”. [AiR No. 23, June/2020, 2] [AiR No. 29, July/2020, 3] [Business Standard]
During a virtual summit in July, Japanese Prime Minister Abe and his Australian counterpart Morrison addressed the question of how to intensify their countries´ security relationship in face of China´s increasing activities in the Indo-Pacific. [AiR No. 28, July/2020, 2]
India is working on balancing against Chinese influence in Myanmar
(dql) For Delhi, China’s rise forms a constant challenge to India’s dominance of its backyard currently tested in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. After India’s foreign minister visited Bangladesh last week to work on bilateral ties, Myanmar is the next country on India's wooing list, a country where India and China compete for dominance.
Timing seems well for the Indian chief diplomat though. First, from a Myanmar perspective, India has handled its role in mediating between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Rohingya issue rather well. Second, China is currently regarded as playing a dangerous role in relation to two of Myanmar’s insurgent groups. On July 2, the Myanmar commander-in-chief referring to the Arakan Army (AA) and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) alleged that terrorist groups in the country were being backed by 'strong forces’ implying China. A military spokesperson then clarified the army chief was referring to the fact that AA and ARSA fighters had used Chinese made weapons when attacking the armed forces in a 2019 attack.
Another pain point Delhi could press has been revealed
by Myanmar’s auditor general who had raised alarm over loans from China: "The truth is the loans from China come at higher interest rates compared to loans from financial institutions like the World Bank or the IMF" he was quoted, adding: "So, I would like to remind the government ministries to be more restrained in using Chinese loans." Other criticism came up with regard to Chinese investment projects like the Muse-Mandalay Electric Railway built by a Chinese company or plans to erect a new Yangon city in cooperation with China.
These disturbances notwithstanding, China is present in the country as well and has also been working on deepening its ties with Myanmar with President Xi Jinping having visited the country at the beginning of the year.
To make things even more complicated, geostrategy and domestic politics are increasingly intertwined with Myanmar’s generals inclined to quest the Chinese card which becomes more attractive for Aung San Suu Kyi after having been put under pressure by the West over the Rohingya issue. [The Week]
Pakistan-China relations: Beijing and Islamabad deepen economic and military ties
(lm) Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi last week hosted his Pakistani counterpart, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, for the second round of the China-Pakistan Foreign Ministers' Strategic Dialogue. As both nations remain locked in border stand-offs with their mutual neighbor India, both China and Pakistan reaffirmed the vitality of their partnership, and agreed to continue their support on issues concerning each other`s core national interests. [Anadolu Ajansı]
To begin with, both countries agreed to push ahead with new rail and power projects under the $64 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) agreement. The top diplomats also talked about the ongoing peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban, praising both sides for their efforts to initiate intra-Afghan negotiations. On Tuesday, Pakistan`s Foreign Minister invited the Chinese special envoy for Afghanistan for talks with a delegation of Taliban leaders to be held the same day in Islamabad. [Bloomberg]
In the wake of the diplomatic talks, the Pakistan Navy said on Sunday that China had launched the first of four “most advanced” warships that are built in China for Islamabad. [South China Morning Post] [Hindustan Times]
While welcoming the representatives of leading Chinese companies, Pakistan`s Prime Minister Imran Khan on Monday emphasized the need for deeper economic ties between the two countries, and invited the Chinese entrepreneurs to establish their regional offices in Pakistan. [DAWN]
Thailand arrests Vietnamese fishermen, confiscates their boats
(jn) Thai authorities have arrested 36 Vietnamese fishermen and confiscated their four boats on suspicion of poaching in Thailand’s exclusive economic zone. The arrests came two days after Malaysia’s coast guard had shot and killed a Vietnamese fishing boat crew member during a South China Sea confrontation, and weeks after Indonesian authorities had detained three Vietnamese boats for alleged poaching. [Radio Free Asia] [AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3]
Indonesian Ulema Council denounces Israel-UAE deal
(dql) The Indonesian Ulema Council gathering the world largest Muslim country’s religious leaders on Wednesday denounced the recent normalization deal between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel calling it a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. The Council’s speaker asked the UAE to remember that the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) had agreed to impose an embargo on Israel during its emergency meeting in Jakarta in March 2016 due to its actions against Palestine adding Indonesia owed Palestine for being one of the first to acknowledge its independence from colonial rule in 1945: “Palestine is the first country to recognize Indonesia's independence, we will never forget their kindness.”
The UAE-Israel normalization deal was announced by US President Donald Trump last week making the UAE the first Gulf state and third Arab nation to have full diplomatic relations with Israel after Egypt and Jordan. [AA]
Japanese Foreign Minister visits Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia
(jn) Japanese foreign minister Motegi Toshimitsu visited Laos from August 22-24 to mark the 65th Anniversary of diplomatic relations between Laos and Japan. Among several topics, both sides discussed whether to allow long-term residents of each other’s nations, and investors and businesspeople, to travel between the two countries while maintaining the requirement of a fourteen-day quarantine at home or at another designated area. Such travelers would be monitored throughout their stay, but it would make commerce possible, with the Lao side keen to see more Japanese businesses move their operations to Laos. [Laotian Times]
Mr. Motegi also visited Cambodia and Myanmar, where he met with his respective counterparts, Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia and State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar, and agreed to reopen borders for expatriates as soon as early September, relaxing travel restrictions that were imposed to contain the spread of the new coronavirus pandemic. Similar to the deal between Laos and Japan, expatriates and other long-term residents will be allowed to travel reciprocally provided they self-quarantine for 14 days after arriving and take other precautionary measures. [Nikkei Asian Review 1] [Nikkei Asian Review 2]
Vietnam and Philippines push back against Chinese claims in South China Sea
(jn/ls) Vietnam’s foreign ministry said on Thursday that the presence of Chinese bombers on the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea would jeopardize peace in the region and violate Vietnam’s sovereignty. China has boosted its presence in disputed parts of the strategic waterway in recent months and conducted exercises, further heightening tensions in the longstanding conflict at a time when other claimants are battling coronavirus outbreaks. Only recently, intense Chinese pressure had led to cancellations of drilling contracts of Vietnamese companies with international corporations. [South China Morning Post 1] [AiR No. 30, July/2020, 4]
The Philippines’ Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana accused Beijing of illegally occupying Filipino maritime territory surrounding the Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal. The Department of Foreign Affairs lodged a diplomatic protest. In addition, Lorenzana said that China’s nine-dash line used to claim most of the South China Sea is a fabrication. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague did not recognize the nine-dash-line under international law. [PhilStar] [Inquirer]
Possibly also having this precedent in mind, Vietnam submitted a list of nominated arbitrators to the U.N. Secretary General earlier in May. For the first time in the history of the country, a foreign international law expert was among the nominated persons, a professor from the National University of Singapore’s Centre for International Law. Moreover, in November last year, a Vietnamese diplomat announced that his country was considering to bring China to arbitral court over Chinese intrusions into Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in particular the oil-rich Vanguard Bank. [VERA Files]
However, China argues that ASEAN claimants are bound by the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea which requires them to settle the dispute bilaterally rather than through multilateral bodies such as the U.N. However, as the sea dispute is becoming a proxy arena for the strategic battle between China and the U.S., Southeast Asian countries may feel emboldened to take legal action. [South China Morning Post 2]
In June, Singapore and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) signed a model agreement recognizing the city-state as an alternative seat for the tribunal. [AiR No. 24, June/2020, 3]
Vietnam to buy Russian Covid-19 vaccine
(ls) Vietnam has announced that it will buy 50 million to 150 million doses of the newly developed Russian Covid-19 vaccine while also continuing the development of an own vaccine. In addition, it will buy vaccines from the United Kingdom. [Chiang Rai Times]
The development merits a closer look at Russia’s relations with Southeast Asia over the course of recent years. The country has intensified its efforts to build stronger ties with East and Southeast Asia in political, economic and defense terms, both bilaterally and multilaterally. In 2011, Russia became a member of the East Asia Summit, alongside the U.S. From a Southeast Asian perspective, ties with Russia are largely seen as part of a strategy to counter-balance Chinese and American influence in the region. Russia, for its part, also sees economic opportunities, for example with regard to oil explorations in the South China Sea. The Observer Research Foundation has published a concise analysis of Russian-Southeast Asian relations since 2014. [Observer Research Foundation]
Malaysia finalizes deal with Goldman Sachs over 1MDB claims
(ls) The U.S. investment bank Goldman Sachs has finalized a $3.9 billion agreement with Malaysia to resolve all charges linked to the 1MDB state fund scandal. According to the settlement, Malaysia will drop all criminal proceedings against Goldman Sachs and some of the bank’s executives. A few of the bank’s former employees will continue to face criminal charges. Earlier this month, former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment and a RM210 million ($69.5 million) fine in one of several cases against him related to the 1MDB scandal. [Verdict] [AiR No. 31, August/2020, 1]
Upcoming Online Events
25 August 2020 @ 10:00 am EDT, Wilson Center, USA
Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights Globally: Where We Are and Where We Are Going
This webcast will focus on the advancements, challenges and data concerning the Sustainable Development Goal of Universal Health Coverage with a special focus on sexual and reproductive health
To access the discussion, please visit [Wilson Center].
25 August 2020 @ 4:00 pm EDT, Queen’s University, Canada
Bio-terrorism as common agency: Power projection and cooperation
This online lecture will assess the outside biosecurity threat posed by a terrorist outfit, not a state actor, and will formulate a strategic game to model the essential interactions between the terrorist outfit and two countries.
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25 August 2020 @ 11:00 am EDT, German Marshall Fund of the United States, USA
Transatlantic Tuesdays – The Politics of Globalization in the Run-Up to the 2020 Election
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26 August 2020 @ 1:00 pm BST, International Institute for Strategic Studies, UK
After the crash, the blast and the verdict: Lebanon on the ropes
Following the recent events in Lebanon, this discussion will assess the multifaceted crisis and will aim to determine possible subsequent political settlements.
For more information, please visit [IISS].
26 August 2020 @ 10:30 am EDT, Wilson Center, USA
Blinded by Silence: Foreign and Security Policy Discourse in Pakistan
This address by Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa will examine the influence of Pakistan’s history and structure on its handling on the increasingly multipolarity with China and Russia as the new power centers.
Please find registration details here: [Wilson Center].
26 August 2020 @ 1:00 pm EDT, Asia Society Policy Institute, USA
WITA Webinar: Conversation with WTO Director General Candidate H.E. Ambassador Tudor Ulianovschi
This webcast will interview the candidate, H.E. Ambassador Tudor Ulianovschi, for the post of Director General of the World Trade Organization.
Please find registration details at [Asia Society]
26 August 2020 @ 8:00 pm GMT+8, Center for China & Globalization, China
Rebooting the Belt and Road Initiative Amidst the Pandemic: Challenges, Prospects, and Innovations
This virtual discussion will address the social and economic consequences of Covid-19 for the BRI projects and the influence of rising economic nationalism and xenophobia on the BRI projects.
Details are available at [CCG]
26 August 2020 @ 12:00 pm EDT, Brookings, USA
Africa in Perspective – Spotlight on Somalia
This webinar will examine Somalia’s pave to popular elections in 2021 and the impact of Covid-19 on the country’s health system.
See [Rusi] for additional information.
26 August 2020 @ 10:30 am ET, Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, Switzerland
Jointly Advancing Policy Tools for Sustainable Security Sector Reform
This webinar will focus on the political economy analysis of the security sector in fragile, violent and conflict settings.
Please find further details here: [DCAF].
26 August 2020 @ 12:00 pm IST, Observer Research Foundation, India
Sri Lanka: The way forward
This roundtable will address the impact of the Sri Lankan parliamentary polls, which were held on 5 August.
For further details, please see [ORF].
26 August 2020 @ 12:00 pm EDT, Center for Strategic and International Studies, USA
Combating Malign Influence in 2020
This event will offer insight into Deputy Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen’s take on the threat of foreign malign influence operations.
Please find the details here: [CSIS].
26 August 2020 @ 12:30 pm EDT, Center for Strategic and International Studies, USA
The Centrality of Germany to European Security and Defense
This webinar will discuss the impact of German forces deployed along NATO’s eastern flank, the future of NATO-EU cooperation and the EU’s security and defense capabilities.
Please check [CSIS] for registration details.
26 August 2020 @ 10:00 am UTC+8, Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore
Webinar Series on Southeast Asian Countries' Updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs):
Spotlight on Lao PDR and Myanmar
This talk will focus on the key features of Lao PDR's and Myanmar's updated 2020 NDC targets, the progress of their NDCs, and the long-term low emissions development strategies, as well as opportunities and challenges in the implementation of the NDCs moving forward.
If you are interested in joining the event, visit [ISEAS] for further information.
26 August @ 10:00 am EDT, Atlantic Council, USA
US defense strategy and posture for an era of great power competition
In this event, experts will discuss what the next administration’s national security and defense priorities should be.
Details are accessible at [Atlantic Council].
27 August 2020 @ 10:00 am EDT, Wilson Center, USA
Deforestation in the Time of Covid-19
This event will discuss the acceleration of the commodity-driven deforestation due to Covid-19.
To access the discussion, please register here: [Wilson Center].
27 August 2020 @ 11:00 am GMT+8, Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs, Malaysia
Federal-state friction amid Malaysia’s dual political and pandemic plight
This webinar will discuss the dynamics of the federal-state relations as well as the affect of the twin shocks of political crisis and Covid-19.
Registration details are available under [IDEAS].
27 August 2020 @ 10:30 am GMT+8, Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs, Malaysia
China Plus One: Convergence or Divergence in ASEAN Integration
This virtual discussion will deliberate on the reaction to a wave of firm relocations away from China and the long-term prospects for ASEAN integration.
If you are interested in joining the virtual discussion, please register under [IDEAS].
27 August 2020 @ 5:15 pm EEST, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Finland
25 years of membership: Austria, Finland and Sweden in the EU
This event discusses the key rationale for the EU membership of Austria, Finland and Sweden, who joined in 1995, as well as their general approach and their wishes for future achievements in the EU.
To access the discussion, please visit [Europe Forum Finland].
27 August 2020 @ 9:00 am EDT, United States Institute of Peace, USA
A Conversation with Afghan Acting Foreign Minister Mohammed Haneef Atmar
This discussion will feature Afghan Acting Foreign Minister who will talk about the Afghanistan peace process as talks with the Taliban commence.
For more information and registration, kindly follow [USIP].
27 August 2020 @ 9:00 am EDT, Center for Strategic and International Studies, USA
The End of Chinese Mercantilism? China’s New “Dual Circulation” Strategy
This event analyses Beijing’s newest economic policy framework – dual circulation – and its impact on China’s economic development trajectory.
Further details are available at [CSIS]
27 August 2020 @ 9:00 am EDT, Center for Strategic and International Studies, USA
Korea Chair “The Capital Cable” #9 with Markus Garlauskas
This virtual discussion with Mr Garlauskas will focus on U.S. policy towards North Korea and inter-Korean relations.
Follow [CSIS] for further details.
27 August 2020 @ 10:30 am UTC+2, South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa
Foreign Policy in Uncertain Times: What are the options for South Africa’s climate change diplomacy?
This webinar will discuss South Africa’s climate change diplomacy options over the next few years
See [SAIIA] for additional information.
27 August 2020 @ 11:00 am PDT, Pacific Council on International Policy, USA
The Militarization of Law Enforcement
This virtual panel discussion will assess the impact of the increasing militarization of American policing on public safety and public trust.
Event information is accessible at [Pacific Council].
27 August 2020 @ 4:00 pm AST, Brookings, USA
Palestine and the Arab World: A relationship in crisis?
This webcast explores the current state of relations between Palestine and the Arab World and will aim to explain how the relations have development.
Please find more details here: [Brookings].
27 August 2020 @ 9:00 am EDT, Atlantic Council, USA
Belarus: What’s next?
This event will examine the need for US action in Belarus and how the events in Belarus aer unfolding.
Please visit [Atlantic Council] for details about the event.
27 August 2020 @ 4:00 pm EDT, Atlantic Council, USA
America’s role in the world: US views on the future, at home and abroad
This webinar explores how the next President will have to mobilize the American public to support a foreign policy that is capable of protecting democracy and enhancing prosperity and security.
Please find registration details here: [Atlantic Council].
27 August 2020 @ 3:00 pm GMT+2, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa
Ethiopia’s foreign policy balancing act in the Gulf and Red Sea
Ethiopia has strong ties with the Middle East. This webinar will assess Ethiopia’s foreign policy towards Gulf countries and the Red Sea.
If you are interested in joining the webinar, please find further details at [ISS].
31 August 2020 @ 10:00 am UTC+8, Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore
Southeast Asia in the Shadow of a Rising China
This talk will focus on the author’s new book In the Dragon’s Shadow which examines the dramatic effects of China’s rising economic and political power on Southeast Asia.
Please find the details here: [ISEAS]
31 August 2020 @ 12:00 pm EDT, Atlantic Council, USA
‘Desert One’: How the Hostage Crisis and failed rescue raid still cloud US-Iran relations
This event will discuss the new documentary ‘Desert One’ which reveals the true story behind the Hostage Crisis.
Details are accessible under [Atlantic Council].
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