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Grasp the pattern, read the trend Asia in Review No. 42, October/2020, 3
Brought to you by CPG ![]() ![]() Dear Readers, Please enjoy this week’s brief on the latest events and developments in constitutional politics and governance, geopolitics and international relations in Asia. Special greetings are extended to readers in Zambia which celebrates Independence Day this week. With best regards, Duc Quang Ly Program Manager, German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG) Webpage: www.cpg-online.de, Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CPGTU Main Sections
Law and Politics in East Asia ![]() China: Xi Jinping's power position to be further cemented (dql) In a move further personalizing political power in the hands of President Xi Jinping in China, a new regulation is expected to be adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee at the party’s annual political meeting later this month. According the regulation, Xi in his capacity as CCP General Secretary would be vested with the exclusive power to set the meeting agendas of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, the two top policy making bodies with 25 members representing the innermost core of the party’s leadership. Under the party’s constitution the General Secretary so far only has the power to convene Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee meetings. [Yahoo News] For short bios of the current seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee see [Brookings]. China: Only state-approved haj pilgrimages allowed (dql) New rules issued by China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs ban privately organized, non-official haj pilgrimages to Mecca. Thy allow only those pilgrimages arranged by the Islamic Association of China which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department. The regulations also called on the Association to educate haj attendees on “patriotic and safe behavior,” and to prevent “the infiltration of religious extremist thinking and behaviour.” [South China Morning Post] The new rules come as China is facing increasing criticism for its efforts to control religious practices and ‘sinicize’ religions in the country. [Bitter Winter] [The Quint] [China Christian Daily] China: New national flag/emblem law (dql) China has adopted amendments to the country’s National Flag Law and National Emblem Law that will criminalize the intentional insulting of the national flag and emblem, including burning, mutilating, painting, defacing or trampling the national symbols in public places. The amendments had been proposed in the wake of the anti-government demonstrations in Hong Kong last year where protesters trampled on the Chinese flag. The revised laws, which will enter into force on January 1, 2021, will also apply to the special administrative regions Hong Kong and Macao where changes to respective ordinances are expected. [Global News] Japan: Campaign for LGBT equality law kicked off (dql) Japanese sexual minority groups and human rights organizations launched an online signature collecting campaign for a petition for an LGBT equality law to expand explicit legal protection for sexual minorities. Despite modest improvements in equal treatment of LGBT people, same-sex marriage is still not legally allowed in Japan, while transgender people must remove their reproductive organs to have sex changes identified in official documents, to name two of the most pressing issues the campaign organizers want to tackle. Furthermore, pressure to conform with societal norms and values still forces many LGBT people to hide their sexual identities. [Kyodo News] [AP] [OECD] South Korea: Lawmakers to face trial over illegal election campaigning charges (dql) South Korea’s prosecution last week indicted over 20 sitting lawmakers, including seven of the ruling Democratic Party (DP) and ten of the main opposition People Power Party (PPP), over charges of violations of the election law while campaigning for the legislative elections in past April. The political stake in these trials is higher for the PPP than for the DP as in case of a verdict the former would lose the veto power against a possible attempt of the latter to push for a constitutional amendment that would allow for an one-time renewal of the office of the president. President Moon Jae-in of the DP has repeatedly expressed his determination to push through such a constitutional revision. An amendment to the constitution requires approval by two-thirds of the incumbent lawmakers before the bill goes to a national referendum for final decision. The DP currently holds an absolute majority of 174 seats in the 300-member parliament, the PPP 103, so that losing more than two seats would mean losing its sure-fire veto power. [Yonhap] South Korea: Prosecution under pressure over bribery accusations (dql) South Korea’s prosecution has come under pressure after a jailed key suspect in a financial fraud scandal involving a private equity investment company has declared that he had lobbied ranking prosecutors for favors in this scandal, one of whom is now member of the investigative unit. The company is accused of covering up huge losses and subsequently suspending fund redemption worth more than 1.4 million USD. He also stated that prosecutors pressed him to testify to implicate politicians of the ruling Democratic Party. The claim adds to the Justice Ministry’s criticism that the prosecution conducted an “insufficient” investigation into the fraud case. It has ordered immediate investigations of the prosecutors. [Korea Herald] Taiwan: KMT referendum proposals to be heard before the Election Commission (ef/dql) Two recent referendum proposals by the Kuomintang (KMT), the opposition party, will be heard before the Central Election Commission (CEC). The proposals are, inter alia, aimed at overturning the government’s easing of restrictions on imports of US pork containing the leanness-enhancing additive ractopamine which the KMT views as a means of the government to satisfy US demands for commencing negotiations on a free trade agreement with Taiwan. By doing so, the government disregards health risks posed by the additive. Under the Taiwanese Referendum Act, referendums can take place every two years and require a three-stage process. However, as the CEC decided to hold hearings the second stage of this process, in which a petition must receive the signatures of 1.5 percent of voters - or 214,514 people - in the most recent presidential election, is skipped. The KMT condemned the CEC’s decision arguing that it disregards the people’s will, adding that the CEC's move "shows how the government of President Tsai Ing-wen complicates and impedes the direct exercise of people's civil rights." [Focus Taiwan] In a related move, the CEC rejected two referendum proposals on drafting a new constitution proposed by an independence advocate on the grounds that their wording lacked clarity and did not meet procedural regulations. The proposals asked: “Do you support the president in pushing for the establishment of a new constitution reflecting the reality of Taiwan?” and: “Do you support the president in initiating a constitutional reform process for the country?” [Taipei Times] Law and Politics in South Asia ![]() Bangladesh: Five people sentenced to death for gang-raping girl in 2012 (lm) A Bangladesh court has issued the death penalty to five convicts in a 2012 rape case, amid growing public anger over rampant sexual violence [see AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2]. It was the first conviction since the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina amended the law to elevate the maximum punishment for sexual assault from life imprisonment to capital punishment. [Al Jazeera] [Anadolu Agency] Meanwhile, Amnesty International called the elevation of the punishment for rape a ‘regressive step’, saying it will not reduce violence against women but only ‘deflects attention from the lack of real action to address the appalling brutality faced by so many Bangladeshi women’. [Amnesty International] India: Kashmir parties forge group for restoration of ‘special status’ (lm) After chairing a meeting of Kashmir’s main parties, the president of one of Jammu and Kashmir’s oldest parties, the National Conference (NC), announced a new grouping called the ‘Peoples Alliance for Gupkar Declaration’ to seek a peaceful restoration of the disputed region’s autonomy. Prior to this, the Indian government ordered the release of former Kashmiri Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti after a 14-month detention, who promptly called for a campaign to restore Indian-administered Kashmir’s special rights. [Hindustan Times] [Al Jazeera] The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi last year unilaterally abrogated the special status hitherto enjoyed by its side of the state of Kashmir, cracked down on opposition and rounded up hundreds of people to forestall protests [see AiR No. 45, November/2019, 1] [AiR No. 32, August/2019, 1]. After revoking the region’s autonomy, New Delhi imposed a protracted communication blackout with mobiles phones, internet links and landlines cut. In August, authorities then ordered the restoration of high-speed 4G internet services in two of Kashmir’s 20 districts on a ‘trial basis’ from after India’s Supreme Court ruled that an indefinite shutdown of the internet was illegal [see AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3]. In May, the NC had pulled out of the Delimitation Commission, which was set up to redraw Lok Sabha and assembly constituencies of Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, and Jammu and Kashmir, and accused the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of seeking to divide the Union Territory on religious lines by manufacturing a Hindu dominance in the Kashmir valley. [AiR No. 36, September/2020, 2] Nepal: No-confidence motion in provincial parliament sheds light on balance of power within ruling party (lm) After provincial lawmakers had registered a no-confidence motion against the Chief Minister of Karnali Province, both Nepal’s Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) co-chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal summoned provincial NCP leaders to Kathmandu. The no-confidence motion was thwarted after lawmakers withdrew their support to the no-confidence motion. [The Himalayan Times 1] Noteworthy, 15 out of 18 lawmakers who registered the no-trust motion were formerly associated with the now-dissolved Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-(UML)), then led by Prime Minister Oli. In 2018, the party has merged with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) (CPN(M)), at the time led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal, to form the now-ruling NCP. Against this backdrop, party co-chair Dahal met with Prime Minister Oli, urging him to direct lawmakers in Karnali Province to withdraw the no-trust motion. [The Himalayan Times 2] Nepal: Cabinet reshuffle ahead of Indian Army Chief visit (lm) Prime Minister Oli has reshuffled his cabinet, attaching hitherto-Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ishwar Pokharel to the Prime Minister’s Office and appointing another three new ministers – a move that leaves Pokharel without portfolio. The reshuffle took place after co-chair of the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) Pushpa Kamal Dahal held talks with the prime minister, approving the move that he considers necessary to increase the efficiency of the government. [The Himalayan Times] Observers see a connection between the decision to transfer Pokharel and the upcoming visit of Indian Army Chief General Naravane, scheduled for November 3, saying the transfer is part of an effort by Prime Minister Oli to reset ties with neighboring India. Pokharel, after all, had strongly opposed the visit, saying that both countries should first solve their boundary dispute. [Hindustan Times] [The Himalayan Times] [One India] While China and India are currently engaged in heightened border tensions in the Himalayas [see e.g. AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2], bilateral ties between New Delhi and Kathmandu had been strained over border-related issues since last November. The diplomatic gap between the two countries widened further in May when New Delhi announced the inauguration of a new Himalayan link road built through the disputed area of Kalapani that lies at a strategic three-way junction with Tibet and China [see AiR No. 20, May/2020, 3]. In July, then, Nepal unilaterally changed its map, showing the disputed territories of Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh and Kalapani within its borders [see AiR No. 22, June/2020, 1, AiR No. 24, June/2020, 3, AiR No. 28, July/2020, 2]. At that time, Indian observers had urged their government not to burn all the bridges between Kathmandu and New Delhi, arguing the dispute pushed Nepal closer to China. Resuming dialogue in August, Prime Minister Oli had laid the groundwork for his reformed India outreach when he called Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to greet him on the occasion of India’s 74th Independence Day [see AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3]. More recently, the prime minister last month stopped the distribution of a new text book that included the country’s revised political map. Pakistan: Tens of thousands demand resignation of PM Khan (lm) Tens of thousands of opposition supporters rallied on October 18 in the city of Karachi as part of a campaign to oust Pakistan's Prime Minister Imran Khan, who they accuse of being installed by the military in a rigged 2018 election. The rally in Karachi followed a protest by 50 000 people in eastern Gujranwala, a stronghold of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), on Friday. The night before Friday’s rally the government embarked on mass detentions and arrests of about 500 opposition figures and activists, mainly from the opposition PML-N. [Dawn] [The Guardian] [Hindustan Times] Weekend’s protests were the first held by the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), a joint platform of eleven opposition political parties that was formed last month to oust Khan from power [see AiR No. 38, September/2020, 4]. The alliance marks the first time in Pakistan’s history that all opposition political parties have come together to challenge the military’s interference in politics. The three mainstream opposition parties – PML-N, Pakistan People’s party (PPP) and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) – are at the forefront of the movement [see AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1]. Speaking via video link from London to the Gujranwala gathering, former Prime Minister Sharif Nawaz accused army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa of orchestrating his ouster in 2017 and installing Imran Khan as prime minister the following year. The PML-N supremo further accused Bajwa and the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's intelligence agency, of interfering in political affairs and coercing the judiciary. [Deutsche Welle] Sharif, who has been in London for medical treatment since November is facing a number of corruption charges and is considered by the courts to have absconded. The Pakistan authorities are attempting to get him extradited back from the United Kingdom [see AiR No. 37, September/2020, 3]. He is also facing sedition charges for accusing the military of political interference [see AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2, AiR No. 37, September/2020, 3]. Referring to those charges, he told the crowd it was common for ‘dictators’ to label politicians as traitors. [The Straits Times] In the wake of the PDM’s announcement, there have been multiple arrests of opposition senior figures in retaliation to the mounting anti-government criticism. Pakistani police detained the son-in-law of Nawaz Sharif on Monday after he led a crowd in chanting against the country’s military at the tomb of the Pakistan’s founder. Last month, anti-corruption forces arrested Shehbaz Sharif, leader of PML-N, and the brother of Nawaz Sharif. He and other opposition politicians have accused the Khan government of political victimization. Khan, who won the 2018 election on a strong anti-corruption platform, denies the accusation [see AiR No. 39, September/2020, 5]. [Arab News] The anti-government rallies on Friday and Sunday were the first in a series of demonstrations planned to increase pressure on Khan. The next rally is set to be held in Quetta October 25, followed by protests in Peshawar (November 22), Multan (November 30), and Lahore (December 13). The parties plan to end the campaign with a ‘long march’ march on Islamabad, the capital, in 2021. The opposition leaders have said they would use mass resignations and votes of no confidence in parliament to take down the government. Pakistan: Court prevents government from publishing a proclamation against former PM Sharif in UK (lm) The Islamabad High Court (IHC) rejected a petition filed by the federal government seeking publication of a proclamation against former prime minister Nawaz Sharif in two British newspapers. The federal government had submitted a compliance report relating to the publication of proclamation issued in the Al-Azizia and Avenfield references against Sharif in two Pakistani newspapers. [The New Indian Express] The proclamation was issued earlier this month, after arrest warrants against Sharif had not been received in London, where he has been residing since November last year [see AiR No. 37, September/2020, 3]. [AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2] Further, the IHC registrar office in a letter to the foreign secretary ordered the country’s High Commission in the United Kingdom to display the proclamation in the vicinity of Sharif’s residence in London. [Dawn] Pakistan: Arrest warrant issued against former president Asif Ali Zardari (lm) Pakistan's anti-corruption watchdog, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), on October 15 issued an arrest warrant against former President and co-chairman of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Asif Ali Zardari in a case relating to money laundering through suspicious bank accounts and companies. Further, the NAB asked the Islamabad High Court (IHC) to deny Zardari a pre-arrest bail. The IHC, however, exempted Zardari from personal appearance in the case for medical reasons. Earlier last week, Zardari had been shifted to a hospital after feeling ‘unwell’. [Anadolu Agency] [Hindustan Times] Zardari, who is facing multiple corruption and money laundering cases, was arrested in June 2019 by anti-corruption officials in a separate money laundering case and granted bail by the IHC on medical grounds in December [AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2]. The court adjourned the hearing till November 5. Pakistan: Opposition criticizes federal government for not laying PIDA ordinance before parliament (lm) Opposition Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) criticized the Khan government for not tabling the controversial Pakistan Islands Development Authority (PIDA) Ordinance that would affect especially the Sindh province - one of the four provinces of Pakistan that is located at the southeastern coastline -, before the National Assembly or the Senate when both houses were in session the previous day. Further, opposition parties submitted a resolution to the Senate, seeking disapproval of the PIDA Ordinance. [Dawn 1] Prior to this, a key member of the federal government accused the provincial administration of ‘playing politics’ over the issue after senior PTI leader and Maritime Affairs Minister Ali Zaidi posted on social media a provincial government letter through which it had made ‘available’ Bundal Island to the federal government. Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Imran Khan on October 15 directed the state governor of Sindh to sort out the matter related to the project in consultation with PPP-led provincial government of Sindh. [Dawn 2] [Dawn 3] President Arif Alvi promulgated an ordinance for establishing the ‘Pakistan Islands Development Authority’ (PIDA) on August 31 with the primary purpose to develop and maintain Bundal and Buddo islands, which are located in the coastal belt of Sindh province. The ordinance gained public attention in early October after Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) chairman Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari posted the ordinance on social media, calling it an ‘illegal annexation’ by the ruling Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Alleging mala fide intent, PPP leaders argue that the federal government is overreaching into the concerns of the province, as any island within 12 nautical miles of the maritime boundaries falls within the jurisdiction of the provincial government, according to the constitution. [AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2]. [Nikkei Asia Review] Pakistan: Hindu temple desecrated (lm) In the latest manifestation of persistent discrimination faced by the Hindu community in Pakistan, a place of worship in the country’s southern province of Sindh where capital city Karachi is located has been vandalized. Hindus constitute Pakistan’s largest non-Muslim minority, estimated at between two and four percent of the population. Most of them live in southern province of Sindh. Condemning the recent vandalism, a human rights activist said that only 20 temples out of more than formerly 420 are now left in the province. [Hindustan Times] Presumably the most iconic example of the deplorable condition of Pakistan’s beleaguered Hindu community is the deconstruction of Shri Krishna Mandir, the first temple in Pakistan’s capital for the city’s minority Hindu residents and visitors. Soon after the land had been allocated to the city`s Hindu community in 2017, the Capital Development Authority (CDA) had put the construction on hold, responding to massive public disapproval and political uproar against the project. In July, the Islamabad High Court disposed all petitions against the construction of the temple and ordered that the construction can continue the after the building plan was approved by the Capital Development Authority (CDA). Notwithstanding the decision, the government referred the case to the Council of Islamic Ideology, a constitutional body that advises it on whether legislation is compliant with the laws of Islam. The final decision was expected for September. [see AiR No. 28, July/2020, 2] Mistreatment of minorities also damages Pakistan’s international image: Based on the annual report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), which had accused Pakistan of engaging in systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations of religious freedom, as defined by the International Religious Freedom Act, the US government in December last year redesignated Pakistan as a ‘country of particular concern,’ or CPC. [see AiR No. 53, December/2019, 5] Sri Lanka: Leaked document details Supreme Court’s determination on 20th Constitutional Amendment (lm/ng) A document purporting to be the determination of the Supreme Court (SC) on the proposed 20th Constitutional Amendment Bill, which aims to remove the checks and balances on the president, on October 10 appeared on the internet. According to the unconfirmed determination, the ruling leaves the basic structure of the proposed bill untouched while making a referendum necessary in the case of four provisions. [Economy Next] [see the full 20thConstitutional Amendment Bill here Sri Lanka BRIEF] Earlier this month, the SC concluded a hearing from petitioners challenging the bill, including political parties, human rights activists, the Bar Council and other groups, and conveyed its confidential decision to the President and the Speaker of Parliament [see AiR No. 38, September/2020, 4, AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1]. A parliamentary debate is scheduled to take place from October 20 -21 [see AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2]. However, Sri Lanka’s Parliamentary Opposition is demanding the postponement of the debate, citing regulations imposed on gatherings by the government last week in light of a second wave of COVID-19 infections. [ColomboPage] [EconomyNext] Denouncing the SC’s verdict, opponents of the bill say the decision would fall short of a ‘serious analysis or indeed understanding of the ways in which the Bill affects popular sovereignty and constitutional government’. [Associated Press] During a Cabinet meeting on Monday, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa reportedly proposed to introduce three changes to the proposed 20th Constitutional Amendment. Specifically, clauses pertaining to auditing in the 19th Constitutional Amendment should remain untouched. The Cabinet further decided that emergency bills be moved only in the case of natural disasters and national security issues. Finally, the limit set by the 19th Amendment on the number of Ministers, too, will reportedly remain unchanged. Previously, Sri Lanka’s Attorney General (AG) on September 29 day had informed the SC that the government would introduce multiple amendments to the proposed legislation [see AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1]. [The Island Online] Sri Lanka: Former PM says he would have prevented the Easter Sunday terror attack if he had received the available intel (lm) Testifying before the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Easter Sunday bombings, former Prime Minister Wickremesinghe acknowledged a clear breakdown in the country’s security apparatus at the time of the bombings. On 21 April 2019, Sri Lankan citizens had pledged allegiance to ISIS and killed more than 260 people by detonated backpack suicide bombs in three churches and four hotels. [ColomboPage] A special board of inquiry, set up in the aftermath of the attacks by then-President Sirisena, had recommended to launch an investigation into alleged security lapses. At the time, Sirisena himself faced criticism for failing to act on intelligence warnings prior to the attacks. The president, though, claimed to have not been alerted to such warnings. [AiR (1/7/2019)] A second probe into the suicide bombings was launched in last September after allegations had questioned the independence of the initial investigation. While carried out by a cross-section of lawmakers, many opposition members boycotted the fresh inquiry, saying the commission was being used by political parties to deflect responsibility for failing to stop the attacks. [AiR No. 39, September/2019, 4] Later the same year, the leader of Sri Lanka’s State Intelligence Service (SIS) was dismissed after the parliamentary committee had concluded that he was primarily responsible for the intelligence failure. the country’s spy chief, however, refused to step down and appealed to the Supreme Court over his ‘unfair dismissal’. [AiR No. 50, December/2019, 2] Sri Lanka: Son of PM Mahinda Rajapaksa appointed prime mister’s Chief of Staff Yoshitha Rajapaksa, son of incumbent prime minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, has been appointed his father’s Chief of Staff. After concerns were raised on Yoshitha Rajapaksa’s position within the Navy in the wake of the appointment, he resigned from the force. The appointment was made public only after a congratulatory tweet by the Chinese Embassy in Colombo. [Daily Mirror Online] [Colombo Gazette 1] [Colombo Gazette 2] Law and Politics in Southeast Asia ![]() Indonesia: Heavy handling of ongoing protests against Omnibus Bill (nd) In the ongoing protests against the Omnibus job creation bill, eight people affiliated with the newly created movement Save Indonesia Coalition (KAMI) [See also AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1] were separately arrested, in Jakarta and Medan, North Sumatra, for allegedly spreading hate speech and supporting violence during the protestsamid protests against the Job Creation Law. Amnesty International deemed the arrest a threat against freedom of expression and an intimidation tactic to discourage legitimate protest against the controversial bill. [Tempco 1] [Jakarta Post] Similarly, volunteers of Muhammadiyah’s disaster mitigation organization (MDMC) said police used excessive force against the organization's field volunteer medics. Allegedly, four volunteers were beaten and dragged to a police car in front of the Fresher Apartment in Central Jakarta’s Menteng on Tuesday. The volunteers wore uniforms featuring the organization's name 'Muhammadiyah Volunteers’, according to MDMC chairperson Budi Setiawan. [Tempco 2] Meanwhile, civil society coalition “Indonesian People’s Faction” (Fraksi Rakyat Indonesia/FRI) argues the invalidity of the bill. With reference to the House of Representatives (DPR) Regulation No.2/2020 on the formation of a Law stating the draft laws must be handed to the president within seven days since it was passed. The bill was passed on October 5, resulting in a deadline until October 13, while DPR deputy speaker Azis Syamsuddin argues, the deadline was October 14 at midnight. [Tempco 3] Indonesia: AI criticizes military over LGBTI charge (nd) Following a recent case of imprisonment and dismissal of an officer engaging in consensual, same-sex action with a subordinate soldier, Amnesty International Indonesia (AI) criticized the Indonesian military (TNI) and urged the government to make it clear that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would not be tolerated, and that state institutions should be committed to protect rather than undermine human rights. The officer was found guilty of violating Article 103 of the Military Criminal Code on disobedience to service orders. He was sentenced to one-year imprisonment and dishonorably dismissed from the military. In March this year, another officer was convicted over the same matter. TNI defended the latest decision, emphasizing that homosexuality in the force would be firmly punished. Similar comments came from the National Police, that announced ethics punishments to personnel engaging in LGBTI-related activity. Homosexuality is not illegal in Indonesia, yet discrimination is on the rise since a couple of years. [Jakarta Post] [Amnesty International] Laos: Christians expelled from their homes (py) Seven Lao Christians in the country’s Saravan province in Laos’ South have been expelled from their homes for refusing to renounce their faith. The evicted Christians now live in the forest putting up with a shortage of rice and food supply. A new piece of legislation was passed last December which allows Christians to practice services and preach their services throughout the country. Though improvements to safeguard the rights and freedom of religious beliefs in Laos have been made, the bipartisan U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) still report cases of abuse and violations of religious freedom in Laos, especially in remote rural areas. [Radio Free Asia] Though the Laos socialist constitution states that it provides the citizens with the right and freedom to believe or not to believe in religion, religious freedom in Laos has always been an embattled topic. A 2019 Report on International Religious Freedom: Laos can be found [here]. Myanmar: Decline in Freedom of the Net (lf) Freedom House and Freedom of Expression Myanmar, local human rights groups, have observed a sharp decline in the overall Freedom and the Freedom of Net in Myanmar. This is an especially worrisome with regards to the elections in November. Mass rallies and campaigning have been prohibited in Myanmar due to the ongoing pandemic. Therefore, almost all parties campaigning happened online. However, Freedom House identified large internet restrictions in several states, including Northern Rakhine and Chin state, where since June mobile internet access has largely been restricted after a complete internet blackout. In addition, the government blocks news and activist websites. Particularly, ethnic news websites have been affected by a block from the government. In addition, Myanmar has seen large scale prosecution of internet users under two different laws, Telecommunication law, and the law Protecting the Privacy and Security of Citizens. Free Expression Myanmar states that the situation of Freedom on the Internet has deteriorated since the relatively free elections in 2015. According to Freedom House, the National League for Democracy has failed to improve the human rights situation in the country. [Freedom House 1] [Freedom House 2] [Myanmar Times] This is particularly concerning after last weeks report on the spread of hate speech through several Facebook accounts linked to a platform called Radio Free Myanmar, and issues regarding Facebook detecting hate speech on a more general level [AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2]. Additionally worrisome are the restrictions to journalism. Foreign journalists are largely kept from entering the country and covering the new elections, while local journalism has seen large constrains since the Covid-19 lockdowns. [AiR No. 40, October/ 2020, 1] [AiR No. 39, September/ 2020, 5] Myanmar: 1,5 million people kept from voting (lf) The Union Election Commission (UEC) has announced that in 56 townships the situation would be to dangerous to hold elections, leaving 1,5 million people unable to cast their vote. Most of these townships are in the from ethnic minorities dominated regions of Rakhine, Karen, Kachin, Chin, Mon and Shan states. The UEC has come under fire for its decision, as several of these townships are considered as relatively safe. Ethnic parties stated that the majority of the excluded townships are regions which were won by ethnic parties in 2015. They urged the UEC to rethink their decision to ensure that ethnic minorities would receive the same voting rights as the majority population. [Irrawaddy 1] [Irrawaddy 2] Myanmar: UDP dissolved over illegal funding (lf) The Union Democratic Party (UDP) has been dissolved over illegal funding. The Union Election Commission has found that the leader supported the party financially through transfers from China. The former chair of the UDP, Michael Kyaw Myint, who is currently detained on a fugitive warrant, spend around 10,72 million US dollars on the party, breaking the Political Party Registration Law. The UDP has the second biggest group of candidates running for the election. [Irrawaddy] Last week, several candidates had already been disqualified from the election. [AiR No. 41, October/ 2020, 2]. Three weeks ago the chairmen had been arrested [AiR No. 39, September/ 2020, 5] Myanmar: Candidates of ruling party abducted (lf) Three candidates from the ruling National League for Democracy party have been abducted by an unidentified armed group. They were abducted during a campaign tour through southern Rakhine state, close to where most of the combat between the Arakan Army and the Tatmadaw have been taken place since 2018. [Radio Free Asia] Myanmar: NLD member filed complaint against USDP supporters (lf) A member of the National League for Democracy (NLD), the current civilian government party, has filed a complaint against 26 members of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). According to the complaint, supporters of the USDP targeted and attacked NLD supporters in a rally with 1,000 of participants. This is not the first report of supporters of the current governing party being attacked in recent weeks. With the elections only a few weeks away, tensions between supporters of the military and the current civilian government are expected to rise. [Irrawaddy] Myanmar: Shan ethnic groups want to negotiate end of conflict (lf) A Shan ethnic armed group, Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), wants to negotiate with the Tatmadaw to end the fighting. The fighting between the RCSS and the Tatmadaw has displaced 3500 civilians in recent weeks. This comes after several civilian Shan groups have urged the RCSS to come to a ceasefire agreement and stop fighting. The local population, which has already suffered under food and health insecurities due to the ongoing Covid-19 crisis in Myanmar, is afraid to lose their voting rights in the upcoming elections. [Mizzima], [Eleven Myanmar], [Myanmar Times] Myanmar: More candidates from oppositions parties disqualified (lf) Two more candidates from opposition parties have been disqualified three weeks before the election. The Union Election Commission stated that the candidates had not met the citizenship requirements. The two candidates are from the Union and Solidarity Party, as well as the Democratic Party for a New Society. So far, thirteen candidates have been rejected based on citizenship issues, all belonging to opposition parties. Most of the dismissed candidates were from the Democracy and Human Rights Party. All five disqualified candidates are of Rohingya decent. The disqualification of the candidates is directly linked to the highly criticized Citizen Law from 1982. It deprives Rohingyas of Burmese citizenship, granting it solely to the “national races” who are considered by the State to have settled in Myanmar prior to 1824. This law has alienated many of Myanmar’s residences and the consequences are still visible today. [Radio Free Asia] Philippines: Fast-tracked proposal to enable President to cut down permit requirements (nd) Filipino senate unanimously passed a proposal enabling the president to limit requirements for national and local permits, licenses and certifications during a national emergency, such as the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, significantly shortening regulatory process and control, including the power to remove those employees who fail to comply with the president's orders. President Duterte labelled the proposal as urgent, allowing Congress to pass it on second and third reading on the same day. [Philstar] Philippines: Communist party announces targeting Chinese firms (nd) The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) announced it has directed its armed wing to target Chinese firms involved in infrastructure projects in the Philippines, claiming the constructions harm the environment, threaten national minorities , and displacing farmers from their land. CCP stated it directed the guerrilla units to “mount more frequent tactical offensives” against the government and the Chinese firms. Earlier, the Philippine government announced it would not cut ties to Chinese companies building military installation in the disputed South China Sea, as the US suggested. At least one of 24 firms sanctioned by the US is involved in Philippine infrastructure projects. The CPP’s New People’s Army (NPA) , a guerilla group, disposes about 5,000 fighters scattered over the country, has been waging a rebellion against the Filipino government since 1969 and was originally inspired by the founding father of the People’s Republic of China. In the midst of the Cold War, China supplied Filipino communists with weapons against US-backed Marcos administration, after which the CPP has repudiated links with Chinese communist doctrine in favor of an own ideology. Once a college student of CPP founder Sison, initially, there was hope President Rodrigo Duterte might find a peace deal with the group, which were disappointed when he broke off talks in 2017. [Radio Free Asia] Philippines: Deployment of militiamen to West Philippine Sea (nd) Following the announcement to deploy militia to the West Philippine sea and criticism thereof, Navy chief Vice Admiral defended the decision, which was necessary due to the inadequately equipped and staffed status of the navy. The planned modernization of the military was further slowed down by the pandemic. This step comes in response to Chinese militia patrolling in the West Philippine Sea and subsequent clashes with Filipino fishermen in the last months and years. Two Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) companies, each about 120 men, will be deployed to the disputed waters, one supporting the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Western Command in the Kalayaan Island Group, the other in support of the AFP Northern Command in Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal, according to Vice Admiral Bacordo. He added, that the militia can stay longer and more focused in specific areas, where they are based at, whereas the regular navy vessels are pooled and sent to an area, from which they have to move on at some point. [Rappler 1] [Rappler 2]
Singapore: Companies may consider wage cuts to minimize retrenchments (py) The National Wages Council (NWC) advised companies that have already used other cost-saving measures to implement temporary wage cuts but only to the extent needed to minimize retrenchments. For low-wage workers, employers are recommended to implement a wage freeze instead of pay cuts. The government sectors have well endorsed the guidelines. The National Wages Council was formed in 1972 when Singapore was going through industrialization. The council is a tripartite body comprising representatives from the three social partners, namely the employers, the trade unions and the government. Normally, the council convenes annually to forge a national consensus on wage-related matters. However, due to the escalating situation, it met again in August to update the guidelines. [Channel News Asia ] [Tripartism] Thailand: Protest momentum maintained despite “serious” state of emergency (nd) Thousands of protesters took to the streets in various places of Bangkok throughout the entire past week to demand the resignation of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha and his cabinet, constitutional changes, and reform of the monarchy under the constitution. [Nikkei Asian Review] In an unprecedented, once unthinkable show of dissent towards monarchy, protesters on Wednesday the three-finger-salute towards a royal motorcade which passed them en route to an annual Buddhist merit offering ceremony. [Aljazeera] This prompted the imposition of a “serious” state of emergency on Thursday banning gatherings of more than four people as well as actions considered provoking conflict, and distribution of letters and publications – including electronic data – that may stir fear or could be deemed "fake news." Two protesters were arrested on Friday over the motorcade incident and charged under Section 110 of the Criminal Code for harming Her Majesty the Queen’s liberty, facing up to life in jail if convicted. [Coconuts Bangkok] [Prachatai 1] Defying the ban and the arrest of protest leaders, the 'leaderless' protest continued over the weekend, simultaneously held in 17 provinces across the country. [Bangkok Post 1] [The Thaiger] Police on Friday use water cannons to disperse the protesters, featuring a water mixed with chemicals, which drew criticism of human rights advocates. Police also announced possible jail time for posting a selfie from the protest on social media, highlighting the importance of those networks for the protest movement. [Khaosod] [Thai Examiner 1] [New York Times] Also on Friday, the National police chief signed an order requesting the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission and the Digital Economy and Society Ministry to investigate and possibly ban Voice TV, Prachathai.com, The Reporters and The Standard, and the Free Youth movement Facebook page for allegedly harming national security. This action is possible under the newly enacted state of emergency. [Bangkok Post 2] [Reuters] A Prachatai reporter was arrested reporting in Bangkok, wearing a press armband from Thai Journalists Association. [Prachatai 2] Vietnam: Jailed democracy activist in new hunger strike (jn) Vietnamese pro-democracy activist Tran Huynh Duy Thuc has entered his third hunger strike within two years, demanding that his 16-year sentence be reduced under a law that was enacted after his sentencing. He was jailed in 2010 pursuant to Art. 79 of the penal code for criticizing the Vietnamese government in his online articles. [Radio Free Asia] International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia ![]() China re-elected to UN Human Rights Council (dql) Last week, China was re-elected to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) after securing 139 votes out of 193 votes of the General Assembly in a race of five nations for four seats in the Asia-Pacific group. The other elected countries include Pakistan (169), Uzbekistan (164), and Nepal (150). Saudi Arabia garnered 90 votes. China’s result is a sharp decrease compared to the election in 2016 when Beijing had received 180 votes. [Quartz] US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lashed out against China’s, Russia’s and Cuba’s election calling it a "win for tyrants and embarrassment for the United Nations." In 2018 the USA withdrew from the UNHRC. [First Post] China hit back demanding that the USA “stop spreading political virus and make some earnest efforts to promote and protect human rights in its own country,” adding that it “should stop politicising human rights issues,” and refrain from “using human rights as a pretext to interfere in others’ internal affairs.” [Hong Kong Free Press] China-USA relations: Beijing’s passes export control law (dql) Allowing the Chinese government to "take reciprocal measures" against countries using export controls to harm China's national security and interests, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, China’s top legislative body, passed a law on export control. Under the law, which will enter into force on 1 December and apply to all companies, military and nuclear products as well as technical data related to the items covered by the law are subject to export-control stipulations. [CGTN] [Nikkei Asian Review] While the law does not name any targeted countries, it is widely seen as a retaliatory move against recent US sanctions against Chinese technology firms, including Huawei and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp, China’s biggest chipmaker. [Reuters] [AP] Cross-strait relations: Tensions between Beijing and Taipei further rise (dql/ef) Amid high-running cross-strait tensions, Chinese state television reported early last week that China has foiled hundreds of espionage activities of Taiwan’s intelligence forces. [Global News] Taiwan rejected the accusations calling televised confessions of Taiwanese citizens before mainland courts fake news, while a Taiwanese court found a Taiwanese retired colonel guilty of attempting to establish a spy network for Beijing and sentenced him to four years in jail. [Reuters 1] [South China Morning Post 1] The wrangle over espionage activities adds to already heightened tensions between China and Taiwan in which Beijing’s military maneuvering behavior in the Taiwan Strait has undergone a major shift towards gray zone activities over the past two years. For a long time, the status quo in the Taiwan Strait was defined by the Taiwan Strait median line, an unofficial demarcation line in the middle of the waters between China and Taiwan proposed by the USA just over 60 years ago and so far widely respected by both sides. In March 2019, China violated that line for the first time in 20 years, signaling a new aggressive posture towards Taiwan. Since then, the Chinese Air Force has flown over the line at least five more times, with the latest conducted in September when China sent 19 aircraft across the median line. In early 2020, Chinese forces held a night exercise right on the line. [National Interest] [Livemint] [AiR No. 11, March/2020, 3] [AiR No. 38, September/2020, 4] Further fueling the escalating cross-strait tensions, Chinese President Xi Jinping during his inspection of a military base in Guangdong on the north shore of the South China Sea called on troops to "put all their minds and energy on preparing for war," as well as to be "absolutely loyal, absolutely pure, and absolutely reliable." In a related statement, made during his visit of an exhibition dedicated to the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the China’s entry into the Korean War, he called on the nation to inherit the “great spirit of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea … in the new era to fight for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” [Xinhua] [Global Times] Meanwhile, Hong Kong air traffic controllers told Taiwan there was danger until further notice on a flight path to the Taiwanese-controlled Pratas Islands in the northern part of the contested South China Sea, effectively blocking Taiwan’s only air route to the disputed islands. [Reuters 2] Despite these developments US officials and analysts do not see a Chinese invasion of Taiwan imminent. Speaking at last week’s Aspen Security Forum US national security advisor Robert O’Brien urged Taiwan to build up asymmetric and anti-access area denial strategies in order to avoid being exposed to Chinese gray zone-type operations, while at the same time expressing his doubts that Beijing was going to attack Taiwan at this point in time. Similarly, US think tank Rand stated that recent Chinese military activities were more about intimidation than pointing to provoking a war. Thus, an actual invasion was more unlikely than ever as China faces its own domestic economic and political issues that are only masked by the repeated military threats. [Japan Times] [Focus Taiwan] [South China Morning Post 2] For an analysis of China’s harsh rhetoric and military muscle-flexing against Taiwan, see John Dotson in [The Jamestown Foundation] who suggests that “PLA saber rattling is likely to continue,” as Beijing has no other policy alternatives than military pressure given that public sentiment in Taiwan is increasingly hostile towards unification on Beijing’s terms. As far as the American strategy is concerned, it has long been marked by a strategic ambiguity which contained sufficient pressure on China to take action against Taiwan, but also sufficient uncertainty for the Taiwanese side whether the USA would rush to Taiwan's aid if Taiwan, in turn, provoked an escalation. This ambiguity seems to no longer work, as China and Taiwan both are stepping up their rhetoric and military against each other, while the USA under President Donald Trump has also become more assertive in its defense of Taiwan. For insights into an increasingly broad consensus among US foreign policy strategists on a necessary shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity over Taiwan, see Gerrit van der Wees [National Interest] who argues that ending strategic ambiguity needs to be coupled with a vision that focuses on “Taiwan’s place as a full and equal member in the international family of nations.” Taiwan-USA relations: White House pushes arms sales to Taipei (dql) In a latest sign of growing support of the USA in building up Taiwan defense, the White House has informed the Congress that it will seek approval for three more sales of advanced weaponry to Taiwan, including track-based rocket launchers and long-range missiles. [Reuters] Meanwhile, the USS Barry, a guided missile destroyer, passed through the Taiwan Strait last Wednesday, while a Chinese Y-8 anti-submarine aircraft entered the southwestern corner of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone last Friday. [Focus Taiwan] [Taiwan News] In a latest development, reflecting high running cross-strait tensions, China has reportedly deployed its most advanced hypersonic missile to its coastal areas near Taiwan to ‘prepare for a possible invasion’ of the island. [South China Morning Post 2] China-Australia relations: Beijing’s stops purchase of Australian coal (dql) Already strained relations between China and Australia are further worsening after it was confirmed that Chinese customers have been advised to defer orders of Australian coal while Australian cotton exporters have been notified that exports will be cut in 2021. By targeting coal, Beijing is targeting Canberra’s third-largest export commodity to the Chinese market behind natural gas and iron ore, which accounted for 14.1 billion AUSD in 2018 and 2019. Beijing’s move comes shortly after Australia took part in the Quad meeting in Tokyo earlier this month, prompting observers to suggest that it might be a reprisal for what Beijing considers to be Australia’s hostile attitude to it. At the meeting, Foreign Minister Marise Payne shied away from specifically mentioning China, but nevertheless made clear that Australia was not hesitating to align itself with its Quad partners in confronting China. [The Conversation] China-Saudi Arabia relations: Deepening economic ties (dql) China Geological Survey, China’s largest state-run geoscience agency has secured a 54 million USD deal in Saudi-Arabia to conduct a geochemical survey of 540,000 square kilometers of the Arabian shield area. [Yahoo News] The contract is the latest sign of warming relations between China and Saudi-Arabia and comes after recent reports about a China-assisted construction of a facility for extracting uranium yellowcake from uranium ore, a major development in Riyadh’s nuclear program. [The Print] Japan: Newest warship revealed (dql) Japan's newest submarine Taigei was unveiled last week, a 3,000-ton attack submarine which measures 84 meters in length and 9.1 meters in width and is expected to go into service in March 2022. It joins Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force's submarine fleet as its 22nd vessel. The disclosure comes at a time of intensified Chinese naval activity around a collection of Japan-administered islands in the East China Sea, claimed by both Japan and China. The islands are believed to inhabit oil and natural gas reserves and are located close to important shipping routes and lucrative fishing areas. [Newsweek] In an earlier development, Japan announced to establish three electronic defense units on islands facing the East China Sea by March 2022, in part to gather information on Beijing's increasing activities in the East China Sea. [Nikkei Asian Review] South Korea to buy advanced military hardware (dql) South Korea has announced plans to purchase advanced military hardware worth nearly 23 million USD by 2021, including light-weight suicide unmanned aerial vehicles, drones that fire guns at ground targets, advanced surveillance plus attack drones, multipurpose unmanned vehicles, intelligent anti-jamming censors and a smartphone-based combat command system. This is the second round in the Defense Acquisition Program Administration’s “rapid acquisition” project, following a first round in May, in which surveillance drones, small unmanned aircraft and portable anti-drone guns were acquired. [Korea Biz Wire] Meanwhile, the USA delivered 24 F-35A next-generation fighter jets to South Korea as part of Seoul's plan to deploy 40 units through next. Seoul began bringing in the advanced stealth fighters in March last year. [Korea Herald] South Korea-China relations: Increase in number of Chinese war vessels near Korean peninsula (dql) According to data of the South Korean Defense Ministry, the number of Chinese warships crossing the tentative median line in South Korea’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) amounted to around 290 times in 2019, rising from 110 times in 2016 and 2017 and 230 times in 2018. Seoul has demanded that the EEZs of the two countries be demarcated by drawing a median line between the two countries’ overlapping areas. Beijing, however, wants a proportional EEZ line be drawn by taking into account coastlines and the population along them. [Yonhap] South Korea-Philippines relations: Strengthening cooperation (dql) During the inaugural session of the Joint Defense Cooperation Committee between the two countries, held via video conference, South Korea Vice Defense Minister Park Jae-min and his Philippine counterpart Ricardo David agreed to deepen cooperation on various security issues, including the COVID-19 pandemic as well as peace efforts on the Korean Peninsula. Park, furthermore, request the Philippines' support for his country’s hosting of the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference next year, as well as for the cybersecurity unit under the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus which South Korea is going co-chair with Malaysia from 2021 to 2023. [Korea Herald] Inter-Korean relations: Pyongyang’s development of missile capabilities faster than expected by Seoul (dql) According to South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development, the country’s agency for research and development in defense technology, North Korea is developing its missile capabilities at a much higher pace than believed. The Agency's conceded his surprise, stating that his assumption that South Korea is about 20 years ahead of North Korea needed to be corrected to 10 years. The finding is based on an analysis of images of North Korea’s October 10 parade held to mark the 75th founding anniversary of its ruling Workers' Party at which a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), along with other weapons, were showcased. [Korea Herald] Taiwan, Japan, and USA discuss intellectual property rights protection (ef) Taiwan, the US, and Japan held a two-day workshop on the protection of trade secrets and intellectual property rights under the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF). The US representative stressed the importance of interaction, IPR protection, investment, and innovation in order to stay competitive in a modern global economy. The GCTF is a Taiwanese-US initiative that was launched in 2015 to expose Taiwan’s expertise and leadership to the global stage. In 2019, Japan joined as a full partner. [Focus Taiwan] Taiwan-India relations: Growing relations (ef) Speaking at an event to mark the handover of the leadership of the Taiwan-India Parliamentary Friendship Association, the group's new chairwoman vowed to promote bilateral parliamentary exchanges between the two countries. She also thanked India’s media for their support, referring to China's attempts weeks earlier to order Indian journalists to not refer to Taiwan as a country or a nation when reporting on Taiwan's National Day (Oct. 10). Beijing's attempts backfired. Not only did the Indian Foreign Ministry tell the Chinese Embassy to keep its hands out of Indian media, but the #TaiwanNationalDay subsequently trended on Indian Twitter. Furthermore, President Tsai Ing-wen retweeted several photos from her trip to India in 2012 to thank her new Indian followers. Whilst India does not officially recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, its government has also not openly endorsed the One-China-principle since 2010.[Focus Taiwan] [The Diplomat] [Hindustan Times] Sri Lanka: Financial lifeline from China when repayments on outstanding loans are due (lm/ng) Following on the heels of a short-notice Colombo visit of a high-level Chinese delegation last week, negotiations are reportedly underway for a $1.5 billion currency-swap agreement between Sri Lanka’s Central Bank and the People’s Bank of China. During last week's visit, Beijing offered a $90 million grant towards COVID 19-related medical assistance [see AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2], and is now likely to favorably consider the Rajapaksa government’s request for an additional $700 million. In yet another follow-up, both sides on October 14 signed a supplementary agreement on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on water research and technology cooperation, aimed at providing clean drinking water to several areas of the island country. [Xinhua] [The Hindu 1] The negotiations come at a time when Sri Lanka is gearing up to repay a daunting $4.5 billion of its outstanding foreign loans next year. The government of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, that is, desperately needs cash to service its multibillion-dollar international debts and to run a current account deficit estimated at $1.1 billion annually. [Nikkei Asia Review] Notably, this was the third loan request by Colombo to Beijing this year, after the $500 million ‘urgent financial assistance’ that China sanctioned in March, to help cope with the economic knock-on effects of the pandemic. Earlier, Sri Lanka had relied heavily on China to construct $1.5 billion port in Hambantota in the country’s south. After the port was operating at a loss and couldn’t generate enough revenue to repay the loan the country had received to build it, the port was leased to China for 99 years in return for $1.1 billion which eased its position [see AiR December/2017, 3]. As for India, New Delhi promised to consider Colombo’s request for a debt moratorium – Sri Lanka owes $960 million to India – and a $1 billion currency swap arrangement [see AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1]. The Reserve Bank of India already signed an agreement for extending a $400 million currency swap to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) [see AiR No. 30, July/2020, 4], and is perusing a further $1 billion requested by Sri Lanka. [The Hindu 2] [Observer Research Foundation] As Sri Lanka is exploring different options to repay its debt, including additional loans from China, opposition lawmakers have raised concerns over the Rajapaksa administration’s growing reliance on Beijing, cautioning the government not to completely burn bridges with other creditors, especially Japan, once the country’s largest lender for development projects. Further, government critics urge the administration to seek for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout, a move they say would not just avoid the country defaulting on foreign debts, but also build up the confidence of international investors and enable the country to borrow gain.[EconomyNext] Last week, the minister who initiated and spearheaded the Colombo Light Rail Transport (LRT) Project in a letter to Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga apologized for the government’s sudden decision to cancel the project. Last month, Sri Lanka suspended the $1.5 billion light rail project for its capital that had been finalized by the previous government, on the grounds that it was not a ‘cost-effective solution’.[Reuters] [News in Asia] US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to visit Sri Lanka, Maldives after Delhi talks later this month (lm/ng) Against the backdrop of further Chinese advancements [see above], a highly-anticipated Colombo visit by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo assumes added significance. Pompeo was previously scheduled to come to Sri Lanka in June 2019 but the visit had to be cancelled over concern about growing sentiments against a proposed American military base on the island. Pompeo, who will visit Sri Lanka en route to New Delhi in the coming weeks [see AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2], will presumably press Colombo on the pending US proposal on the $480 million Compact of the ‘Millennium Challenge Cooperation’ (MCC) [see AiR No. 26, June/2020, 5] and a new Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Washington has been pressuring Colombo since July 2019 to renew its SOFA, which allows visa-free movement of US security and defense personnel in and out of Sri Lanka. [The Indian Express] [South Asia Journal] Significantly, Sri Lanka has not hosted a high-level United States’ diplomat since John Kerry’s visit in 2015 – a clear sign that the United States regards Sri Lanka - situated just north of the main naval trade routes across the Indian Ocean that serve as China’s economic lifeline - as a crucial part of its Indo-Pacific strategy. Still, the Sri Lankan government may not bend to the United States on the issue of the MCC or the SOFA as both agreements have come under heavy flak from Sri Lankan nationalists. [The Diplomat] Indicating how closely Washington monitors political developments on the island, the US Department of Defense in its annual report to Congress last month named Sri Lanka as one of the countries where Beijing ‘is very likely already considering and planning for additional overseas military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces.’ [US Department of Defense] India apprehends Chinese soldier who strayed across disputed border in Indian-controlled Ladakh On Monday, the Indian Army announced it had apprehended a Chinese soldier after he ‘strayed’ across the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldier was captured inside Indian-controlled Ladakh’s Demchok area, and was returned after the completion of formalities after China urged India to return the soldier ‘in a timely manner’. [The Straits Times 1] [Associated Press] [South China Morning Post 1] As the tensions in Ladakh continue with no sign of dissolution, India has bought high-altitude warfare kits from the United States under the Logistics Exchange Memorandum Agreement, a sign that New Delhi is preparing for an extended winter deployment. In this context, S. K. Saini, the second-highest ranking general in the Indian Army, is on a scheduled visit to the US Army Pacific Command to discuss other emergency purchases and building capabilities. [The Indian Express] [The Straits Times 2] Counter to the usual practice of giving the eastern and northern army units of the PLA the latest equipment first, Beijing is also prioritizing its soldiers in Tibet for winter equipment and patrol gear. Still, in light of the onset of bone-chilling temperatures and high-speed freezing winds, observers recognize that the Chinese troops’ new winter equipment ‘may not give them an advantage in skirmishes in the wild’, because India’s soldiers are more accustomed to war in ice cold high altitude environments. [South China Morning Post 2] [South China Morning Post 3] While talks to ease tensions along the disputed border are yet to produce a tangible breakthrough in de-escalation, India and China are expected to hold the eighth round of military talks next week. On October 12, senior commanders held the seventh round of talks in the western Himalayas that went on for more than 10 hours [see AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2]. [Hindustan Times] Moreover, Beijing reiterated on October 13 that it does not recognize the region of Ladakh, the region at the center of the China-India border dispute that New Delhi designated as a union territory last year. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 29 had for the first time refused to recognize the Union Territory of Ladakh and, in a separate statement, said it would abide only by a ‘very clear’ border alignment first spelt out in 1959 by late Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai – a claim explicitly rejected by India then and since [see AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2].The statement came just a day after India inaugurated 44 permanent bridges across seven states and Union territories, in an effort to catch up with Chinese infrastructure development on the other side of the LAC [see AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2]. New Delhi, in a sharp assertion on October 15, said Beijing had no right to comment on its internal matters. [South China Morning Post 4] Pakistan re-elected to United Nations Human Rights Council (lm) Securing the highest number of votes among five candidates from the Asia-Pacific region, Pakistan on October 13 was re-elected to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Islamabad is currently serving on the UNHRC since January 2018 and will continue as a member for another three-year term, starting on January 1 2021. Since the UNHRC’s establishment in 2006, this is the fifth time that Pakistan has been elected to the UN’s premier body on human rights. [Anadolu Agency] While Russia and Cuba ran unopposed in the secret ballot at the UN General Assembly, Pakistan vied for membership in a five-nation race for four spots with Saudi Arabia, China, Uzbekistan and Nepal. Pakistan received 169 votes, Uzbekistan 164, Nepal 150, China 139 and Saudi Arabia 90 votes – ending Riyadh’s bid to again be a member of the UN’s top human rights body. [Al Jazeera] United States Deputy Secretary of State visits Bangladesh, as US tries to engage with smaller countries (lm) Speaking after a meeting with Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister, US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun said Dhaka will be a ‘centerpiece’ of the United States’ work in the region as it sees the country as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific region. During a meeting the previous day, he invited Dhaka to explore opportunities in signing a Free Trade Agreement with the US. [bdnews24.com] [The Daily Star] Biegun’s three-day visit in Dhaka followed US Defense Secretary Mark Esper’s phone conversation with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in September. Significantly, Bangladesh had not hosted a senior United States’ diplomat of Biegun’s stature since August 2016 – a clear sign that the United States is stepping up efforts to raise its visibility in South Asia at a time when China has increased engagement with countries in the region through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) [see AiR No. 37, September/2020, 3]. Before he arrived in Dhaka on Wednesday, Biegun was in New Delhi earlier in the week where he delivered the opening speech of the India-US Forum and held talks with Indian officials on areas of mutual interest. In doing so, Biegun laid the groundwork for the U.S.-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue involving the foreign and defense ministers of the two sides scheduled for October 26-27 [see AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2]. [South China Morning Post 1] While in New Delhi, Biegun also had an informal meeting with the Bhutanese Ambassador to India, since Bhutan does not maintain diplomatic relations with any of the UN Security Council’s permanent members, preferring to keep them at arm’s length. [U.S. Department of State] [South China Morning Post 2] Maldives’ minister calls into question Free Trade Agreement with China (lm) Speaking on a program aired by the state radio station, Maldives’ economic minister called into question the country’s Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with China, saying the agreement should not have been signed in the first place as it may hamper trade relations with other countries, notably India. Refuting the minister’s statement, China’s Ambassador to Maldives declared that the FTA is of ‘mutual benefit and high-quality’, adding that ‘it conforms to international practice and will lift the economic and trade ties to new level.’ [The Economic Times] [The Edition 1] Notwithstanding the economic minister’s statement, China and Maldives engaged in discussions on Thursday, to explore bilateral economic cooperation in a post-COVID-19 environment. [The Edition 2] The contentious agreement was signed between then-President Abdulla Yameen and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping during the former's first state visit to Beijing in December 2017. At the time, Beijing was embarking on its grand Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and therefore, financed several major projects during Yameen’s five-year tenure [see e.g. AiR No. 39, September/2019, 4]. Following his election victory in November 2018, incumbent President Ibrahim Solih quickly moved to normalize relations with New Delhi, returning to the Maldives’ traditional ‘India First’ policy [see e.g. AiR (2/6/2019)]. In this context, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his first overseas trip after his re-election to the Maldives. It was also during that time that members of the ruling Maldivian Democratic Party for the first time openly questioned the FTA [see AiR (4/11/2018)]. In a bid to counter China ’s growing financial footprint in South Asia, New Delhi-backed infrastructure projects are currently being implemented at a fast pace. Further, India has provided a host of support measures to the Indian Ocean archipelago to mitigate the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic [see e.g. AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3, AiR No. 38, September/2020, 4]. Nepal: Chinese encroachment in Nepal’s territory continues to spark tension After an inspection team last month found that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had constructed at least nine buildings in Nepal’s northwestern Humla district, Kathmandu has set up six border observation posts (BOPs) along its border with neighboring China. Notably, in the last six months, Nepal has opened around 90 BOPs along its border with China and India, and is reportedly planning to set up at least 500 more within the next two years. [Times Of India] Meanwhile, Nepal’s main opposition party, Nepali Congress (NC), on Wednesday accused the ruling Nepal Communist Party’s (NCP) of trying to cover-up the issue by ignoring accumulated evidence, adding that the NCP’s denial may constitute an act of treason. Prior a fact-finding team of the NC had visited the northern border of Nepal and concluded that China has in fact encroached approximately two kilometers of Nepali land. [The Himalayan Times] Notwithstanding the findings, Nepal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs last month announced that an inter-ministerial team in 2016 had already found the buildings in question to be located approximately one kilometer inside the Chinese territory from the Nepal-China border [see AiR No. 39, September/2020, 5]. Following the announcement, students in the Nepalese capital Kathmandu staged protests in front of the Chinese embassy [see AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1]. India conducts second trial of surface-to-surface missile India on October 16 successfully conducted a night trial of its indigenously developed nuclear-capable Prithvi-2 missile from a test range in Odisha. [The Times of India] [Hindustan Times] Against the backdrop of heightened tension with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), the Ministry of Defense's top research and development arm, has conducted a series of missile tests [see AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1]. Friday’s flight test was the second of the surface-to-surface missile in less than three weeks, and the eleventh missile test carried out by the DRDO in the past 40 days Pakistan, United Kingdom hold consultations on arms control, non-proliferation (lm) Representatives of Pakistan and the United Kingdom on October 13 held virtually the fifth round of their bilateral consultations on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. Both sides agreed to hold the sixth round of consultations next year on a mutually agreed date. [British High Commission Islamabad] The same day, both sides also agreed to closely work together for timely implementation of an Extradition Treaty to surrender alleged criminals for prosecution or punishment. Both sides further agreed for timely finalization of a Readmission Agreement for the return of illegal citizens staying abroad. [The Nation] Laos: More Chinese assistance (py) Following an official visit to Laos by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, China agreed to assist Laos across three initiatives as part of its effort to bolster cooperative relations between the two countries. Those will cover Chinese supplies to curb the dengue fever, a rural development infrastructure project and an offer for a generalized system of preferences for duty exemptions and facilitating transport of goods across borders. Besides, an easing of immigration policy was discussed which would grant certain privileges to Chinese individuals with regards to entry and exit procedures, especially diplomatic staff, technical experts and foreign workers. The said fast-track immigration policy was already discussed in September. Foreign Minister Wang also met with the President of Laos, Bounhang Vorachit to discuss further bilateral relations. Laos would be granted priority access to the Covid-19 vaccine once they are ready. Foreign Minister Wang Yi is currently on a tour of ASEAN, having visited Cambodia, with Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore as his next destinations. [Laotian times] [AiR NO. 38, September/2020, 4] Indonesia: Prabowo to leave for US upon invitation (nd) Upon an invitation by his US counterpart Mark Esper, Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto will travel to the US. Prabowo was banned since 2000 from entering the US following his alleged involvement in human rights violation as a commander of the army’s special forces under Suharto, his father-in-law, including including the abductions of pro-democracy activists in 1997-98 and atrocities in East Timor, a province until 1999, which became independent in 2002. He never faced a trial. In the following years, Prabowo attempted multiple times to return to politics and run for president. He was defeated twice by president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, in 2014 and 2019, who then appointed Prabowo as minister of defense, which secured the support of Prabowo’s party, Gerindra. Besides furthering bilateral defense cooperation in light of China's actions in the South China Sea and a strong foothold in the region due to it's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), it is speculated the visit serves to close a deal on American-made major weapon systems to modernize the Indonesian Military (TNI). There was interest expressed inter alia in American warplanes, but it will be rather tough for Prabowo to achieve a deal benefiting Indonesian defense companies, which is stipulated in the Defense Industry Law, such as transfers-of-technology or offset schemes, since this advantage is usually limited to countries within the US network of allies, of which Indonesia is not part. The need to counterbalance Chinese activity in South East Asia might tip the weight in favor of Indonesia. The invitation highlights that the US, despite the non-investigated allegations of human rights abuses, aims at forging closer ties with Indonesia amid growing tensions with China globally and regionally. Indonesia is not a claimant state in the South China Sea but China's nine-dash-line conflicts with the countries exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna Sea. Yet, due to economic entanglement with China, a complete shift towards the US is not likely. Amnesty International, among other human rights groups, in a statement opposed the invitation and the lift of the 20-year travel ban referring to a letter sent to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo earlier this year to further investigate the case. [Amnesty International] Despite a Democrat Senator's support for this criticism, given the strategic relevance of Indonesia for the US, it is unlikely that even a Biden-administration would move away from Prabowo again, given the possibilities of his further existing effort to run for office in 2024. [Jakarta Post] [New York Times] [The Strategist] Indonesia: Plans to strengthen economic ties with Taiwan (nd) In a letter to the Central News Agency, Indonesian envoy to Taiwan, emphasized his country's goal to further trade with Taiwan, which follows a directive from Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. Indonesia plans to promote the export of Indonesian goods, referring to the high number of Indonesian migrant workers in Taiwan, and to form partnerships for technology transfers According to the envoy, Taiwan's New Southbound Policy was also directed at strengthening economic and cultural ties with Southeast Asian countries, covering ASEAN members, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. [Taipei Times] Indonesia: Netherlands to pay compensation for victims (nd) Following a recent court ruling brought about by widows and children of 11 men killed in Sulawesi island, the Netherlands announced compensations to children of Indonesians who were executed by Dutch soldiers between 1945 and 1950 in the Indonesian War of Independence. Claimants have to conform to certain criteria, inter alia proof of paternity and the killings within a documented execution. The compensation will amount to 5,000 euros ($5,890), it is yet unclear how many people will be eligible to be apply for it. In Sulawesi, between 1946 and 1947 at least 860 men were executed. Currently, there are other cases brought about by relatives of victims of killings executed by Dutch colonial troops during so-called cleansing actions against Indonesian freedom fighters. In 2013, the Dutch government apologized for the killings, and while announcing compensation for the wives, had refused to compensate the children. [Al Jazeera] Indonesia, Japan to strengthen bilateral ties (nd) Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, after visiting Vietnam, arrived in Indonesia and put another emphasis on the importance of South East Asian for Japan, for achieving peace in South China Sea and advertised Japan's "free and open Indo-Pacific" concept of regional cooperation in light of current military conflicts with China. The successor to recently resigned Shinzo Abe thereby continues his predecessor's foreign policy. "I emphasize the spirit of cooperation to continue to be strengthened, especially in the midst of increasingly sharp rivalries between the world's superpower nations," Suga said when meeting with president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. The leaders agreed to strengthen bilateral ties as well as defense and military cooperation, working towards a defense equipment and technology transfer agreement. Such was signed with Vietnam on Monday, existing equipment transfer deals are with 11 other countries, including the US, UK, the Philippines and Malaysia, and in negotiation with Thailand, and were subsequently made after easing arms exports ban in 2014. Additionally, Japan extended a 50 billion yen ($470 million) loan to support Indonesia's economy, as well as furthering infrastructure projects like a high-speed rail systems and the development of remote islands. The countries also agreed to enable easing entry restrictions for essential business travel. As opposed to China's unilateral and military activity, which has caused tension in the region, Japan is showcasing a rule-based international system as an alternative for ASEAN nations. [Star Tribune] Indonesia: Foreign Ministry no information about lifted ban against cleric (nd) After recent rumors about leader of the Islam Defenders Front (FPI), Rizieq Shihab, returning from his self-exile in Saudi Arabia, Foreign Affairs Ministry’s spokesperson, Teuku Faizasyah, and Indonesian Ambassador for Saudi Arabia, Agus Maftuh, both said they had no information of the ban against Rizieq being lifted. According to Rizieq’s son-in-law Hanif Alatas, a letter from Saudi Arabia’s immigration office from 2019 stated Rizieq was not allowed to leave Saudi Arabia, the reason being “security”. Indonesian Immigration Office denied that it had issued a travel ban against Rizieq to prevent him from entering Indonesia. Meanwhile, Ambassador Agus criticized the official statement by FPI about Rizieq's return, claiming direct sources in Mecca, using a language, “i’lan min Makkah al-Mukarramah” [announcement from the Holy city of Mecca], that according to Agus could be perceived as politicizing the place of pilgrimage and offend Saudi Arabia. In the statement, FPI claimed in negotiations between Rizieq and the Saudi authorities his ban to leave Saudi Arabia was lifted. In 2017, prior to leaving for Mecca, the cleric was charged in a pornography case and for insulting state ideology Pancasila. The charges were dropped 2019, Rizieq stays in Saudia Arabia with an expired visa. [Jakarta Post] [Tempo 1] [Tempo 2] Indonesia: Rejected request for military base (nd) After multiple high-level approaches earlier this year, Indonesia rejected a US request to let its P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance planes to land and refuel. The planes have been used to monitor the recently escalating activity of China in the disputed South China Sea. Recently, the US used military bases in Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia. The request surprised official since Indonesia has a long-standing policy of foreign policy neutrality and has never allowed foreign militaries to operate there. [Channel News Asia] Philippines: Army General denies security risk (nd) Following criticism by former Supreme Court judge Antonio Carpio, that China “will surely want to eavesdrop” on military communications, Philippines‘ armed forces chief General Gilbert Gapay reassured that the communication kit on bases would not pose a security threat. DITO Telecommunity Corp, a joint venture between state-run China Telecom and a tycoon with close relation to President Rodrigo Duterte, was allowed to build towers on military land for its market entry, including 5G technology. There are further 22 military sites in negotiation for the installment of communication kits. While Gapay said there was no risk and emphasized that the Philippines‘ two largest communication companies, Globe and PLDT, also have communication kits using Chinesy technology on military ground, some lawmakers warned the equipment could be used to spy on the US-allied Filipino military. [Philstar] Philippines: Military Chief calls situation in South China Sea “very tense” (nd) Philippine armed forces chief, General Gilbert Gapay, labeled the situation in the South China Sea as “very tense”, with China conduction unilateral exercises and firing missiles in August this year. Since China claims almost the entire waters, it forces the claimant states – Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam – into conflict for they have to react to China's creation of facts. China has been building artificial islands and militarizing atolls in the disputed territory. In conjunction with a state visit, Malaysian and Chinese foreign ministers released a press statement on their determination for peace and stability in the disputed waters and their continued effort together with ASEAN members to agree on a Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea, which has been unresolved for almost two decades. While both top diplomats of China – comparing the US-led “Quad”-initiate with “old-fashioned Cold War mentality“ – and the US blame the respective other, General Gapay highlighted both nation's fault at creating uncertainty and aggression. [Thailand News] Philippines: Moratorium on energy exploration lifted (nd) Six years after its imposition, the 2014 moratorium on energy exploration in the South China Sea, which the Philippines refer to as West Philippine Sea, was lifted unilaterally by the Philippines due to the need for a national energy source, according to Philippine Energy Secretary Alfonso Cusi. The moratorium came about due to disputes between the Philippines and China over the waters, which were followed by a ruling in 2016 by an international arbitration tribunal in The Hague, striking down China's entire claim of the waters. The ruling was for the first time prominently defended by president Rodrigo Duterte in September [See also AiR No. 39, September/2020, 5] In 2018, China and the Philippines signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with respect to the joint oil and gas exploration in the disputed waters, giving a 60 % stake in resources extracted from the Reed Bank to the Philippines and the remaining 40 % to China, which was followed by street protests claiming a sell-out to the Chinese. Analysts commented the share deal was in violation of the Philippine constitution. The Reed Bank lies within the Filipino EEZ, approximately 50 kilometers northwest of Palawan, Malampaya, and is believed to contain vast and yet untouched natural resources. Additionally, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan and Vietnam have overlapping claims or boundaries with China in the disputed area. [Radio Free Asia] [Philstar] Malaysia, Poland to sign MoU on education (nd) Malaysia and Poland will be signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on higher education next year, which marks the 50th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations. The MoU shall further cooperation in education, such as exchanges and scholarships and cultural programs. Currently, about 180 Malaysian students study in Poland, half of them medicine, with growing interest in polytechnics, and 1,000 Malaysian graduates, according to Polish Ambassador Krzysztof Dębnicki. [Daily Express] Vietnam, Japan visit with arms deal in tow (jn) On his three-day state visit starting on Sunday, newly appointed Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihige Suga agreed with his counterpart Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc in Hanoi on Monday to accelerate the reopening of borders for short-term business travelers and restart two-way passenger flights. This comes after both countries had already decided in July to resume business travel for expatriates and long-term residents. Seemingly acknowledging China’s geopolitical rise in the region, the two leaders also agreed to cooperate on the "free and open Indo-Pacific" initiative. Japan is one of the countries that Vietnam is turning to in its effort to find other economic and military allies as response to China’s ambitions, especially in the South China Sea dispute. Both stressed the importance of ensuring maritime safety and security in the South China Sea as well as peaceful dispute settlement and the adherence to international law. Regarding the latter they referred to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and the aspired Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). The prime ministers signed twelve agreements on the economy, environment, public infrastructure, healthcare, agriculture, energy, and the transfer of defense technologies. The energy agreements particularly deal with a thermal power plant and a liquefied natural gas power plant, both under development and expected to start operation in 2026. Mr. Suga also said that his government would provide Vietnam healthcare equipment worth almost $38 million to recover from the impact of the pandemic. He also met with Vietnamese President and Communist Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong on Monday. [Asia Nikkei Review 1] [Vietnam Express] One of the most significant agreements that Japan and Vietnam signed allows Japan to export defense equipment and technology to Vietnam. Mr. Suga said that it was “a big step in the field of security for both countries that we reached an agreement in principle” in this area. [Reuters] Mr. Suga’s trip to South East Asia was set to focus on security cooperation between countries that each face the geopolitical encroachment of China on their doorsteps, most prominently in the South China Sea dispute. With such a cooperation and potential arms sales, Japan aims to prop up the defense capabilities of other Indo-Pacific nations to rein in Chinese maritime advances. Among the military goods Japan could also offer are patrol and transport planes as well as warning and control radar systems. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 80% of Vietnam's arms in the last decade came from Russia, however, the country has intensified cooperation with Japan and the U.S. in the face of rising Chinese dominance. [Asia Nikkei Review 2] [Vietnam News] Cambodia, China sign free trade deal signaling closer relationship (jn) Cambodia and China signed the Cambodia-China Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA) in a ceremony attended by Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen on Monday last week. It is the first of such bilateral deal for Cambodia at a time when it is inching closer towards China amid the latter’s rivalry with the United States in the region. The not yet publicized deal was signed by the Ministers of Commerce of each country completing a process of just three rounds of negotiations from January to July of this year. Cambodia also secured $ 140 million in loans and grants from Beijing to fund several of the country’s “top priority projects”, among them infrastructure projects such as connecting Cambodia with Hong Kong via undersea fiber-optic cable as well as power plant and road construction. Details about the content of the deal are still unknown as is how it would fit in the already existing ASEAN-China Free Trade Area. Cambodia’s Commerce Minister, Pan Sorasak said that the “signing of the agreement signifies even stronger ties between the two countries and marks another key historical milestone for Cambodia-China relations.” He said he hoped that the agreement would enter into force early next year and would strengthen the economic ties to China through a higher degree of market access and trade liberalization. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce said on its website that the agreement comprised issues such as investment, trade, tourism, transportation and agriculture. A Cambodian official said in July that it covered 340 commodities with 95% of them tariff-free, among them fruit, vegetables, meat, grain, but not Cambodian rice, rubber and sugar. By concluding the CCFTA, Cambodia also aims to offset losses incurred after the EU suspended its “Everything But Arms” trade privileges in August because of the dire state of human and democratic rights in the country. Officially circulated expectations that the deal would boost trade with China by 20% or more annually have been met with skepticism among experts, especially given that the vital apparel industry seems to have been largely left out of the FTA [see AiR No. 33 August/2020, 3]. China accounted for 37% of imported goods to Cambodia in 2019, or $ 8.3 billion, while Cambodia sent only $ 900 million of goods to China which is about 5% of its total exports. Total trade between the two countries grew about 28% from 2018 to more than $ 9 billion in 2019, according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. The Cambodian government said it expects bilateral trade to reach $ 10 billion in 2023.[Reuters] [Nikkei Asian Review] [South China Morning Post] [Radio Free Asia] Chinese vessels intrude into Vietnamese EEZ (jn) Ship tracking data have shown that a Chinese survey ship escorted by a coastguard ship entered Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) along Vietnam’s central coast on Monday, Oct. 12. The survey ship of the type Shiyan-1 is operated by the Chinese Institute for Acoustics, that had already been expelled from the Eastern Indian Ocean by India’s navy in December 2019 because it had been suspected of mapping the topography of the ocean floor for military purposes. [Radio Free Asia] Announcements ![]() Upcoming Online Events 20 October 2020 @ 3:00 pm CEST, Clingendael, The Netherlands Turkish Foreign Policy in the Levant This webinar will discuss Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East after the peace negotiations between the AKP and the PKK collapsed in 2015. Please find details here: [Clingendael].
22 October 2020 @ 10:00 am CEST, Bruegel, Belgium How can the EU and Japan boost collaboration and multilateralism around the globe? This virtual discussion will assess perspectives on the impact of the EU and Japan on global collaboration and multilateralism in areas such as health, climate, and trade. To access the discussion, please visit [Bruegel].
22-23 October 2020 @ 8:45 am EDT, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada Journalism in the Time of Crisis: At the Intersection of Journalism and the Pandemic This two-day event will seek to identify the role played by journalism in the greatest international crisis in a generation. For further details, please see [CIGI].
23 October 2020 @ 1:00 pm EDT, Center for American Progress, USA After the Polls Close: Countering Election Disinformation on Social Media The Center for American Progress will discuss the steps that social media platforms should take in order to prepare for potential attempts to stoke conflict or delegitimize the results of the 2020 General Election. If you are interested in joining the event, visit [CAP] further information.
23 October 2020 @ 3:00 pm CEST, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, Italy U.S. Foreign Policy in the MENA Region after the Election This webinar will gather experts from MENA countries, Europe, and the U.S., who will discuss current challenged and changes in the MENA region, future shocks that are anticipated in MENA countries, and how international engagement has changed over the past decade. Details are available at [ISPI].
26 October 2020 @ 6:00 pm CEST, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, Italy Overcoming the Pandemic: the EU Quest for Growth and Jobs This virtual roundtable will seek to answer whether recent EU measures hint at a renewed and more solidaristic Europe and how these measures can be fully implemented. See [ISPI] for additional information.
26 October 2020 @ 5:00 pm CEST, Bruegel, Belgium The Future of EU-US Trade Relations After the US Election This event analyzes how the trade relationship between the EU and the US will develop in the coming years as well as how the EU is affected by the China-US relation. Further details are available at [Bruegel].
27 October 2020 @ 10:00 - 11:00 am EDT, Middle East Institute, Washington DC, US Economic Development and Security: Three Seas Initiative in the Black Sea This webinar will address the following question: What role does the Black Sea play for Eastern European economic development and security? How can the Three Seas Initiative make a difference to the Black Sea region in terms of economic development? How can non-3SI members like Georgia and Ukraine buy in and benefit from the Three Seas Initiative? Please find registration details here: [MEI]
27 October 2020 @ 16:00 - 17:15 pm UTC + 2, Danish Institute for International Studies, Denmark Treacherous sea of data This webinar will discuss issues of ethics, justice, and equality in the sea of big data. Please find registration details here: [Gender& (IN) Security]
27 October 2020 @ 3:00 - 4:00 pm EDT, The Heritage Foundation, Washington DC, US Virtual Event: The Fight to Get a COVID - 19 Vaccine: The Inside Story of the Administration’s Operation Warp Speed This webinar will discuss the goal, the progress and the challenges involved with this critical project. It will also explore the status of the vaccines and how an Army General has adapted to lead an effort requiring the cooperation of literally hundreds of different entities, both in and out of government. Please find registration details here: [Public Health]
27 October 2020 @ 13:00 pm UTC, DiploFoundation, Switzerland Internet governance in October 2020 This event will discuss what were the main Internet governance updates in October? How will recent updates influence the developments in upcoming months? Please find registration details here: [Diplo]
27 October 2020 @ 11:00 - 12:15 pm SGT, Institute of Water Policy, Singapore Sustainable and inclusive: Are cities meeting goals for equitable environmental growth? This online event will present a new method for assessing environmental equity -- how evenly or unevenly cities are distributing environmental benefits and burdens across neighborhoods. Further details are available at [IWP]
28 October 2020 @ 9:00 - 1030 UTC + 1, Bingham Centre for the rule of law, UK The Rule of Law in the technological age At this webinar, leading experts from both academia and practice to discuss a series of important questions, including: What are the ethical boundaries to AI systems, which would shape the kind of society we want to live in?; Are existing legal frameworks fit for purpose in the context of AI, and what are the legal boundaries to AI systems?; and What challenges and transformations are triggered by technological progress in relation to the Rule of Law and access to justice? Further details are available at [Binghamcentre]
28 October 2020 @ 1:00 - 2:00 pm EDT, The Heritage Foundation, Washington DC, US Virtual Event: How Action Civics Teaches Our Kids to Protest This event will discuss the important study and provide a roadmap for putting Americans back on a path toward civic knowledge. Please find registration details here: [Civil Society]
28 October 2020 @ 3:00 - 4:30 pm EDT, Stimson, Washington DC, US Historical Memory of Southeast Asia in the United States This edited volume sheds new light on US interventions in Southeast Asia after World War II, including US bombings in Laos and Cambodia. Please find registration details here: [STIMSON]
28 October 2020 @ 1:00 - 2:00 pm EDT, Stimson, Washington DC, US How is Southeast Asia countering the Chinese influence? This event will discuss the origins, methods, and success of different Southeast Asian countries’ counterstrategy to China, as well as the role of the United States. Please find registration details here: [STIMSON]
28 October 2020 @ 3:00 pm EDT, Foreign Policy Research Institute, US Main Line Briefing This webinar will discuss on the Main Line Briefing series. If you are interested in joining the webinar, please find further details at [FPRI]
28 October 2020 @ 4:00 EDT, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, California, US Accelerate Change or Lose: A Discussion with US AIR Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Charles Q. Brown US Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Charles Q. Brown and Michael Auslin discuss Accelerate Change or Lose on Capital. Please find registration details here: [Hoover]
28 October 2020 @ 4:30 pm CEST, Bruegel, Belgium What Will the EU’s New Migration Policy Do Differently? This webinar will discuss the new ‘three pillars’ proposal by the European Commission that hopes to bridge the divides over solidarity and fairness. Inter alia, the questions as to the probability of its success will be evaluated. Please check [Bruegel] for registration details.
28 October 2020 @ 2:30 pm CEST, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, Italy G20 at the time of Covid-19. What’s at stake in 2021 This event will seek to answer questions that emerge in light of the Italian Presidency of the G20 in 2021, such as which multilateral responses are needed in a post Covid-19 world. For registration details, please visit [ISPI].
Recent and upcoming book releases Michael Freeman, A Magna Carta for Children?: Rethinking Children’s Rights (The Hamlyn Lectures), Cambridge University Press, October 1, 2020, 546 pages. For more information, see [Cambridge]. Dr Ratnabali & Dr U C Jha, Martial Law in India: Historical, Comparative and Constitutional Perspective, Vij Books India, October 1, 2020, 284 pages. For more details, see [Kobo]. Xiaoqun Xu, Heaven has Eyes: A History of Chinese Law 1st Edition, Oxford University Press, 376 pages, October 13, 2020. More about the book at [Oxford University]. Dylan Rodriguez, White Reconstruction: Domestic Warfare and the Logics of Genocide, Fordham University Press, 1st Edition, October 13, 2020, 256 pages. For more details, see [Fordham]. Laura-Stell E. Enonchong, The Constitution and Governance in Cameroon (Routledge Studies on Law in Africa), Routledge; 1st Edition, October 19, 2020. For more information, see [Routledge].
Calls The Law Brigade Publishers invites submissions for its topical issue “International Journal of Legal Developments & Allied Issues, Volume 6, Issue 6”. Closing date for submissions is October 31, 2020. More information at [The Law brigade] The Centre for Human Rights and Subaltern Studies invites submissions for publication in the inaugural edition of its annual E-Journal "NUSRL Journal of Human Rights". Manuscripts can be submitted until November 20, 2020. For further details, see [CHRSS] The International Journal of Legal and Social Studies invites papers submissions in the area of legal jurisprudence with possibility of an intersectionality with social studies for its Volume 4, Issue 2. Closing date for submissions is November 7, 2020. Further details, see [IJLSS] The ICFAI Journal of Modern Law and Justice on Arbitration and Sports Law invites paper submissions for its Volume 1, Issue 2. Closing date of submissions is October 25, 2020. More information at [ICFAJ] The Faculty of Law University of Delhi invites paper submission for its Volume 8. Closing date of submissions is November 1, 2020. More information at [Delhi]
Jobs & positions The Cardiff University, the Crime and Security Research Institute offers a fixed time contract position of Research Associate. Closing date for applications is October 30, 2020. More about the vacancy at [Cardiff University] The Nottingham Trent University offers a fixed time contract position of Research Assistant in Law. Closing date for applications is October 21, 2020. Further information at [NTU] The University of Queensland Australia offers a permanent position of Senior Lecturer in Law, Science and Technology. Closing date for applications is November 11, 2020. Further information at [University of Queensland] We would greatly appreciate your feedback! Please send any feedback you have regarding this newsletter to: info@cpg-online.de Also, don't forget to Like CPG on Facebook, and browse our website for other updates and news!
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