Grasp the pattern, read the trend
Asia in Review
No. 47, November/2020, 4
Brought to you by CPG
Dear Readers,
Please enjoy this week’s brief on the latest events and developments in constitutional politics and governance, geopolitics and international relations in Asia.
Special greetings are extended to readers in Albania, Mauritius, Mongolia and Suriname which celebrate Independence Day and National Day this week.
With best regards,
Henning Glaser
Director, German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG)
Webpage: www.cpg-online.de, Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CPGTU
Main Sections
Law and Politics in Asia
Law and Politics in East Asia
Law and Politics in South Asia
Law and Politics in Southeast Asia
International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia
Announcements
Law and Politics in Asia
Asian countries divided over UN death penalty moratorium
(dql) In a poll on a resolution which calls for a moratorium on the use of capital punishment eleven countries from the Asia-Pacific region were among the 39 countries which voted against the resolution in the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. They include Afghanistan, Brunei Darussalam, China, India, Japan, the Maldives, North Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, and Tonga.
120 countries voted for the resolution, including over 15 Asia-Pacific countries. Among them are Sri Lanka and the Philippines. 24 countries abstained from the vote. Asia-Pacific countries among these are Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. [Human Rights Watch]
Law and Politics in East Asia
China: Hong Kong more opposition lawmakers arrested
(dql) Three opposition lawmakers in the Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo), the city’s parliament, have been arrested over charges of contempt in the legislature and intent to cause harm to others. Months ago, the arrested lawmakers disrupted LegCo hearings on the now-approved National Anthem ordinance, which criminalizes any insult to or abuse of the Chinese national anthem. [AP]
The arrests are the latest in a string of arrests in recent weeks and months. Earlier this month, seven pro-democracy lawmakers were arrested over their actions in another chaotic legislative meeting in May. [Yahoo News]
The recent arrests come shortly after the Hong Kong government disqualified four opposition lawmakers following the central government’s adoption of a resolution that allows the city government to oust LegCo members who are deemed unpatriotic or acting in a manner that poses a threat to national security. In response, 15 pro-democracy lawmakers resigned en bloc. [AiR No. 46, November/2020, 3]
Japan: Political parties divided over national referendum reform bill
(dql) Japan’s path to a new national referendum law becomes thorny, after a debate in the Diet last week proofed that ruling and opposition parties remain split over a related bill which had been already proposed by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in June 2018. It aims to make it easier for voters to cast their ballots in constitutional referendums by, among other things, setting up polling stations in commercial facilities.
While the LDP pushes for a quick vote on the bill, the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party insists on debates on restrictions on television commercials for national referendums on constitutional amendments prior to a decision on the bill. [Nippon]
Japan: Supreme Court finds gap in weight of votes in Upper House election vote constitutional
(dql) In a ruling last week, Japan's Supreme Court ruled that a vote-value disparity in the House of Councillors election in July 2019, in which the weight of individual votes in less populated constituencies was up to three times higher than those in more densely populated electoral districts, was constitutional and rejected demands of plaintiffs to nullify the election results.
The ruling followed conflicting decisions of high courts in lawsuits filed by lawyers claiming that the vote-value disparity constituted a violation of the constitutional requirement for a proportional ratio between a seat and the number of voters needed to win such a seat. [Mainichi]
South Korea: Ruling party to change law to overcome opposition blockade of anti-corruption agency launch
(dql) South Korea’s ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) announced that it will use its majority in parliament to push through a law that would allow it to override vetoes of the main opposition People Power Party against the launch of the Corruption Investigation Office for High-Ranking Officials (CIO).
The announcement comes after a seven-member panel concluded its third and fourth meeting without to agree on two out of nine candidates for the post of the CIO’s head. The panel consists of three government officials and four experts recommended by the two parties [Korea Herald]
The creation of the CIO with its power to investigate corruption cases involving high ranking officials lies at the core of the Moon administration’s reform of the country’s prosecution, in an attempt to curb the power of the prosecution which had been so far the sole institution in South Korea to initiate investigation and to decide whether to indict a specific suspect. This overwhelming power is widely seen as source for the prosecution’s abuse of power in the past. [The Diplomat]
South Korea: Bill to introduce quota of female executives in large companies proposed
(dql) Last week, a lawmaker of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) submitted a proposal which requires the introduction of a quota of female executives on the boards of stock market-listed companies with assets surpassing 1.8 billion USD. However, the bill did not mention a fix quota.
If approved, the bill would apply to currently close to 150 companies with a ratio of female executives at 4.5%. [Yonhap]
Taiwan: License of pro-Beijing news channel not renewed
(nm) Last week, Taiwan’s National Communications Commission (NCC) announced it will not renew the broadcasting license of cable news station Chung T’ien News (CTi News), effectively closing it down from December 11 when its current licence expires. According to the NCC, the unanimous decision is based on CTi’s repeated violations of broadcast regulations and failures of the channel’s internal discipline and control mechanisms, in particular the failure to fact check news as well as the channel’s largest shareholder’s involvement in the editorial process.
CTi News is owned by pro-China Want Want China Times Media Group, which belongs to Taiwanese tycoon Tsai Eng-meng, who openly shows support for the Chinese Communist Party. The channel is among the harshest critics of President Tsai Ing-wen and her independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). As one of the most-watched cable news networks, it is widely considered as a vocal supporter of unification with China.
Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), criticized the rejection accusing the NCC of using political power to interfere with freedom of the press. The DPP, meanwhile, endorsed the NCC’s decision, citing the protection of Taiwan’s freedom and democracy in the wake of fake news produced and circulated CTi News. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) echoed this claim arguing that Taiwan has become a “victim of growing media interference” from China. It called the rejection regrettable but insisted that it does not violate press freedom. [Bloomberg] Reporters Without Borders] [Taipei Times 1] [Taipei Times 2]
The NCC’s decision marks the first time Taiwan has shut a television news station since the regulatory body had been set up in 2006.
Taiwan: KTM joins “Autumn Struggle” march to protest government’s plan to lift ban US pork import policy
(nm) Tens of thousands of people took part in the “Autumn Struggle” protest march, an annual rally organized by labor groups. Traditionally focused on labour issues, this year’s protesters expressed particular discontent over the government’s plan to lift the ban on imports of US pork containing ractopamine, an animal feed additive which enhances leanness but is banned in the European Union and China, as well as in the US for beef more than 30 months old.
Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), joined the rally for the first time, as part of a campaign against the pork policy of the Tsai administration which it believes threatens food safety. [Focus Taiwan] [Reuters] [AiR No. 46, November/2020, 3]
Law and Politics in South Asia
India: Regional parties to contest local polls in Jammu & Kashmir union territory, checkmating ruling BJP
(lm) In a first since the revocation of Article 370 and the subsequent bifurcation of the former state of Kashmir [see AiR No. 32, August/2019, 1], elections will be held in the Jammu and Kashmir union territory. From November 28 to December 22, the newly created District Development Councils (DDCs) will go to the polls in eight phases. Along with 280 DDC seats, election will be held to fill over 12,000 vacant seats in panchayats (village councils) and more than 230 in urban local bodies. [Hindustan Times]
Aimed at strengthening the system of local self-government of villages in the union territory, the DDCs are set to become a new unit of governance in Jammu and Kashmir. Every district in Jammu and Kashmir will be divided into 14 territorial constituencies to elect members of the body in the maiden DDC elections. A legislation to this effect was brought in by the central government earlier this year, amending the Jammu and Kashmir’s Panchayati Raj Act, 1989. [The Indian Express 1]
In a surprise move, six constituents of the recently formalized ‘The People’s Alliance for Gupkar Declaration’ (PAGD) [see AiR No. 42, October/2020, 3] announced the alliance would contest the elections. The PAGD’s decision assumes added significance when considering that the National Conference (NC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), both founding members of the conglomerate, had boycotted regional polls held in 2018 to protest the abrogation of Article 370. In May, the NC had even pulled out of the Delimitation Commission, which was set up to redraw parliamentary and assembly constituencies of Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, and Jammu and Kashmir, and accused the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of seeking to divide the union territory on religious lines by manufacturing a Hindu dominance in the Kashmir valley [see AiR No. 36, September/2020, 2]. [India Today]
Observers therefore put particular emphasis on the dilemma faced by the regional parties which had to decide whether they would officially boycott the polls and risk getting further marginalized or accept the elections without resistance and ended up legitimizing the unilateral abrogation [see AiR No. 44, November/2020, 1]. Lending further credence to the argument that the BJP was expecting a political landscape void of competitors, the Minister of Home Affairs called the PAGD an ‘unholy global gang’, accusing its members of hobnobbing with foreign players. [The Hindu 1] [The Hindu 2] [The Print]
In the run-up to the election, the central government has issued orders to move an additional 25,000 security personnel to Jammu and Kashmir. But what is more, leaders and candidates of the PAGD allege that while candidates of the ruling BJP are allowed to canvass voters, candidates of the alliance are being whisked away by police to ‘cluster accommodations’ due to a perceived threat to their lives, leaving their movement and ability to campaign severely restricted. [The Indian Express 2] [The Wire]
India: Streaming services now within the ambit of government control
(lm) In a first step to regulate content on digital media, the central government has issued an order bringing online news portals and over-the-top (OTT) content providers such as Netflix under the authority of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB). News on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram will also come within the ministry’s ambit, according to a gazette notification published on November 11. [Al Jazeera] [Hindustan Times]
While electronic media in India is regulated by the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act of 1995, digital content hitherto effectively slipped under the legal radar. In October 2019, the government had indicated that it will issue ‘negative’ lists of don’ts’ for video streaming services like Netflix and Hotstar. It also wanted the platforms to come up with a self-regulatory body on the lines of the News Broadcasting Standards Authority. Anticipating the government’s intervention, 15 live-streaming platforms came together under the aegis of the Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI) in mid-September to sign a code of self-regulation, formulating a framework for age classification, appropriate content description and access control. The MIB, however, rejected the code. [The Hindu]
The new legislation comes at a time when lawmakers in India are trying to find the balance between pre-censorship and ex-ante regulation. In a case in point, the Home Minister of the state of Madhya Pradesh on November 22 asked police to investigate after a member of the country's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) objected to scenes in a Netflix series, in which a Hindu girl kisses a Muslim boy against the backdrop of a Hindu temple. [The Straits Times] [The Print]
India: Comedian likely to face contempt of court proceedings for publishing jokes about Supreme Court
(lm) Indian comedian Kunal Kamra may face jail term after the Attorney-General (AG) green-lighted petitions accusing Kamra of criminal contempt of court for his tweets about a Supreme Court (SC) decision. The Indian Contempt of Courts Act criminalizes any speech which ‘scandalizes’ or ‘lowers the authority of’ any court, or interferes with judicial proceedings. Anyone found guilty could face imprisonment for up to six months. [The Straits Times]
In a tweet published on November 11, Kamra suggested that the SC had given preferential treatment to Arnab Goswami, a TV news anchor and supporter of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Goswami had been arrested on November 4 for alleged abetment of suicide. Within a week of his arrest, petitions for his bail were heard by the sessions court, the high court and the SC on a priority basis. While the lower courts dismissed his pleas, the apex court, which took an out-of-turn hearing of Goswami’s bail plea, granted him interim bail after hearing his petition via video conference. [The Wire]
A day after the AG consented to initiating contempt proceedings against Kamra, the comedian released an open letter on social media in which he refused to apologize for and to retract his statement. On November 20, then, the AG gave his consent for another round of contempt proceedings against Kamra for a second tweet. [The Hindu 1] [The Tribune] [National Herald]
Interestingly, the AG declined consent earlier this month to initiate contempt proceedings against the Chief Minister of the state of Andhra Pradesh and his principal advisor for making allegations against a judge of the SC and some other judges of the state high court. [The Print]
Against this backdrop, the parliamentary panel charged with examining the Data Protection Bill on November 19 invited representatives of Twitter to clarify on the company’s policy regarding the suspension and removal of user accounts and tweets. After the meeting, Committee chairperson Meenakshi Lekhi - a BJP lawmaker – said that Twitter’s explanation on banning handles and tweets was inadequate. [The Hindu 2] [The Times of India]
Taking place against the larger political confrontation between the parties, the meeting also triggered a Twitter row between Lekhi and opposition politician Shashi Tharoor over the mandate of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Personal Data Protection Bill. Tharoor is also chairman of the ‘Parliamentary Committee on Information Technology’, which in August had summoned representatives of social media giant Facebook to report on allegations of deliberate omissions, inaction and political bias while dealing with online hate-speech in India [see AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3]. [MediaNama]
Nepal: PM Oli tells Secretariat members that he would not tolerate false allegations made against him
(lm) During a meeting of the Nepal’s ruling Communist Party’s (NCP) Secretariat, Prime Minister Oli told the apex body’s nine members that he would not tolerate false allegations made against him. Further elaborating, Oli announced to step down as both party co-chair and prime minister if the allegations levelled against him by party co-chair and rival Pushpa Kamal Dahal were proven right or else Dahal would have to quit party co-leadership. [The Himalayan Times 1]
The party’s Secretariat meeting concluded with the decision that would be given the opportunity to present his own political document during the next meeting scheduled for November 28. Thereafter, the NCP will hold its Standing Committee meeting on December 3 and Central Committee meeting on December 10.
In a document presented at a previous meeting, Dahal had accused the prime minister of failures, including Oli’s alleged backtracking on previous agreements and his failure to control the coronavirus pandemic to demand the premier minister’s resignation for the sake of party unity. [AiR No. 46, November/2020, 3]
Shortly thereafter, PM Oli called for delaying the then-upcoming Secretariat meeting, even asking the Party General Secretary to persuade Dahal to postpone the meeting and withdraw the document. Increasingly isolated, Oli then tried to woo some Secretariat members, in particular Madhav Nepal and Bamdev Gautam, offering the post of prime minister after the upcoming elections and party chairmanship, respectively, through the general convention. The next day, however, the prime minister suddenly agreed for a Secretariat meeting, a move coming as a surprise. [The Kathmandu Post 1]
Two events may have caused Oli’s change of heart: First, on November 11, the Supreme Court refused to issue an interim order, clearing the deck for Gautam, who was appointed a member of the country’s National Assembly (NA) in September [see AiR No. 38, September/2020, 4], to assume additional constitutional posts and to become a minister. Before the court’s ruling, observers had suggested that a potential reprieve could tilt the balance in the Secretariat in Oli’s favor. But for now, Gautam, who had turned his coat in the past [see AiR No. 44, November/2020, 1], appears to be standing firm and sticking with the Dahal faction. [The Kathmandu Post 2]
Secondly, the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, met with Prime Minister Oli on Tuesday evening, raising once again questions if the NCP is indeed still functioning on its own – an involvement in internal party affairs, which is not new. Throughout July, the Chinese ambassador had been going door-to-door in Kathmandu, paying visits to leaders of the NCP in order to prevent a party split and save Prime Minister Oli’s job. [AiR No. 27, July/2020, 1]
On November 21, the prime minister met with former Prime Minister and current President of Nepal’s main opposition party, the Nepali Congress (NC), Sher Bahadur Deuba. The meeting has been interpreted by some observers as an attempt by Oli to seek the NC’s support to run a coalition government if the ruling NCP splits. [The Himalayan Times 2] [The Kathmandu Post 3]
Pakistan: Anti-terrorism court hands down 10-year imprisonment to Jamat-ud-Dawa chief Hafiz Saeed
(lm) An anti-terrorism court has sentenced Hafiz Saeed, chief of the Islamist militant organization Jama'at-ud-Da'wah (JuD), to ten years in prison on two charges terrorism-financing. The sentences - five years each - will run concurrently. Saeed is already in jail serving two sentences of five-and-a-half years each, handed down to him in February this year. Two of his aides were also sentenced to 10-and-a-half years each, while his brother-in-law has been sentenced to six-month imprisonment. [The Indian Express]
The UN lists JuD as an alias of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), one of the largest militant organizations in South Asia, whose members, inter alias, carried out the 2008 Mumbai attacks that left at least 174 people dead and more than 300 wounded. The Indian government's view is that Pakistan, particularly through its intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has both supported the group and sheltered Hafiz Saeed. [The Straits Times]
Last year, New Delhi provided evidence on the issue to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental organization that monitors global money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF had placed Pakistan on its rating list of countries tagged as prone to illicit financial activity in June 2018. Since then, Islamabad has been facing possible blacklisting by the FATF, which could lead to economic sanctions from institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
During the FATF's last review in October, Islamabad was urged to complete the internationally agreed action plan by February 2021 and to demonstrate that terrorism financing probes resulted in effective sanctions. In the run-up to the meeting, India had mounted a determined effort to hold Pakistan responsible for its role in supporting terrorism and terrorist infrastructure. [AiR No. 43, October/2020, 4]
Pakistan: High Court rejects petition seeking lift of broadcasting ban
(lm) The Islamabad High Court has dismissed a petition against a notification by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) that prevents all television channels in Pakistan from broadcasting or rebroadcasting speeches, interviews and public addresses by proclaimed offenders and absconders. [Daiji World]
The petition, which was filed by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) along with some journalists, also challenged a ban imposed on the broadcasting of commentary, opinions or suggestions about the potential fate of any matter, which is sub-judice in the courts. The petitioners argued that both PEMRA orders would deny people their right to information, which they say is constitutionally guaranteed. [Dawn]
Taking place against the backdrop of a larger political confrontation between the ruling Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the newly-formed Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), the notification was published just days after electronic media had live broadcasted a speech from former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, in which he had offered a direct attack on the country’s powerful military. Sharif had addressed the PDM’s multi-parties conference through video link from London [see AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1]. Earlier, Sharif had been declared in absentia an absconder over his prolonged absence from the proceedings pertaining to a corruption case [see AiR No. 37, September/2020, 3]
Pakistan: Opposition alliance defies ban on public gatherings and holds rally in Peshawar
(lm) Prime Minister Imran Khan on November 22 said the federal government would be compelled to enforce a complete lockdown if the opposition did not desist from holding public gatherings at a time when the country was reeling under the impact of COVID-19. The previous day, the newly-formed Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) [see AiR No. 38, September/2020, 4, AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1] held a rally in Peshawar, despite not holding a permission. [Dawn 1]
In the run-up to Saturday’s protests, the prime minister and several members of his Cabinet had criticized the PDM for allegedly playing with the lives of common people – a claim Khan repeated on Sunday, saying the PDM would be responsible for the consequences if it continued with public gatherings amidst a second wave of coronavirus cases. [The Express Tribune] [Dawn 2]
In the run-up to the rally, the opposition alliance had sought permission to hold a public meeting. Noting that the rate of coronavirus cases in the city had already exceeded 13 percent, the local government, however, refused to grant the permission, saying that a public gathering was likely to further increase the spread of the virus. In light of the sudden spike in COVID-19 cases, the local government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province constituted a five-member committee to meet parliamentary leaders of the opposition to convince them to call off the Peshawar rally, but the alliance's leaders refused to join the meeting. [Dawn 3]
On November 16, the prime minister then imposed restrictions on public gatherings and called upon on citizens to observe standard operating procedures to curb the second wave of the virus. He also suspended public gatherings of his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party and asked other political parties to follow suit. PDM President Maulana Fazlur Rehman [see AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1] the next day announced that the alliance rejected Khan’s request and announced that its remaining three public meetings would be held as planned.
The PDM will continue its campaign in Multan (November 30), followed by protests in Lahore (December 13). The parties plan to end the campaign with a ‘long march’ march on Islamabad, the capital, in 2021.
Pakistan: PM Khan approves creation of coordination body for intelligence apparatus
(lm) Prime Minister Imran Khan has green-lighted the formation of the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC), which is supposed to serve as a mechanism to coordinate the over two dozen intelligence organizations in the country. The NICC will likely be headed by the director general of the country’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The decision is part of a long-awaited reform of Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus, which until recently had come to a standstill due to differences over the leadership of the new body. [Dawn]
Sri Lanka: President Rajapaksa establishes two new ministries, reassigns departments
(lm) Sri Lanka’s President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has created two new ministries – Public Security and Technology – and reassigned some of the functions previously held under him and his elder brother and State Minister of Internal Security, Home Affairs and Disaster Management, Chamal Rajapaksa, as a consequence. [ColomboPage]
The new Ministry of Public Security will be responsible for supervising the police department, the civil security department, the police training college and the multi-purpose development task force, all of which had been hitherto managed by the State Ministry of Defense. The newly established Ministry of Technology will be in charge of the Sri Lanka Telecommunications Regulatory Commission as well as the Sri Lanka Telecom, among others. [EconomyNext]
Law and Politics in Southeast Asia
Cambodia: Gambling law promulgated while casino operator plans to build theme park close to Angkor Wat
(nd) A newly promulgated Law on the Management of Integrated Resorts and Commercial Gambling (LMCG) regulates commercial gaming activities with respect to individuals and entities. Cambodia’s gambling sector attracts many tourist, mostly Chinese, and creates significant jobs and tax revenue. For the sake to fight money laundering, bribery, corruption and the financing of terrorism, the new law enables authorities to inspect material and record voices from cameras installed at casinos and other commercial gaming centers. Cambodian citizens are still not allowed to visit casinos. [Phnompenh Post]
Meanwhile, NagaCorp, Hong Kong-listed operator of NagaWorld casinos in the Cambodian capital, is about to erect a 75-hectare theme park project outside of Siem Reap, nearby the iconic Angkor Wat temple by a Chinese state-owned enterprise not known yet. The government granted a 50-year lease on the land. While developers emphasize the expected increase in tourism, locals and rights groups remain skeptical of the benefits and asked for more transparency. Many worry about the preservation of the identity of the UNESCO World Heritage site, which displays artifacts from the 12th century, in light of the entertainment nature of the project and a planned “China Town” inside the theme park.
Concerns about gambling facilities being built are rooted in the years-long Chinese investment into Sihanoukville, which became a magnet for Chinese casinos, much to the disdain of local residents. After most Western countries stopped investing in Cambodia over its human rights situation, China gained big influence as investor. [Radio Free Asia]
Cambodia: Theme park close to Angkor Wat to be built
(nd) NagaCorp, Hong Kong-listed operator of NagaWorld casinos in the capital, announced to built a 75-hectare theme park project outside of Siem Reap, nearby the iconic Angkor Wat temple. It will be built by a Chinese state-owned enterprise not known yet. The government granted a 50-year lease on the land. While developers emphasize the expected increase in tourism, locals and rights groups remain skeptical of the benefits and asked for more transparency. Many worry about the preservation of the identity of the UNESCO World Heritage site, which displays artifacts from the 12th century, in light of the entertainment nature of the project and a planned “China Town” inside the theme park.
Concerns about gambling facilities being built are rooted in the years-long Chinese investment into Sihanoukville, which became a magnet for Chinese casinos, much to the disdain of local residents. After most Western countries stopped investing in Cambodia over its human rights situation, China gained big influence as investor. [Radio Free Asia]
Indonesia: Dissolving of 29 state agencies
(nd) In an effort to decrease bureaucracy, Indonesia plans to dissolve 29 state agencies next year, ten of which were established through presidential executive regulation respectively decree, the rest by law and therefore needing participation of the House of Representatives. Reasons given for the decrease were overlaps between the tasks of several ministries, as well as their proven ineffectiveness due to a lack of communication.
A leaner bureaucracy is one of the president's key goals, who shortly after his inauguration in 2014 disbanded 10 state bodies and continued doing it over the following years. The bloated-up bureaucracy was inherited from his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who set up numerous "auxiliary agencies" with often overlapping tasks, creating unjustifiable operational costs. Critics emphasize the state still has to be able to form new agencies and should have a more long-time oriented planning for the future organization of agencies. [The Star]
Indonesia: Growing influence of returned cleric
(nd) Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) leader Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, who just came back from self-exile in Saudi Arabia [See also AiR No. 46, November/2020, 3], has grown his influence and holds daily, popular sermons, frequently attacking the administration of president Joko Widodo, and the recently-enacted, controversial omnibus law. His sermons grew in size and took on more frequently political issues, calling his listeners to fight to “liberate Indonesia”, which forced the administration to react. Social distancing was cited to prevent gatherings, the police chiefs of Jakarta and West Java were both fired for not enforcing the protocols. According to the health ministry, 80 attendants of the gatherings contracted Covid-19, sparking rumors that the now resting cleric and his family might have, too.
Rizieq argues that compliance to shariah law has a basis in Indonesia's constitution and Pancasila, the five founding principles, with the first saying "Belief in One God," illustrating Islam's concept of monotheism.
While he distanced himself from the establishment of a caliphate and denounced violence, he tolerated the beheading of a French teacher for showing caricatures of the prophet. While not posing a risk as potential political enemy, for he does not have a national basis and conservatism has not translated into politics, analysts argue Rizieq could create more social unrest, which would make necessary reforms harder to materialize.
Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan visited Rizieq when he returned. Basweda's win in 2017 is founded upon rallies against Chinese-Indonesian Christian governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja "Ahok" Purnama, over alleged blasphemy, mobilized by Rizieq [See also AiR No. 46, November/2020, 3]. Later, FPI tweeted implying support for Baswedan in Indonesia's next presidential election in 2024. On December 2, which marks the anniversary of the rallies, there will be another mass gathering, for which police has denied permits for, citing Covid-19 and tearing down advertising posters.
Meanwhile, the commander of the Indonesian Military (TNI) stands with the administration, calling out heavily against the cleric to not threaten Indonesia's unity: “I will not hesitate to take serious action. Don’t try to disturb our unity and integrity. Don’t feel as if you are representing all Muslims. A good Muslim is one who believes in caring and tolerance for everyone and everything. […] As a Muslim, I can’t accept it.”
TNI is respected due to his support of the struggle for independence, in contrast to notoriously corrupt police, who was responsible for internal security since 1998, which makes the TNI's involvement a “grey area.” The TNI claims its duty is as “protector of the nation.” Rizieq has accused the TNI to favor Chinese-Indonesians over Muslim clerics. [Nikkei Asia] [Asia Times]
Myanmar: Politician shot dead in Northern Shan State
(lf) An elected member from the National League for Democracy (NLD) has been shot dead in Northern Shan State by an unidentified shooter. The NLD has called for a quick investigation and denied any political reasons for the violence. [Reuters]
The country’s latest election has been preceded by political violence with tensions having been particularly high between the military proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the NLD. [AiR No. 42, October/ 2020, 3], [AiR 44, November/ 2020, 1]
Myanmar: Increase in female lawmakers
(lf) In both the national and regional parliaments, there has been an increase of 4% in the elected female lawmakers and regional affairs ministers, making up 17% altogether. While the increase is still resulting in the lowest percentage of female lawmakers among ASEAN, the increase has been steady and the elected parliamentarians are younger and more educated than in 2015, with many of them from civil society and activist groups in their respective regions. [Irrawaddy]
Philippines: Rise in requests by government, Facebook reports
(nd) According to Facebook's latest transparency report, the Philippine government made 131 “preservation requests” for about 1,100 users and accounts in the first half of 2020, in comparison to such requests for 1,099 accounts from 2016 to 2019.
The request is for Facebook to take a temporary snapshot of the account to preserve content that is potentially relevant to criminal investigations. The information will only be disclosed within legal proceedings, requiring a subpoena, a court order and a search warrant. In 2020, the Philippines passed the controversial anti-terror law to fight drug crime, which was criticized by many countries and human rights organizations. [Rappler]
Singapore: Activist charged with staging illegal protests
(py) Activist Jolovan Wham Kwok Han was charged on Monday with staging illegal protests for trwo actions. The first charge was for holding up a sign, demanding to drop the charges against two activists accused of writing a defamatory article alleging corruption in the Singapore Cabinet. [Channel News Asia 1] The second charge was for holding up a smiley face on a cardboard to support a “Fridays for Future” activist. [ALJAZEERA] [Channel News Asia 2]
According to the Public Order Act, all forms of public protest are illegal unless they are staged at Singapore’s speaker corner with a police permit. [South China Morning Post] Besides, the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Bill (POFMA) which was signed into law in October 2019, allows any government minister to order correction notices, removal of content and blocking of access to content online. [AiR No. 27, July/2020, 2] [Heinrich Böll Stiftung]
Thailand: Cambodian monks to go into exile
(nd) Two Buddhist monks fled from Cambodia to Thailand, avoiding their arrest. The activists were targeted by the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) for joining protests demanding the release of trade union leader Rong Chhun. They resisted exerted pressure by pro-government cleric officials to join the CPP. Many activists and civil society groups have condemned Chhun's arrest in July 2020, who was charged with sedition for commenting on the demarcation of the border between Cambodia and Vietnam, stripping local farmers of their land. [Asia News]
Vietnam: Government threatens to shut down Facebook over censorship request
(lm) Vietnam’s government has threatened to shut down Facebook in the country if the social media giant does not bow to government pressure to censor more local political content on its platform, Reuters reported, citing an unidentified senior company official. Facebook initially agreed to step up censorship of anti-state posts for local users in April. However, the government in August made another request for the company to further increase its restrictions of critical posts, threatening to shut the social media platform down if the company does not comply. [Reuters]
Facebook is astoundingly popular in Vietnam, counting more than half the country’s people among its account holders, who have turned the platform into a vibrant public sphere outside and beyond the ambit of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and its wooden state media outlets. At the same time, in a country with no independent media, the company is under constant government scrutiny, with Facebook repeatedly censoring dissenting posts at the request of the Vietnamese authorities. In August 2019, Vietnam’s information minister told the parliament that the company was complying with ‘70-75 percent’ of the government’s requests to remove content, up from about 30 percent previously. But what is more, since April, there has also been an increased number of cases in which journalists, bloggers, and activists were prosecuted for their activities on Facebook [see e.g. AiR No. 43, October/2020, 4, AiR No. 28, July/2020, 2]
Thus, the company has long faced criticism from rights group for too willingly acquiescing to government censorship demands, instead of using its leverage as Vietnam’s biggest media platform to hold the line against censorship [see e.g. AiR No. 44, November/2020, 1]. At the same time, observers say that the public outrage which would follow any attempt to ban the platform would make it entirely possible that Facebook could simply call the government’s bluff. Hence, between the poles of the desire for profit in the one instance, and the fear of political instability in the other, the relationship between the social media giant and the Vietnamese government may likely remain in a state of stable tension. [The Diplomat]
Vietnam: Government threatens to shut down Facebook over censorship request
(lm) Vietnam’s government has threatened to shut down Facebook in the country if the social media giant does not bow to government pressure to censor more local political content on its platform, Reuters reported, citing an unidentified senior company official. Facebook initially agreed to step up censorship of anti-state posts for local users in April. However, the government in August made another request for the company to further increase its restrictions of critical posts, threatening to shut the social media platform down if the company does not comply. [Reuters]
Facebook is astoundingly popular in Vietnam, counting more than half the country’s people among its account holders, who have turned the platform into a vibrant public sphere outside and beyond the ambit of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and its wooden state media outlets. At the same time, in a country with no independent media, the company is under constant government scrutiny, with Facebook repeatedly censoring dissenting posts at the request of the Vietnamese authorities. In August 2019, Vietnam’s information minister told the parliament that the company was complying with ‘70-75 percent’ of the government’s requests to remove content, up from about 30 percent previously. But what is more, since April, there has also been an increased number of cases in which journalists, bloggers, and activists were prosecuted for their activities on Facebook [see e.g. AiR No. 43, October/2020, 4, AiR No. 28, July/2020, 2]
Thus, the company has long faced criticism from rights group for too willingly acquiescing to government censorship demands, instead of using its leverage as Vietnam’s biggest media platform to hold the line against censorship [see e.g. AiR No. 44, November/2020, 1]. At the same time, observers say that the public outrage which would follow any attempt to ban the platform would make it entirely possible that Facebook could simply call the government’s bluff. Hence, between the poles of the desire for profit in the one instance, and the fear of political instability in the other, the relationship between the social media giant and the Vietnamese government may likely remain in a state of stable tension. [The Diplomat]
International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia
China: Advancing stealth capacities
(dql) According to Chinese military experts, China has developed a meter wave anti-stealth radar capable of detecting advanced stealth aircraft and guiding missiles to strike on stealthy fighter jets. [EurAsian Times]
Meanwhile, Chinese scientists have claimed breakthroughs in an engineered material that would advance stealth technology used in fighter jets of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), citing successful experiments with metamaterials designed to escape radars with wave-bending powers. [South China Morning Post]
China: Moon mission launched
(dql) China launched a spacecraft to the moon, expected to be the first country to bring back lunar rock and soil samples, in a first in over four decades.
The launch is the latest move in the country’s ambitious space program, which Beijing hopes will lead to an international lunar research station and eventually to a human colony on the moon.
So far, only the US and Russia have retrieved lunar samples back in the 1970s. [New Yoprk Times]
China considers joining CPTPP
(dql) Speaking at the virtually held APEC summit last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China is “proactively considering” joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the trade agreement covering 11 countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam) and accounting for more than 13% of the global GDP. [SupChina]
The announcement comes shortly after China joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership with the ten ASEAN member states, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. [AiR No. 46, November/2020, 3]
As the US is neither party to the CPTPP, from which President Donald Trump pulled out shortly after his election in 2016, nor to the RCEP, analysts describe the deals as a geopolitical victory for China which will further widen and deepen its influence in Asia. The deals further send a strong message to the world that China, while emphasizing domestic consumption for its economic growth, does not turn inwards in a protectionist manner but is committed to free trade and multilateralism. It is believed that the deals pave the way for further trade agreements among the member countries, such as one between China, South Korea, and Japan. [CNBC] [Foreign Policy] [Jakarta Post]
Against this background, analysts see pressure mounting on President-elect Joe Biden to consider to join these two trade deals, too. [The Diplomat] [Bloomberg] [Nikkei Asian Review]
China at G20 reassures commitment to global efforts and cooperation to fight pandemic
(dql) Speaking at the G20 summit, which was dominated by the pandemic issue, Chinese President called for a “global firewall against COVID-19”, reassuring China’s commitment to providing assistance and support to other developing countries, and to contributing to making vaccines a “global public good accessible and affordable to people around the world.”
Pointing to lessons learned from pandemic and its impact on the global economy, he stressed the need to restore the secure and smooth operation of global industrial and supply chains as well as the need to reduce tariffs and barriers, and to explore the liberalization of trade of key medical supplies.
He pledged that China as “a builder of global peace, a contributor to global development and a defender of international order,” is willing to pursue peaceful coexistence and common development with all countries.
US and its allies urge Beijing to reinstate disqualified Hong Kong lawmakers
(dql) Foreign ministers from Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the US last week issued a joint statement calling on Beijing to reinstate four Hong Kong opposition legislators which were disqualified by the city’s government over charges of supporting the independence of the city. [AiR No. 46, November/2020, 3]
The five eyes alliance’s ministers expressed “serious concerns” over China’s imposition of new rules to disqualify elected legislators, calling the resolution part of a concerted campaign to silence political dissent which was triggered by the Beijing’s imposition of the National Security Law for Hong Kong in July. [South China Morning Post]
China’s Foreign Ministry was quick to buke the statement, warning “[w]hether it's Five Eyes or Ten Eyes, as long as they dare to hurt China's sovereignty, security and development interests, they will get their eyes poked and blinded.” [The Star]
China maintains discontent against Australia
(dql) Amid already frosty relations, China is hardening its stance against Australia. Following a fiercely worded statement in which China reiterated that it held Australia solely responsible for the current condition of the countries’ bilateral ties because of a “series of wrong moves related to China” on Canberra’s sides, China made public a list of more than a dozen grievances against Australia. Topping the list is a ban of Huawei from the roll-out of 5G over national security concerns. Further grievances include the passage of foreign interference laws, the call for an investigation into the origins of the coronavirus, and speaking on the South China Sea as well as on human rights allegations in Xinjiang. [CNN] [9 News]
The Chinese rebuff came just a day after Australia and Japan agreed in principle on a defense pact which will increase joint military exercises in key geo-strategic waterways, including in the South and East China seas, and also allows the stationing of troops in each other's countries. [AiR No. 46, November/2020, 3]
Relations between Beijing and Canberra have been spiraling downwards since Australian Prime Minister Morrison demanded an international investigation into the outbreak of the coronavirus in China and after Huawei was excluded from Australia's national 5G network over national security concerns. In response Beijing imposed trade bans and restrictions on imports of various Australian commodities.
China-Japan relations: Foreign Ministers agree on pandemic cooperation amid hardening stances on disputed East China Sea islands
(dql) In a meeting on Tuesday in Tokyo, Chinese Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and his Japanese counterpart Toshimitsu Motegi agreed to cooperate in combating the coronavirus and reviving their pandemic-hit economies. They also agreed to try to avoid actions that provoke tensions over disputed islands in the East China Sea and to set up a hotline between their militaries by the end of December. In spite of this, both sides insists on their respective claims over the disputed territories, with Motegi reiterating Japan’s demand that China “takes a forward-looking action,” while Wang reassured China’s position saying that “we will continue to safeguard our sovereignty.” [AP]
Wang is scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga on Wednesday. His visit comes at a time when concerns about Beijing’ influence in the Asia are rising in Japan while potentials to deepen economic ties increase after both countries joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
Japan: New generation frigate launched
(dql) Japan’s Navy last week launched its first new generation of stealth multi-mission frigates. The new type is a 435-foot-long warship, displacing 5.500 tons when fully loaded. It will incorporate missile launchers, surface and underwater unmanned systems and electronic counter-measures and is expected to be commissioned into the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in 2022 after qualification trials. [Defense World]
Inter-Korean relations: Seoul not co-sponsoring UN resolution on North Korea’s rights abuses
(dql) South Korea has opted out of co-sponsoring a UN resolution on human rights violations in North Korea, which was adopted last week by the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly. The resolution, drafted by the European Union and sponsored by 58 countries, condemns Pyongyang’s practices of forced labor, abductions, and arbitrary detention, while urging Pyongyang to permit assistance from international humanitarian agencies. The resolution, if adopted by the UN General Assembly, would be the 16th of its kind since 2005. [Korea Times]
It is the second consecutive year in which South Korea decided not to co-sponsor the resolution. The decision is widely believed to maintain door open for inter-Korean peace talks. [Korea Herald]
North Korea condemned the resolution, calling it "political ploy" that has "nothing to do with improving human rights." [UPI]
The US, meanwhile, imposed sanctions on a Russian construction company and a North Korean trading company accused of being involved in exporting forced labor from North Korea. According to US estimations, Pyongyang was earning over 500 million USD annually almost 100,000 workers abroad of which around 50.000 were in China and 30.000 in Russia. [Reuters]
Taiwan-US relations: Deepening economic ties amid Taiwanese fishery products being put on US list of forced labor produced goods
(dql/nm) In a latest sign of efforts to increase bilateral economic cooperation, Taiwan and the US in a meeting in Washington last week signed a five-year agreement to establish an annual U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership (EPP) Dialogue. The delegations were led by the Undersecretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Keith Krach, and Taiwanese Minister without portfolio John Deng respectively. Issues addressed at the meeting covered the State Department’s new Clean Network project and 5G security, semiconductors, as well as investment screening and science and technology.
Pointing to the political dimension of the agreement, the US Department of State reassured that the institutionalization of the EPP Dialogue “will help strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship,” and at the same time “further magnify the two societies’ respect for democracy, and strengthen our shared commitment to free markets, entrepreneurship, and freedom.” [VoA] [AP]
The memorandum comes at a time of strengthened ties between the US and Taiwan. On Thursday, Taiwan’s top envoy to the US confirmed that Andrew Wheeler, head of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), will visit Taiwan during the week of December 5. The visit raised criticism in the US as the trip will be taxpayer-funded, although Mr. Wheeler will no longer represent the incoming administration’s EPA policy. [Focus Taiwan] [New York Times, $]
Further fostering bilateral relations, several US senators also urged the World Health Organization (WHO) on Friday to allow Taiwan meaningful participation in its activities, including in the annual World Health Assembly. The bipartisan letter stressed Taiwan’s successful handling of its local COVID-19 outbreak and pointed out that Taiwan’s exclusion from the WHO “places the political agenda of a single member over the health of the global community”. [Taipei Times]
Meanwhile, the US Department of Labor has put Taiwanese fishery products on its ‘List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor’, with import restrictions on Taiwan-caught seafood and a substantial impact on the future of the Taiwan’s seafood industry looming. Taiwan seafood exports account for over 1.3 billion USD annually. However, the island’s fishing fleet has long been accused of abuse and nonpayment of migrant fishermen. [Nikkei Asian Review]
In a related development, Greenpeace along with more than 30 other human rights, environmental and labor organizations across the world urged the Taiwanese government to launch reforms to tackle what they called "persistent and systemic issues of forced labor" on Taiwan's distant water fishing (DWF) fleets. The core demands for reform included the entitlement of migrant fishermen to the same rights and protection as Taiwanese fishermen by including them in the Taiwan’s Labor Standards Act as well as the ratification of the Work in Fishing Convention. The Convention was adopted at the 96th International Labour Conference (ILC) of the International Labour Organization ILO in 2007 and consists of a set of standards aimed to ensure that fishermen work under decent conditions on board fishing vessels covering minimum requirements for work on board; conditions of service; accommodation and food; occupational safety and health protection; medical care and social security. [Focus Taiwan]
Widely unknown, Taiwan has one of the world’s largest fishing industries. With more than 1.000 Taiwanese-flagged and over 200 Taiwanese-owned, foreign-flagged DWF vessels, it is the second-largest fishing entity on the high seas behind China. It is the largest longline tuna exporter in the world and the second largest supplier of frozen tuna to Thailand. [IHRB]
For Greenpeace’s findings on forced labour in Taiwan’s distant water fisheries, see [Greenpeace].
At G20, Indian PM Modi focuses on green politics
(lm) In his speech at the opening session of the G20 summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on November 22 called for a new ‘global index’ for the post-coronavirus world which would, inter alia, incorporate a strong emphasis on a sustainable use of resources. Further elaborating on the issue, Modi later said that India was the only country on track among the G20 nations to keep what it had promised under the 2015 Paris Agreement – unlike China, the United States and the European Union. [The Times of India] [Scroll.in]
India’s track record of being the only ‘2 degree Celsius compatible’ country was confirmed in a report released on November 18 by Climate Transparency, an international partnership of 14 research and non-governmental organizations, which showed that the other 19 leading and emerging economies were far from achieving their goals. India’s headline pledge under its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) is to reduce the emissions intensity by 33-35 percent over the 2005 levels by 2030. [Deutsche Welle]
Still, the report also noted that India continues to be not on track for the Paris Agreement’s 1.5-degree Celsius pathway – a target which gained momentum in 2018 after the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published a report showing how the 2-degree Celsius goal (keeping the global average temperature rise within 2 degree Celsius by 2100 from the pre-industrial level) would be devastating for the planet. [Climate Transparency]
It was further announced that India will be hosting the G20 summit in 2023 — a year later than previously planned. [Deccan Herald]
Addressing the BRICS summit, Indian PM Modi calls terrorism the biggest problem confronting the world
(lm) Indian Prime Minister Modi on November 17 addressed a virtual summit of the five-nation BRICS grouping focusing on terrorism and post-pandemic economic recovery. In his remarks, Modi touched upon cooperation in public health and the need for reforms of the UN Security Council and global bodies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). India will be holding the BRICS chairmanship next year, which also marks the 15th anniversary of the grouping. [The New Indian Express]
Addressing the summit after Russian President Vladimir Putin, Modi said that terrorism was the biggest problem facing the world today, adding that there was a need to ensure that countries that shelter terrorists must also be blamed. Read between the lines, the remarks were a clear nod to China, which has repeatedly shielded Pakistan from international censure for sponsoring cross-border terrorism in India and Afghanistan. [One India]
A case in point was the virtual meeting of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) held in October to decide whether to keep Pakistan in on the groupings Compliance Document, also known as ‘grey’ monitoring list. In the run-up to the meeting, India had mounted a determined effort to hold Pakistan responsible for its role in supporting terrorism and terrorist infrastructure. Although Islamabad was yet to report total compliance with the FATF’s 27-point action plan, China tried their best during the meeting to support Pakistan’s poor performance [see AiR No. 43, October/2020, 4].
Against this backdrop, it is worth taking a closer look at the role of Russia, which holds the rotating SCO presidency this year and also hosted the BRICS summit. As close observers of the high-altitude border standoff attest, Moscow continues to play an important though discreet role in bringing India and China to the negotiating table. In part, this is because India’s dependence on Russia weaponry is deep enough for New Delhi to be not able to offend Russian sensibilities directly [see e.g. AiR No. 38, September/2020, 4 AiR No. 26, June/2020, 5].
At the BRICS summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin said his country was ready to cooperate with its BRICS partners in the manufacturing and distribution of the Russian-made Sputnik V vaccine. The Russian Direct Investment Fund, which bankrolled the development of the anti-coronavirus vaccine, has agreements with India and Brazil to conduct trials of the jab, as well as manufacturing agreements with pharmaceutical companies in India and China to produce it, the Russian leader added. [Associated Press] [The Moscow Times]
Indian PM Modi calls US President-elect Joe Biden to discuss strategic ties
(lm) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held his first phone conversation with US President-elect Joe Biden to congratulate him and reaffirm India’s commitment to a strategic partnership between the two countries. Modi had initially sent his congratulations to Biden and Vice President-elect Kamala Harris just hours after the former was declared president-elect. [The Straits Times] [Al Jazeera 1]
Stepping up the Trump administration’s anti-China message in India, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former Defense chief Mark Esper visited New Delhi a week ahead of the US’s November 3 presidential election. During the two-day visit, India had signed on to the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), which commits both countries to provide reciprocal access to each other’s military facilities, securing military communications, and sharing geospatial data from airborne and satellite sensor [see AiR No. 44, November/2020, 1].
India enjoys a strong and growing relationship with the US, with five US presidents (Republican and Democrat) visiting the South Asian nation in the last 10 years. In the same vein, US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun, who was visiting New Delhi a week earlier, also touched on the then-upcoming US presidential election, saying that any possible outcome was unlikely to affect deepening US-ties with New Delhi because ‘this relationship is much bigger than any one political party.’ [AiR No. 43, October/2020, 4]
Modi’s swift welcome of the new US leaders comes amid concerns among Indian foreign policy experts who say the prime minister had in the past come dangerously close to endorsing Trump’s candidature, which they said could hurt India’s prospects under a Democratic administration. While New Delhi enjoys cross-party support in Washington, Democratic lawmakers have increasingly voiced concern about human rights under the Hindu nationalist Modi, including his championing of the Hindu nationalist citizenship law and revocation of autonomy in Muslim-majority Kashmir [see e.g. AiR No. 8, February/2020, 4]. Still, India’s governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) maintains that the issue of Kashmir and the citizenship law are internal matters that will not impact US-India ties. Analysts therefore say US-Indian relations will continue to see an upward trajectory, albeit with nuanced changes, as Washington wants New Delhi as a key partner in efforts to push back against China. [Al Jazeera 2] [South China Morning Post]
US National Security Adviser tells Vietnam to curb illegal Chinese shipment to avoid duties
(lm) During a two-day visit to Hanoi, US National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien urged Vietnamese leaders to intensify efforts to curb the illegal re-routing of Chinese transshipments and to reduce Hanoi’s bilateral trade surplus to reverse recently imposed US tariffs. [South China Morning Post 1]
According to observers, the Southeast Asian country has emerged as one of the largest beneficiaries of the ongoing trade dispute between China and the United States as some businesses are relocating their supply chains from China in order to avoid tariffs. At the same time, Vietnam relies heavily on China for materials and equipment for its labor-intensive manufacturing. Meanwhile, the United States is its largest export market. [Deutsche Welle]
After Washington in October announced an official investigation into whether Hanoi had manipulated its currency [see AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1], the US Commerce Department this month imposed preliminary anti-subsidy duties on Vietnamese car and truck tires, citing the nation’s ‘undervalued currency’ among the reasons. Before, the US Treasury Department in January had already placed Vietnam on a watchlist of ten potential currency manipulators that also includes Malaysia and Singapore. [Bloomberg]
Before, O’Brien had taken part in the virtual East Asia Summit, on the sidelines of which 15 countries, including Vietnam and the Philippines, signed the China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which marks a major setback for the US influence in Asia [see AiR No. 46, November/2020, 3]. On a more positive note, US conglomerate General Electric and a Vietnamese company signed a memorandum of understanding to develop an LNG (liquified natural gas) power plant near Ho Chi Minh City, during O’Brien’s visit to Hanoi. [The Business Times]
What is noteworthy, the visit follows a visit to Hanoi last month by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, which had yielded no concrete agreements, despite the high expectations for Pompeo’s trip [see AiR No. 44, November/2020, 1]. Some observers suggest that O’Brien’s on-again trip may have been aimed at signaling consistency and continuity in Washington’s hardened stance on the South China Sea dispute, despite the transition from Trump to Biden. [South China Morning Post 2]
Quad members conclude 24th edition of Malabar exercise
(lm) The latest iteration of the Malabar exercise concluded on Friday with a second phase being held from November 17 to 20 in the norther Arabian Sea. The first phase took place from November 3 to 6 off the coast of Vishakhapatnam in the Bay of Bengal. [The Times of India]
The exercise was the first for the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a loose strategic coalition of Japan, India, Australia and the United States, since the grouping’s reconvening in November 2017 [see AiR November/2017, 4, AiR November/2017, 3]. While the Malabar exercise was formally independent of the Quad consultation mechanisms, observers say Canberra’s participation after 13 years of absence is a clear sign of the increasing strategic convergence of the four countries in the face of China’s assertiveness [see AiR No. 43, October/2020, 4].
Following on the heels, the Indian Navy from November 18 to 22 conducted a Coordinated Patrol (CORPAT) with the Royal Thai Navy in the Andaman Sea. The navies of both countries have been carrying out CORPAT along their International Maritime Boundary Line twice a year since 2005, with the aim of keeping this vital part of the Indian Ocean safe and secure for commercial shipping and international trade. [The Hindu]
Just days later, the navies of both countries together with the Republic of Singapore Navy from November 21 to 22 conducted the second iteration of their trilateral maritime SITMEX-20 exercise in Andaman Sea. Hosted by the Indian Navy, the first edition of SITMEX, which included a shore phase at Port Blair and a sea phase in the Andaman Sea, was conducted in September 2019 [see AiR No. 39, September/2019, 4]. [India Today] [Hindustan Times]
India summons Pakistani diplomat over foiled terrorist attack
(lm) India has summoned a senior Pakistani diplomat over what New Delhi said was a foiled attack this week in the frontier territory of Jammu and Kashmir by a Pakistan-based militant group, a charge Islamabad firmly denied. [The Straits Times]
On November 19, four members of the Pakistan-based terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) were killed in a gun battle with Indian security forces in the Jammu district of the Jammu and Kashmir union territory. JeM’s primary motive is to separate Kashmir from India and merge it into Pakistan through attacks on security and government targets. In February 2019, the group claimed responsibility for a suicide attack that killed 40 Indian soldiers in the Indian-administered Kashmir town of Pulwama, the worst such attack on Kashmiri soil [see AiR (3/2/2019), AiR (4/2/2019)]. [The Hindu]
Earlier this month, Pakistan said it had compiled a dossier with evidence that India was sponsoring ‘terrorist’ activities from Afghan soil, aimed at destabilizing the country and undermining its economic partnership with China. [AiR No. 46, November/2020, 3]
In separate developments, an Indian soldier was killed and another wounded by Pakistani shelling along the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir between the two nuclear-armed rivals. Earlier this month, Pakistani and Indian troops exchanged fire across the highly-militarized frontier, leaving 12 people dead, including three Indian and one Pakistani soldier, and wounding at least 36 on both sides. The fatalities were some of the highest reported in recent years [see AiR No. 46, November/2020, 3]. [Japan Times]
Pakistan: Soldier, four fighters killed in shoot-out near the border with Afghanistan
(lm) During a raid in Pakistan's restive North Waziristan region, on November 22, four suspected militants and one soldier were killed in an ensuing gun battle. [Al Jazeera] [Anadolu Agency]
A part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the district of North Waziristan long served as a headquarters for local and foreign rebels until 2017, when the army said it had cleared the semi-autonomous tribal region of fighters following a series of operations. The region still sees sporadic attacks, mainly targeting security forces. [see AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1, AiR No. 37, September/2020, 3]
Maldives to receive Japanese grant to strengthen maritime security
(lm) The Maldives and Japan on November 22 signed an agreement for a Japanese grant of $7.6 million to be extended to the Maldives Coast Guard and the Maritime Rescue and Coordination Center. Intended to enhance the Coast Guard’s operational capabilities in carrying out humanitarian operations, observers say the agreement brings the archipelago even more firmly into the ‘Indo-Pacific’ side of the emerging geopolitical maritime fault line pitting the US and its allies against China. [The Hindu] [The Edition] [Avas]
Coming less than three months after the signing of a bilateral US-Maldives framework agreement [see AiR No. 37, September/2020, 3], the grant aid is Male’s second major pact with a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a loose strategic coalition of Japan, India, Australia and the United States.
Indonesia: G20 presidency in 2022
(nd) Indonesia will assume the G20 presidency in 2022, instead of 2023, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi announced. Since Indonesia will chair ASEAN in 2023, bilateral talks with India resulted in a switch. India's initial turn would have been 2023 but also intended to postpone.
Next year, Indonesia will join the troika, which consists of the previous, current and upcoming chair. Currently, presidency is held by Italy, who took in over from Saudi Arabia, who hosted the group's summit last Sunday. G20 consists of 19 countries and the European Union. Current and foreseeably future topics with involve measures against poverty, women’s empowerment, climate change and the corona virus pandemic, including efforts to cooperate developing and facilitate access to a vaccination. [Jakarta Globe]
Indonesia: Analysis on RCEP potential
(nd) A recent analysis from the Perth USAsia Centre, University of Western Australia, argues why the recent signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement on November 17, a free trade agreement, which will encompass 29 % of the global GDP, can play a key role in the countries' post-COVID-19 economic recovery. Through a common market, regional integration will be strengthened by developing regional value chains according to common trade rules, possibly benefiting Indonesia, which was yet unable to capture the production and investment moving out of China due to its trade war with the US. A prerequisite would be a continued effort to development the infrastructure and economic reforms. Due to the lack of efficient infrastructure, Indonesia has higher transport costs than other ASEAN states. With the economic downturn of the pandemic, it is harder for Indonesia to mobilize the billions needed to develop such crucial infrastructure, making it more dependent on initiatives by regional governments, such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, requiring diplomatic tact and sensitivity.
Though part of president Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s plan to transform Indonesia into a investment destination, he failed to convince Indonesian's of the benefits of foreign investment, preferring a more protectionist approach. To attract such capital, though, Indonesia would need to reform its bureaucracy and the legal system as well as fight corruption. It has proved to be a difficult political climate for such fundamental change, given the massive protests against the controversial jobs creation omnibus bill passed early October, which precisely aimed at creating a more favorable environment for investors. [See also AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1]
Yet, the omnimus bill did not tackle wide-spread corruption in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which dominate the construction industry, therefore the government relies on them for much needed infrastructural development. [East Asia Forum]
Indonesia, US non-public White House meeting
(nd) In a meeting that was not put his public schedule, president Donald Trump met with Indonesia's Minister of Maritime Affairs and Investment at the White House on Tuesday.
The meeting was surprising, since Trump has not appeared in public since he lost the elections to Joe Biden and it remains in jeopardy whether he will be the first US president to not attend a G20 summit this weekend.
The meeting discussed joint vaccine production and their bilateral economic and strategic partnership in defense and technology.
Earlier this month, the US extended extended Indonesia’s Generalized System of Preferences, on Wednesday, Indonesia signed a $750 million infrastructure financing by the US. Last month, Indonesia, with the highest number of Covid-19 infestions and deaths in Southeast Asia, signed deals with Sinovac Biotech Ltd., Cansino and Sinopharm, Chinese pharmaceutical companies conducting late-stage vaccine trials, to be able to start mass vaccination by the end of this year.
The Indonesian visit to the US also aims at promoting investment in its sovereign wealth fund, aimed at financing infrastructure and thereby economic growth and met with a representative of the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a former roommate of Trump's son-in-law Jared Kushner. The DFC cooperates with the private sector to support development projects in lower- and middle-income countries, which is why it has been called an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Even if DFC approves the Indonesia fund, it remains unclear whether investors would trust it given the high level of corruption and debt of Indonesia, according to analysts. [Voice of Asia] [CNN]
Indonesia to receive $2bn in US investments for its sovereign wealth fund
(dql) Indonesia announced its planned multibillion dollar sovereign wealth fund will receive investments worth $2 billion from the US's new development bank. Adam Boehler, the head of United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) signed a letter of interest last week during a visit of Luhut Pandjaitan, Indonesia's coordinating minister of maritime affairs and investment, to Washington.
The setting up of a sovereign wealth fund was stipulated in the recently passed so-called omnibus law. The promise of $2 billion from the U.S. is a welcome boost for Indonesia, which is looking to raise $15 billion for the fund. [Nikkei Asian Review]
Indonesia: Move of HQ to Natuna Islands
(nd) The Indonesian navy moves its combat force headquarter to Natuna Islands, at the southern edge of the South China Sea, to be able to respond faster and protect territorial interests in the disputed waters amid rising tensions in the area where Chinese nine-dash-line-claims overlap with Indonesia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Jakarta, which rejects the Chinese claims resolutely, has detected a Chinese Coast Guard ship in its EEZ in September. Additionally, the Indonesia’s EEZ overlapps with those of Vietnam in the region as well with fishing boats from both countries regularly encroaching in the respective zones. For Indonesia, the challenge is mounting on both front lines. Last month alone, 31 foreign vessels, most Vietnamese-flagged, were detected to have fished illegally in the Natuna area, according to Destructive Fishing Watch (DFW) Indonesia. Yet, the biggest threat are Chinese fishing activities, which cannot be counterbalanced by merely deploying more Indonesian fishing vessels due to better gear and training of the Chinese fishermen. [Radio Free Asia]
Laos, China to sign tariffs agreement
(py) Under a Preferential Tariff Program, China agreed to remove tariffs on 97 percent of Laotian goods. Similar agreements were signed with Cambodia and Myanmar. The new agreement creates more production in Laos and increases exports to China. Yet, critics say the scheme might benefit China more than Laos more by setting higher standards for products from Lao-owned operations than those from Chinese investors in Laos. [Radio Free Asia]
Malaysia: Malacca to stop Chinese backed harbor project
(nd) Malaysian state of Malacca canceled a China backed $10.5 billion harbor development project, the Melaka Gateway project, because the developer had failed to complete its tasks in due time.
Initiated under the government of then-Prime Minister Najib Razak, the Malaysian developer KAJ backed by state-owned PowerChina and two other Chinese companies, the ensuing Mahathir government revoked the project's license in October 2018 over conflicting reports on whether the developer’s duties were fulfilled. After the developer successfully appealed the decision in 2019, the company failed to complete other parts of the project to be completed in October this year leading to the project’s final termination. [Radio Free Asia] [The Diplomat]
Philippines: US military assistance in jeopardy?
(nd) A Filipino envoy in Washington commented military aid to the Philippines might end under the leadership of President-elect Joe Biden. The ambassador referred to a democratic-party-proposed bill to suspend military aid “on the issue of human rights”, with respect to the anti-terrorism law and alleged human rights abuses in the wake of President Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs. According to the Ambassador, the Philippines received more than $550 million in military assistance from 2016 to 2019. Filipino officials commented, however, they were assured the US-Filipino military alliance would remain unchanged under a Biden administration. The alliance is important for both countries to counter-balance Chinese assertiveness in the region, including the South China Sea. [Philippine Inquirer]
Still, this week, the US under defeated President Trump donated $18 million worth of weapon systems to the Philippines to fight Islamist militants in Mindanao. The outgoing US administration also welcomed president Rodrigo Duterte's decision to extend the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) until early 2021, while arguing for a longer period of extension. [Philippine Inquirer] [See also AiR No. 46, November/2020, 3]
Philippines, India, Russia to reach missile deal early next year
(nd) The Philippine government might sign an agreement for the purchase of the Indian built BrahMos cruise missile. With an initial expression of interest late 2019, the pandemic seems to have delayed the purchase, which is likely to take place early 2021 as part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) modernization program.
BrahMos is part of BrahMos Aerospace, a joint venture between India and Russia, which was set up in 1998, and can be launched from both land and air. Apart from the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia have expressed interest to purchase the BrahMos cruise missile. The missile could be used to protect Filipino claims in the disputed South China Sea and deter China from further aggression. India and the Philippines have earlier agreed to intensify both countries' military and maritime cooperation, in light of regional conflicts. [The Diplomat]
Announcements
Upcoming Online Events
25 November 2020 @ 10:00 am CET, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden
Belarus Between Threats and Opportunities
This webinar organized by the Embassy of the Republic of Poland and the Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania in the Kingdom of Sweden will discuss Belarus’ current situation in light of mass protests against election fraud. The panel includes Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, leader of the Belarusian civil society.
For more information as well as registration by mail, please see: [UI] or [gov.pl].
25 November 2020 @ 9:00 am CET, Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, Switzerland
Gender-Based Violence and Access to Justice during the COVID-19 Pandemic
This webinar will include various speakers from across the Asia-Pacific region on the issue of gender-based violence and access to justice during the current health crisis.
Follow [DCAF] for further information and registration details.
25 November 2020 @ 3:00 pm CET, European Centre for International Political Economy, Belgium
ECIPE Webinar: Them and Us – How Immigrants and Locals can Thrive Together
In this online talk, Philippe Legrain makes the case for immigration, arguing that societies open to immigrants will fare better than closed societies – not just in economic terms.
Please find the details here: [ECIPE].
25 November 2020 @ 3:00 pm IST, Centre for Policy Research, India
Policy Lab Webinar: “Urban Poor Communities and COVID-19 – Inclusive Policies and Practice for Improved Urban Resilience”
This webinar will assess the role of water and sanitation in enhancing the resilience of urban poor communities.
For more information, please visit: [CPR].
25 November 2020 @ 11:30 am - 5:15 pm GMT + 8 , Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore
Young Singaporeans Conference 2020: “Choices”
This event will discuss the opportunities for young Singaporeans to talk about their personal choices around life, work, home, and values — and how these are affected by and may affect Singapore in the year 2030.
For more details see [IPS].
25 November 2020 @ 5:00 - 6:30 pm GMT + 2 , The South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa
The Crisis of Democratisation in the Middle East - North Africa Region and SAIIA Western Cape AGM
This webinar will discuss the crisis of democratisation in the Middle East-North Africa Region with a keynote address by Hussein Solomon.
For more details see [SAIIA].
25 November 2020 @ 18:00 - 20:00 pm GMT + 11, Australian Institute of International Affairs- Western Australia, Australia
Panel Discussion: Australian Trade after Covid - 19
This event will discuss Australia's current trade outlook, the problems Australian exporters are facing, and what can be done about them.
More details at [AIIAWA].
25 November 2020 @ 15:00 - 16:30 pm IST, Council on Energy, Environment and Water, India
Advancing EV Charging in India with Interoperability
This webinar will discuss how interoperability could be used to advance India’s EV charging ecosystem.
For registration details, please visit [CEEW].
25 - 26 November 2020 @ 2:45 pm CET, International Crisis Group, USA
2020 Watch List Virtual Policy Dialogue
This two-day virtual dialogue will discuss international crises, gathering participants around Kosovo/Serbia, Libya, the Sahel, Turkey, and the economic impact of COVIC-19 in Latin America. It assesses how the EU can play a stronger role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
For more information, please visit [Crisis Group].
26 November 2020 @ 9:30 am CET, Clingendael, Netherlands
EU-Japan Relations: Beyond the Strategic Partnership Agreement
The panel discussion will aim to evaluate the first period of EU-Japan relations since the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) entered into force in February 2019, the progress of cooperation under the new framework of EPA and the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), and the effects of the SPA and the Free Trade Agreement on the relations.
Details are accessible at [Clingendael] and [jdzb].
26 November 2020 @ 10:30 am IST, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, India
Webinar on Indian Army Operations in Counter Insurgency / Counter Terrorism (CI/CT) Environment and the Human Rights Challenges
This webinar will discuss operational realities affecting human rights aspects in CI/CT environment and the role of the Indian Army in protecting human rights of the citizens.
Please find the details here: [CLAWS].
26 November 2020 @ 1:00 am CET, Centre for International Governance Innovation, Canada
Deepfakes and Digital Harms: Emerging Technologies and Gender-Based Violence
Senior Fellow Suzie Dunn will assess online gender-based violence by considering its key concepts, the technologies used to target women, and existing supports for women affected. The ensuing discussion will focus on ways technologies impact women’s safety online as well as possible solutions.
Please find the details here: [CIGI].
26 November 2020 @ 6:00 pm AEDT, Lowy Institute, Australia
2020 Lowy Lecture
The 2020 Lowy Lecture will be delivered by Fareed Zakaria, observer of international affairs and host of CNN’s weekly foreign affairs programme Fareed Zakaria GPS. Dr Zakaria will assess this year’s world politics as marked by a global health crisis, US-China rivalry, and the US election.
If you wish to join the lecture, please visit [Lowy] for more information.
26 November 2020 @ 7:30 - 9:00 am UTC, DiploFoundation, Switzerland
Digital Security and Economic Recovery
The online high-level event ‘Digital Security and Economic Recovery: Boosting Confidence and Productivity through Secure Digital Technology’ is organised by DiploFoundation and the Swiss Confederation as part of the Geneva Dialogue on Responsible Behaviour in Cyberspace.
For registration details, please visit [DIPLO]
26 November 2020 @ 10:00 - 12:00 am CET, GLOBSEC, Slovakia
Mapping National and Regional Approaches to a More Coherent European Common Foreign and Security Policy
In this workshop will discuss the mapping national and regional approaches, as well as introduce two specific topics: European strategic autonomy and the future the EU enlargement and neighbourhood policies.
For more detail see, [GLOBSEC].
26 November 2020 @ 4:00 pm GMT, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, London, UK
James Brokenshire on the Evolving Threat Posed by Terrorism in the UK
This event will discuss the challenges and opportunities the Government faces in responding to self-initiated terrorists, with a particular focus on right-wing terrorism.
For registration details, please visit [RUSI]
26 November 2020 @ 9:00 - 10:30 am GMT + 8 , YUSOF ISHAK Institute, Singapore
Geopolitical Rivalry and Social Media Polarization in Southeast Asia
This webinar will discuss how heightened geopolitical rivalry in Southeast Asia is playing out on social media platforms and being shaped by technology and cyber policy.
For more information, see [ISEAS].
26 November, 2020 @ 5:00 - 6:00 pm GMT + 11, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Australia
Human Trafficking, Modern Slavery and the Multilateral System
The Global Slavery Index highlights that 40.3 million people are living in some form of modern slavery today, including forced labour, human trafficking, forced marriage and child labour.
For registration details, please visit [AIIA]
27 November 2020 @ 11:00 am JST, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan
SPF NUS-ISAS Joint Webinar Part 1 – Post-election U.S. Policy toward the Indo-Pacific: Expectations and Concerns
This online panel jointly hosted by Sasakawa Peace Foundation and National University of Singapore will evaluate the impact of the US presidential election on the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, reflecting on changes in domestic policies and the future of US foreign policy in the region.
If you wish to participate in the event, follow [SPF] for more information.
27 November 2020 @ 1:00 pm CET, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden
In what ways do Sweden and India cooperate in the global climate crisis?
This ministerial dialogue between the Swedish Minister Isabella Lövin and her Indian counterpart Minister Prakash Javadekar is part of the third edition of Strategic Forum India.
If you are interested in joining the webinar, please find further details at [UI].
27 November 2020 @ 6:00 - 7:30 pm EDT , Institute for Policy Studies, Washington DC, US
The Palestine Agenda & 2020 US Elections
This event will examine the important ramifications of the election for Palestinian rights.
For registration details, please visit [IPS].
27 November, 2020 @ 2:00 - 3:30 pm GMT, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK
China’s use of cyber coercion
This event will assess how extensive and how effective China’s cyber campaigns have been in achieving its strategic goals, including China’s anti-independence drive against the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan, its ‘anti-terrorist’ drive against the Uighur population and Tibetan opposition groups, and China’s consolidation of its South China Sea territorial and maritime claims.
For registration details, please visit [IISS].
27 November 2020 @ 2:00 - 4:00 pm GMT, Danish Institute for International Studies, Denmark
Rebels and the state in Central Africa
In this event, leading experts not only offer an inside look into rebellion in Central Africa, but also explore different ways of thinking through the intricacies of state-rebel relations in Central Africa.
For registration details, please visit [DIIS].
30 November 2020 @ 3:00 pm CET, Egmont Institute, Belgium
What kind of Climate Policy for the EU?
This event will discuss how the EU’s climate diplomacy can raise global ambition to tackle the climate crisis and contribute to the EU’s objective of a climate-neutral EU by 2050, and how this relates to the European Green Deal policies.
Further details are available at [Egmont].
30 November 2020 @ 3:30 pm CET, Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, Switzerland
Exploring Armed Groups in Libya: Perspectives on Security Sector Reform in a Hybrid Environment
The paper launched in this webinar explores the impact of different dimensions of the transformations brought about since the 2011 revolution on security provision in the Libyan landscape.
Please see [DCAF] for further information.
30 November 2020 @ 3:00 pm CET, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden
LGBTIQ Rights and International Actors: perspectives from activism, politics and research
This webinar asks how governments and international actors can effectively support LGBTIQ activists and how foreign policy and international development cooperation can be used to address LGBTIQ rights.
If you are interested in joining the webinar, please find further details at [UI].
1 December 2020 @ 3:30 - 5:00 pm GMT + 8 , Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
Assessing the Role of TNI in Combating COVID- 19 in Indonesia
Since the start of the COVID-19 outbreak in Indonesia, the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) has been deployed as a quick reaction force to combat the pandemic. Under Law No. 34/2004 on the TNI, the military can be deployed to support military operations other than war (MOOTW).
For more details see [RSIS].
1 December 2020 @ 8:00 - 10:00 am EDT, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington DC, US
North Korea’s Economy Post- Pandemic
This event will examine the impact of sanctions, Covid-19, and natural disasters on North Korea’s trade, industry, markets, and finance sectors.
For more details see, [CSIS]
1 December 2020 @ 9:00 - 10:15 am ET, Center for Global Development, Washington DC, USA
Digital Agriculture
The rapid spread of mobile phones in developing countries, coupled with recent advances in our ability to analyze big data through tools such as machine learning and artificial intelligence, has generated considerable excitement about the potential of information and communications technology (ICT) for development.
For more details, see [CGDEV].
1 December 2020 @ 11:00 - 12:00 pm EDT, Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, US
Russia’s challenge to the West: A British perspective
Russia is a country in economic and demographic decline, but it is still able to cause considerable disruption on the international stage.
For more details, see [FSI stanford].
1 December 2020 @ 2:00 - 4:00 pm EST, Brookings, Washington DC, US
Fiscal policy advice for Joe Biden and Congress
When Joe Biden takes office, he will confront unusually challenging economic circumstances: a persistent pandemic, an economy far short of full employment, and federal debt at historic highs.
For more information, see [Brookings].
1–2 December 2020 @ 8:00 am EST, Asia Society Policy Institute
SCMP China Conference: United States
This two-day virtual conference hosted by South China Morning Post and Asia Society Policy Institute explores the relationship between China and the United States, asking whether meaningful cooperation is at all possible or if the two countries are about to devolve even further.
For more information and fee-based registration, please visit: [Asia Society].
1 December 2020 @ 3:00 pm AEST, Asia Society Australia, Australia
Southeast Asia and Major Powers
This discussion will focus on the geopolitics of the COVID-19 pandemic and Southeast Asian regionalism, assessing how ASEAN and Southeast Asian countries managed the global health crisis and what is to be expected moving forward.
For more information and registration, please visit: [Asian Society].
2 December 2020 @ 4:00 pm GMT, Institute for Public Policy Research, United Kingdom
Webinar: Just Transitions – International examples and what we can learn
This roundtable assesses how public policy can be designed to support a rapid and fair transition to net zero and the restoration of nature by looking at past transitions in different countries, sectors, and industries.
For more information and registration details, please visit: [IPPR].
2 December 2020 @ 1:00 pm CET, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden
Gaza and West Bank – How to Unite One People
This talk assesses how authority and legitimacy can be restored in the Palestinian territories and how Palestinians can resolve the conflicts within their society as well as with Israel.
If you are interested in joining the webinar, please find further details at [UI].
3 December 2020 @ 9:00 am ET, Center for American Progress, United States
The US-Japan Alliance: Priorities for 2021
This online panel will discuss the current state of US-Japan relations and how both countries should be thinking about 2021, considering Japan’s new Prime Minister and a new U.S. President-elect.
For more information, please visit [Center for American Progress].
3 December 2020 @ 8:00 pm EST, National Endowment for Democracy, United States
SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET LECTURE: MINXIN PEI ON “TOTALITARIANISM’S LONG DARK SHADOW OVER CHINA”
This online class hosted by the Embassy of Canada and the National Endowment for Democracy features Dr. Minxin Pei, Pritzker Professor of Government and George R. Roberts Fellow at Clarement McKenna College.
If you are interested in joining this virtual class, please register by 27 November 2020.
For more information visit: [NED].
3 December 2020 @ 12:00 pm CET, European Council on Foreign Relations Paris, France
Comment les opinions publiques influencent-elles la politique étrangère ?
This webinar asks to what extent European countries differ in taking public opinion into account when forming foreign policy and discusses the benefits and pitfalls this entails. In this regard, it will also assess Europe’s behaviour towards the United States. Registration is required.
Further details are available here: [ECFR].
If you are interested in joining the webinar, please register here: [Zoom].
3 December 2020 @ 3:00 pm CET, Clingendael, Netherlands
Webinar: Europe’s Digital Decade?
This webinar will discuss China’s Digital Silk Road as well as efforts the EU has made to improve its digital connectivity in the following domains: regulation, business, infrastructure, and Official Development Assistance (ODA).
Details are accessible at [Clingendael].
3 December 2020 @ 3:00 pm MYT, Asia-Europe Institute, Universiti Malaya, Malaysia
ASEAN-EU Dialogue Webinar Series 3: People and Culture
This panel focusses on trade and migration issues and discusses cultural cleavages and experiences as integral parts shaping ASEAN identity.
If you are interested in joining the webinar, please follow [Asia-Europe] for more information.
4 December 2020 @ 3:00 pm EDT, Hudson Institute, United States
Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Disruption: Navigating North Korea Policy in 2021
In this virtual workshop, leaders from the United States and South Korea will discuss critical issues on the Korean Peninsula, asking how the US and South Korea can deal diplomatically with North Korea.
Further details are available here: [Hudson Institute].
Recent book releases
Binyamin Appelbaum, The Economists' Hour: False Prophets, Free Markets, and the Fracture of Society, Little, Brown and Company, September 3, 2020, 336 pages, reviewed in [Washington Post].
Doris Kearns Goodwin, Leadership In Turbulent Times, Simon & Schuster, September 18, 2020, 496 pages, reviewed in [New York Times].
Richard Greene, Russian Roulette, Little, Brown, September 3, 2020, 608 pages, reviewed in [Standard].
Calls
The International Conference on Chinese Economy and Economic Development, to be held in June 24-25, 2021 in Paris, France, invites to submit abstracts and papers until December 1. 2020. More information at [Waset].
ATINER invites to submit papers for its 19th Annual International Conference on Politics & International Studies, scheduled for 14-17 June 2021, Athens, Greece. Closing date for submissions is February 15, 2021. For more details, see [Atiner]
Jobs & positions
The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) offers a position of Legal Advisor to help design and implement ICNL’s programs across Asia. Closing date for applications is December 10, 2020. More information at [ICNL].
The United Nations' Economic Commission for Africa offers a position of Director, Sub-Regional Office, Southern Africa. Applications can be submitted until January 6, 2021. See [UN] for more details.
Monash University offers a position of Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Nutrition, Dietetics and Food, responsible for conducting research and the production of publications from that research. Closing date for applications is December 6, 2020. More at [Monash University].
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Room 204, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, 2 Prachan Road, Bangkok 10200, Thailand