Grasp the pattern, read the trend

No. 41, October/2021, 2

Brought to you by CPG

Dear Readers,

Please enjoy this week’s update on the latest events and developments in constitutional politics and governance, geopolitics and international relations in Asia.

With best regards,

Henning Glaser

Editor in Chief

Webpage: www.cpg-online.de, Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CPGTU

Main Sections

• Constitutional Law and –Politics, Human Rights and National Security in East Asia

• Constitutional Law and –Politics, Human Rights and National Security in South Asia

• Constitutional Law and –Politics, Human Rights and National Security in Southeast Asia

• International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia

• Announcements

Constitutional Law and –Politics, Human Rights and National Security in East Asia

China: Contagion fears over ongoing Evergrande crisis

(tj) Amid the ongoing crisis surrounding Evergrande, last week saw further Chinese property developers default on bonds, fuelling investor concern that Evergrande’s financial crisis could represent a broader narrative of a global contagion of the collapse of the property market. 

Fantasia Holdings Group Co, which develops high-end apartments and urban renewal projects, failed to repay a $205.7 million bond that came due Monday, prompting a series of rating downgrades late Tuesday to levels signifying default that sent the market value of the Chinese homebuilder's dollar-denominated bonds down by almost 50%. [Al Jazeera] [BBC] [South China Morning Post]

Meanwhile, two other Chinese property firms have hit financial trouble after missing debt payments, including Sinic Holdings which had missed interest payments, raising uncertainty as to whether Sinic could meet a $246 million bond repayment due later this month. Likewise, Hong Kong developer Modern Land has asked for a three-month extension on repayments on $250 million bond due on 25 October. [BBC] [The Guardian]

Similarly, Chinese Estates Holdings, a major shareholder of embattled developer China Evergrande, said on Wednesday it had proposed to be taken private by Solar Bright Ltd for HK$1.91 billion ($245.30 million). [Reuters 1]

Furthermore, two Hong Kong property agencies, Centaline and Midland Holdings, are suing heavily indebted China Evergrande Group over millions in unpaid commissions. [Reuters 2]

Likewise, Evergrande’s offshore bond default has been labelled as ‘imminent’, expectations remaining slim as to whether Evergrande will be able to meet the semi-annual payments on its April 2022, April 2023 and April 2024 offshore bonds, which are due on Monday. Already faced with more than $300 billion of debt, Evergrande has already missed coupon payments on dollar bonds twice last month, worth a combined amount of $131 million, to which Evergrande has a 30-day grace period to pay for these coupons. Expectations remain hesitant whether Evergrande will similarly meet. [Reuters 3] [See, AiR No.49, October 2021, 1] [The Guardian]

Currently, despite China’s central bank and state media having indicated that Beijing will assist in protecting individual citizen’s exposure to the property market, Beijing has not yet commented directly on Evergrande’s financial problems. [BBC] [See, AiR No.49, October 2021, 1; AiR No. 39, September 2021, 4; AiR No.36, September 2021, 1].

China: Hong Kong policy update reinforces Beijing’s grasp on civil liberties

(tj) On her policy address on Wednesday, Carrie Lam announced Hong Kong’s 5-year plan, detailing five new policy objectives for Hong Kong including safeguarding security, preventing ‘terrorist activities’ by supervising schools, the launch of new programmes to help detained youths and introducing more oath-taking arrangements for public officials. [Hong Kong Free Press 1]

As speculated last week, Lam announced that Hong Kong will be moving forward with Article 23 of the Basic Law whereby officials would be reviewing existing laws to better target security threats and prevent those who are opposed to China and attempt to destabilise Hong Kong. [See, AiR No.49, October 2021, 1] 

Expected to be implemented within the next legislative term by 2026, the Hong Kong government announced that prior to enacting the legislation it would host public consultations, albeit provided no indication of the scope or timeline of the consultations. [Hong Kong Free Press 1]

Similarly, Lam announced that Hong Kong will strengthen national security education and raise law-abiding and national security awareness of Hong Kong people, in particular the youth, through different activities and approaches, including recruiting Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), as a public service broadcaster, to play an active role in promoting the Constitution and the Basic Law, and engendering a sense of citizenship and national identity. [Reuters] 

This comes amid last week’s ordering of RTHK by the Hong Kong government to support the national security and interests of the Chinese and Hong Kong governments, despite RTHK’s charter guaranteeing the media outlet’s editorial independence. [See, AiR No.49, October 2021, 1] 

Likewise, Lam sought to outlaw ‘fake news’, and urged to criminalise insults to police to ensure police officers have ‘enough dignity’ to enforce the law. [Hong Kong Free Press 2] [Hong Kong Free Press 3] 

Lam further proposed new cybersecurity law to protect ‘critical infrastructure’, designed to make the operators of public utilities and other crucial infrastructure step up security against cyber-attacks. [Hong Kong Free Press 4]

Lam’s announcement regarding stricter enforcement comes amid fresh reports of the increasing pressure of Beijing in quashing political dissent. For example, groups and venues associated with the commemoration of the June 4 Tiananmen Square vigil have become the latest target of Beijing’s national security law, several Hong Kong civil society groups previously having toppled to increasing pressure of Beijing’s National Security Law. [See, See, AiR No.49, October 2021, 1; AiR No. 39, September 2021, 4]

This has since culminated in the Chinese University of Hong Kong’s students announcing its dissolution after 50 years after multiple arrests of its members and severed universities ties due to alleged false statements and possible breaches of the national security law. [Hong Kong Free Press 5] 

Similarly, the University of Hong Kong has recently ordered the removal a statute commemorating the Tiananmen Square crackdown, a centrepiece of annual Tiananmen vigils. Writing a letter to the since disbanded Hong Kong Alliance, who organised the annual vigil, the University requested the statute be removed by 13 October, otherwise would be deemed ‘abandoned’. [BBC] [The Guardian]

Likewise in marking Taiwan’s National Day on 10th of Otocber, Hong Kong officials have warned that celebrating the ’Double Ten’ could constitute support for Taiwanese independence, a crime under Beijing’s national security law. [Hong Kong Free Press 6]

Lastly, another large section of Lam’s address on Wednesday was Hong Kong’s plan for housing, amid public pressure mounting against Lam as Hon Kong’s public housing has not adequately kept up with demand. [AP News]

Lam unveiled plans for tackling a long-standing housing shortage and housing affordability for the city's 7.5 million people, anticipating the construction of a Northern Metropolis on the border with the mainland's technology hub of Shenzhen, covering 300 square kilometres, containing 926,000 homes for some 2.5 million people, and creating more than 500,000 jobs and complementing the city's role as a financial centre. [Reuters 2]

China: Beijing ends anti-sanctions law amid financial concerns

(tj) Carrie Lam announced on Tuesday, October 5, that Beijing has no timetable to extend an anti-sanctions law to counter actions by foreign governments amid escalating geopolitical tensions, a law that businesses fear could impact Hong Kong’s position as a global financial hub and the unfeasibility of bankers remaining compliant with both US targeted sanctions and the Chinese law.  [Reuters]

US sanctions have been implemented over the past 2 years targeting Hong Kong and Chinese officials for reasons of undermining freedoms and democracy in Hong Kong and human rights violations in Xinjiang.  [MENA FN]

China: Incongruous wins and losses for Chinese LGBT community 

(tj) Amid a judicial review application filed in March 2021 by applicant, Ng, the respondent, the Secretary for Justice and Director of Health, confirmed that the Hong Kong government would treat same-sex widows and widowers equally when handling after-death arrangements of their spouses. 

Notified the Secretary did not recognise him as his partner’s surviving spouse, Ng sought a judicial review of the Secretary’s decision on the basis that the decision was contrary to the Basic Law and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. 

High Court Justice Chow Ka-ming has since affirmed that both parties had reached a consensus, whereby Ng had withdrawn his application, Chow announcing that government’s position would ensure equality in after death arrangements for same-sex couples. [The Standard]

However, despite the auspicious result for same-sex couples, the Hong Kong government remained silent to further issues that same-sex couples face, including the right to object or consent to organ donation for education or research, their right for a couple to be buried together, having priority when applying for a cremation permit, having ashes released, and for burial, exhuming or removing their late spouse’s body.

The Applicant, Ng and his since deceased partner, Li, had previously brought two other judicial review proceedings against the government seeking equal rights for non-heterosexual couples, involving the rights of same-sex couples to live together in government-subsidised housing, and the other relating to inheritance laws where a member of a same-sex couple has not left a will. In both cases, the High Court ruled in favour of Ng, to which the government is currently appealing against them. [Hong Kong Free Press]

Incongruously, there have been growing concerns against Beijing’s expansionist crackdown on the LGBT community.

China decriminalised homosexuality in 1997, and in 2001, the authorities removed it from an official list of mental disorders. Despite an earlier 2016 ban on expressions of same-sex love in film and television such as men kissing on screen or holding hands, many tech platforms found ways around the rules to cater to the increasing popularity of gender diverse and LGBT content.

Beijing has since insistently pursued the narrative that LGBT culture is a “Western” idea that was imported into China.

This has since recently culminated in the unexplained cancellation of Shanghai’s 11-year long LGBT pride festival on August 13 last year and increased restrictions targeting China’s LGBT population, including the banning of LGBT social media accounts, increased censorship of discussion of LGBT issues online, bans on ‘sissy’ boys on television, gay university groups being placed under pressure on campuses and regulators being directed to ‘gaylove’ in video games. [South China Morning Post] [See, AiR No.36, September 2021, 1]

China still suffers from a lacunae in anti-discrimination laws that protects Chinese citizens from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, with same-sex marriage remaining illegal. 

China: Beijing instructs increase in coal production amid energy crisis

(tj) Beijing has instructed top coal producer to increase its output amid a serious power crisis that has engendered record-high prices, shortages of electricity and power rationing across China that has crippled industrial output. More than 70 mines in Inner Mongolia have been ordered to increase its goal production by nearly 100 million tonnes, equating to almost 3% of China’s total annual thermal coal consumption.

Despite this announcement, coal production has been stymied by recent flooding, propelling China’s goal futures to record levels. [Financial Times]

In recent weeks, millions of homes and businesses have been hit by power cuts, culminating in China's state planner, the National Development and Reform Commission, calling on mining companies and power firms to sign up to new agreements to resolve the problem. [BBC] [Reuters 1] [South China Morning Post] [The Guardian]

Despite Beijing’s September 2020 pledge to end its year-on-year growth of CO2 emissions by 2030 and become carbon neutral by 2060, this represents a significant backwards step in Beijing’s goals in reducing its carbon footprint which comes shortly before the UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP26) in Glasgow to which Beijing intends to send a representative team of delegates. [Reuters 2] 

China: Ex-journalist detained for defaming Chinese Korean War soldiers 

(tj) Ex-journalist, Luo Changping, whose previous work exposed official corruption, has been detained on suspicion of defaming war heroes of the Korean War after making comments about a patriotic film. Luo has reportedly confessed. 

Eager to protect its legitimacy resting partly on victories over the Japanese forces in World War Two and over the Nationalists to end China’s civil war in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has long kept a tight grip on the country’s history and the historical narratives of the Chinese Communist Party’s role therein. In a recent case, a defendant was sentenced to eight months in prison for a similar offence. [Reuters] 

China: Beijing proposes to add cryptocurrency to ‘negative list’ 

(tj) Beijing has recently added cryptocurrency mining to the ‘negative list’ of industries in which investment is restricted or prohibited to both Chinese and foreign investors. 

Should Beijing push forward with this draft list, it would cement that recent banning of cryptocurrency trading and mining, with China’s central bank along with several other Chinese agencies vowing to eradicate ‘illegal’ cryptocurrency activities. [Reuters] [See, AiR No.49, October 2021, 1] 

Japan: Fumio Kishida gives first policy speech amid intra-party feud over elections candidates and low approval ratings

(lnl) The new Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, elected in parliament on October 4 after winning the election for the leadership of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on September 29 [see No. 40, October/2021, 1], held his first policy speech on Friday, October 8. Addressing the Lower House of Parliament, Kishida laid out strategies on how to tackle the economic situation in the country, how the government will respond to the Covid-19 situation, and how to work for a free and open Indo-Pacific in the face of an increasingly assertive China and missile threats from North Korea.  

Fumio Kishida vowed to lead Japan out of the Covid-19 crisis by putting together a stimulus package which includes grants for hard-hit businesses and higher wages for healthcare workers. Moreover, in trying to boost the national economy the Prime Minister announced to invest in artificial intelligence and seek legislation to prevent the leakage of technology to overseas competitors. Kishida promised to achieve a “new form of Japanese capitalism” that focuses on fairer distribution of wealth, also pledging to promote wage growth by introducing “tax support” for companies that raise incomes. 

With regards to foreign policy, Kishida vowed to work with like-minded countries to counter China’s growing economic influence and military buildup in the region. Kishida confirmed to be ready for a meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to resolve the issue of the abduction of Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, he is also willing to work with Russian President Vladimir Putin to resolve the decades-long territorial dispute in the northeast of Hokkaido. [Kyodo News] [The Straits Times]

The Kishida administration is facing many challenges. One of the hurdles that Kishida has to tackle is the fast-approaching Lower House election on October 31. The Prime Minister is aiming for a simple majority for the LDP and its coalition partner, the Komeito. Currently the coalition enjoys a supermajority with 304 of the 465 seats. A simple majority requires 233 seats, and thus Kishida’s electoral goal would give the LDP 70 less seats. Higher numbers of seats would be needed to guarantee the success of his policy agenda. Another hurdle is how Kishida will execute his hearty foreign policy agenda, and how he will navigate to tackle the security issues in the region. For a more in-depth analysis of the challenges for the new Kishida cabinet see [Council on Foreign Relations]. 

Additionally, the LDP has not yet determined their House of Representatives election candidates. The power struggle inside the party is in full swing as no official endorsements have yet been made in a number of important constituencies. The internal party faction of Kishida has been greatly strengthened at the expense of the Nikai faction, represented by former secretary general of the LDP Toshihiro Nikai. With the campaign period for the general election to start in less than one week the party is scrambling to sort out which candidates to endorse. The party claims to prioritize incumbent candidates, but the final result remains to be seen. [The Japan Times]

For a discussion of Kishida’s challenges of factionalism within his own party see Bryce Wakefield in [East Asia Forum].

Perhaps one of Kishida’s immediate hurdles is his struggle to gain public support. According to the daily Asahi poll, Kishida’s approval rating stands at 45% while an opinion poll by the Mainichi Shimbun revealed a supporting rate of 49% and disapproving rate of 40%. The more conservative-leaning Yomiuri said 56% of the respondents supported the new government, while the Nikkei results showed a supporting rate of 59%.

The polls indicate that Kishida’s new government is receiving a support rate far lower than that of his predecessor Yoshihide Suga. When Suga launched his cabinet in September 2020, he received a supporting rate of 64%. Only 21% of respondents answered they had high expectations for the new cabinet led by Kishida, 51% however, said they did not. [Reuters] [The Mainichi] 

Japan: Campaigning commences for House of Councilors by-elections

(lnl) Following the resignation of two members of the House of Councilors from the Shizuoka and Yamaguchi constituencies, an official campaign for the respective by-elections started on Thursday, October 7. These by-elections for the Upper House, to be held on October 24, gain importance as they are regarded as a prelude to the House of Representatives election, which is expected to be held on October 31. 

The Shizuoka by-election has become necessary after LDP politician Shigeki Iwai, a former state minister of land, infrastructure, transport and tourism, resigned from the House of Councilors to run for the post of Shizuoka governor in June. The Yamaguchi by-election follows the resignation of LDP member Yoshimasa Hayashi, a former education, culture, sports, science and technology minister. He left the Upper House to run for the Lower House election. [The Japan News] [The Japan Times]

Japan: Families of North Korea abductees urge Kishida to take action

(lnl) Families of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s urged the newly appointed Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and his government to take actions to secure the return of the victims. Relatives have expressed disappointment that the new cabinet lacks members who are well versed in the issue. [The Mainichi] North Korea claims that the issue has “already been resolved” and warned that the bilateral relations between the countries would worsen unless Tokyo changes its position on the abduction issue.

The Japanese government officially lists 17 people as having been abducted by North Korea. Five of them have been repatriated to Japan in 2002 and Tokyo has been demanding the return of the remaining twelve people. Pyongyang maintains that it is not possible as eight of the abductees have died and the other four have never entered the country. [The Mainichi] 

South Korea: Gov. Lee wins ruling party primary 

(aml) Gyeonggi Governor Lee Jae-myung won the final primary of the ruling Democratic Party (DPK) to become their candidate for the upcoming presidential election. Lee recieved 50.29% of the votes, while his closest rival prime minister Lee Nak-yon only got 39.14%. Former justice minister Choo Mi-ae received 9.01% and Rep. Park Yong-jin 1.55% of the votes. 

Since Lee is currently under critic for being connected to the Seongnam land development scandal [AiR, No.40, October/2021, 1] which took place during his time as the city’s major, he used his acceptance speech to pledge the progress of policy issues, push for a universal basic income and affordable housing and calling for the “ultimate battle against the corrupt establishment”. [Reuters] [Nikkei Asia] [The Korea Herald 1]

Meanwhile, the main opposition People Power Party (PPP) has shortlisted four candidates in its second primary elimination round: former prosecutor general Yoon Seok-youl, Rep. Hong Joon-pyo, former opposition lawmaker Yoo Seong-min, and former Jeju Province governor Won Hee-ryong. The result was based on a survey combined of a national poll and a poll from registered PPP members. [The Korea Herald 2]

Leading candidate Yoon has been under critique recently for superstitious or unscientific beliefs. He had been witnessed for displaying the Chinese character for “King” on his palm what his opponents described as utter disregard for the democratic system and a reliance on superstition. Additionally, Yoon is accused of having ties to an anal acupuncture specialist. [The Korea Herald 3] [The Korea Times 1] [The Korea Times 2]

South Korea: 15 military officials indicted over death of Air Force sexual abuse victim

(aml) After a 120-days long investigation, military prosecutors have indicted 15 military officials who were connected to the cover-up of a sexual abuse case in the Air Force. A female Air Force officer who had been sexually assaulted by a colleague, had committed suicide earlier this year after her superiors failed to handle her report correctly and tried to cover up the incident. The colleague who allegedly abused her was arrested in June and currently faces trial [see AiR, No.33, August/2021, 3].

The results of the investigation into the case show that Air Force officers allegedly tried to cover up the case without helping the victim. In total, 38 officials will be subject to disciplinary measures. 

Charges were brought for trying to persuade the victim to drop her complaint, failing to properly report the victim’s death to the defense ministry and destroying evidence. 

The incident, which hasn’t been the only case of sexual abuse in the military, has sparked a public outcry which led to the resignation of Air Force Chief of Staff Lee Seong-yong, an official apology from president Moon Jae-in and the launching of task forces to combat the reoccurring sexual assaults in the military. [The Korea Times]

South Korea: Investigation into central intelligence chief over interference in presidential election

(aml) The state anti-corruption investigation office has launched a probe into Park Jie-won, director of the National Intelligence Service over allegations of interfering with the upcoming presidential election. Park is being accused of having violated the National Intelligence Service Act and the Public Official Election Act. Allegations were raised by the leading presidential contender of the main opposition People Power Party (PPP) Yoon Seok-youl, that Park gave tips to the online news outlet Newsverse about Yoon trying to interfere with the general elections in April last year when he served a prosecutor general. The reports that followed the tips said that people close to Yoon had instigated the PPP to file a complaint against pro-Moon government figures. [The Korea Herald] [The Korea Times]

South Korea: Lawmaker accused of embezzling funds for wartime sexual slavery victims 

(aml) Lawmaker Youn Mee-hyang of the ruling Democratic Party has been accused of misappropriating money from funds aimed at helping woman who were forced into wartime sexual slavery, for personal purposes. Prior to her election in 2020, Youn led the Korean Council for Justice and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slaver by Japan. According to the People Power Party which received a copy of the indictment from the justice ministry, Youn allegedly spend over 100 million won ($84,300) of the funds for paying at restaurants or other personal purposes from January 2011 until March 2020. 

Youn has denied the embezzlement, saying that the cited transactions were either made for professional purposes or paid by herself. [The Korea Herald]

South Korea: Progress Seongnam land development scandal 

(aml) The police have seized the phone of key suspect Yoo Dong-gyu, former acting president of Seongnam Development Crop. in relation to the land development scandal [AiR, No.40, October/2021, 1]. The phone had gone missing during a raid in Yoo’s home in late September. Yoo reportedly threw it out of the window, but the police were able to track down the person who picked it up. Yoo is said to have a close relationship with Lee Jae-myung, presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Party (DPK) who had been Seongnam’s major in 2015. He has been put under pretrial detention over charges for breach of trust and bribery since he is accused of receiving at least 1.1 billion won ($930,138) in relation to the scandal. [The Korea Herald 1]

On Monday, the prosecutors questioned Kim Man-bae, owner Hwacheon Daeyu, an asset management firm at the center of the scandal. Kim is accused of colluding with Yoo, since his former rather small and unknown firm had been chosen as a civilian partner in the 2015 development project and profited immensely from that. Kim allegedly paid Yoo 500 million won ($418,769) and allegations have been raised that not Kim, but Yoo is the real owner of one of Hwacheon Daeyu’s subsidiaries, Cheonhwa Doing No.1. Kim has until now denied all allegations. [The Korea Times 1][The Korea Herald 2]

While DPK presidential candidate Lee is severely criticized and urged to undergo a special counsel investigation for power abuse by the main opposition People Power Party (PPP) for playing a key role in the scandal as Seongnam’s major at the time [The Korea Times 2], Rep. Kwak Sang-do, a PPP lawmaker is also being criticized for his son’s possible involvement in the scandal. His son, employee at Hwacheon Daeyu, had received 5 billion won ($4.2 million) in severance pay and it has been questioned whether Kwak’s status as a leading lawmaker has played a role in the uncommonly high payment. [The Korea Herald 3]

South Korea: Seoul city government bans labor union’s street rallies 

(aml) After the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) had renewed its threat to go on a general strike on Thursday, the Seoul city government has forbidden the planned walkouts planned for October 20th due to Covid-19 related concerns, although the KTCU had announced a strict compliance with the anti-virus guidelines including vaccination and testing. The strikes were planned to involve all 1.1 million KCTU members for the improvement of labor rights such as the abolition of non-regular employment and a general revision of labor laws. The union represents employees of the Korean government as well as metal, construction, and non-regular workers. [The Korea Herald] [The Korea Times]

Taiwan: High Court drops verdicts against Sunflower movement protesters

(dql) Taiwan’s High Court yesterday revoked guilty verdicts against seven people involved in the occupation of the Executive Yuan during Sunflower movement in group, which included the seven defendants, attempted to occupy the nearby Executive Yuan in March 2014 after the charges against them have been dropped.

In April last year, the High Court handed down prison sentences ranging from two to four months for inciting the occupation. Following an appeal, the Supreme Court in January remanded the cases to the High Court, arguing that the defendants were exercising their “right of resistance,” or civil disobedience, as part of their freedom of expression.

Discontent over a move of the then-ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) to fast-track a bill on a cross-strait services trade agreement with China led to the Sunflower movement, with protests taking place from March 18 to April 10 during which hundreds of people broke into the Legislative Yuan, while thousands demonstrated outside the complex.

Constitutional Law and –Politics, Human Rights and National Security in South Asia 

Bangladesh: Authorities to move another 81,000 Rohingya to remote island after deal with UN

(lm) Bangladesh is set to send another 81,000 Rohingya refugees to a remote island in the Bay of Bengal after agreeing to give the United Nations (UN) a role in providing humanitarian assistance and monitoring conditions on the island, Bhasan Char.

Since December of last year, Bangladeshi authorities have shifted more than 19,000 people to Bhasan Char to ease chronic overcrowding in the sprawling refugee camps of Cox’s Bazar, where more than one million members of the largely Muslim Rohingya minority group have taken shelter.

The UN and the Bangladeshi government signed an agreement on October 9 for closer cooperation on services and activities to benefit the island’s inhabitants, including major areas like education and skills training. With the accord, Bangladeshi authorities will move forward with a plan to relocate an additional 81,000 Rohingya to Bhasan Char once the monsoon storms that batter the Bay of Bengal each year end in November. [Associated Press]

The agreement came as a paradigm shift after the UN and humanitarian groups had voiced concern about the low-lying island’s vulnerability to cyclones and floods. At the time of the first transfers to the island, rights groups also alleged that the refugees had been listed without their consent [see AiR No. 50, December/2020, 3]. [The Diplomat]

In May then, a visit by two-member delegation from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to the island resulted in the agency saying that it would enter further discussions with the Bangladeshi government for its operational engagement on Bhasan Char. [AiR No. 23, June/2021, 2]

But although the Hasina administration has spent more than $112 million on development, growing numbers of migrants are trying to escape the low-slung landmass, risking drowning in the waters of the Bay of Bengal as well as prosecution if they are caught by the authorities. [Al Jazeera] [The New York Times, $]

Bangladesh: Killing of prominent Rohingya leader underscores violence in refugee camps, HRW says

(ad/lm) Against the backdrop of the assassination of a high-profile Rohingya leader last month, international rights watchdogs have called on Bangladesh authorities and United Nations officials to take urgent measures to protect Rohingya refugees facing threats and violence in the Cox’s Bazar camps.

Unidentified gunmen on September 29 shot and killed Mohib Ullah, a prominent activist for the more than 800,000-strong Muslim minority Rohingya. No one has claimed responsibility for the murder, though Ullah’s family later blamed the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), an armed group active in the camps, with activists claiming they were enraged by Ullah’s growing popularity. [AiR No. 40, October/2021, 1]

In fact, for years, Ullah – who advocated for the Rohingya to return to Myanmar –had predicted he would be killed by the hardliners who regularly sent him death threats.   But Bangladesh’s police told Reuters they had received no reports from the prominent activist about any threats or requests for protection. [Reuters]

Against this backdrop, Human Rights Watch, in a statement on October 6, alleged that authorities did not adequately investigate Mohib Ullah’s concerns and did provide only provide insufficient support for him and other activists. Additionally, the organization in its statement cited an activist who alleged collusion between some officers of Bangladesh’s Armed Police Battalion deployed in the refugee camps and members of the ARSA. [Human Rights Watch]

The international watchdog further referred to Ullah’s murder as the latest evidence of mounting violence as armed gangs and extremists vie for power. At least a dozen activists have come forward to seek protection from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and Bangladesh officials since the activists’ killing because of renewed threats from armed groups and other risks of violence. 

In related developments, a man with suspected involvement in Ullah’s murder has given a confessional statement to a magistrate following a three-day remand. So far, police have made five arrests in connection with the killing and interrogated each of them in custody for three days. [Dhaka Tribune]

Bangladesh: Authorities detain sister of exiled journalist

(ad) The Committee to Protect Journalists has called on Bangladeshi authorities to immediately release the sister of an exiled journalist, in a case that is believed to come in retaliation for the man’s reporting. [Committee to Protect Journalists]

A unit of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), an elite anti-crime and anti-terrorism unit of the Bangladesh Police, on October 6 raided the home of Nusrat Shahreen Raka, the sister of exiled journalist Kanak Sarwar.

In December of last year, the High Court had directed the government to immediately block all social media handles Sarwar, including his Facebook and YouTube channel, for running "anti-state distorted content" through the platforms. [The Daily Star]

Following the arrest, the RAB repeatedly questioned Raka about her brother, asking why he opposed the ruling Hasina administration. Later, two complaints were filed against the journalist’s sister under the Digital Security Act (DSA) and Narcotics Control Act (NAC), respectively. [Dhaka Tribune]

The Digital Security Act complaint alleges that Raka violated three sections of the act: the publication of offensive, false, or threatening information; defamation; and the transmission or publication of content that deteriorates law and order. Each of those offenses carries a potential prison sentence of three to seven years and a fine of $3,497 to $5,827. The complaint filed under the NAC, in turn, alleges that Raka possessed narcotics; a violation of the Act carries up to three years in prison.

While her sons were released after about 30 hours, Raka remained in detention for another five days, as per order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court in the capital, Dhaka.

Bangladesh: Next Election Commission will be formed by search committee, minister says, citing pandemic

(ad) Bangladesh’s Law Minister Anisul Huq said on October 7 that the next Election Commission (EC) will be formed through a “Search Committee”, citing the ongoing coronavirus pandemic as reason behind the decision. [The Daily Star]

The five-year tenure of the current EC will expire in February 2022; the next Commission will be tasked with arranging the country’s next parliamentary election, which is scheduled to be held by December 2023.

Article 118 (1) of Bangladesh’s Constitution stipulates that the government shall appoint an EC consisting of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and up to four Election Commissioners, subject to the provision of a law supposed to be introduced on that behalf. However, no government has taken such an initiative in the last 50 years. In the absence of the law, Bangladesh’s president formed search committees in 2012 and 2017 to appoint the CEC and commissioners. [AiR No. 40, October/2021, 1]

Bangladesh: Supreme Court overturns stay-order on BFUJ elections

(ad/lm) Hearing a writ petition, the Appellate Division of Bangladesh’s Supreme Court on October 10 overturned the High Court’s two-month stay order on the elections of the Bangladesh Federal Union of Journalists (BFUJ). [Dhaka Tribune]

The High Court’s stay order on the election of the BFUJ was passed on September 28, in response to a petition filed by a journalist, who’s name had been dropped from the list of eligible voters. Following the top court’s decision, elections for different posts in the BFUJ are set to be held on October 23.

Bangladesh: Border guards to open fire at Myanmar border to stop trafficking, foreign minister says

(ad/lm) Taking a tough stance against smuggling along Bangladesh’s border with Myanmar, Foreign Minister AK Abdul Momen on October 5 said the country’s border guards had been instructed to open fire. [The Daily Star]

Bangladesh and Myanmar share a 270-kilometer border, stretching from the tripoint with India in the north to the Bay of Bengal in the south. About 210 kilometers of the border is fenced, with the government of Myanmar announcing in 2017 that it was planning to fence off the rest of the border, which is known for criminal activities, including human trafficking, arms and drugs smuggling, and robbery.

In January of last year, the two countries held the latest iteration of their joint senior-level border conference to discuss illegal immigration, border crimes, and joint patrolling, among others.

India: Top body of opposition Congress to meet on October 16, as party is on the verge of split

(lm) The top body of India’s opposition National Congress (INC) party, the Congress Working Committee (CWC) will be holding a meeting on October 16 to hold talks over the new party chief, the "current political situation", and state elections next year. [NDTV]

Elections to seven State Assemblies are due next year; the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of Prime Minister Narendra Modi rules all these States, save the northwestern State of Punjab. But the three Indian states with INC-led governments – Punjab, Chhattisgarh, and Rajasthan – are all in the news for rebellion in their ranks.

In Punjab, Chief Minister Amarinder Singh resigned on September 19 following months of a bitter power tussle with the chief of the INC’s Punjab unit, Navjot Singh Sidhu. Prior to these months of turmoil, polls were fairly split between the INC and the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), a regional newcomer currently led by Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal. But now the Congress is expected to lose the election to the state’s Legislative Assembly, slated to be held in February or March next year. [The Diplomat]

Later last month, much to the embarrassment of the INC high command, Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Bhupesh Baghel herded his supporters to the capital, New Delhi, in a show of strength to stamp out any challenge to his position from his intraparty rival T. S. Singh Deo. Since Baghel completed serving 2.5 years as the states’ chief minister in June, supporters of Singh Deo are demanding a change of guard, though the INC never talked about rotational chief ministership when it came to power in the 2018 election. [Hindustan Times]

In the northern state of Rajasthan, meanwhile, a long-drawn tussle between Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot and his intraparty rival Sachin Pilot has been put on the backburner, but only for now; the fire has not been doused. Two consecutive meetings between Pilot and INC leader Rahul Gandhi and Gandhi’s daughter, Priyanka – days after the leadership change in Punjab – had set off speculation of plans of a similar exercise in Rajasthan. [NDTV 1]

Most recently, in India’s eastern Bihar state, the opposition Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) announced on October 3 names of two party candidates for two by-elections to be held later this month. Significantly, the announcement was made in absence of leaders from the Grand Alliance, a coalition of political parties that comprises the RJD, the INC, and several left parties.The Congress party had earlier announced that it would contest one seat in the by-elections, which had been assigned to it in 2020. [The Hindu]

Ever since the INC was swept out of power by the BJP in the 2014 general elections and its strength further diminished in the 2019 general elections, the party has seen desertions in droves. The most recent of these was Sushmita Dev, formerly the president of the INC’s women’s wing. Dev, who joined the All India Trinamool Congress in August, was the fourth high-profile member of Rahul Gandhi’s inner circle – the “Young Guns” as they were called –to leave the party within the last two years.

In the Indian northeastern state of Tripura, in turn, the former president of the local INC unit last week announced the founding of a new political party – the Tripura Democratic Front (TDF) – days after he quit the INC, alongside with former Youth Congress President Pujan Biswas. [NDTV 2] [The Indian Express]

Against this backdrop, some Indian observers argue that a leadership crisis at the helm of the INC is corroding its influence, with some arguing that party has become more a party of dynasts than a serious political enterprise, to its own cost. [Foreign Policy, $]

When Rahul Gandhi resigned from the presidency in 2019 – accepting moral responsibility for the party’s defeat in the national election – he was clear that the next president should be a non-Gandhi. The CWC responded by making his mother, Sonia Gandhi, acting president. Sonia, the widow of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, has now spent more time atop the INC than Jawaharlal Nehru, who led the INC from 1919-20 and again from 1928-29.

When a group of 23 party leaders, known by the acronym G-23, sent a letter to the INC president in August of last year to demand sweeping changes in the party structure, their request was ignored and at least one of them lost their positions for speaking out.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing Punjab crisis and the recent high-profile exits from the INC, the 23 party dissidents have once again expressed concern over what they called was the continuing drift in the party, reminding the Gandhis that nothing has changed on the ground. [The Times of India]

The crux of the problem is that there is no clarity on whether a non-Gandhi Congress chief would be accepted by the party rank-and-file or even by the Indian electorate at large, for whom the INC has long been synonymous with the Nehru–Gandhi family: Since 1978 (except for a short gap between 1991-98) the INC has been led by a member of the Nehru-Gandhi family. 

India: Coal crisis leaves New Delhi with few options to avoid power crunch

(lm) India is the latest country to face severe energy supply problems in the coming months due to coal shortages and a post-pandemic surge in demand. 

According to data from the Central Electricity Authority of India (CEA), as many as 63 of the country’s 135 coal-fired power plants have two days – or less – of coal supplies.    In total, 75 plants are running with five days’ worth of coal or less, the level the CEA deems to be "supercritical." While these plants will not go offline in a matter of days, they are extremely vulnerable to any further disruption to coal supply or a spike in demand. [The Straits Times]

Power consumption in August and September exceeded the volumes from the same months in the pre-pandemic year of 2019, as businesses recover from the latest wave of COVID-19 earlier this year. The central government, anticipating that demand will remain at current levels, ordered power companies to boost their stockpiles of coal.

But India’s domestic energy providers, most notably state-owned Coal India Limited, the largest coal miner in the world, have failed to stockpile sufficient amounts to meet the predicted rise in demand. Moreover, coal production has been hit by severe flooding in India’s eastern and central states during the typical monsoon season, with mines and key logistics routes impacted. [Nikkei Asia]

If India is not able to fix the coal crunch soon, power sector companies face the prospect of importing coal at significant cost to bridge the gap in production. But supplies have been tight as global coal prices rise, chiefly because neighboring China has ordered its state-owned energy companies to secure fossil fuel supplies at all costs to stave off winter shortages. [Financial Times]

Industrial and domestic consumption usually hits peak levels as the country enters a festival season starting later this month. A months-long supply squeeze would likely undermine a rebound in Asia’s third-biggest economy, which has been recovering from an unprecedented 7.3 percent contraction in the fiscal year ended in March. [Al Jazeera]

Moreover, there are concerns that the shortages will be used by to justify pushing more domestic coal production, with some state governments already putting on the pressure for expedited clearance for new coalmines in protected areas. [The Guardian]

Furthermore, if India – the world’s third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases – is to meet its climate targets in the coming years, it will also need to wean itself off coal, which currently accounts for almost 70 percent of the electricity generation in the country.

Precisely because New Delhi is so dependent on carbon-based fuels, it has been a notable holdout in the current global climate negotiations, including an agreement to phase out coal consumption and end the financing of coal plants. Last month, India skipped the preparatory meeting to this year’s UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) in London, the only one of 51 invited countries to do so. [Foreign Policy, $]

India: Supreme Court orders states to pay compensation for each COVID-19 death

(lm) India’s Supreme Court has approved the central government's decision to pay more than $650 as compensation for every death due to COVID-19, as a way to help families cope with the loss.

On October 4, Justice MR Shah said the "next of kith and kin of the deceased person" shall be paid this compensation. The apex court added that the compensation should be paid within 30 days after a family submits an application. Victims who died within 30 days of the diagnosis will be eligible, according to the court judgment, as well as people who were treated in hospital for longer than that and then passed away. [CNN]

The Supreme Court's order followed a petition by lawyers seeking compensation for the families of COVID-19 victims under the National Disaster Management Act 2005. The petitioners had appealed to the top court to provide at least eight times the compensation under the National Disaster Management Authority, through which the central government provides some financial help in natural disasters such as earthquakes. [BBC]

The central government, in its affidavit, which was approved by the Supreme Court, agreed to the minimum payable amount being disbursed by local authorities under the State Disaster Response Fund. [The Straits Times]

The total compensation amounts to more than $300 million based on India's current death toll: The country has officially recorded more than 449,000 COVID-19 deaths since the start of the pandemic last year. But experts believe that up to ten times more people could have died in the pandemic, with most people losing their lives during the second wave of the outbreak between March and May this year.

The funds for this compensation will be provided by the states. At least two states - Kerala and Rajasthan - have said the compensation payouts would put pressure on their exchequers, and that the funds should be provided by the central government.

A day after the Supreme Court approved the government plan, experts and victims’ families on October 5 described the payout as a “joke” and “too little” to ease their suffering. [Arab News]

India: Minister’s son arrested over deaths at farmers’ protest

(lm) The son of an Indian federal minister has been arrested on preliminary charges of murder and sent to judicial custody, police said on October 10, in a case that has sparked a national outcry and drawn renewed attention to year-long protests against contentious agriculture laws.

At least eight people, including four farmers, died on October 3 after a car thought to be owned by Ajay Mishra, the Junior Home Affairs Minister, plowed into demonstrators in a district in the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh.

Farmers alleged that Ajay’s son, Ashish Mishra, was behind the attack, but the Mishras denied the charge. An angry mob then beat to death three men in the car, including the driver. A journalist also died in the violence. [AiR No. 40, October/2021, 1] [NBC News]

After mounting pressure by opposition politicians, protest groups and India's Supreme Court, police on October 7 confirmed that they had opened an investigation into Ashish and 15 to 20 other unnamed people. Two days thereafter, police arrested Ashish Mishra on grounds of "non-cooperation" and "evasive replies" during an hours-long interrogation. He faced court on October 11; formal charges have to be filed within 90 days. [BBC] [Deutsche Welle]

India: Two teachers shot dead in Indian-administered Kashmir as militant attacks surge

(lm) Hundreds of people in Indian-administered Kashmir have been detained by police, after suspected anti-India militants shot dead two teachers, taking the number of people killed in the in the disputed Himalayan region in less than a week to seven.

Three assailants entered a government school in the region’s capital, Srinagar, on October 7 and shot dead the principal and her colleague. Witnesses later verified that the victims were killed by the attackers after they were singled out as members of the Hindu and Sikh communities – both minority groups in the Muslim-majority region – respectively. [The Guardian]

Following the shooting, nearly 500 residents suspected to have links with banned religious and militant groups were detained across the disputed territory. Moreover, India's counter-terrorism task force, the National Investigation Agency, summoned 40 schoolteachers for questioning on October 10. [France24]

A rebel group known as The Resistance Front (TRF) – associated with one of the main Islamic militant groups operating in Kashmir, Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba – claimed responsibility for the assassination of the two teachers. The TRF said on social media that it had “carried out the targeted attack on two non-locals who had harassed the parents of the students to salute the occupier’s flag on August 15,” referring to celebrations for India’s Independence Day. [The New York Times, $]

The two teachers were the latest casualties in a spate of civilian killings in the region in the last few days, all blamed on militant groups. At least seven civilians have been shot dead in different attacks in the past five days, six of them in Srinagar. Four of those killed, including the two teachers, belonged to minority groups. [The Straits Times]

India has long accused neighboring Pakistan, which also controls a portion of Kashmir and claims the region in full, of orchestrating the recent violence. Pakistan has denied those accusations.

India: New IAF chief looks beyond 36 additional Rafale jets, wants 114 multi role fighter aircraft

(lm) While addressing the press on October 8 [see entry in this edition], the Chief of India’s Air Force (IAF), Air Chief Marshal Vivek Ram Chaudhari, said the procurement of 114 multirole fighter planes (MRFA) would be taking place under the framework of the Make in India initiative, adding that the IAF was moving the "case forward". [NDTV]

In April 2019, the IAF had issued am initial tender to acquire 114 jets at an estimated cost of $18 billion. Companies from the United States, France, Sweden and Russia and a European consortium are working to sell India on their aircrafts for the project, which at the time was promoted as one of the world’s biggest military procurement programs. 

The MRFA competition had been touted as a 're-run' of an aborted competition to buy 126 fighter aircraft for the IAF that was called the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), which was first launched in the first decade of this millennium.

Dassault Aviation’s Rafale was announced as the winner of the MMRCA tender in 2012, but the procurement process was cancelled in 2015 as negotiations with the French defense manufacturer got bogged down. But a year later, the Modi administration inked a $9.2 billion deal with Dassault to buy 36 Rafale jets off the shelf.

But in 2020, news emerged that the US government, under then President Donald Trump, wanted to disrupt the IAF tender by offering a heavyweight fighter: Boeing's new fourth-generation plus F-15EX. This was widely seen as Washington’s attempt to discourage India from going forward with its $5.3 billion order of five units of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. Crucially, the Trump administration the same year kicked Turkey out of the F-35 program and imposed sanctions under federal law after Ankara received its first S-400, a major step against a longtime NATO ally. [The EurAsian Times]

The US Air Force intends to buy 76 F-15EX fighters by 2025 and could eventually have a fleet of 144 jets. Earlier this year, Boeing confirmed the F-15EX had been offered to the IAF. [The Week]

In addition to procuring 114 MRFA, the IAF is also seeking to induct 83 Light Combat Aircraft (LCA)-Mk1A and the indigenously developed fifth generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). The designs, specifications, and configuration for both projects have been finalized last month, and the roll-out for the first models for the test flights will begin in 2023 and 2024, respectively. 

Significantly, the IAF will not be able to meet its target of 42 squadrons over the next 10-15 years, according to Chief of the Air Force Chaudhari, despite the planned acquisition. For the next decade will see the phasing out of four squadrons of the MiG 21 Bison, Jaguar deep penetration aircraft, Mirage 2000 and the MiG 29s, leaving the IAF with just 35 squadrons. [ThePrint]

India: Suspected rebels kill five soldiers in Indian-administered Kashmir, Army says

(lm) In the deadliest incident since February, suspected rebels have shot dead five soldiers after fighting erupted during a search operation on October 11 close to the Line of Control, which separates Indian- and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. [Al Jazeera] [Anadolu Agency]

A junior officer and four soldiers were killed during the search operation – which is ongoing – in the district of Poonch.

Indian security forces, in turn, shot dead two suspected militants from The Resistance Front (TRF), an anti-India rebel group which authorities believe is an offshoot of Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and behind a recent spate of civilian killings. [see entry above]

Maldives: Supreme Court denies former President Yameen bail in money laundering case

(lm) The Maldives’ Supreme Court has refused to grant bail to former President Abdullah Yameen, who is currently kept under house arrest in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. During the hearing on October 5, the three-member bench, however, stayed a $5 million fine imposed on Yameen on top of the jail term. [raajje 1]

Widely seen as pro-China and accused of crushing dissent in the archipelago, Yameen served as the Maldives’ president from 2013 until his surprise defeat in the 2018 general election. In 2019, he was sentenced to five years in prison by the country’s Criminal Court after being found guilty of embezzling $1 million – fees for leasing land for tourism development – that were supposed to go to the state. Apart from the jail term, he was also given a fine totaling $5 million, to be settled within six months of the verdict.

Earlier this year, in August, then, the Attorney General (AG)’s Office filed a case with the country’s Civil Court after Yameen had failed to pay up the fine. The first hearing in the trial took place on October 6. [raajje 2]

However, Yameen in the meantime had filed an appeal with the Supreme Court after a high court had earlier ruled to uphold the Criminal Court’s decision in January this year. After the AG Office decided to file the case at the Civil Court, the former president’s defense attorneys therefore revealed that the money laundering conviction had been appealed at the Supreme Court, which was why the fine was unsettled.

The appeal trial at the Supreme Court on began on September 12; Yameen had made a total of three submissions in the case: to release him on bail, to grant a stay order on the execution of his money laundering sentence as well as presenting two new evidences. [The Edition]

Currently, he has also been facing a corruption trial over the lease of an island for resort development.   Further, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), the Presidential Inquiry Commission on Asset Recovery as well as the Maldives Police Service are currently conducting probes against the ex-president, regarding the Maldives Marketing and Public Relations Corporation (MMPRC) grand corruption case.

Yameen’s Progressive Party (PPM) has accused the present government led by President Ibrahim Mohammed Solih of politicizing and influencing the former president’s trial. To support these claims, the PPM last month leaked audiotapes which appeared to show that three of the five judges who convicted Yameen in the money laundering case were influenced by the Office of President – a claim the president’s office denied [see AiR No. 36, September/2021, 1].

Pakistan: ISI gets new chief in surprise army reshuffle

(lm/mm) In a surprise military shake-up, the Pakistan Army on October 6 announced that Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, hitherto the head of the country’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), had been appointed as Peshawar Corps Commander. [Dawn]

The Peshawar Corps (XI Corps) is stationed in Pakistan’s northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province which borders Afghanistan. Since the Taliban takeover across the border, the region has seen a surge in terrorist attacks, most notably one on the World Bank-funded Dasu Hydropower project on July 14 [see AiR No. 29, July/2021, 3].

Succeeding on General Hammed as ISI Director-General is Lieutenant General Nadeem Anjum, who belongs to the Punjab Regiment of the Pakistan Army, and has served as Karachi Corps Commander as well as Commandant of the Command and Staff College Quetta, a premier military institution of the Army. He is considered a battle-hardened soldier. [Geo News] [The Hindu]

The appointment of the new ISI Director-General follows on days of intense speculation about imminent changes at the country’s premier intelligence service. It is believed that the matter had been under consideration for some time, but was only announced after the corps commanders meeting held on October 5. The current Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), General Qamar Javed Bajwa, later met Prime Minister Imran Khan on October 6 for a final formal consultation on the matter.

The timing of the change at the top of the ISI, however, took many by surprise. For it was generally believed that General Hameed would hold the position until April next year, despite having already completed his two-year tenure.

Some observers are therefore looking at the shake-up from the angle of the upcoming race for the next COAS in 2022, when General Bajwa’s tenure is set to expire. Crucially, under Pakistani Army law, contenders need to have a tenure of at least six months as a Corps Commander to be eligible to serve as COAS. General Hameed, who is scheduled to retire in April 2023, was yet to meet this requirement. [ThePrint]

General Hameed will take over the command of Corps XI from Lieutenant General Nauman Mehmood, who will move to National Defence University (NDU) as the institution’s new president. Incumbent President Lieutenant General Muhammad Saeed will fill in the place vacated by General Anjum at the Karachi Corps following the latter’s posting as new ISI chief.

Pakistan: Islamic parties push for Taliban recognition in Afghanistan

(lm/mm) Powerful Islamist factions are putting pressure on Prime Minister Khan’s administration to officially recognize the theocratic Taliban government in neighboring Afghanistan, as they are hoping to revive their strength and influence in Pakistan’s political and cultural landscape.

Although the Taliban have been courting governments around the world for international recognition of its "Islamic Emirate" in Afghanistan, no country officially recognizes their rule. As far as Islamabad is concerned, its senior officials have resisted Western pressure to hold the new authorities in Kabul to account for public executions, among others; they insist that the more urgent need is to prevent a humanitarian crisis that could spill across Pakistan’s border.

But while Pakistan's secular political parties vehemently oppose any formal recognition of the Taliban, right-wing religious parties, most notably from the two major religious Islamic parties with pro-Taliban credentials – Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat-e-Islami (JUI-F) – increasingly pressure the Khan administration into recognizing the Taliban. [Deutsche Welle]

Days after the fall of Kabul in mid-August, the leader of the JUI-F and one of the country’s most powerful clerics, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, wrote a letter to the chief of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, congratulating him on the victory. More recently, Rehman has argued that recognition of the Taliban is in Pakistan's national interest and would further strengthen ties between the two Muslim-majority countries.

The JI, in turn, is set to launch a mobilization campaign to demand that Islamabad recognize Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and would also make this demand in parliament.

The Afghan Taliban, JI and JUI-F all follow Deobandi ideology, a school of thought which emphasizes adherence to Islamic law. The Islamic revivalist movement within Sunni Islam is believed to be taught in more than 50 percent of Pakistan’s 36,000 Islamic religious seminaries, some of which are said to be under the control of JUI affiliates. Crucially, Afghan Taliban officials and foot soldiers alike have studied in these seminaries Pakistan’s northwest border region; and both the JUI and JI were at the forefront of the Afghan-Soviet War through direct involvement in the recruitment of mujahideen from Pakistan.

But according to observers, the reappearance of Maulana Abdul Aziz, the longtime, pro-Taliban leader of the Lal Masjid ("Red Mosque") in Islamabad is the most worrisome. [The Diplomat]

In 2007, the mosque and its next-door Jamia Hafsa Islamic seminary were the site of a bloody raid by Pakistani security forces after a week-long standoff with armed militants inside the compound, which left at least 100 dead. Since then, Aziz has faced 27 legal proceedings and spent several stints in prison – but has never been convicted.

Since the fall of Kabul, Aziz and his followers have periodically replaced the Pakistani flag with the white Taliban flags on the Jamia Hafsa roof, defying government orders.      In fact, Maulana Aziz and his highly charged students have several times repelled Islamabad Police and threatened consequences for removing the Afghan Taliban’s flag.

Sri Lanka: President acknowledges shortcomings of his administration and addresses past pledges

(egm/lm) Sri Lanka’s President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has admitted his government is "not delivering" as shortages persist of food, medicines and other essential items because of a dire foreign exchange squeeze. Addressing a ceremony held to observe the 72nd anniversary of the Sri Lanka Army on October 10, the president also reaffirmed his pledge to introduce a new constitution and electoral system by 2022. [Radio France Internationale]

The Rajapaksa administration has been subject to criticism from various fronts, including the opposition, civil society and other parties, for its method of managing the pandemic and Sri Lanka’s struggling economy. Backlash in social media has pointed out the considerable number of lives lost to COVID-19, which exceed 13,000 cases, despite the vaccine rollout efforts.

In his speech, President Rajapaksa also responded to allegations of militarization for his decision to appoint retired military officers to civil administration positions. Defending his decisions, he stated that the decision aimed to end corruption. Noteworthy, the remarks came just days following the publication of the so-called Pandora Papers, which alleged that Rajapaksa’s niece and her husband would have hidden offshore holdings [see entry below].

The president also explained his call to ban chemical fertilizer in an attempt to move towards green agriculture despite farmers’ protests. The current costs of fertilizer imports exceed $300 million which is considered an additional strain for Sri Lanka’s economy as it faces a foreign exchange shortage due to money printing.

Moreover, as Sri Lanka’s economy reaches its limits and its $500 million worth European trade concession remains under review over human rights issues and pending reforms to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) [see entry below], the president’s speech also addressed national security concerns in relation to the issue of terrorism.

His assurance to protect the country from terrorism comes in the midst of the growing international criticism for his administration’s lack of progress in the areas of accountability, reconciliation and matters of human rights concerns. Moreover, the government has also been subject to objections for its alleged unequal application of the law and discriminatory practices which have allowed the pardoning of a former legislator sentenced to death for murdering a member of his own party while an outspoken lawyer continues to face arbitrary detention for an extensive period of time without charges under the PTA [see AiR No. 26, June/2021, 5] [see also AiR No. 36, September/2021, 1].

Sri Lanka: EU Monitoring Mission concludes visit to review Colombo’s GSP+ status

(egm) A European Union (EU) delegation sent to review Sri Lanka’s progress implementing the 27 international conventions applicable under the Generalized System of Preferences Plus (GSP+), concluded its ten-day working visit on October 6. [DailyMirror] [The Hindu]

The visit followed the European Parliament’s call made in its June 10 resolution for the removal of Sri Lanka’s Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) – a contentious anti-terror law that gives police sweeping powers to arrest suspects without trial – encouraging the EU Commission to temporarily withdraw Colombo’s GSP+ status if the law was not repealed [see AiR No. 25, June/2021, 4].

According to a statement released on October 5, the visiting mission paid particular attention to the topics of non-discrimination, the respect of the rights of all communities, the continued use of the (PTA), threats to the exercise of fundamental freedoms, and the development of draft legislation on Non-Governmental Organizations. [EEAS.EU]

Furthermore, during the discussions with government officials including President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Foreign Minister Prof G L Peiris, Justice Minister Ali Sabry, and Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa, the EU delegation remarked on ongoing human rights issues, the rule of law, economic social and cultural rights and labor relations as established in the international conventions ratified by Sri Lanka.

Additional meetings were also held with members of the opposition, civil society, human rights’ defenders, trade unions and employers as well as brief exchanges with EU Member States Ambassadors and United Nations agencies. 

In this regard, the EU recalled the amendment of the PTA’s as a prior commitment made in 2017 for Sri Lanka’s re-admittance to the GSP+ scheme after the country’s trade preferences were withdrawn in 2010 due to shortcomings implementing UN human rights conventions.

Addressing the EU delegation, President Rajapaksa explained that the necessary Committees have been appointed to carry out the reports which the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General have been instructed to follow. Furthermore, he stated that immediate steps would be taken to amend the necessary provisions of the PTA [see AiR No. 35, August/2021, 5].

Moreover, the EU’s Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Denis Chaibi, announced the development of regular reports to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers concerning the subject of the continued monitoring and engagement with Sri Lanka. The purpose of this ongoing collaboration, as stated by Ambassador Chaibi, is to encourage the country’s advancement in the international commitments required for its continued access to the EU market. 

The removal of Sri Lanka’s GSP+ trade concessions would result in grave implications for the island nation’s main industries, apparel and fishing, seeing as they have benefitted considerably from the EU’s trading support. Currently the EU represents Sri Lanka’s biggest export partner as over 80 percent of the country’s exports are eligible to access Europe without taxation.

Sri Lanka: Criticism follows probes into President’s niece listed in Pandora Papers

(egm) Sri Lanka’s President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has ordered a probe into his niece’s overseas wealth after she and her husband were alleged in the Pandora Papers of bribery and corruption, a move considered by the opposition a cover-up by the Rajapaksa family. [Al Jazeera]

As revealed in confidential documents gathered by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists and data leaked by the Pandora Papers, Nirupama Rajapaksa and her husband are listed for having hidden offshore holdings worth about $18 million in 2017 [see AiR No. 40, October/2021, 1].

In light of the accusations, President Rajapaksa has directed the Chairman of the Bribery Commission – the country’s anti-corruption body – to submit a report on the assets of his niece and her husband within a month.

As Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and senior government members discuss the issue further, businessman Thirukumar Nadesan who was mentioned in the Pandora Papers, addressed the President in a letter claiming his innocence and requesting the appointment of a private investigator to probe into the allegations. [DailyMirror 1]

The opposition criticized the government’s move, claiming that the investigation would figure as an attempt to cover up the incident by the Rajapaksa family which has held a powerful position in the country for decades. 

But government sources claim that the Rajapaksa family, despite its connection with Nirupama and her husband, was not aware of the secret business dealings seeing as the claims go back to the early 1990s – prior to the enactment of the 2006 Money Laundry Act.

Against this backdrop, Sri Lankan United National Party MP S.M. Marikkar told the Parliament that the argument showcased the government’s attempt to mislead people by appointing a commission and ruling out further investigations as the incident took place before 1994. In the same vein, left-wing opposition legislator Anura Dissanayake stated that there could be little trust given to the latest investigation claims as they were set up to deflect public outrage while protecting the guilty. [DailyMirror 2]

Currently, the possession of offshore assets and shell companies is considered legal in Sri Lanka, as long as assets are declared to local authorities. However, on September 7, the government enacted a finance bill providing tax amnesty to individuals who voluntarily disclose previously undisclosed taxable income or assets, in exchange for granting immunity from criminal prosecution [see AiR No. 38, September/2021, 3].

The move is regarded as an effort to reintroduce the wealth stashed abroad at a time when the country faces an economic crisis and depleting foreign exchange reserves. 

Sri Lanka: ‘Mastermind’ behind the Easter bombings and co-conspirators indicted

(egm) The alleged mastermind behind the 2019 Easter Sunday suicide bombings has been indicted along with 24 co-conspirators by Sri Lankan prosecutors on October 4. According to officials, suspects are currently under police custody and the related hearings are expected to begin on November 23. [Al Jazeera] [Jurist]

Since the three attacks that took place on April 21, 2019, targeting Sri Lanka’s Christian community and claiming the lives of 269 people, prosecutors have brought 23,270 charges against the suspects - three of whom have been accused of “terrorism” by the United States Justice Department.

Authorities have accused Mohamed Naufar for being the “mastermind” behind the attacks and a member of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorist group. The indictments brought against him and the other conspirators under the Prevention of Terrorism Act include charges for preparation, aiding and gathering explosives, and murder.

Additionally, a separate indictment has been made against former Police Chief Pujith Jayasundara and former Defense Secretary Hemasiri Fernando for failing to act on intelligence warnings of a possible ISIL attack. Their actions are viewed under the accusations as constituting criminal negligence and murder. In the same manner, under a further inquiry into former President Maithripala Sirisena, it was discovered that he too had failed to act despite having prior knowledge of an attack and would also have to be prosecuted [see AiR No. 9, March/2021, 1]. 

Meanwhile, the head of the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka, Cardinal Malcolm Ranjith, has repeatedly expressed his displeasure with the apparent lack of progress on the investigation into the Easter bombings [see AiR No. 17, April/2021, 4].

Sri Lanka: Supreme Court orders to ensure safety of prisoners filing charges against Minister Ratwatte

(egm) Following the incident at the Anuradhapura Prison where Minister Lohan Ratwatte broke in on September 12, the Supreme Court ordered the assurance for the security of eight prisoners who filed a Fundamental Rights petition against state Minister Ratwatte [see also AiR No. 38, September/2021, 3]. [DailyMirror][Daily News]

On October 5, under direct orders from the Supreme Court, the Attorney General directed the Commissioner General of Prisons and Prison Superintendent of Anuradhapura to ensure the rights of access to lawyers for the prisoners detained at the Anuradhapura prison under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The petition taken up before a Three-Judge Bench comprising Chief Justice Jayantha Jayasuriya, Justices Murdu Fernando and S.Thurairajah, will be taken for support on October 21.

The petitioners seek an order against the alleged criminal conduct of State Minister Ratwatte who entered the Anuradhapura Prison and threatened 10 detainees to kneel before him while pointing a pistol to their head. According to their allegations, while apparently intoxicated, the State Minister claimed that the President had given him full power over the prisoners held under the PTA and could decide to either release or shoot them.  

In this note, the petitioners claim their fundamental rights under Articles 12(1) and 12(2) have been infringed and therefore request an interim order to be transferred to any prison in the Northern Province for their safety. 

According to the President’s Counsel, M.A. Sumanthiran who appeared before the petitioners, his clients fear that they will become subject to the mass killing of prisoners such as the previous three cases recorded in the history of the country.

Constitutional Law and –Politics, Human Rights and National Security in Southeast Asia 

Cambodia: President orders constitutional change for Cambodian citizenship for top posts

(nd) On October 6, Cambodian President Hun Sen ordered the justice ministry to amend the constitution in order to hinder dual-citizenship holders to assume the country's top posts, including the prime minister. In a statement, Hun Sen said the prime minister, upper and lower houses speakers and head of the constitutional council must only hold Cambodian citizenship "to show loyalty to the nation and avoid foreign interference".

His comments were triggered by a Guardian report about Hun Sen holding a Cypriot passport, referencing information obtained in the latest data dump, known as the "Pandora Papers". A government statement indicated Hun Sen only holds Cambodian citizenship, not mentioning whether he had another one in the past. The Guardian, however published a corrected version of its article, saying Hun Sen was not part of a group of people acquiring Cypriot passports. According to a Reuters Special Report in October 2019, family members and key police, business and political associates of Hun Sen had bought a foreign nationality via a citizenship for sale arrangement in Cyprus [Reuters] [The Diplomat]

Cambodia: Entertainment workers forced to take pregnancy tests, have abortions

(nd) According to workers in the entertainment industry, women are subject to forced pregnancy tests and pressured into having an abortion if tested positive. Six workers from karaoke parlors told Voice of Democracy (VoD) about the procedure, and self-induced abortion to not lose their jobs. According to VoD, the Labor Ministry is aware of the claims. In the past though, rather than taking legal steps against the owners, the Ministry entered into agreements with them, including a fine and a promise of future abidance of the law.

The Secretary General of the Cambodian NGO Committee on CEDAW commented that the Labor Ministry in order to assure civilian trust should introduce legal action against shop owners, adding it was the government’s duty to ensure neither public institutions nor private enterprises abuse or discriminate against women. [UCA News]

Indonesia: Labor Party revived to compete in upcoming 2024 elections 

(ms) A number of organizations have revived the Labor Party and appointed administrators for the 2021-2026 period at the party’s fourth congress held in Jakarta on 4-5 October. Amongst the organizations involved in the re-establishment of the party are the four largest labor confederations in Indonesia, as well as old Labor Party officials, and several other unions and social movement organizations. [CNN Indonesia]  

One of the main factors in reviving the party is Indonesia’s ratification of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, which was passed last year amid widespread protests. Unions, environmentalists, and other critics oppose the legislation, alleging that it will favor capitalists and investors and worsen labor and environmental protections. [Sindonews] [See also AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2] 

The party, originally founded in 2003, has been revived with the intention to take part in the 2024 general election. It has not competed in a general election since 2009 and has never reached the threshold to win a seat in parliament.

The elected President of the Labor Party for 2021-2026, Sadiq Iqbal, was officially sworn in at the party congress. Sadiq also serves as the President of the Confederation of Trade Unions (KSPI) and is well known for being vocal in the affairs of workers and laborers. He has said that it is imperative that Indonesia, as an industrialist county, has a Labor Party so that the struggles of the workers can be carried out in parliament, and not just on the streets. [Tempo] [Tribunnews]

Since the end of the authoritarian Suharto presidency in Indonesia in 1998, independent unions have cooperated to achieve significant victories in economic and policy terms locally and nationally. Their influence has been underwritten by their capacity to stage large-scale demonstrations, having no organic links to a major political party with a proworker platform. This is in contrast to labor actors with links to populist governments in Latin America and social democrats in Western Europe. However, recognizing the limits of what can be accomplished only on the streets, Indonesian unions in recent years have also turned to electoral politics as a means to give working class-actors a stronger voice in Indonesia’s politics. 

Indonesia: Parliament Passes Major Tax Overhaul 

(ms) Indonesia’s parliament approved the country’s most ambitious tax overhauls into law on October 7. The law calls for value-added tax (VAT) rates for sales of nearly all goods and services to be raised from its current rate of 10% to 11% next April and to 12% by 2025. It also keeps the corporate tax rate unchanged at 22%, scrapping an earlier plan to cut it to 20% next year. Plus, it includes a 35% income tax for those earning more than 5 billion rupiah a year, an income tax cut for most other people, and a new carbon tax. 

The law is aimed at optimizing revenue collection to compensate for the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the state’s treasuries last year. Next year’s tax revenue is projected to increase by around 129.3 trillion rupiah with the new fiscal measures, which would narrow the fiscal deficit.

However, some business group and analysts have criticized the government for tightening fiscal policy too soon, with the economic recovery from the pandemic still fragile. Some are calling instead for fiscal stimulus and to delay the VAT hike until the further recovery of people’s purchasing power. [Reuters]

Indonesia: President Widodo to pardon academic jailed under controversial internet law

(ms) President Joko Widodo has agreed to pardon an academic jailed last month for defamation under Indonesia’s controversial Electronic Information and Transaction (ITE) law. Saiful Mahdi, a lecturer from Syiah Kuala University in Aceh, was originally sentenced to three months in jail accused of slandering the university after he criticized a hiring process for lecturers in a private WhatsApp messenger group. President Widodo’s decision to pardon him follows an outcry from human rights groups which say the law curtails freedom of expression. Amnesty International, for example, has called the ITE law “deeply flawed”. [Amnesty International] 

Although meant to regulate online activity, including defamation and hate speech, and protect against cybercrime, the law’s ambiguous wording has frequently been used by those in power to silence criticism and dissent. Earlier this year, the government formed a task force to ensure that the law be applied more judiciously, and President Widodo has said he wants to revise the law this year. [Reuters] [The Australian] [see also AiR No. 10, March/2021, 2] 

In recent years, there has been a trend across the Southeast Asia region of increasing government control of the internet. [Global Risk Insights] Earlier this year, Singapore passed the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act, for example, which gives the government significant leverage over social media platforms and users to issue corrections or remove posts it finds to contain falsehoods [see AiR No. 21, May/2021, 4]. Cambodia meanwhile is planning a national internet gateway, which could give authorities increased powers to crackdown on online free-speech [see AiR No. 8, February/2021, 4]. Myanmar also has repeatedly cut internet access in response to anti-government protests [see also AiR No. 31, August/2021, 1]. 

Indonesia: President Joko Widodo provides model for good governance

(ms) According to a recent analysis by Kishore Mahbubani, Singaporean diplomat, President Joko Widodo has made a series of significant accomplishments since being elected in 2014. For one, he has helped to bridge political divides in Indonesia, with the presidential candidate and the vice-presidential candidate whom Jokowi defeated in his 2019-relection – Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno – now serving in his cabinet as defense minister and tourism minister respectively. His success in building coalitions was vital for the passage last year of the so-called Omnibus Law, which aims to boost investment and create new jobs, despite criticism by labor unions, environmentalists and students. [See also AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2]

Moreover, Jokowi’s personal experience of poverty has influenced his ambitions to assist the poor, with numerous relevant programs delivered by his administration. His government has distributed land to the poor through the formalization of land ownership; introduced the Indonesia health card and a new national health insurance scheme, both to provide universal healthcare; launched the Smart Indonesia Card to increase school enrolment and achieve universal education; and it currently administers a cash-transfer program for the poor.

As a result of the programs, Indonesia’s Gini coefficient of wealth inequality, which had been rising steadily before Jokowi took office, has subsequently declined. All has been achieved while keeping Indonesia’s public debt low by international standards, at less than 40% of GDP.

Infrastructure development has also been a key goal under Jokowi’s presidency. Bold plans are underway to build highways across Indonesia and Jakarta’s metro network is being rapidly developed in order to relieve some of the world’s worst traffic congestion.

On the economic front, Jokowi’s reforms helped to raise Indonesia’s ranking in the World Bank’s “Doing Business” index from 120th in 2014 to 73rd in 2020. And the country would undoubtedly be enjoying an economic boom now if it was not for the impact of COVID-19. Nevertheless, it could be worse, with early and decisive action taken by Jokowi to secure 175 million vaccine doses for a population of 270 million.

Also geopolitically prudent, Jokowi has managed to maintain good relations with both China and the US despite the great powers’ growing rivalry. In recent years, the US has invested more in Indonesia, and China’s investments have been much larger, with Indonesia participating in many projects tied to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.[Project Syndicate]

Indonesian and Filipino officials included in Pandora Papers leak

(lt/ms) Both Indonesian and Filipino officials have been included in the Pandora Papers leak.

Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan and Coordinating Minister for the Economy Airlangga Hartarto have been named in the Pandora Papers report. [Tempo 1] Luhut is reported to be related to a Panama-incorporated oil and gas company, Petrocapital SA. He is recorded as having served as an executive officer, attending several meetings that took place between 2007 and 2010. A spokesman for Luhut has confirmed his role but said the company failed to obtain investment projects under his office term. Airlangga, meanwhile, is reported to own two shell companies named Buckley Development Corporation and Smart Property Holdings Limited. Both companies are located in the British Virgin Islands, a tax-exempt jurisdiction in the Caribbean. Airlangga has claimed, however, he knew neither about the establishment nor the transactions of the companies. [Tempo 2] [VOI]

Over 940 individuals and companies using Philippine addresses have been discovered in the leak. [Rappler] Included in the 940 Philippine addresses uncovered in the leak are 31 law firms. Transportation Secretary Arthur Tugade was also found to have kept an offshore company, Solart Holdings Limited, during his eight years in public service. No details about Solart Holdings Limited have been declared other than its acquisition in 2003. [Rappler 1] Under the Constitution and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, it is an administrative and criminal offense for government officials to fail in declaring their assets. This includes business interests and financial connections. Tugade’s failure to declare his offshore ties and the inclusion of Filipino addresses in the Pandora Papers leak is questionable, with many calling for the investigation of this corruption. [Rappler 2]

The Pandora Papers is the result of an investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists into almost 12 million leaked documents of 14 financial firms that manage shell companies in tax haven countries. The documents expose the hidden wealth, tax avoidance, and money laundering of world leaders, politicians, and billionaires. [BBC]

Malaysia: Growing intolerance claimed after social media outrage

(nd) Citing recent social media controversies, civil society groups have warned of growing racial and religious intolerance in Malaysia. Muslim preacher Syakir Nasoha in a TikTok video that reached 17,000 views accused indigenous people of Sarawak and Sabah, namely Buddhists, Hindus and Dayaks, of killing Muslims, a claim that can possibly incite violence against those groups. Parallelly, senior politician from Bersatu Party, Borhanuddin Che Rahim, on Facebook questioned the recruitment of badminton player S. Kisona, who is of ethnic Indian descent, in the national team. The Bersatu Party is a constituent of the ruling coalition government led by Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yakoob. 

Politicians and civil society were quick to condemn the content, with police reporting to have received 3,000 complaints against the preacher. Still, according to civil society groups, they are a sign of growing intolerance. Recently, a senior counterterrorism official has warned that religious and ethnically motivated extremism poses the biggest threat of a terrorist incident. Also, it is often claimed that politicians seek to exploit racial divisions. Additionally, the natural sources-rich states of Sabah and Sarawak are still less developed than Peninsula Malaysia, sparking political unrest and fueling claims of being treated unfairly and abandoned.

According to critics, the rising intolerance can be traced back to political instability in recent years. After having ruled for 61 years, the biggest party, United Malays National Organization (UMNO), was ousted in the 2018 elections. The incoming governments, however, have been instable and unable to secure lasting majorities, three Prime Ministers emerged within three years. [South China Morning Post]

Malaysia: Five-year-development plan passed

(nd) Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob’s five-year road map, known as the 12th Malaysia Plan, was passed in parliament on October 7. The plan includes 400 billion ringgit (US$95.53 billion) to be spent on development projects including new highways and rail networks, affordable housing, and improvements in health, education and broadband connectivity, in an effort to turn Malaysia into a high-income economy by 2025. [The Straits Times]

The plan, however, will also increase race-based affirmative action policies, which have long been criticized by the opposition as well as economists and industry groups. Under a new “safety-net” framework in the plan, inter alia, shares and companies owned by ethnic Malay can only be offered to other ethnic Malay-owned consortiums, companies or individuals, to ensure certain equities remain to be held in Malay hands. The ethno-nationalist direction is sought to be inevitable by analysts due to the looming 2022 general election.

The policies aim at empowering Bumiputra, referring to ethnic Malays and indigenous peoples meaning “sons of the soil”. Such policies began with the New Economic Policy (NEP) about 50 years ago, in an effort to fight inequality between Malays – who at the time comprised nearly 50% of the population but held only around 3% of the country’s wealth – and comparably prosperous ethnic Chinese minorities. The special position of Malays, who constitute 70% of the population, was enshrined in the constitution. It was initially only planned to last for two decades and supposed to produce a viable Malay middle class, while according to critics it instead enriched well-connected businessmen, thereby created resentment among non-Malays and have caused a significant “brain drain” of highly qualified non-Malay to Singapore and Australia. [Asia Times]

After now having a confidence vote for a test of his claimed majority, the passing of his first policy document is a boost for Ismail ahead of the upcoming federal budget proposal on October 2029. Legislators from the main opposition Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition did not block the passage.

Malaysia: Bill to raise government debt limit tabled

(nd) Malaysia’s finance minister tabled a bill in parliament to raise the limit on government debt, the second time in a little over a year, due to the repercussions of the pandemic on the economy. According to the bill, the statutory debt ceiling shall be raised to 65% of gross domestic product until 2023, from now 60%. With the increase, the government aims to finance extra spending of 45 billion ringgit ($10.8 billion) for a stimulus package. 

Other countries in the region have also looked for funding additional support programs in light of continued economic downturns due to the pandemic. Thailand has raised its debt limit last month, the Philippines are approaching their limit, and Indonesia passed a new tax law to expand its revenue base. [Bloomberg]

Role of Facebook in inciting violence in Myanmar

(ds) In her harsh assessment of Facebook’s power made in front of US Senators on October 5, whistle-blower Frances Haugen held up Myanmar as an example of how the social media site is capable of intensifying extremism. Haugen’s testimony comes after a report from British newspaper The Guardian found that an uptick in hate speech on the platform accompanied the violence against the Rohingya people in 2018. [The Guardian]

In June of this year, the advocacy organization Global Witness published an exposé on Facebook’s role in promulgating misinformation in Myanmar, declaring that the site’s algorithm had “amplified” pro-junta propaganda following February’s coup. This occurred despite Facebook moderators removing the military’s official presence on the platform, citing its appalling human rights record. Global Witness has appealed to the tech firm to do more to combat its role in inciting offline violence, a fact backed up by Facebook’s own research. [Global witness]

Observers point out that for many Burmese Facebook practically “is the internet”, in the way it holds a fundamental position in society in terms of business, marketing, and social interaction, especially among the country’s youth. Half of Myanmar’s 54 million people use the platform, which often comes preinstalled on smartphones, and its near omnipresence contributes to an even greater capacity to influence public discourse, says an expert quoted by the BBC. [BBC]

Myanmar: Foreign pressure keeps mounting on junta

(ds) Legislation has been introduced in the US Senate by lawmakers who argue more US support is needed in response to the violent unrest that has followed the military takeover of Myanmar in February. The Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2021, or BURMA Act, calls for harsher sanctions on the regime, regional support for refugees, more decisive action at the UN and determination of genocide in regard to the treatment of the Rohingya. [House Foreign Affairs Committee]

Meanwhile, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is reportedly becoming increasingly frustrated by the obstruction on the part of the regime, maintaining that Myanmar’s military junta must come to the table to begin peace talks. ASEAN member state Malaysia has voiced that the junta’s failure to begin implementing the Five-Point Consensus to end the violence is untenable, stating instead that the nation might hold talks with the parallel authority National Unity Government (NUG), in the place of the ruling regime. [The Diplomat 1]

Meanwhile, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in support of NUG and its parliamentary committee as “the only legitimate representatives of the democratic wishes of the people of Myanmar” and urged ASEAN and other foreign governments “to include and involve them in genuine and inclusive political dialogue and efforts aimed at the peaceful resolution of the crisis.” While this support is a setback to the military’s efforts for international recognition, it is unlikely to be followed by practical moves by the European Commission, such as closing its mission in Yangon and thereby officially switching recognition to the opposition. [The Diplomat 2]

Regime troops and collaborators routinely killed amid widespread resignation

(ds) People working with Myanmar’s military regime are more and more at risk from the country’s armed resistance groups, as up to 40 junta troops were killed in an attack on a 50-vehicle convoy. The Yaw Defence Force (YDF) has claimed to have placed landmines along the strategic Gangaw-Kalay Highway, which is often traversed by military forces. Reports suggest the resistance groups are attempting to prevent the military from sending in reinforcements of armored vehicles, artillery, and attack helicopters into the Magway Region, one of many places that have seen increased violence of late. [Radio Free Asia]

The deaths of troops coincide with regime-controlled media reports that nearly 700 individuals have been killed since February’s coup after being accused of acting as informants for the junta. Reports linked to the National Unity Government, currently in exile, claim that in response to the military’s targeting of townships and civilians, resistance forces have in turn been attacking junta-appointed administrators in attempts to weaken the regime’s hold over the country. [The Irrawaddy 1] The rise in targeted killings against junta collaborators has resulted in the resignations of over 100 local officials around the country in recent weeks. [The Irrawaddy 2]

Newly unveiled coast guard accompanied by increased armaments and missing aid money

(ds) Myanmar’s military junta has inaugurated an updated military coast guard that will be charged with protecting the Southeast Asian nation’s nearly 2,000 km-long coastline. In a rare public appearance since seizing power in February, military leader Min Aung Hlaing greeted foreign press from atop a 47-meter military vessel on October 6. [France 24] Enacted in 2018 under the now-toppled National League for Democracy’s (NLD) administration, the coastguard will aim to contain illegal fishing and drug trafficking along the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea shoreline. [The Irrawaddy]

The announcement of Myanmar’s new military maritime controls come as the UN criticized a military build-up in the nation. Human rights spokeswoman, Ravina Shamdasani, released a statement denouncing “a substantial deployment of heavy weapons and troops'' into areas of the country currently under internet blackouts, aimed at repressing dissent. Shamdasani stated that the UN fears an imminent military-led attack on resistance forces, who have been launching more frequent ambushes on junta troops, and which would undoubtedly add to the more than 1,100 lives lost since February’s military takeover. [Reuters]

The fears of greater junta-led violence are compounded by the UN’s warning that less than half of its $385m emergency humanitarian appeal for Myanmar has been provided to it to help the 215,000 people displaced by the conflict. [The Financial Times]

Philippines: Commission of Human Rights leader dies of COVID-19

(lt) Chito Gascon, chairperson of the Philippine Commission on Human Rights, has died after contracting COVID-19. The Filipino legislator was confirmed to have succumbed to the virus on 9 October 2021. 

Gascon was best recognized as being the youngest member of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. In 2015, he was appointed as chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, an independent body responsible for investigating human rights violations in the Philippines. Due to his role in defending human rights, he often clashed with President Rodrigo Duterte’s deadly war on drugs. [Al Jazeera] [Manila Times] 

Philippines: Commission on Elections denounces those behind Bongbong Marcos alert message

(lt) The Commission on Elections has vowed to hold those responsible for the misuse of the national emergency text alert system attempting to garner votes for presidential candidate Bongbong Marcos. Several people were reported to have received an alert during Marcos’ filing of candidacy at the Sofitel Hotel in Pasay City. The message in question contained Marcos’ initials “BBM,” ending with the hashtag “#BBM 2022.” The incident is now being investigated by the National Telecommunications Commission. [ABS-CBN News]

Bongbong Marcos, son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, has denied involvement in the incident. His political camp has supported investigations into the misuse of the national emergency text alert system, stating that Marcos himself was also a recipient of the alert. [CNN]

Diverse range of candidates file for presidential candidacy in 2022 Philippine elections

(lt) At least fifty candidates aiming to replace current leader President Rodrigo Duterte as head of state of the Philippines have filed their certificates of candidacy. Among them are current Vice President Leni Robredo, former boxer Manny Pacquiao, current Mayor of Manila Isko Moreno and son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, Bongbong Marcos. [CNN 1]

A fervent critic of Duterte, Robredo filed her candidacy in response to the 1Sambayan opposition coalition’s endorsement of her as their presidential bet in the 2022 elections. With her background as a human rights lawyer, Robredo has been well-received by many Duterte dissenters due to her role in quelling the effects of COVID-19 in the Philippines. This is evidenced in her providing 483,000 PPE sets to the disadvantaged through her grassroots program, Office of the Vice President. [Manila Bulletin]

Another candidate aiming for Philippine presidency includes former boxer and current senator Manny Pacquiao, who gave up his career in late September to focus on his political aspirations. Pacquiao has vowed to eradicate corruption and poverty rates in the Philippines, hoping to win over voters through using his popularity as a boxer. [South China Morning Post]

Manila Mayor Isko Moreno has also utilized his fame as a former actor to win support from Filipino voters. Moreno, a Manila native, began his career in politics in 1998 as a city councilor. He was later elected vice-mayor in 2007, followed by his election as mayor in 2019. [CNN 2]

With many opposing his presidential candidacy, Bongbong Marcos is renowned for his relation to late president Ferdinand Marcos. The only son of the former dictator, Marcos has promised to unify leadership and end the nation’s current economic crisis. He ran for the position of vice president in 2016 against Leni Robredo, losing narrowly. Marcos has also served as a congressman representing his home province of Ilocos Norte, where he has also held the positions of governor and vice governor. His mother Imelda has also had a political career, being elected to the House of Representatives four times after returning to the Philippines following her exile in Hawaii. Marcos’s candidacy has faced harsh criticism from victims who suffered under his father’s imposition of martial law, resulting in nationwide protests. [CNN] [ABC News]

Philippines: Maria Ressa wins 2021 Nobel Peace Prize 

(lt) Maria Ressa, co-founder and chief executive of the online news publication Rappler, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize of 2021 alongside Russian journalist Dmitry Muratov on 8 October 2021. The pair have been recognized for their role in protecting rights to freedom of speech and expression in their respective democracies. [Rappler]

The first Nobel Peace Prize awarded to a Filipino, Ressa has faced harsh criticism due to Rappler’s open opposition towards President Rodrigo Duterte’s administration. [Rappler] Rappler has reported extensively on Duterte’s war on drugs, misogyny and human rights violations occurring during his presidency. Due to her work, Ressa has faced numerous arrests and legal cases which appear to be politically motivated. After congratulating Ressa, spokesman Harry Roque added that “Maria Ressa still has to clear her name before our courts as in fact she’s a convicted felon for libel, cyber libel in the Philippines and she faces other cases in the Philippines”; “that’s for the courts to decide.” [BBC News] [Benar News]

Singapore: Court lays out framework for dealing with false online information

(nd) In a landmark ruling, the Court of Appeal overturned part of a correction direction issued against the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) under the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA). In the 156-pages decision rendered on October 8, the judges for the first time laid out a five-step framework for a court to determine whether or not to overturn a correction direction under POFMA. Also, the judges upheld the constitutionality of POFMA and stated that the burden of proof lies with the complainant making the allegedly false statement and not the minister issuing the correction direction, an issue that was debated heavily in the previous instances. The Ministry of Manpower issued three directions against SDP for comments made on unemployment in Singapore in December 2019 for their false content. [Channel News Asia]

Thailand: Protesters mark 45th anniversary of Thammasat massacre

(kk) Protesters gathered at Thammasat University in Bangkok to mark the 45th anniversary of the massacre of students by state forces and right-wing radicals on October 6, 1976. In 1976, Thai students protested the return of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, the leader of the “Three Tyrants,” who had ruled Thailand for ten years. This happened three years after Thanom fled the country amid violent protests as Thai students successfully overthrew the authoritarian government in 1973.

Since July 2021, young Thai activists have been staging pro-democracy protests in Bangkok against dictatorship mirroring those articulated by thousands of students who rallied at Thammasat University in 1976. A protester who joined the massacre memorial indicated that Thailand must have a prime minister who was elected by the people under a democratic constitution. In recent months, various groups of protesters have returned to the street to demand that Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-O-Cha leaves office. [See AiR No. 36, September/2021, 1] 

The police has resorted to a more violent approach, including tougher legal action against protesters especially during almost-daily protests held by Thalu Gaz group, whose methods are more violent than other anti-government groups. [See AiR No. 37, September/2021, 2] [See also AiR No. 38, September/2021, 3]

Move Forward Party leader Pita Limcharoenrat, who attended the memorial, said the government's use of violence and legal action against young protesters and activists reflected that having differing political points of view has never been accepted by the government. [Bangkok Post 1] 

Thatchapong Kaedam – a prominent political activist – expressed concerns over lese-majeste, a royal defamation law which carries a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison, adding that the law should be abolished for the truth regarding the massacre would be revealed and bring justice to the victims. [BenarNews]

Kritsadang Nutcharas, a Ratsadon group lawyer, announced his intention to bring the perpetrators of the Thammasat Massacre to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to restore justice for the victims. The lawyer stated that the massacre was an intentional act by those in power at that time to eradicate students who called for freedom and democracy. Kritsadang reiterated that the families of the victims have yet to receive an apology or compensation. According to official figures, 45 deaths were reported, forty of whom were students, while 145 people were injured and 3,094 were arrested. [Bangkok Post 2]

Thailand: Nine soldiers charged with alleged torture, death of a private in 2011

(kk) A military court charged a former army officer and eight subordinates with unintentional murder in a decade-old case involving the alleged torture and murder of a newly enlisted private in Thailand's restive Deep South. The Court has scheduled the defendants’ submission of testimony for 25 November 2021.

In 2011, Wichian Puaksom volunteered for the army and was assigned to Narathiwat province, in the South of Thailand. Only a month after, he died from alleged torture by his superiors and other soldiers after he was accused of escaping from military training. 

Wichian’s family have spent years seeking for justice. His niece said her family filed several petitions against Lt. Puri Perksopon and his subordinates with then-Army Chief Gen. Prayuth Chan-O-Cha, but failed to receive justice. In 2018, Wichian’s niece successfully filed a petition with the Office of Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission, which conducts an initial investigation into misconduct by government officials. Eventually, on September 30, the 46th Military Circle Court indicted Puri and eight of his subordinates for malfeasance, disobedience of superiors and third-degree murder. [BenarNews]

The Cross-Cultural Foundation (CrCF), a Thai human rights NGO, stated the case is under jurisdiction of the military court, which could take a long time before rendering a final ruling since Thailand has not enacted a law against torture and enforced disappearance. CrCF added that no one has been punished for their alleged roles in Wichian’s torture and death in the past ten years.  [Prachatai English]

In September, the Thai parliament approved four draft bills against torture and enforced disappearance, which have been sent to a lower House committee for a review. [See AiR No. 38, September/2021, 3]

Thailand: Rights groups condemn Thai government’s use of lèse majesté law

(kk) Prominent human rights organizations warned that many Thai pro-democracy activists could be sentenced to as many as 300 years in prison for royal defamation. 

According to a report by the International Federation for Human Rights, the Thai Lawyers for Human Rights and Internet Law Reform Dialogue, in less than a year, a total of 124 people, including at least eight children, were charged with royal defamation under Section 112 of the Criminal Code, also known as the lèse majesté law. The penalty for such a crime ranges from 3 to 15 years in prison for each count of royal defamation. In November 2020, prosecutions under Section 112 resumed, despite being absent for two years, in response to the pro-democracy protests across the country for most of that year. [See AiR No. 49, December/2020, 2] Prominent pro-democracy leaders have been charged with numerous counts of royal defamation over their speeches at protests and online statements. Parit "Penguin" Chiwarak, a student activist, has been charged with 20 cases of lese majeste, which means he could potentially face a total of 300 years in prison if convicted.

Half of the royal defamation charges against pro-democracy activists, protesters and other individuals are related to forms of online expression. The charges were based on complaints made by members of royalist groups, cyber vigilantes, other internet users, and the military’s Information Operation (IO) in some cases. Members of the online royalist group, Thailand Help Center for Cyberbullying Victims, had filed royal defamation charges against many activists including Parit, Anon Nampa, and Panupong “Mike” Jadnok. [See AiR No. 25, June/2021, 4] [See also AiR No. 39, September/2021, 4]

Rights groups urged the Thai government to revise and repeal the lèse majesté law, to drop charges against those who are currently facing criminal prosecution, and release those who have been imprisoned under Section 112. [UCA News]

Thailand: Court denies Emergency Decree temporary injunction request

(kk) The Civil Court has rejected activists’ request to stop a public gathering ban under the emergency decree. The court explained that the decree, which bans gatherings of over five people, was necessary as it aims to curtail the spread of COVID-19, and there was no evidence indicating a motivation to suppress political rallies. [Bangkok Post 1]

Earlier, the Internet Law Reform Dialogue (iLaw) – a Thai NGO – along with the anti-government Ratsadon group and a feminist movement representative, filed a petition against Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-O-Cha and related officials, demanding a revocation of the public gathering ban and a temporary injunction pending the final ruling. The activists also demanded a 4.5-million-baht compensation for damages caused by the decree, claiming they were one of the damaged parties as they were charged with violation of the decree for participating in a protest on March 24, while only exercising their constitutional rights. [Bangkok Post 2] [Prachatai English]

Yingcheep Atchanont – iLaw manager – said the government could impose certain restrictions to contain the pandemic, but the decree could not be applied to suppress political expression or protests. He added that a revocation of the decree would means the drop of all charges based on it. [Thai PBS World]

According to a report by Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, at least 902 protesters and activists have been charged with violating the emergency decree since July 2020. Many have also faced other charges including violating Section 215 of the Criminal Code, which prevents gatherings of more than 10 people with intention to create an act of violence.

Following the court’s rejection of temporary injunction of the decree request, the next hearing for the petition is scheduled for January 31, 2022.

Thailand: Former Move Forward Party MP to launch a new political party

(kk) Former Move Forward Party (MFP) MP Win Sutheerachai announced the founding of a new political party to compete in the next election. Ruam Thai United was established by Win, founder and editor-in-chief of an online news outlet Voranai Vanijaka, former leader of the Mahachon Party Apirat Sirinavin, and famous transgender model Nitchanat Sudlapa. 

Win – former MFP party-list MP – announced his departure from the MFP a day before the announcement of Ruam Thai United, citing the “changing situation and context”. The four founders said the party was a cooperation of people from different backgrounds who share a desire to see changes and a developed Thailand, by following the concept of "thinking together, doing together and creating together". Win insisted that the party is not sponsored by any groups or parties. The founders also expressed their stance on not accepting the senators’ power to vote on a prime minister and would only embrace the parties that come from the people. [Bangkok Post] [Thaipost, in Thai]

Thailand: PPRP to nominate Prayuth as PM candidate in the next election

(kk) The ruling Palang Pracharat Party (PPRP) decided to nominate Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-O-Cha as prime ministerial candidate in the next election in 2023 amid sinking public support. The move was welcomed by the PM, while igniting a debate on term limits.

Prawit Wongsuwon, Deputy Prime Minister and PPRP leader, reportedly told party members that the PPRP would definitely nominate Prayuth as a PM candidate, affirming that their relationship was still intact. [Bangkok Post 1]

Earlier, the PM survived his third no-confidence vote in September. However, there were rumors of a plot to oust Prayuth before the vote began. Thammanat Prompao – the secretary-general of PPRP and Prawit's close ally – was allegedly involved in the plan. Although Thammanat had denied the accusation, he was dismissed from his post as Deputy Agriculture Minister by a royal command initiated by the PM’s suggestion, resulting in speculations over internal rifts within the PPRP. [See AiR No. 37, September/2021, 2]

The possibility of Prayuth to be nominated for another term has raised questions whether it violates the constitution as the Thai charter limits maximum tenure of a prime minister to eight years, regardless of whether the four-year terms are served consecutively. The opposition insisted that Prayuth’s premiership began on the day he was installed as the head of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) following the 2014 coup. The ruling coalition argued that Prayuth’s term began when the current charter was promulgated in 2017. [See AiR No. 40, October/2021, 1]

According to the government spokesman, the PM has asked Deputy Prime Minister Wissanu Krea-ngam, who is a legal expert, to provide an official interpretation of the term-limit rule, which might be brought to the Constitutional Court in the future.

Nevertheless, Prayuth is facing the challenges of gaining public support to ensure the PPRP’s victory. In a survey conducted by the National Institute of Development Administration in September, 17.5% of 2,018 respondents considered Prayuth as the most suitable choice to lead the country, down from 19.3% in June and 28.8% in March.

Since late March, Thailand has been struggling with a third wave of the pandemic. The situation worsened in July due to the spread of the delta strain. The economic strain of the pandemic and business lockdowns infuriated the public, blaming the government's vaccine rollout strategy. [Nikkei Asia]

Aside from the ruling party, other parties also started to name their prime ministerial candidates for the next election. The Kla Party is backing its leader Korn Chatikavanij, likewise to the Democrat Party which supports its leader Jurin Laksanawisit as PM candidate. [Bangkok Post 2]

Thailand: Police intensify crackdown on young protesters; cop shot in the head amid violent protest

(kk) Thai authorities continue to employ strict tactics against young activists and protesters as protests turned violent. Analysts attributed the growing violence to widespread anger over the government’s mismanagement of the pandemic and its slow vaccine rollout. In recent weeks, the police have been using tougher actions in response to protesters’ alleged arson and the bursting of firecrackers during demonstrations. Twenty-eight people were arrested during an anti-government protest on October 6, five of whom were minors, one only 11 years old.

A protester said that they were resorting to violence because they wanted the attention of a government ignoring their grievances, adding that police action against them has been disproportionate including threatening them with criminal charges and conducting searches in the Din Daeng area.

On the night of October 6, after the memorial of the massacre in 1976 [See article above], Thalu Gaz group clashed with the police at Din Daeng. The police conducted searches inside the apartment complex. According to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR), at least 34 people were arrested, all were charged with violating the curfew. They were later released except for three minors as they were additionally charged with illegal possession of explosives and possession of marijuana. [Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, in Thai] 

On the same night, a policeman was shot in the head during a search operation for suspects of violent acts during the protest in an apartment complex. The police spokesman for the Metropolitan Police Bureau said the police have information about the suspected culprit, but no arrest warrant has been issued yet. His Majesty the King has accepted the officer as a patient under royal patronage. According to the metropolitan police, over 70 people were arrested on October 7. [BenarNews]  [Bangkok Post 1]

Police were also preparing to file a civil lawsuit against protesters who allegedly vandalized five water cannons to request a compensation for damage totaling 47 million baht. The metropolitan police said that protesters poured sand into the fuel and oil tanks, ruining the engines of the five trucks. [Bangkok Post 2]

Meanwhile, on October 7, a student activist from Thammasat University was arrested and has been charged with royal defamation over her speech at the protest on August 10, during which she demanded a reform of the monarchy. She was denied bail for she has previously committed the same offense. [Prachatai English]

Thailand: Military reshuffle reflects divided control between the crown and PM

(kk) The latest annual military reshuffle suggested that supremacy over the country’s armed forces will become increasingly divided between the crown on the one hand and General Prawit Wongsuwan and Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-O-cha on the other, with the Army Commander position as a point of conflict. 

The appointments and promotions reflect both performance and pre-cadet academy linkages, as well as factional ties and favoritism. The class ties are importantly based on ties forged in Thailand’s pre-cadet school, the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School. The most influential Army faction has traditionally been the “Wongthewan” or “Divine Progeny” faction, rooted in the King’s Guard unit. It is Thailand’s oldest military faction, which the current king himself is also a member of. The second most powerful has been the “Burapha Phayak” or “Eastern Tigers”, representing the Second Infantry and Cavalry Division. This faction’s core of power has been in a sub-faction, grounded in the 21st Infantry Regiment, known as the “Thahan Suea Ratchinee” or “Queen’s Tiger Guards”. Burapha Phayak was the dominant Thai Army faction from 2007 until 2016, to which Prime Minister and Defense Minister General Prayuth, Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit and Interior Minister General Anupong Paochinda belong. There are other army factions such as Special Forces (Muak Daeng or Red Berets). In 2018, King Vajiralongkorn also created the “Kho Daeng” or “Red Rim” group, whose members attend special short-term military training under palace auspices. Only Red Rim officers can now ascend to the Army or Supreme Command positions, and the group has become a means for the palace to influence the military.

The Five “Tigers” of the Thai Security Services consist of the Commander of Armed Forces, the Commander of Army, the Commander of Navy, the Commander of Air Force, and the Police Commissioner. After this year’s reshuffle all five positions are held by palace-trusted individuals. Remaining Armed Forces Commander and Burapha Phayak Cavalry faction General Chalermpol Srisawasdi, and Army Commander and Wongthewan faction member General Narongphan Jitkaewthae, are both Red Rim officers. The Police Commissioner Police General Suwat Jaengyodsuk remains in office, but given his mandatory retirement next year, the promotion of also-palace-tied Police General Torsak Sukvimol from Commander of the Central Investigative Bureau to the post of Assistant Police Commissioner is noteworthy since he is likely to succeed Suwat. Torsak’s successor is also closely linked to the palace. The two newly appointed, Air Force Commander Air Chief Marshal Napadej Dhupatemiya, and Navy Commander Admiral Somprasong Nilmasai, also have close links to the palace.

The positions of the Armed Forces Commander as well as the Army Commander will be redistributed after next year’s election, which is a possibility for the palace to gain more influence if Prayuth does not stay Prime Minister. [Bangkok Post]

Thailand’s 2021 reshuffle suggests that the Wongthewan and Red Rim factions of the Army remain powerful, because of General Narongphan’s continued posting as Army Commander. Nevertheless, the year has seen an attempt from the Prawit’s and Prayut’s Burapha Phayak to grow its influence in the military as two members of the faction have moved into top Army posts including incoming Army Chief of Staff General Santipong Tampiya and incoming Assistant Army Commander General Jaroenchai Hintao., who will succeed Narongphan as Army Commander in 2023. This would result in Burapha Phayak holding the post of Army Commander for the first time since 2016, which would move power back to Prawit and Prayuth. 

Thailand’s 1st Infantry Division usually is the core of the Wongthewan faction’s power base, is under the command of the 1st Army Region. In October 2019, the Army Region’s 1st and 11th regimes were placed under direct palace control, essentially hollowing out the 1st division to create the new Royal Security Command (RSC). In the future, the palace is likely to assume direct control over all forces belonging to the 1st Infantry Division, and potentially targeting other units. The 2nd Infantry Division, which is influenced by Prawit, is likely to still be the source for powerful Army and Armed Forces Leaders. Depending on Prayut’s re-election, the post of the Army Commander will become a point of conflict between the two power centers. [ISEAS]

Thailand: Thai government urged to vaccinate migrant workers

(kk) Rights advocates urged the Thai government to begin vaccinating migrant workers amid the severe pandemic situation.

Although Thai authorities have administered nearly 60 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines since the launch of a rollout in early June, the vast majority of migrant workers from neighboring countries, especially those working illegally in Thailand, have yet to receive any inoculation. Earlier, Amnesty International had urged Thailand’s government to ensure that migrant workers would also have an access to COVID-19 vaccines regardless of their legal status. Most migrant workers come from Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos, working in labor-intensive industries in Thailand such as fishing. Many of them are undocumented, so they often avoid seeking help from officials for fear of being detained and deported.

Therefore, migrant workers in Thailand have difficulties in gaining an access to vaccination. As a result, the Thai Red Cross Society launched a vaccination campaign for migrant workers, both documented and undocumented, seeking to inoculate 5,000 underprivileged migrants by the end of October. The Thai Red Cross Society stated that the vaccination of migrant workers would benefit Thai people in general as most migrants live in overcrowded camps or dormitories where the virus can spread easily. [UCA News]

Vietnam: Facebook user arrested for criticizing government about Covid-19 policies 

(tl) Vietnamese police arrested a Facebook user for writing a series of online Facebook posts criticizing the government about the pandemic management. He is charged with “abusing freedom and democracy”, for defaming the country’s leaders and causing national disunity. 

Containment efforts, community lockdowns, the inability to return to their own provinces and other restrictions in that way are very unpopular in Vietnam and are at the center of recent protests and demonstrations in the recent days.[AiR No. 40, October/2021, 1]

Vietnam holds the 175th position in the 2021 World Press Freedom Index, with the Tho’s arrest being a part of an ongoing crackdown to silence dissent on social media. Since the begin of the year, RFA reported nearly 30 cases in which Vietnamese citizens have been arrested for political offenses over social media posts, including journalists, bloggers, and another citizen who had posted complaints about coronavirus policies. [Radio Free Asia] [VnExpress][Vietnam | RSF]

Vietnam: Effects of the Delta variant on the country

(tl) The fourth wave of Covid-19 caused by the more contagious Delta variant caused a rapid increase in case numbers in Vietnam, leading the country to be considered one of the worst managers of the pandemic during 2021. 

The country of 96 million people had previously been praised as one of the most providential in handling the first waves of the virus during 2020. In the first year of the pandemic, Vietnam reported 1500 cases with only 35 deaths, but by 2021 the number of cases had peaked at 840,000 with 20,500 deaths as of 10 October. The country's economy, which had previously stood out as one of the few to record positive growth in 2020, contracted by 6.7 per cent on a year-on-year basis between July and September. 

The inadequate government reaction to the rapid spread of the Delta variant can be attributed to the slow rollout of the vaccination campaign among its population. Vietnam was an exception in early 2021 for not rushing to order vaccines from pharmaceutical contractors or other countries. When the Delta variant began to spread, Vietnam had one of the lowest vaccination rates in Southeast Asia: In early July, when the latest wave of the pandemic began to hit, the country had only 3.7 per cent of its citizens receiving their first dose of the vaccine and only 0.2 per cent fully vaccinated. The Vietnamese authorities then imposed harsh lockdowns across much of the country in July, just as they had done in early 2020. The army was called in to enforce strict closures in Ho Chi Minh City, the country's largest city and main business center, where residents were banned from leaving their homes. Also, travel between some districts and provinces was banned, causing great discontent among the population stranded in the big cities. As a part of these measures, hundreds of factories where closed, while the service sector came to a standstill as employees were not allowed to leave their homes or travel to their workplaces.

In recent weeks, daily infection rates fell from a peak of 16,083 on 26 August to around 4000 last weekend. In light of these numbers, the government has begun to relax the restrictions. By late September, many of the lockdown measures were lifted in Hanoi, the capital. On October 1, Ho Chi Minh City's industrial parks, construction projects, malls, hospitality facilities and restaurants for takeaways were allowed to resume operations. The vaccination campaign also seems to be gaining momentum, with the number of daily doses of Covid-19 vaccine administered per 100 people at around 0.91, up from only 0.26 on 1 August. 

Continuing at this pace and accelerating with the lifting of restrictions, the World Bank estimates that the economy will grow by 4.8% this year, much better than most other Southeast Asian states, and most international investors believe it will grow by at least 6% in 2022, returning to pre-pandemic levels. To make the predictions truly feasible, a major challenge for the government will be to convince workers to return to industrial areas, as hundreds of thousands of people have reportedly returned to their rural hometowns since the closures were lifted. Local media suggest that more than 100,000 people have left Ho Chi Minh City in recent days.  Vietnam's main cities had been the focus of massive protests over the past week, with protesters and police clashing over barricades set up on the borders of the capitals. The demonstrators, subject to a rapid increase in unemployment and gripped by the higher cost of living in the cities, protested to be able to return to their provinces. [Asia Times]  [AiR No. 40, October/2021, 1]

International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia

China: Advancing military technology

(dql) According to research findings of French submarine experts China is improving its nuclear missile-equipped submarines to make them harder to be detected by rival powers, with the People’s Liberation Army’s upgrading its new generation type 094 submarines and introducing deceptive tactics to hide identification markers, making it difficult to assess how many of the powerful boats it had built.

Furthermore, the new type 094 is believed to be capable of firing the JL-3 or Julang (Big Wave) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a range of over 10,000km (6,200 miles), thus capable of reaching the US mainland. [South China Morning Post 1]

Meanwhile, Chinese state television has presented a new armed spy drone, the WJ-700, reportedly being capable of working with other unmanned aircraft to carry out reconnaissance and strike operations. [South China Morning Post 2]

Furthermore, China is reportedly testing experimental armed drone ships at a secret naval base on the country’s northern coast, with satellite images suggesting that construction started five years ago. [USNI News]

China-US relations: Laying ground for more exchange amid launch of new CIA ‘China’ unit and high tensions over Taiwan

(dql/zh) On Wednesday, October 6, Yang Jiechi, member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and Director of the party Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and US national security adviser Jake Sullivan met in Zurich, Switzerland, to exchange areas of potential cooperation as well as to mark disagreements and red lines. 

While this is not new, the meeting in the Swiss city seems to signal willingness on both sides to at least resume standard diplomatic practice to lay ground for further communication overcoming spite and mockery which overshadowed their first meeting in March in Alaska. [South China Morning Post 1] [Axio]

The White House’s readout of the meeting confirms in a conciliatory language that “areas where the United States and the PRC have an interest in working together to address vital transnational challenges,” as well as of areas where the US “have concern with the PRC’s actions,” were discussed. Furthermore, Sullivan made clear that on the hand the US “will continue to invest in our own national strength and work closely with our allies and partners,” but on the other will also “continue to engage with the PRC at a senior level to ensure responsible competition.” [White House]

Similarly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry called the meeting “constructive, and conducive to enhancing mutual understanding,” and reported that Yang and Sullivan “agreed to take action, following the spirit of the phone call between Chinese and U.S. heads of state on September 10, strengthen strategic communication, properly manage differences, avoid conflict and confrontation, seek mutual benefits and win-win results, and work together to bring China-U.S. relations back on the right track of sound and steady development.” The report, however, warned that “U.S. side needs to have a deep understanding of the mutually beneficial nature of China-U.S. relations and correctly understand China’s domestic and foreign policies and strategic intentions,” pointing to earlier claims made by Beijing that the US (politically motivated) misperception of China as root cause of Sino-US tensions. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China]

Reflecting a perception of having the upper hand in China-US relations, Global Times, China’s daily tabloid newspaper under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party's flagship People's Daily newspaper, was quick to cite scholars hailing the meeting as a signal that the “US is planning to put an end to its reckless and unrealistic strategy of dealing with China ‘from the position of strength’.” [Global Times]

However, only a day after the meeting, the US Central Intelligence Agency announced that it has created a new “China Mission Centre” to facilitate a whole-of-agency response to China as “the most important geopolitical threat we face in the 21st century.” In addition, a new “Transnational and Technology Mission Centre” was announced that would address issues “critical to US competitiveness”, including emerging technologies, economic security, climate change and global health. [Politico]

Also reflecting a confrontational, muscular stance, US Trade Representative Katherine Tai days earlier vowed in a briefing to safeguard US interest “to the hilt,” condemning China’s ”lack of adherence to global trading norms has undercut the prosperity of Americans and others around the world,” and not ruling out further tariffs on Chinese imports. [New York Times]

Meanwhile, the US has reportedly deployed a small unit of special operations forces have been based in Taiwan for at least a year to train local military forces. [US News]

The news about this secret deployment comes as satellite images reveal that China is expanding its airbases near Taiwan by deploying its new J-16D fighter jets, which are designed for electronic warfare. [South China Morning Post 2]

Earlier this month, Taiwan had reported almost 150 warplanes in its aid defense identification zone (ADIZ), marking the latest strike of the growing tensions [See AiR No.40, October 2021, 1]. 

In the wake of this latest development, Taiwan’s Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng described cross-strait tensions “the worst in 40 years” and warned that China could be capable of mounting a full-scale invasion by 2025, arguing that “by 2025 China will bring the cost and attrition to its lowest.” [BBC][The Guardian] [see also entry below].

Bleak outlook for cross-strait relations: Tsai and Xi uncompromising in commemorative speeches

(zh) Taiwanese President Tasi Ing-wen and Chinese President Xi Jinping appeared uncompromising on cross-strait relations in their respective latest commemorative speeches. 

At the formal celebration ceremony of Double Ten (10th of October), Taiwan’s National Day,Tsai Ing-wen reiterated her long-standing tough stance towards China, vowing to bolster the island’s national defense and determination “to ensure that nobody can force Taiwan to take the path China has laid out for us. This is because the path that China has laid out offers neither a free and democratic way of life for Taiwan, nor sovereignty for our 23 million people.” She further made clear that while Taiwan will not “act rashly” and will do its best to ease Cross-Strait tensions, “there should be absolutely no illusions that the Taiwanese people will bow to pressure.” Speaking of sross-Strait differences, Tsai marked red lines and emphasized that it “requires the two sides of the Strait to engage in dialogue on the basis of parity”, adding that the island’s future should be decided “in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people”. [The Guardian] For the full text of Tsai’s National Day address, see [Focus Taiwan].

A day before Double Ten, speaking at the 110th-anniversary event of the revolution that toppled China’s last imperial dynasty on 10th of October in 1911, Xi Jinping highlighted that reunification was an integral part of “achieving national rejuvenation” and a “shared mission”, while rejecting attempts to reach at Taiwan’s independence would be “the greatest obstacle to national reunification and a grave danger to national rejuvenation." He reiterated that “one country, two systems”, the 1992 consensus, and the one-China policy principle will remain the basis for peaceful reunification. [CGTN] [BBC]

In response to Tsai's speech, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office released a statement accusing her of inciting division and advocating for Taiwan independence. On the other side, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), insisted that “neither side of the Taiwan Strait is subordinate to the other,” rejecting Xi’s remarks as a “one-sided distortion of historical facts,” and calling on Beijing to abandon its “provocative” actions and “consider interactions based on peace, reciprocity, democracy, and dialogue with a more open mind”. The Presidential Office also issued a statement saying “’one country, two systems’ is not feasible” as Hong Kong has shown. [Focus Taiwan 1]

Reflecting diverging positions on how to manage cross-strait relations within Taiwan, Taiwan’s former President Ma Ying-jeou of the opposition Kuomintang insisted that the “1992 consensus” is crucial for maintaining peace and prosperity on both sides of the strait. [Focus Taiwan 2][South China Morning Post]

Taiwan warns of Chinese invasion by 2025

(zh) Speaking on October 6 at a joint hearing of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee and Finance Committee which was discussing a multi-billion-dollar defense spending bill of the cabinet to build missiles and warships, Taiwan’s Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng described current cross-strait tensions as “the worst in 40 years,” and warned that Beijing could be capable of mounting a full-scale invasion by 2025, arguing that [b]y 2025 China will bring the cost and attrition to its lowest. [BBC][The Guardian]

Chiu’s statement comes on the heels of 150 Chinese warplanes entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in four consecutive days. The intrusion began on October 1, China’s national day [see AiR No.40, October 2021, 1]. 

Domestically, Taiwan has been preparing for a potential war with China. The island has begun its second Tuo Chiang class corvette construction. Currently, the Navy operates two vessels build under the Tuo Chiang programs, aiming to have six by the end of 2023. [Focus Taiwan 1]

Furthermore, a special military budget of NT$240 billion (US$8.6 billion) for the next five years, which was passed by the cabinet and is now pending for the legislature’s approval [see AiR No. 38, September/2021, 4], will mostly go toward naval weapons, including land-based missile systems and “high-performance” ship, in a hope to build “asymmetrical” capabilities to deter China. During the abovementioned committee hearing on the proposed extra military budget, the military has publicly acknowledged the existence of the “Yun Feng” medium-range surface-to-surface missile for the first time, saying it is “working on it”. Under development since the 1990s, the missile is said to have a range of up to 1500 kilometers. [Focus Taiwan 2] [Reuters]

Meanwhile, it is reported that Taiwan’s military has allocated an extra NT$9.4 billion (US$336 million) for the production of more Sky Bow III surface-to-air missiles, some of which will be stationed on Dongyin Island, which lies only 125 kilometers from China. They are expectedto be completed in June 2022. [Taiwan News]

In related news, opinion polls have shown that Taiwanese public are not expecting an imminent war or concerned about the possibility of a potential military conflict. [South China Morning Post]

In latest development, China’s military revealed on Monday, October 11, it had conducted beach landing and assault exercises in the province directly across the sea from Taiwan. [CNN]

US confirms “rock solid” commitment to Taiwan

(zh) Commenting for the first time on China’s military sorties near Taiwan since taking office, US President Joe Biden has said the US and China agreed to abide by the “Taiwan agreement” in his phone call of 9th September with Chinese President Xi Jinping, adding: "We made it clear that I don't think he should be doing anything other than abiding by the agreement.” While Biden’s remark of the Taiwan agreement sparked confusion, Taiwan’s Presidential Office has sought clarification from Washington and was confirmed that the US policy toward Taiwan remained unchanged and is in line with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and Six Assurances. The TRA and Six Assurances allows the US to engage with Taiwan within an unofficial relationship and provide arms sales to the island without the violation of its One-China policy. 

After Biden’s remark, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated that the US commitment to Taiwan is “rock solid”, calling China to halt its “provocative” action around Taiwan and warned of the risks of “miscalculation”. [Focus Taiwan][Reuters 1][Reuters 2][South China Morning Post]

In another development, US national security adviser Jake Sullivan has said the US is “deeply concerned” about China’s actions that are “fundamentally destabilizing [regional peace and security]”. His comment comes a day after a meeting with Yan Jiechi, member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and Director of the party’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission. When asked whether the US was reluctant to use force in the wake of the recent Afghanistan withdrawal, Sullivan responded that such a reference is “a grave mistake”, echoing Blinken’s remark on US commitment to Taiwan. [BBC] 

Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal reports that the US has been secretly operating a small contingent of Special Operations and Marine forces in Taiwan for at least one year. When asked about the report, the Pentagon did not directly make comment, saying the US’ support for Taiwan remains “strong, principled, and bipartisan” and is aligned against threats posed by China. The US military has not been permanently based on Taiwan since the bilateral diplomatic relations ended in 1979.  [Wall Street Journal] [The Guardian]

Regarding the US military deployment in Taiwan, Democrat lawmakers Thom Tillis and Republican Ami Bera said that they were not made aware of it but will not be upset by the troop presence, calling the government to end the “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan. In the meantime, six Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have sent the letter to the panel requesting regular Cabinet-level briefings with Biden’s top administration officials on China and Taiwan policy, as well as “an open full committee hearing on Taiwan”, a move came after Biden’s confusing comment about “Taiwan agreement”. [Politico]

The Taiwan issue has become a dominant foreign policy debate in Washington. For an analysis of this debate, see [The Washington Post].

French Senate delegation visits Taiwan, calling it “country”

(zh) A French Senate delegation led by former Defense Minister Alain Richard has arrived on Taiwan on 6th October for a five-day visit. In a speech after being conferred a top medal of honor by Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen, Ricard said Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Paris has been doing “a very good job in representing your country”. Calling Taiwan “country” and implying its sovereignty is a provocation directed against China. Beijing, which views naming Taiwan a “country” as breach of the One-China policy, has repeatedly opposed the trip and the Chinese ambassador to France Lu Shaye said it would “needlessly disrupt” Sino-France relations. [France 24][Reuters][RFI]

Another visit to the island was that of former Australia Prime Minister Tony Abbott, starting on 5th October. Describing Taiwan also as a “country”, Abbott said he hoped the trip could “help to end the isolation from which Taiwan has been suffering for so many decades”. Calling democracies to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with the island, he voiced his support for Taiwan’s bid to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In the Yushan Forum, a regional security forum held by the local think tank Taiwan-Asia Exchange, Abbott has described China as a ‘bully”, saying Beijing “could lash out disastrously very soon”. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison said Abbott was visiting Taiwan as “a private citizen”. While Abbott’s visit is in no official capacity, he was granted a meeting with Tsai. [Nikkei Asia][Reuters 1][The Guardian 1][The Guardian 2] 

China’s embassy in Australia condemned Abbott’s visit his remarks about China, branding

Abbott as a “pitiful” politician, saying his performance in Taiwan was “despicable and insane”. [ABC]Reuters 2]

China, Russia want US biological warfare capabilities checked by UN

(dql) In another sign on China and Russia closing diplomatic ranks against the US, Beijing and Moscow have issued a joint statement urging the US to abide by a United Nations convention on biological weapons. The statement also called on the UN to check and limit the biological warfare capacities of the US and its allies, arguing that “in light of rapid advances in the field of science and technology with dual-use capabilities, the risk of biological agents being used as weapons has increased.”

The call was made at an arms control committee discussion of the UN’s Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) on Thursday, October 7. [South China Morning Post]

The issue on biological weapons has gained traction in China-US tensions as both sides have traded barbs over the coronavirus’ origin and accusations that it could be linked to each other’s research in that field. 

Interestingly, late last month, a bill was introduced last week by U.S. Sen. Jim Risch that allows for greater scrutiny of US biological research collaboration with China to prevent misuse of scientific research for the advancement of its military ambitions, citing, among others, “evidence that emerged in the midst of the COVID–19 pandemic of collaboration between ostensibly civilian research laboratories in the People’s Republic of China and the People’s Liberation Army.” [Senate, USA] [Homeland Preparedness News]

For an account of differences between the US’s and China’s military approach to biotechnology, see Rob Carlson, Chad Sbragia, and Kate Sixt in [War on the Rocks] who argue that to maintain US lead in biotechnology US defense planners need to address China’s broader approach to biotechnology and its integrated approach to civil-military fusion that seeks to bring together the country’s civilian and military industrial bases in order to better project power.

China-Japan relations: Kishida not cozying up to Xi in phone talk

(dql) In their phone talk on Friday, October 8, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japan’s newly elected Prime Minister Fumio Kishida traded hidden warning against each other, with the latter showing no signs of derailing from Japan’s increasingly self-confident stance towards China.  

While Xi called on Tokyo to “properly handle major and sensitive issues,” pointing to both “challenges and opportunities” in their countries’ relationship, Kishida assured the importance of maintaining stable bilateral relations for the region and the international community, but also insisted that Japan would “say what needs to be said,” referring shortcomings in upholding human rights and the rule of law China is accused of. 

In his policy speech short before the phone conversation Kishida pledged to cooperate partners including the Quad members Australia, India and the United States to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific region, reiterating pledges made in earlier talks with US President Biden and Australian Prime Minister Morrison on October 5 and 6 respectively. [South China Morning Post] [The Mainichi] [see also entry below]

Japan: Kishida and Biden agree to strengthen relations

(lnl) Japan’s new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and U.S. President Joe Biden confirmed the countries’ continued cooperation during phone talks on Tuesday, October 5. Biden reassured that the U.S. would commit to defend Japan and the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Kishida reported that Tokyo and Washington will work on strengthening the alliance between the countries and continue to work together toward achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific. 

Additionally, Kishida hopes to partner with other like-minded democracies in Asia and Europe to counter both China and North Korea and pledged to improve Japan’s missile and naval defense capabilities. The Prime Minister did, however, acknowledge on Monday, October 4, the need to continue the dialogue with China as the country is an important trade partner. [AP News] [The Mainichi]

After his talk with Biden, Kishida held a video conversation with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison. The two leaders agreed to promote cooperation under the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) framework, which includes Japan, the U.S., Australia and India. [see No. 39, September/2021, 4] [The Japan News]

Following the call between Kishida and Biden, Japan’s Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken held a phone talk on Thursday, October 7, with the two foreign ministers re-affirming the close relationship between Japan and the U.S. as “the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond,” as well as their commitment to resolve the issue of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula in cooperation with South Korea. [The Hill]

Japan and Russia in agreement to advance peace treaty talks

(lnl) Japan’s new Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to advance negotiations for a postwar peace treaty over a phone talk on Thursday, October 7. Tokyo will seek to settle the issue of the Northern Territories – the four Russian-controlled islands in the northeast of Hokkaido.

During the conversation, the leaders agreed to move forward with the negotiations based on past agreements which include a 1956 joint declaration that states that Japan will have control over two of the four islands, Shikotan and the Habomai islet group, following the conclusion of a peace treaty. [Japan Today] 

Kishida also asked for Moscow’s help in resolving the issue of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, and the issue of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development programs. [Kyodo News]

Japan and Russia have a decades-old unresolved territorial dispute concerning the sovereignty of the four islands. With Japan’s surrender in 1945 after World War II, the islands were seized by the Soviet Union and the disagreement prevented the countries from signing a peace treaty. Japan maintains that the islands are an inherent part of Japan’s territory, and that Russia has illegally occupied them.

Japan signals an assertive position on China’s tough stand on Taiwan

(lnl) Japan’s new government signaled on Tuesday, October 5 an assertive tone on China’s aggressive posture towards Taiwan, with Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi announcing that Japan would not only monitor the situation, but also “weigh the various possible scenarios that may arise to consider what options we have, as well as the preparations we must make.”

Tensions have been on the rise over Taiwan with 148 Chinese air force planes having been detected in Taiwan’s air defense identification zone over the course of four days from Friday, October 1. [Reuters]

Iran calls for South Korea to release frozen oil billions 

(aml) Iran has threatened legal actions against South Korea if they don’t release more than $7 billion in funds for oil shipments that have been frozen because of US sanctions. Iran had been South Korea’s third-largest trading partner in the Middle East before in 2018 the US withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal and reimposed harsh sanctions against the Islamic republic. South Korea thereupon stopped purchasing Iranian oil and the trade between the two countries fell from $12 billion in 2017 to $111 million in 2020. [The Korea Times]

The US have shown interest in restoring the nuclear deal and lift the sanctions. On Thursday, First Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-kun and the US Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley held phone talks on a cooperation in the negotiations that had remained stalled since June due to concerns that the election of hardline cleric Ebrahim Raisi as president might complicate the negotiations. However, Iran has indicated to return to the dialogue soon. Choi repeated South Korea’s commitment and special interest into the negotiations because of the Seoul-Teheran relations. During the talk, Malley had also expressed the US’s appreciation that South Korea enforces the existing sanctions so vigorously. [The Korea Herald]

South Korea, Japan relations not expected to improve after election of new prime minister Kishida

(aml) The election of new Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is expected to not lead to an improvement of the strained Japan-South Korea relations in the near future. [see AiR, No.40, October/2021, 1]

Kishida, who played a major role in the 2015 agreement between the two countries over the treatment of victims of wartime sexual slavery, has announced his new Cabinet. Although he replaced 18 out of 20 ministers, the new ones are mostly related to former Prime Minister Suga or Abe, who both had a far-right stance on the issue. Hirokazu Matsuno, who will be the new chief cabinet secretary, had denied the existence of wartime sexual slavery when he was education minister in 2014. The remain of Toshimmitsu Motegi as Foreign Minister also signals no change concerning Japan’s position towards claims that stem from victims of forced labor and sexual slavery under Japan’s colonial rule over South Korea from 1910-1945. [The Korea Times 1]

Although South Korean President Moon Jae-in has congratulated Kishida on his win and urged the two countries to “set an example for cooperation as neighboring countries” who “share basic values in democracy and principles of market economy”, [The Korea Times 2] Prime Minister Kishida has signalized that the first step in resolving the ongoing issues needs to be taken be South Korea. In his first policy speech Kishida demanded that South Korea takes “appropriate action” to improve the situation, but that Japan will remain its “coherent stance”. [The Korea Herald 1]

Furthermore, a summit between the two leaders probably won’t happen soon. After planned meetings between Moon and former Prime Minister Suga failed due to discrepancies concerning timing and topics that should be discussed, a meeting on the occasion of G20 or COP26 will not happen since Kishida already announced to attend them online. [The Korea Herald 2]

South Korea, UAE hold talks to deepen cooperation

(aml) Foreign minister Chung Eui-yong and his UAE counterpart Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan held talk in Dubai on Sunday to find a way to further strengthen the countries’ relationship that had been upgraded to a special strategic partnership in 2018. Chung expressed his hope for the Emirate’s “Projects of the 50”, which are developmental and economic projects to attract talent and investment to the Middle Eastern country. The UAE-minister said that South Korea’s economic achievements had been a model for the country, and both agreed to continue cooperation regarding South Korea’s efforts to host the 2030 World Expo in Busan and the UN peacekeeping ministerial conference in Seoul in December. [The Korea Herald ]

South Korea calls for multilateral discussion on Europe’s new carbon policy

(aml) The South Korean trade ministry called for the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to discuss ways to prevent global environmental regulations, such as the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) from hindering global free trade. CBAM is expected to be fully implemented by 2026 and will require importers of cement, electricity, fertilizer, steel, and aluminum to purchase “carbon certificates” corresponding to the amount of carbon spend on the production to make those with a worse environmental impact less competitive. South Korea’s steel and aluminum industries will be heavily affected when the policy is fully implied. The call came before the 12th ministerial conference of the WTO will start on November 30th. [The Korea Times]

Sri Lanka seeks India’s support to make the Indian Ocean a ‘Zone of Peace’

(egm) In his meeting with visiting Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa assured the Indian diplomat that his country does not intend to engage in any activity that could pose a threat to New Delhi, and sought India’s support for his wish to turn the Indian Ocean into a “Zone of Peace.” [The Citizen]

The visit also comes in the midst of the ongoing joint military exercises between India and Sri Lanka in the island nation’s Ampara District. The 12 day military exercises which began on October 4 are a means of enhancing ties between the armies of both countries as well as strengthening their interoperability and encouraging exchange of best practices in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. [The Hindu 1]

In his statement, President Rajapaksa explained his relations with China, highlighting that India could rest assured as there is a clear understanding of the geographical location of the two countries and Sri Lanka’s position as a comprehensive environment for investment opportunities. In the same note, he appealed to the Indian Foreign Secretary for the reemergence of the friendly relations between their countries as exhibited in the 1960s and 70s.

Their talk comes in the midst of India’s concerns over China’s increasing influence in the region and the ongoing issues regarding the Trincomalee oil tanks deal between both countries. [DailyMirror]

While both countries work towards the development of long-term and short-term measures to enhance their relations, Beijing’s foothold in the region is also expected to grow with the commencement of the Chinese-built Port City commercial operations. [EconomyNext 1]

However, in a move to counter China’s growing influence in the region, the Indian Adani Group signed on September 30 a $700 million deal with the Sri Lanka Ports Authority and the John Keells Holdings conglomerate. The agreement was recognized as the largest foreign investment project in the island nation’s farea of port development [see AiR No. 40, October/2021, 1]. [Nikkei Asia] [The Diplomat]

Furthermore, the move to rebuild bilateral relations between India and Sri Lanka also comes as strains rise between the two countries over the ownership of the World War II-era oil storage facility in the strategically advantaged port district of Trincomalee. Since 2003, both countries have been linked in an economic partnership through the Trincomalee Harbour as the Sri Lankan subsidiary of India's oil major Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), Lanka IOC, was given leasing rights to 99 tanks at the facility for a period of 35 years. However, oil sector trade unions in the island nation have been pressuring for the return of the tanks to the state under the control of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC). [The Economic Times]

As the ruling Sri Lanka Podujana Peremuna argues for the return of the oil tank farm from the state-run Indian Oil Corporation (IOC), Energy Minister Udaya Gammanpila has already denied the possibility of their operation due to the 1987 Indo-Lanka accord. According to his statement given on October 4, said accord establishes that even after the end of India’s 35-year lease running until 2038, Sri Lanka can only develop the tanks with India and no other investor [see EconomyNext 2].[The Hindu 2]

In this respect, President Rajapaksa has entrusted the Minister in charge to resolve the situation with the Trincomalee oil tanks in a manner that is agreeable to both sides. 

In the same vein, the two men also addressed India’s concerns surrounding the position of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka and the country’s accountability and reconciliation efforts. According to the Indian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, the foreign minister reiterated India’s demand for the full implementation of the provisions presented in the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. Particular emphasis was given to those involving the devolution of powers to all nine provinces, allowing them to self-govern, and to hold Provincial Council elections as soon as possible. 

Although the 13th amendment was incorporated following the 1987 Indo-Lanka accord in an effort to solve the conflict between Sri Lanka’s armed forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam which resulted in a civil war, the governments in power have resisted its full implementation, fearing it would lead to the creation of independent states, as explained by analysts.  

In his response to the foreign minister, President Rajapaksa’s explained his intention to create an inclusive environment for the Tamils who left the country, starting with his invitation to the Tamil diaspora and those living abroad to contribute with their support in improving the relations between both communities- as stated in his speech at the recent UN General Assembly [see AiR No. 38, September/2021, 3]. Moreover, he also explained the progress made by his government in the area of reconciliation by returning more than 90 percent of the lands acquired during the war and compensating the families of missing persons.

India made ‘unreasonable demands’ in latest round of border talks, China says

(lm) China has accused India of making unreasonable demands in their latest round of talks aimed at easing a 17-month military standoff along the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Himalayan heights of Ladakh, a sign that the two countries are still struggling to improve bilateral ties.

Army commanders of both countries met on October 10 after a gap of two months at Moldo on the Chinese side in the Ladakh region. After earlier talks in July, troops from both sides had stepped back from Patrolling Point 17A – Gogra Post – going back to their traditional bases and creating a temporary no-patrolling zone [see AiR No. 32, August/2021, 2].

The day after Sunday’s talks, however, China’s Western Theatre Command in a statement said India had “still stuck to unreasonable and unrealistic demands” during the 13th round of commander-level talks. India, for its part, rejected the accusation, saying its suggestions to improve the situation were not accepted by China, which “could not provide any forward-looking proposals.” [South China Morning Post 1] [The Straits Times]

Since February, both India and China have withdrawn troops from some face-off sites on the northern and southern banks of Pangong Tso, Gogra and Galwan Valley, but China is yet to show inclination to withdraw from Patrolling Point 15 at Hot Springs, and the Depsang Plains in eastern Ladakh, both of which did not feature in a piecemeal disengagement process [see AiR No. 45, November/2020, 2].

In the lead-up to the latest round of talks, India’s Chief of the Army Staff, General MM Naravane, said the Chinese had been ramping up military presence and infrastructure development along the disputed LAC [see AiR No. 40, October/2021, 1]. India, for its part, over the past few months has redirected at least 50,000 additional troops to three distinct areas along its border with China, in a historic shift toward an offensive military posture against Beijing [see AiR No. 26, June/2021, 5].

With the standoff continuing, the two sides are looking to continue troop deployment in the forward areas of Ladakh for a second consecutive winter in freezing temperatures. [ABC News]

In related news, Chinese state-owned China Daily published a report on October 9, denying Indian reports about 200 Chinese border troops had been detained by the Indian Army for crossing the LAC, but said a routine patrol had been “unreasonably obstructed” late last month. [South China Morning Post 2]

Indian Air Force prepared to deal with any scenario along disputed LAC, air force chief says

(lm) The Indian Air Force (IAF) is fully prepared to deal with any security challenge in the Himalayan heights of the Ladakh union territory, according to the new IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Vivek Ram Chaudhari. [The New Indian Express]

Chaudhari took over as the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) earlier in September, succeeding Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria.

While addressing the media on October 8, Chaudhari also said that new infrastructure created by the Chinese side in the region would not affect India’s combat readiness. He also argued that the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) – which significantly outnumbers its Indian counterpart – is facing a distinct terrain disadvantage in combat potential. In fact, all existing Chinese airbases facing India are located at high-altitude, which severely limits the weapon and fuel-carrying capacity of the fighter jets [see AiR No. 32, August/2021, 2].

Crucially, the Indian air chief also said that deepening ties between China and Pakistan need not be feared, adding that “the only worry is western technology passing from Pakistan to China.”

Looking at India’s drone capabilities next, ACM Chaudhari stated that the IAF would give contracts to startups to develop swarm drones based on competition, as well as to design counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), as part of IAF’s effort to develop indigenous anti-drone capability.

The air force chief also used the press conference as an opportunity to emphasize that the IAF was committed to the theaterisation process and keen on the integration of the Armed Forces’ three services: Army, Navy, and Air Force.The initial target for the rollout of the theatre concept was 2022. But the process, which is being led by General Rawat, has expectantly not been a smooth one, with the IAF opposing the formation of unified theatre commands, citing limitation of resources [see AiR No. 39, September/2021, 4].

With eye on China, US might think twice about sanctioning India for Russian missile system

(lm) During a three-day visit to India, the US Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, engaged with officials to discuss a variety of issues, from Afghanistan to Indo-Pacific strategy. She met India’s foreign secretary, foreign minister, and national security advisor, along with civil society and business leaders. The US top diplomat also participated in the India Ideas Summit, hosted by the U.S.-India Business Council. [U.S. Department of State]

Despite this momentum, a potential crisis looms: Washington could sanction New Delhi for its acquisition of the Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile system. In November of last year, the US imposed sanctions on Turkey for Ankara’s purchase of the air defense system from Russia under a federal law – the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) – that punishes countries for making major arms deals with Moscow, the world’s second-largest arms exporter [see AiR No. 52, December/2020, 5].

India placed a $5.3 billion order for five units of the S-400 in 2018 and paid the first tranche of $800 million a year later. Ever since, the advent of CAATSA has surfaced sporadically, but with little definitiveness that has resulted in keeping New Delhi off-balance and wary. To date, the only countries sanctioned under the law are Turkey and China, both for buying the same S-400 system slated to arrive in India.

In January, US officials reportedly conveyed to the Modi administration that it was unlikely to grant New Delhi a sanctions waiver. US officials, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin, have since tried to kick the can down the road, saying sanctions would apply only after the first regiment of the Russian-made S-400 was delivered to India later this year [see AiR No. 35, August/2021, 5].

But despite the threats of sanctions, the Modi administration appears to have made the decision with the system. It sees it as critical at a time when it is locked in a stand-off with the China’s People’s Liberation Army at numerous points along the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Himalayan heights of Ladakh. In fact, the new Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief, Air Chief Marshal Vivek Ram Chaudhari, last week said that the S-400 system would mean that the IAF can cut down on its acute need of fighter jets. [Hindustan Times] [see also entry in this edition]

Adding to the inevitability of the deal are renewed doubts about Washington’s reliability as a partner, which got a new life due to the fallout between the US and France following the announcement of the AUKUS security alliance with Australia and the United Kingdom. [AiR No. 38, September/2021, 3]

Against this backdrop, there is a good case to believe that the Biden administration will grant India a waiver once the equipment starts arriving this December. In the first such signal, visiting US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman on October 6 said that while it was “dangerous” for countries to use the Russian missile system, Washington “want[s] to be very thoughtful about the ways ahead.” Sherman also said India’s security concerns were “first and foremost” and “front and centre” for Washington, a statement widely seen as reassuring New Delhi that the US shared its worries about terrorism emanating from a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. [South China Morning Post]

But regardless of what happens, experts believe that the real challenge for the US administration is figuring out how to avoid having to deal with this repeatedly: In 2023, India will receive the first two of four new frigates from Russia, and in 2025, will begin leasing its third nuclear-powered submarine – dubbed Chakra III – from Moscow, all major deals already sealed. In sum, Russia and New Delhi have signed defense deals worth $15 billion in the last three years [see AiR No. 35, August/2021, 5]. [Politico, $]

Chief of US naval operations in India

(dql) Admiral Michael Gilday, Chief of US naval operations, met on Tuesday, October 12, with Indian Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh for a talk focusing on boosting US-Indian maritime security cooperation. 

Gilday is arrived on Monday in India for a five-day visit, with further scheduled meetings with the Indian Commander-in-Chiefs of the Navy’s Western Command in Mumbai and Eastern Command at Visakhapatnam respectively. 

He is also Gilday is also scheduled to embark the US Navy’s Carrier Strike Group off the East Coast of India which is being led by nuclear-powered US aircraft carrier Carl Vinson and it is taking part in the second phase of the Malabar exercise from October 12-15, featuring navies of all four Quad countries comprising India, the US, Australia and Japan. [NDTV]

US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman holds strained talks with Pakistani officials

(lm) During talks with Pakistani officials, the US deputy secretary of state, Wendy Sherman, has made clear to Islamabad that the Biden administration has downgraded the bilateral relationship, as each side searches for a way forward in a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

Sherman arrived in Pakistan on October 7, becoming the most senior US diplomat to the most senior U.S. diplomat to visit the country since President Joe Biden’s administration assumed office in Washington.

The two-day visit followed on a meeting between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and his Pakistani counterpart Shah Mahmood Qureshi on the sidelines of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly late last month. Sherman’s trip also came after a group of 22 Republican senators introduced legislation to impose sanctions on the Afghan Taliban and on all foreign governments that support the hardline Islamic group. [Voice of America]

Prior to her arrival, Sherman called on Pakistan to take action against all extremist groups. Washington would “seek a strong partnership with Pakistan on counterterrorism”, she said from Switzerland, her first stop on a trip that also took her to Uzbekistan and India. [Dawn]

On the eve of her arrival then, the US top diplomat used a public event in Mumbai to lay out in more blunt terms the new parameters of US-Pakistan relations, stressing that her Islamabad trip was to serve “a very specific and narrow purpose”: to talk about Afghanistan and the Taliban. [The Guardian]

Following her reception in Pakistan, Sherman held meetings with the Chief of the Army Staff of Pakistan’s Army, General Qamar Javed Bajwa. She also met with Foreign Minister Qureshi and Pakistan’s Security Adviser Moeed Yusuf to discuss “developments in Afghanistan and ways to advance cooperation across the bilateral relationship.” [Associated Press]

Meanwhile, Afghanistan also featured prominently at a meeting of Pakistan’s National Security Committee on October 8, which was attended by Pakistan’s military leaders and Prime Minister Imran Khan. A statement warned that instability in Afghanistan would have “severe implications for Pakistan.” Khan ordered that a “special cell” be set up to coordinate humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and manage Pakistan’s border with its neighbor. [Geo News]

India, Taiwan accelerate talks on multi-billion chip manufacturing agreement

(lm) India is reportedly accelerating talks with Taiwan over a bilateral investment agreement that could bring chip manufacturing to the South Asin nation, along with tariff reductions on components for producing semiconductors by the end of the year, with authorities working on a shortlist of companies this week. [South China Morning Post]

At their first in-person summit, leaders of the Quadrilateral Dialogue (Quad) – the multilateral grouping joining Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – last month agreed to form a supply chain initiative aimed at countering Chinese chip-making. [AiR No. 39, September/2021, 4]

In the weeks thereafter, officials in New Delhi and Taipei – which controls the lion’s share of the world’s semiconductor manufacturing supply – met regularly to discuss a deal that would bring a chip plant worth an estimated $7.5 billion to India to supply everything from 5G devices to electric cars.

During the talks, Taiwan has called for a trade deal with India that would effectively lower import tariffs on dozens of products used to make semiconductors – a potential precursor to a broader trade deal also under consideration, according to people familiar with the discussions.

Against this backdrop, New Delhi is currently studying possible locations with adequate land, water and manpower. The Modi administration is also set to unveil a road map to create “champions in the design of semiconductors” and have a chip manufacturing unit in the country within five years, the country’s Junior Minister for IT, Rajeev Chandrasekhar said.

An expansion of the Indian semiconductor sector would reduce the country’s reliance on China, which accounts for more than one-third of India’s total electronic imports.

Taiwan, for its part, wants to strengthen its diplomatic presence around the globe as it pushes back against the pressure from China. In the latest attempt to crack down on Chinese companies’ illegal investment activities, Taipei last month announced that it would soon amend the existing law governing cross-strait exchanges [see AiR No. 39, September/2021, 4].

Some observers argue that New Delhi will face an uphill climb to present itself as a rival chip-making destination to China, not least because its trade deal with Taiwan is likely to incur Beijing’s wrath for violating its “One China” policy. [News18]

Quad navies start next phase of MALABAR drills

(lm) Member nations of the Quadrilateral Dialogue (Quad) – the multilateral grouping joining Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – launched start the second phase of this year’s Exercise MALABAR in the Bay of Bengal.

Phase 1 of this year’s iteration, hosted by the US, was held from August 26-29 in the Philippine Sea off the coast of Guam [see AiR No. 35, August/2021, 5]. The second phase of the naval drills marks the first military exercises held by Quad since Australia, the UK and the US announced their trilateral security partnership AUKUS on September 15, under which London and Washington are to help Canberra acquire nuclear-powered submarines [see AiR No. 38, September/2021, 3].

The drills also come after US President Biden reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to the “Taiwan Agreement,” acknowledging Taiwan as a Chinese province while a peaceful settlement is reached. The US president authorized the USS Carl Vinson — one of the largest and most advanced aircraft carriers in the US fleet — to participate in the exercises. [NDTV]

India, for its part, will be involving a fleet of new reconnaissance aircraft to the drills, demonstrating New Delhi’s newfound capabilities in naval aviation ahead of the 2022 launch of India’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier, the IAC-1 INS Vikrant [see AiR No. 32, August/2021, 2]. [Hindustan Times]

Pakistan, Iran discuss border security, regional peace and stability, with eye on Afghanistan

(mm/lm) Pakistan and Iran have held the 11th iteration of their Bilateral Political Consultations (BPC), with discussions covering a broad spectrum of topics, including the emerging regional security situation vis-à-vis the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and border security. [Al Jazeera]

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani led his country’s delegation in talks with a team led by Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sohail Mahmood in the Pakistani capital Islamabad on October 5. Separately, the Iranian diplomat also met with Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi later the same day.

The wide-ranging talks also covered regional security, in particular vis-à-vis the fall of Kabul in mid-August. Both sides have recognized the importance of working together, to apply pressure on the Taliban regime. [The Diplomat]

Details on the talks on the issue of border security were scant in both statements, although Pakistan’s military late last month reported that a paramilitary soldier was killed and another wounded in an attack on a Pakistani border post. [DAWN]

Bangladesh: Foreign Minister leaves on official visit to Serbia and Romania

(ad) Bangladesh’s Foreign Minster Dr AK Abdul Momen left for a two-day official visit to Serbia and Romania on October 7. Momen shall attend bilateral meetings in both countries. [Dhaka Tribune]

Indonesia: Chinese survey vessel re-enters Indonesia’s waters

(ms) A Chinese survey vessel has re-entered Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the North Natuna Sea after a week’s retreat, according to ship-tracking data. The vessel, the Hauyand Dizhi 10, originally entered Indonesia’s waters on August 31, operating in the area for almost the whole month of September. It has now again been spotted near the Tuna Block, an important oil and gas field. The area is within the so-called “nine-dash line” that China draws to claim the major part of the South China Sea but is not recognized by international law and disputed by China’s neighbors. [Benar News 1]

The vessel’s activities last month brought media and public attention, promoting Indonesian officials to deploy several warships and a maritime air patrol to the area. Nevertheless, Indonesia played down the presence of the Chinese ship. Now again, Indonesian authorities have chosen to exercise restraint in an effort to avoid conflict. A spokesman for the Indonesian Naval Fleet Command 1 has said the Chinese vessel has committed no violations and is allowed to pass, as are all foreign ships. [Benar News 2] [See also AiR No. 40 October/2021, 1]

Analysts, however, say the Chinese vessels’ movement in a grid pattern shows that it has clearly been carrying out unlawful research activity surveying the seafloor. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requires governments to seek permission in advance for marine scientific research in another state’s EEZ. China often ignores this requirement. Most notably, its survey vessels loitered in the EEZs of Vietnam in late 2019 and Malaysia in early 2020, where oil and gas exploration was underway. [Radio Free Asia]

Indonesia: First Recruits inducted into new reserve force 

(ms) President Joko Widodo inducted the first 3,100 military reservists into the National Reserve Component (KOMCAD) of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) on 7 October. The Ministry of Defense expects to gradually recruit 25,000 reservists in total, as an implementation of the 2019 National Law 23 on the Management of National Resources for Defense of the Nation. According to the law, KOMCAD can only be employed to provide additional manpower to the TNI when needed to deal with armed threats. Enrolment in the force is voluntary and selected members can retain their civilian jobs. [Benar News]

The president has justified the reserve force as necessary to deal with emerging threats to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and people’s safety. However, critics have claimed there is no indication of any urgent armed threat, particularly from external forces, that would require immediate recruitment of military reservists to support the TNI. Human rights group fear the reserve forces could be used instead to usher in the militarization of civilian life and suppress civil society groups and freedoms under the pretext of dealing with terrorism and domestic conflicts. [Jakarta Post]

Indonesia has a long history of violence by government-backed paramilitary and militia groups. During the colonial period, the Indonesian national army itself was originally formed from such groups. Civilian militia units further supported Indonesian armed forces in the Indonesian mass killings of 1965-66, in which an estimated 500,000 people were killed. Plus, the state fostered and utilized a number of quasi-official organizations during the New Order era (1965-98) to repress critical voices of the regime. [Ian Douglus Wilson] [ 

Recently, there has been growing concern of repression of Indonesian civil society, with acts such as the forceful dispersion of protestors by police [see AiR No. 34, August/2021, 4]. Earlier this year, national police Chief Gen. Listyo Sigit Prabowo also announced efforts to revive the defunct and controversial security institution PAM Swakarsa, which was originally established in the late 1990s to counter anti-government protests. 

Indonesia: Local Currency Settlements Pursued with Philippines, Singapore 

(ms) Indonesia’s central Bank, Bank Indonesia, is looking to establish a local currency settlement (LCS) with the Philippines and Singapore. This would allow transactions between these nations to be done directly in local currency (the rupiah, Philippine peso, or Singapore dollar) rather than continuing to use the United States (US) dollar. The Governor of Bank Indonesia, Perry Warjiyo, has said that this would make transactions carried out with the partner countries easier and more efficient, with no need to convert to US dollars within the process. 

Bank of Indonesia established a similar LCS with Thailand and Malaysia in 2018, followed by a settlement with Japan in September 2020 and China in 2021. Since these settlements, the growth value of bilateral transactions with Malaysia, Japan and Thailand using local currencies has continued to accelerate and increase, according to Rahmatullah Sjamsudin, the director of the department of financial market development at Bank Indonesia. [Jakarta Globe]

The Philippines expresses support in favour of military exercises conducted by United States, United Kingdom, Japan in Philippine Sea 

(lt) The Philippines has expressed support towards military exercises conducted between the United States, United Kingdom and Japan in the Philippine Sea. The Philippines hopes that the presence of these states will assist in maintaining the balance of power in the region, curbing China’s growing influence throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Considered an area of strategic and economic importance due to its valued resources, the South China Sea remains a source of tension in the Indo-Pacific. This is due to China’s military claims against Southeast Asian states in the region such as the Philippines, who have accused China of harassing fishermen. [ABS-CBN News]

UK to maintain two offshore patrol vessels in Southeast Asia amid conflict in South China sea

(lt) The United Kingdom has pledged to deploy two offshore patrol vessels in Southeast Asia in an attempt to offset China’s dominance in the region. This follows discussions held between Delfin Lorenzana and Rt. Hon. Amanda Milling, Department of National Defense and UK Minister for Asia respectively. Both have discussed the need to strengthen defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, citing its necessity in maintaining peace and security in the region. [Manila Bulletin]

The risk of ASEAN’s lack of regional control

(tl) The new AUKUS security agreement between the United States, Britain and Australia has once again shown the difficulties for the ASEAN bloc to speak with one voice. The agreement, aimed at limiting Chinese influence in the area, will allow Australia to acquire the technology needed to build nuclear-powered submarines, which will be provided by the US and Britain.  Thanks to nuclear power, Australia would finally be able to seriously impose itself in the South China Sea, a territory at the center of disputes between China and some of the ASEAN countries. It is Beijing, in fact, that has expressed the greatest concerns about the agreement, describing the AUKUS as an attack on regional security. While the Philippines is the only country to outspokenly welcome the agreement, Singapore, a with historical good relations with the United States, has limited itself to expressing a tacit consensus on the results of the agreement, seeing that a full commitment to supporting Western partners might translate as a slap in the face for China, a country on which it is economically and socially dependent. The other ASEAN countries in one way or another shared Beijing's concerns, and among the many voices present, the one that stood out was that of the newly elected Malaysian Prime Minister, Ismail Sabri Yaakob, who declared that the agreement could be "a catalyst towards a nuclear arms race" and might "provoke other powers to act more aggressively in the region, especially in the South China Sea". [ISPI (ITA)]

The lack of a clear stance and the inability to obtain concrete results in its favor only highlight the lack of authority exercised by ASEAN in its territory. It is legitimate to be concerned about a possible military escalation between superpowers such as the United States and China. In fact, the economic implications that would take hold for the ASEAN members would be devastating for the precarious economies of the countries and, according to analysts, what might transpire between the two powers could take the form of a proxy war, fought on Asian soil and calling on the continent to relive the decision-making immobility experienced during the Cold War. But, not taking sides and trying to maintain the current status quo, thinking it is possible to remain a spectator for a long time in the face of Washington and Beijing's maneuvers, could alter the future of the ASEAN bloc, eroding the image of its decision-making capacity.

With the inauguration of Joe Biden as president, the United States seems to have shifted their attention in Southeast Asia, having focused most of its resources on foreign policy during these first quarters of the Democratic presidency. President Biden has revived Obama's 'Pivot to Asia' strategy after the Trump-era jolts at isolationism, deploying all the key figures in his cabinet: Vice-President Harris travelled to Vietnam and Singapore, Secretary of State Blinken took part in high-level meetings with his ASEAN counterparts and Secretary of Defense Austin also visited Singapore. ASEAN is the world's fourth largest economy in terms of GDP and is the eleventh largest trading partner for the United States. The trade balance between the two is clearly in favor of ASEAN, with total goods exported to the US worth $206 billion and imports of $86 billion, making the US a key market for members. [China-files (ITA)]

China, for its part, has not been idle, trying to strengthen its ties with its neighbors during the isolationism of the Trumpian era. In fact, China is the leading trade partner for ASEAN with a total of $298 billion in trade, with member countries representing the most important launching pad for China's global projection.  Confirming China's interest is the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Myanmar, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines. During this mini-tour of ASEAN, Wang Yi, reiterated several times the importance of enhanced cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, aimed at overcoming the health emergency but above all at coordinating with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the impressive Chinese initiative designed to improve infrastructure links with Eurasia. [China Files (ITA)] [China Briefing News]

Despite the advantages of being positioned in the middle, naturally attracting interest from both sides, the risk of not taking a clear position could be dangerous for ASEAN, as recently demonstrated by the outcome of the vaccination campaign in member countries. Instead of speaking with one voice on the vaccine issue, agreeing on a procurement and resource-sharing plan as was done in Europe, ASEAN countries ended up splitting up and choosing their own solutions. This has led to member countries being subjected to 'vaccine diplomacy' by the superpowers, having to adapt to different forms of vaccine supply from country to country.  The result of this is to have a situation where Singapore and Cambodia have fully vaccinated 79 percent and 66 percent of their populations respectively, but Vietnam has achieved just 11 percent, Laos 28 percent, and the Philippines 22 percent.

Another much-debated example of the lack of cohesion within ASEAN is the recent coup in Myanmar. In fact, despite the five-point agreement between the association and the military junta, which included an immediate cessation of violence, concrete results have not yet been achieved. Despite some signs of tightening, such as that of the Malaysian prime minister, who recently made it known that representatives of the military junta may not be welcome at the next ASEAN summit (see also an article in this edition), a solution still seems to be far away. And if the association fails to resolve the crisis in a short time, this will reveal even more the lack of internal cohesion, accentuate the divergences and ultimately leave individual countries at the mercy of great interests such as those of Russia, China and United States. [The Diplomat] [LUISS (ITA)] [Articolo21 (ITA)]

How Vietnam plans to meet its debt to China

(tl) Despite the fact that Vietnam has not formally subscribed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China's majestic project to improve trade links between China and Eurasia, the Southeast Asian country continues to run up its debt to Beijing, creating a risk of political tension with its northern neighbor. 

With $16.3 billion reported between 2000 and 2017, Vietnam is the eighth largest recipient of Chinese loans, second only to Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Vietnam's extraordinary economic growth in recent decades has meant that the country is in dire need of new infrastructure and direct investment in the manufacturing sector, making Beijing's loans attractive. [WorldBank]

According to the Global Infrastructure Hub, Vietnam's infrastructure investment demand is estimated at $605 billion between 2016 and 2040. Despite the Vietnamese government's momentary no to join BRI, there has been official recognition that the project could help the country meet its borrowing needs by 2045, by which Vietnam aims to become a 'developed country'. [Mitsui.com]

In an attempt to stem the hurdle of the infrastructure project, Vietnam in 2015 wanted to sign a bilateral trade expansion agreement between the two countries that would increase Chinese investment creating a trade corridor. Through the agreement, the leaders of the two countries also agreed to improve connections through a railway project that would speed up the transit of goods in northern Vietnam, joining Hanoi, Lao Cai and Hai Pong.

In addition, in 2017, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the joint implementation of the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative and Vietnam's "Two Corridors and One Economic Circle" plan, aimed at ensuring greater trade cooperation in land and sea transit between the two by ensuring rapid access to Chinese credit. [CGTN America] [Xinhua]

Despite these steps forward between the two Asian neighbors, the MOU remains largely unimplemented to date given the serious doubts expressed among leaders and political advisors in Vietnam.

Firstly, Vietnamese leaders have dwelt on the fact that Chinese loans are not provided cheaply. Indeed, Chinese loans carry an average interest rate of 3% per year, about three times higher than those of Japan (0.4-1.2%) and the European Union (1%) and twice as high as those of South Korea (0-2%) and India (1.75%). Moreover, China requires a high degree of collateralization when granting loans. In Laos a Chinese corporate took over part of the country's electricity network when a Laotian company was unable to meet its debts for the construction of a hydroelectric dam. Second, Chinese loans come with a lot of additional conditions, including the design and management of the project by Chinese enterprises, the purchase of Chinese technology, and the use of Chinese workers.

Third, Chinese firms have a terrible record of delays, cost overruns, environmental damage and high maintenance costs. Additionally, Vietnamese people also majority distrust China.

For the time being, as expressed by the leadership in Hanoi, the country is not worried about defaulting on Chinese loans. In fact, Vietnam is aiming for an annual growth rate of around 7%, which would allow it to repay its debts to Beijing. But in the light of the facts, Vietnam's concerns are well-founded, as is its attempt not to exponentially increase its debt to Beijing by not formally joining the BRI. According to AidData’s recent report on China's portfolio of loans and foreign assistance, Vietnam has encouraged out-of-state economic lending, with stipulations through commercial banks, non-state-owned enterprises, and private companies in order to reduce the political risk of national default. [The Diplomat] [Aiddata]

Effects of the EAGLE Act on the relations between ASEAN-US

(tl) Two months after its introduction to the US House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee, the ‘Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement (EAGLE) Act’ has passed the mark for it to be introduced in the House for a vote at a later stage. With the inclusion of ASEAN in the bill, the US aim to strengthen cooperation with the countries in Southeast Asia. There are 17 provisions within the Statement of Policy on Cooperation with ASEAN, with two of them which keep attention of ASEAN’s future commitment with the United States.

Another provision reveals the US administration’s desire for ASEAN to be more involved in the integrations with countries aligned with Washington, urging ASEAN to cooperate with Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and European Union in the areas of security, economy and politics. [Library of US Congress] With China as the principal commercial partner of ASEAN, the US are trying to contain the scope for action of its main competitor in the area. If this provision was to be ratified, it would pose an unprecedented challenge to the Asian association, which has always been predisposed towards the principle of centrality, which has recently been reiterated in light of the bipolar Sino-US tensions in the region. Following the heavily debated AUKUS pact, this bill would mean another loss of autonomy for the bloc. [ASEAN]

Finally, Section 604 enables the United States to execute its strategic competition with China in the area of infrastructure development. Known as the Promoting Responsible Development Alternatives to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this Section authorizes the Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID and other agency chiefs to provide alternatives to development projects that may otherwise become part of China’s BRI. [Library of US Congress] This provision and also other ones providing direct resources to ASEAN is looked upon more favorably in light of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. The disputed waterways are mentioned in the bill, aiming to "prevent destabilizing behaviors and deter risky and dangerous activities by certain parties."

This new approach sought by the Biden administration is aimed at restoring relations with Southeast Asia, which deteriorated during the Trump presidency. By offering support and new development alternatives to ASEAN, the United States is seeking to re-establish itself as a leader in the territory, displacing it from China and securing stable trade routes. On the other hand, the risk of this is to undermine the current status quo erected over the past two decades, risking marginalizing the ASEAN bloc in an increasingly hostile competition between the US and China. [East Asia Forum]

Announcements

Upcoming Online Events 

13 October 2021 @ 10:00-11:15 a.m. (GMT-5), The Chicago Council, USA

Prioritizing a Gender Inclusive Economic Recovery

This event will be focusing on what strategies and changes on infrastructure, investments, and partnerships are paramount in boosting action to create a globally inclusive economic recovery, after this pandemic.

Visit [CC] for more information.

13 October 2021 @ 9:00-11.15 a.m. (GMT+8), ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore

36th ASEAN Roundtable - Braving the Storms: ASEAN in Crisis Mode - Day 2

This session will focus on the key events and developments that have left significant impacts to the region’s political-security landscape in 2021.

Go on [ISEAS] for more details.

13 October 2021 @ 10:00-11:00 a.m. (GMT-4), Center for Strategic & International Studies, USA

21st Century Warfare: A Conversation with Jim Taiclet

For many decades, the U.S.’s technological and operational superiority was the core strength of its military power, but the increasing threats by its near competitors make it essential for new capabilities to be developed. This event will be discussing the future of American warfare.

More details can be found on [CSIS].

13 October 2021 @ 2:00-3:30 p.m. (GMT-4), Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center, USA

Did Nuclear Weapons Save the World from the Third World War? Evidence from the Cuban Missile Crisis

This event will discuss the lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the basis of the research of the book, Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

To find further details, go on [Belfer].

13 October 2021 @ 12:00-1:00 p.m. (GMT-4), The Heritage Foundation, USA

Immigration Federalism: What Can States Do to Secure Their Borders?

This event will have a thorough discussion on what can be done in this security crisis of the United States.

Registration details can be found on [Heritage].

14 October 2021 @ 4:30-5:30 p.m. (GMT+3), Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Finland

Reflections on Afghanistan and US civil - military relations: A conversation with Lieutenant General (US Army - retired) David Barno

This online session will be focusing on how the US experience in Afghanistan and other domestic-related events have affected the state of the civil-military relations and possible institutional reforms and cultural norms to ensure a nonpartisan military.

Go on [FIIA] to find more details on the event.

14 October 2021 @ 9:00 a.m. - 15 October 12:00 p.m. (GMT-4), Center for Strategic & International Studies, USA

2021 Global Development Forum

This event will be examining the crucial challenges that have worsened as a result of the Pandemic, including global economic recovery, strategic competition, digital transformation, and the energy transition.

Check [CSIS] for further details.

14 October 2021 @ 12:00-1:00 p.m. (GMT-4), Cato Institute, USA

What My Grandparents’ Experience in the Holocaust Taught Me about the First Amandment

With freedom of speech and the liberty of exercising religion, the United States has been the place to escape religious persecution and censorship. This event is going to discuss how the Holocaust shaped beliefs on the First Amendment freedoms as well as the recent increase in anti-Semitism in the US.

To learn more visit [CATO]. 

14 October 2021 @ 10:00 - 11:00 a.m. (GMT+9), Asian Development Bank Institute, Japan

Launch of Inaugural ADBI Book Series Entry: COVID-19 Impacts and Policy Options: An Asian Perspective

This webinar will be looking into the overview of the book COVID-19 Impacts and Policy Options: An Asian Perspective as well as examining the economic effects of the pandemic in Asia.

For more details check [ADBI].

14 October 2021 @ 12:15-2:00 p.m. (GMT-4), Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center, USA

Globalizing Oil. Unleashing Capital: An International History of the 1970s Energy Crisis

This session will be diving into the history of how the 1970s Energy Crisis reordered the world, and how this global oil shock gave rise to the world’s current monetary architecture.

Check [Belfer] to find more information.

15 October 2021 @ 4:00 - 6:00 p.m. (GMT+9), Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan

Multi-Stakeholders Dialogue: Building Robust Solidarity with Migrant Workers in East and Southeast Asia

As the pandemic exacerbated the vulnerability of immigrants, affecting the rights of migrant workers and their families. This session will discuss how multi-stakeholders in East and Southeast Asian can build a stronger solidarity with migrant workers, as well as the responsibilities these stakeholders hold in advocating for migrant workers.

For further details, check [SPF].

14 October 2021 @ 8:30 - 10:15 a.m. (GMT+2), Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, Switzerland

Climate Security and Good Security Sector Governance in Southeast Asia

This event will have a discussion on the impact of climate change on human security across the Southeast Asian nations, and its adversities for security sectors in the region.

Go on [GCSS] for more details.

15 October 2021 @ 1:00-2:00 p.m. (GMT-4), Wilson Center, USA

Global Perspectives I UK-Russia Relations

With Russia being referred to as “the most acute threat” to the UK’s security, this event will be discussing the tense relations between the two countries, and what the future might hold.

Go on [Wilson] for more information.

18 October 2021 @ 4:00-5:30 p.m. (GMT-4), Wilson Center, USA

Divisions: A New History of Racism and Resistance in America’s World War II Military

This webinar will be focusing on how a complex tangle of the military creates a structure of white supremacy and how it undermined the nation’s rhetoric of the Four Freedoms which further consolidate white supremacy among the American people

Check [Wilson] web page for registration information.

18 October 2021 @ 12:00 - 1:00 p.m. (GMT-4), Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center, USA

Energy Policy Seminar: Jonas Meckling on “ The Politics of Energy Transitions”

This event will examine the conditions where policymakers can adopt costly policies to drive transformative change in the energy system, as the emerging transition to clean energy is very much political.

More information can be found on [Belfer].

19 October 2021 @ 5:30 - 6:30 p.m. (GMT+11), Australian Institute of International Affairs, Australia

The AUKUS Submarine Deal: Consequences for Global Nuclear Governance

With Australia’s proposal on acquiring nuclear-powered submarines resulting in questions regarding its international commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, safety, and security. This event will be focusing on the implications of the AUKUS partnership for global nuclear governance.

To learn more, check [AIIA].

19 October 2021 2:00 -3:30 p.m. (GMT+1), Overseas Development Institute, UK

Does Better Governance Lead to Improved Health and Education? Lesson from Nigeria

Over the course of two decades, the UK government has funded governance reforms striving for quality of education and of child and maternal health services. This session will go over the significance the reforms have brought in the health and education systems.

To find more details please go on [ODI].

Recent Book Releases 

Wesley Morgan, The Hardest Place: The American Military Adrift in Afghanistan’s Pech Valley, Random House, 634 pages, March 9, 2021, discussed in [Diplomatic Courier].

Debasish Roy Chowdhury and John Keane, To Kill a Democracy: India’s Passage to Despotism, Oxford University Press, 336 pages, August 3, 2021, with a review in [The Hindu].

Linda Colley, The Gun, the Ship, and the Pen: Warfare, Constitutions, and the Making of the Modern World, Liveright, 512 pages, March 30, 2021, discussed in [The New Statesman].

Peter Stott, Hot Air: The Inside Story of the Battle Against Climate Change Denial, Atlantic Books, 336 pages, October 7, 2021, reviewed in [The Guardian]. 

Zachary Karabell, Inside Money: Brown Brothers Harriman and the American Way of Power, Penguin Press, 448 pages, May 18, 2021. A review is available at [Foreign Policy].

Langley Sharp, The Habit of Excellence: Why British Army Leadership Works, Penguin, 325 pages, October 7, 2021, reviewed in [Wavell Room]. 

Kenneth Payne, I, Warbot: The Dawn of Artificially Intelligent Conflict, Oxford University Press, 280 pages, September 1, 2021, with a review in [War on the Rocks].

Anthea Roberts, and Nicolas Lamp, Six Faces of Globalization: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why It Matters, Harvard University Press, 400 pages, September 28, 2021. Read a review at [Asian Review of Books].

Lindsey Miller, North Korea: Like Nowhere Else: Two Years of Living in the World's Most Secretive State, September Publishing, 224 pages, August 10, 2021, reviewed in [Asian Review of Books].

Christopher D. Kolenda, Zero-Sum Victory: What We’re Getting Wrong About War, The University Press of Kentucky, 527 pages, October 26, 2021, with a short review in [Publishers Weekly].

Calls for Papers

The Trans European Policy Studies Association invites paper proposal for a special issue of its “L’Europe en Formation” journal dedicated to the theme ““The Biden Administration and Transatlantic Relations”. Closing date for submissions is October 15, 2021. For more information, see [TEPSA].

Rambhau Mhalgi Prabodhini is seeking paper submission for its conference proceedings of the conference “On Delivering Democracy: Reviewing two Decades of Narendra Modi as Head of Government”, scheduled for October 27-29, 2021. Deadline for submission is October 21, 2021. Further information are available at [RMP].

Jobs and Positions

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is recruiting a Rule of Law, Security and Human Rights Analyst. This position in home-based. Closing date for applications is October 27, 2021. For more details see [UNDP].

The European Council invites applications for the position of Director at the External Relations Department. Deadline for applications is October 20, 2021. Find more about the vacancy at [EUR Lex].

The Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, welcomes applications for a full-time tenure stream position in Political Philosophy. The appointment will be at the rank of Assistant Professor. Closing date of application is November 15, 2021. In you are interested, find further information at [University Toronto].

We would greatly appreciate your feedback! Please send any feedback you have regarding this newsletter to: info@cpg-online.de 

Also, don't forget to Like CPG on Facebook, and browse our website for other updates and news!