Grasp the pattern, read the trend
No. 28, July/2021, 2
Brought to you by CPG
Dear Readers,
The AiR team is presenting you this week’s brief on the latest events and developments in constitutional politics and governance, geopolitics and international relations in Asia.
I wish you an informative read and extend special greetings to readers in France, Kiribati, Northern Ireland, the Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, and Slovakia which celebrate National Day and Independence Day respectively in this week.
With best regards,
Henning Glaser
Editor in Chief
Webpage: www.cpg-online.de, Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CPGTU
Main Sections
Law and Politics in East Asia
Law and Politics in South Asia
Law and Politics in Southeast Asia
International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia
Announcements
Law and Politics in East Asia
China: WeChat shuts LGBT accounts
(dx) WeChat, China’s most popular social media service, has deleted dozens of public accounts on LGBT topics run by university students and nongovernment groups. As the accounts were shut at the same time, observers believe that the action was “planned and coordinated,” prompting concerns concerns over tightened government control over gay and lesbian content.
WeChat public accounts have been an effective venue for Chinese LGBT communities to advocate for their rights, as they are facing the difficulty of carrying out public debates and demonstrations when mainstream society has increasingly excluded them. Although homosexuality has been decriminalized since 1997, same-sex marriage still remains illegal and socially taboo.
Chinese media censorship has grown in recent years across a wide range of organizations, not just LGBT groups, with a particular focus on anything deemed to pose a risk to national security. Under President Xi Jinping, the government has increased control over civil societies in general, in a push to promote the Communist Party’s core socialist values including patriotism and traditional Chinese culture. [AP] [South China Morning Post]
Earlier this year, several Chinese feminist channels on popular social networking forum Douban were also abruptly shut, with the platform reportedly citing extremism, and radical political views and ideological content. [Air No.16, April/2021, 3]
China: More research centers dedicated to Xi Jinping Thought
(dx) The Chinese Communist Party last week launched two new research centers dedicated to branches of Xi Jinping Thought, namely the “Research Center for Xi Jinping Economic Thought” and the “Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization.” The move brings the total of such research centers to 18, reflecting a further cementing of Xi’s position and power
Other prominent research centers on “Xi Thought” established over the recent years include the Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law, the Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, and the Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military. [China Media Project 1] [China Media Project 2]
China: Opposition members disqualified for upcoming legislative election
(dql) Macau’s Electoral Commission has banned 21 opposition figures from the coming legislative elections in September, citing the candidates’ disloyalty to the Semi-autonomous Region Macau and its Basic Law. Among the banned are veteran pro-democracy activists, sitting lawmakers and former lawmakers.
The legislative assembly of the 600.000 people city consists of 33 member 14 of them are elected by the public, while the remaining 19 are indirectly elected from professional sectors and appointed by the city’s chief executive. The pro-democracy camp won four seats in the 2017 election. [Macau Business]
China: Arrests over bomb plot by Hong Kong pro-independence group amid Beijing’s new to-do list to advance city’s national security law
(dx) Hong Kong’s national security police arrested five more people on Monday in connection with last week’s alleged bomb plot by pro-independence group “Returning Valiant”. In a earlier action last week, nine people were arrested on the same suspicion. [AP] [VoA]
Meanwhile, Beijing top officials, speaking at the National Security Law Legal Forum, have laid down a new to-do list for Hong Kong, spelling out judicial, administrative and law enforcement officers’ obligation to enforce the city’s National Security Law and warning that there is “no excuse for anyone not doing their job properly, or doing it wantonly.” Legislators are urged to catch up on formulating and amending related local laws for a more holistic approach covering every aspect of safeguarding China’s sovereignty. They are asked to focus on possible loopholes in Hong Kong’s existing laws and are called for further follow-up legislation. [South China Morning Post] [Ecns]
In a separate development, Hong Kong’s government announced details of its real-name registration scheme under which Hong Kong SIM card users will be required to register with their real names, date of birth and ID numbers. The scheme has sparked privacy concerns among the public while officials sidestepped questions on whether the new policy would assist police probes into potential violations of the national security law. [Hong Kong Free Press]
China: Hong Kong plans to extend senior counsel eligibility to government solicitors despite of barristers' strong opposition
(dx) Hong Kong’s justice minister is pushing ahead with a controversial plan to allow government solicitors to qualify for promotion to senior counsel. The Department of Justice revealed that the Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Bill 2021, which would extend senior counsel eligibility, will be tabled in the Legislative Council (LegCo). The Bar Association, which represents the city’s barristers, voiced its strong objections, arguing the change is a threat to their profession’s independence and doesn't serve public interest.
Under the current system, Hong Kong’s chief justice can appoint barristers to be senior counsel in recognition of their ability and standing in the profession, as well as their knowledge of law. Solicitors are not eligible to be appointed. [South China Morning Post]
China: District councilors’ exodus in Hong Kong
(dql) Some 170 district councilors resigned over the past week following local media reports suggesting that those who are later disqualified after the oath-taking will be required to repay their wages since taking office. The resignations come ahead of the introduction of mandatory oath-taking to the government for district councilors later this month, with Hong Kong authorities maintaining a hardline approach that will unseat any who posted slogans connected to the 2019 anti-government protests on their office walls. [Standard] [South China Morning Post]
China: First local data use legislation adopted in hi-tech hub Shenzhen
(dx) Lawmakers of the city of Shenzhen, China’s hi-tech hub and home of many Chinese internet and tech giants such as Huawei, Tencent and DJI, adopted a new law on data use, marking the first comprehensive legislation for data protection in China.
The new law, which will take effect in January, includes provisions limiting the use of personal data by app developers and prohibiting them from withholding services if consumers do not give consent to their personal data being used. Additionally, a person has the right to decline data collection requests and has the right to know, copy, correct and delete data held online.
Experts believed that the data use legislation was meant to facilitate the development of the digital economy and other cities in China could be encouraged to introduce similar legislation. [South China Morning Post 1] [South China Morning Post 2]
The new law is the latest step taken by China to rein in the country’s big tech companies amid an increasingly digitalized economy. Earlier this month, Cyberspace Administration of China, the country’s internet watchdog, banned Didi, China's largest ride-hailing service, from app stores after citing illegal collection and use of personal information. In April, Alibaba was hit with a record antitrust fine of 2.8 billion USD after an investigation fund the company guilty of abusing its market dominance. [CNN] [see AiR No. 15, April/2021, 2]
Japan: Major personnel changes in Suga’s government
(dx) The government decided to appoint former Vice Foreign Minister Takeo Akiba, a close aide to Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and his predecessor Shinzo Abe, as secretary-general of Japan’s National Security Secretariat. Akiba will be responsible for beefing up the country’s alliance with the United States and forging a stable relationship with China, amid escalating tensions between Washington and Beijing. He will also work on improving chilly relations between Japan and South Korea. He succeeds Shigeru Kitamura who retired from the country's top security post for health reasons.
The Japanese government named Koji Yano, director general of the Finance Ministry's Budget Bureau and a former aide to Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, as the country's new top finance bureaucrat -- the vice finance minister. The government also named Masato Kanda, who heads the ministry's International Bureau, as Japan's top currency diplomat -- the vice finance minister for international affairs. [Mainichi 1] [Mainichi 2] [Japan Times]
Japan: Opposition parties call for extraordinary Diet session before Olympics
(dx) Japan’s government and the ruling parties have been urged by the opposition camp to convene an extraordinary Diet session before the Tokyo Olympics kick off on July 23, but the request was expected to be dropped. The request came immediately after the Suga administration’s decision to implement a fourth state of emergency for the capital to help contain the Covid-19 pandemic. The opposition parties blasted the government for forging ahead with the Games while a state of emergency exists, complaining that doing so goes against all steps taken to date to bring the health crisis under control. They said the event should be canceled, or at least postponed. The opposition parties plan to file a request for International Olympic Committee President to be summoned to the Diet to face questioning. [Asahi Shimbun]
South Korea: New opposition party leader indicates tougher stance towards China
(nm) The new leader of South Korea’s main opposition People Power Party (PPP), Lee Jun-seok, has caused some debate as he is indicating a tougher stance towards China, while sharply criticizing Seoul’s unification ministry. In an interview with Bloomberg, Lee said his fellow millennials will push against Chinese “cruelty” in places like Hong Kong, further stating “We’re definitely going to have to fight against the enemies of democracy.” Lee is the youngest ever selected leader of a major South Korean Party and participated in the 2019 pro-democracy protests in Hong-Kong. The Moon administration has been trying to balance its relationship with China as it seeks to strengthen its ties with the US while being on friendly terms with its largest trading partner.
Further causing controversy, Lee also recently made comments advocating for the abolishment of the unification ministry, as well as the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. Members of his own conservative party, however, showed opposition towards this stance. In an interview, Lee criticized the separation of the foreign affairs ministry and the unification ministry – which is responsible for inter-Korean ties – as this allegedly led to the inefficiency of the ministry.
As incumbent President Moon Jae-in’s five-year term ends in March 2022, Lee will be tasked with finding a conservative candidate for the PPP’s campaign. [Bloomberg] [Korea Times]
For an analysis of Seoul’s US-China dilemma and its stance towards the US “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy, please see [The Diplomat].
South Korea: Supreme Court upholds prison terms for former national intelligence chiefs
(nm) South Korea’s Supreme Court upheld the convictions of three former National Intelligence Service (NIS) chiefs who had been indicted on charges of providing illegal funds from the NIS to the presidential office. The funds allegedly amounted to 3.1 million USD per month. In 2018, a district court had found that while the three were guilty of unlawfully providing those funds, they could not necessarily be considered bribes as no favours were granted in return. The Supreme Court now confirmed the sentence of a January retrial after the court had ruled in 2019 that some of the money should be considered bribes. At the time of the transfers, the presidential office was held by then-President Park Geun-hye who has since been sentenced to a 20-year prison term on charges of abuse of power and coercion following her impeachment in 2017. [Korea Herald] [BBC]
Law and Politics in South Asia
India: PM Modi reshuffles Cabinet amid sagging support
(ad/lm) Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has overhauled his Cabinet in a bid to reinvigorate his government as the country emerges from its devastating COVID-19 outbreak ahead of crucial state elections. [BBC]
Fifteen Cabinet ministers and 29 junior ministers were sworn in by President Ram Nath Kovind in New Delhi on July 7. The new Cabinet will have 77 ministers, up from the current figure of 52. [mint]
Among those who were sworn in are Jyotiraditya Scindia, a former opposition lawmaker who switched to Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) last year; Sarbananda Sonowal, a former Chief Minister of Assam State, and former Indian Congress Party leader Narayan Rane. [The Straits Times 1]
At least 12 Cabinet members, including Health Minister Harsh Vardhan, Communications Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad and Information and Broadcasting Minister Prakash Javadekar, resigned ahead of the reshuffle to make way for their colleagues. [The Indian Express]
Vardhan, who was the face of the government’s efforts to fight COVID-19, was asked to step down along with his deputy. He had come under fire as the country struggled to contain a catastrophic spike in infections in April and May. The health service was under severe pressure in many areas with hospitals running out of beds, medical oxygen and drugs. [The Straits Times 2]
Prasad’s resignation follows the federal government’s bruising legal fight with foreign social media social firms, most notably US giants Twitter and Facebook, while Javadekar – who was also serving as Minister of Environment, Forest and Climate Change – exits his post at a time when New Delhi is facing mounting diplomatic pressure to set its own net zero target ahead of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) to be held this November in Glasgow [see AiR No. 15, April/2021, 2]. But Prasad -a close ally of Prime Minister Modi – is expected to be given an important role in BJP.
This is Modi’s fourth Cabinet change since coming to power in 2014 and the first in his second term. Importantly, his government’s ratings dropped from 75 percent in 2019 to 51 percent this year, according to a survey released earlier in May, providing one of the first indications that his enduring appeal with voters may be fading.
There is a good case to believe that the upcoming State elections have also affected the decision. For elections to seven State Assemblies are due next year; the BJP rules all these States, save the northwestern State of Punjab. [South China Morning Post]
From the politically crucial Uttar Pradesh, at least six ministers have been inducted into the Cabinet. The BJP wants to retain the State next year as a defeat there could bring major embarrassment to Modi, who is an elected lawmaker from Uttar Pradesh.
Earlier this year, the BJP suffered a major setback when it failed to wrest power in the important eastern State of West Bengal from incumbent Chief Minister and high-profile Modi critic, Mamata Banerjee. [AiR No. 18, May/2021, 1]
India: Uttar Pradesh State pushes two-child policy, citing ‘limited ecological and economic resources’
(ad/lm) The provincial government of India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, has proposed legislation that aims to discourage couples from having more than two children, becoming the second Indian state ruled by Prime Minister Modi’s Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) to make such a proposal. [The Indian Express] [South China Morning Post]
The bill, which was unveiled on July 11, says that because of the state's "limited ecological and economic resources at hand, it is necessary and urgent that the provision of the basic necessities of human life are accessible to all citizen".
To this end, it proposes incentives for couples to produce to two or less children and rewards couples that choose voluntary sterilization. Couples with more than two children, crucially, would not be allowed to receive government benefits or subsidies and would be barred from applying for state government jobs. [CNN]
The bill has been compared to China’s two child policy which was also used for population control. India, which is set to overtake Beijing as the world's most populous country by 2027, does not have a national two-child policy. [Insider]
The northeastern state of Assam, which is also ruled by Modi's BJP, last month announced plans for a similar measure that would withhold government benefits from families with more than two children. Assam's Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has said the proposal is partly to control the population growth of the state's Bengali-speaking Muslims who trace their origins to neighboring Bangladesh. [Hindustan Times]
India: Religion is keeping Indians apart, especially in the north of the country, Pew survey finds
(ad) The US-based Pew Research Centre conducted a survey on religion in India, which revealed that while Indians genuinely believe mutual respect for others religion is an important characteristic of an Indian, they prefer religious segregation in the public life sphere. [Pew Research Center] [South China Morning Post]
The survey, covering 30,000 Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists, was conducted in late 2019 and early 2020 and found that Hindus tend to see their religious identity and Indian national identity as closely intertwined. Nearly two-thirds of Hindus said it is “very important” to be Hindu to be “truly” Indian.
Moreover, 40 percent of Muslims faced high levels of discrimination in North India. This demonstrates that a large amount of religious segregation also occurs in the North. On the other hand, the survey does reveal that South India is far more multicultural. This is perhaps due to its coastal trade and exposure to various cultures.
India: Twitter loses immunity over user-generated content
(lm) US microblogging giant Twitter no longer enjoys liability protection against user-generated content in India after failing to comply with the country’s new IT rules, the Indian government said in a legal filing. [The Straits Times]
India’s Ministry for Electronics and Information Technology argues in a filing dated July 5 that the US firm has lost its legal immunity after failing to comply with the country’s new Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code imposed in February. These include appointing a chief compliance officer, a grievance officer, and a contact person to respond to requests from law enforcement 24 hours a day [see AiR No. 9, March/2021, 1].
The statement marks the first time Prime Minister Modi’s government has officially said Twitter has lost its immunity after unconfirmed media reports last month had claimed that the company had lost its so-called “safe harbour” immunity from prosecution for “unlawful” or “inflammatory” tweets. [AiR No. 25, June/2021, 4]
If High Court in New Delhi sides with India’s government, it would mark a major shift in Twitter’s legal obligations in India, for it could open the door for the company’s executives to face criminal charges over objectionable content posted by its users. While social media platforms, including Twitter, often take down content in response to legal challenges, they are generally not legally liable for the contents of their users’ posts.
Although the Indian government has claimed Twitter has lost this legal protection, experts have said that the final decision ultimately rests with India’s courts.
Nepal: Supreme Court orders opposition rival replace KP Sharma Oli as Prime Minister
(lm) Nepal’s Supreme Court on July 12 reinstated the lower house of parliament and appointed opposition leader Sher Bahadur Deuba the country’s new prime minister. The ruling deals a major blow to hitherto caretaker Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli, Oli, who has struggled to hold his government together since he lost a vote of confidence and dissolved the House in May. [Bloomberg] [South China Morning Post] [The Diplomat]
Prime Minister Oli lost a confidence vote on May 10. But before his rivals could stake a claim, the prime minister directed President and ceremonial head of state Bidhya Devi Bhandari to dissolve the House and announce new elections later this year, saying neither he nor opposition leader Deuba were able to muster a majority and form a new government. [AiR No. 21, May/2021, 4]
The move had sparked a fresh constitutional crisis in the Himalayan nation, marking his second attempt to force a fresh election by dissolving parliament’s lower chamber after an initial attempt in December [see AiR No. 51, December/2020, 4].
Court challenges included one by a coalition of opposition parties that called for the immediate restoration of parliament’s lower chamber, with Deuba as the new prime minister [see AiR No. 22, June/2021, 1].
Nepal: People’s Socialist Party, Nepal, to split little more than a year after merger
(lm) After months of intraparty conflict whether or not to support the dissolution of Parliament’s lower house, the two factions of the People’s Socialist Party, Nepal, (PSP-N) last week decided to part ways.
The PSP-N was formed in April of last year through the merger of the two key Madhesh-based parties in Nepal, the Samajbadi Party, Nepal (SPN) and the Rastriya Janata Party Nepal (RJPN) [see AiR No. 28, July/2020, 2]. Madhesi are people of Indian ancestry residing in the Terai of Nepal that make up about 20 percent of the country’s total population.
Importantly, both factions have divergent views on whether the PSP-N should support the KP Sharma Oli-led government or help opposition parties form a new coalition government. The dispute reached a climax when the faction led by former SPN leaders Baburam Bhattarai and Upendra Yadav supported a petition filed with the Supreme Court that called for the formation of a government under the leadership of opposition leader Sher Bahadur Deuba.
The Election Commission (EC) had invited both factions of the party on July 6 in a bid to mediate a rapprochement, but neither side acquiesced to keep the party unity intact. The EC will now form a bench and begin a hearing process to decide which faction will get to retain the party name and the election symbol. [The Kathmandu Post 1]
While it is putting the clock back to before last year’s merger of the SPN and the RJPN, the split will likely have little impact on national politics, as the two factions have already been supporting opposing political camps.
Thus, RJPN leaders Mahanta Thakur and Rajendra Mahato will likely continue lending their support to caretaker Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli, while the SPN headed by Yadav and Bhattarai can be expected to join hands with the opposition alliance of Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre). [The Kathmandu Post 2]
Nepal: Human Rights Commission faces possible downgrading over controversial appointments
(lm) A sub-committee of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) has decided to conduct a special review of the status of Nepal’s Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and has given the national body until July 28 to justify whether the recent appointments to various constitutional bodies comply with existing international norms. [The Kathmandu Post 1] [The Kathmandu Post 2]
The NHRC is currently graded ‘A’ by the GANHRI for its compliance with the Paris Principles, which were adopted by the UN General Assembly as the basic standards governing the mandate and operation of effective national human rights organizations. Above all, the Paris Principles require that a national human rights institution is independent of government and non-government organizations and that its independence is guaranteed by law.
In December of last year, Nepal’s Constitutional Council (CC) – a key agency that nominates officials for various constitutional bodies – had made 38 nominations to vacant positions on 11 constitutional bodies. Crucially, prior to the meeting, the government had issued an ordinance allowing the CC to achieve quorum if as few as three of its five members attend a meeting.
Under the Constitution, appointments to these key institutions are supposed to be vetted by a 15-member joint committee representing both chambers of Parliament. However, Prime Minister Oli dissolved Parliament’s lower house and announced snap elections on December 20 - five days after the appointments were announced [see AiR No. 51, December/2020, 4].
Thus, Nepal’s President Bidhya Devi Bhandari in February appointed 32 individuals to various constitutional bodies - including to all five seats on the NHRC – despite legal challenges in the Supreme Court to the constitutionality of the nominations and the dissolution of the House.
In the following months, then, international rights organizations and independent experts from the United Nations called on the Nepal government to withdraw the ordinance, saying it would undermine public trust and confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and other constitutional bodies. [AiR No. 11, March/2021, 3, AiR No. 18, May/2021, 1].
These organizations are concerned that following the new appointments the NHRC no longer meets the standards that would justify it being graded ‘A’ by the GANHRI. Nepal’s government in March had initially maintained that the appointments were made without jeopardizing the commission’s autonomy, but the GANHRI took the view that the response provided did not fully address all the concerns raised.
Compliance with the Paris Principles is the central requirement of the accreditation process that regulates access to the United Nations Human Rights Council and other UN bodies.
Pakistan: Report by international media watchdog calls Prime Minister Khan a ‘press freedom predator’
(ra/lm) Pakistan last week vehemently rejected a report by Reporters Without Borders that labeled Prime Minister Imran Khan a “press freedom predator” for muzzling the country’s media.
The Paris-based NGO, on July 5 released a list of heads of state and government who it says “embody in a particularly drastic way the ruthless suppression of press freedom.” [Reporters Without Borders]
Critics say Pakistan has long been a deadly place for journalists. The country fares poorly in global press freedom rankings, and since Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan took office in 2018, it has fallen six places (to 145) in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index. Last month, international rights watchdogs voiced concern over growing pressure on journalists in Pakistan, after a journalist was assaulted by three unidentified men who forcibly entered his apartment in Islamabad [see AiR No. 23, June/2021, 2].
Pakistan’s Information Ministry in a statement the following day rejected the allegations, saying Khan’s government believed in the “freedom of expression and media independence.” [Associated Press]
A total of 37 leaders were named in the report, including from China, Russia, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Also on the list is Iran, Turkey, and Syria, effectively making the entire Asian continent – from the Pacific Ocean to the Mediterranean – a hostile environment for reporters.
Other leaders on this list include Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán – the only EU politician included on the list - and Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Sri Lanka: Brother of President Rajapaksa appointed new finance minister
(lm) A brother of Sri Lanka’s President Gotabaya Rajapaksa last week was appointed the new finance minister, in a move that analysts say tightens the family’s grip on power in the South Asian island nation as it confronts growing economic troubles.
Basil Rajapaksa took over the finance portfolio from his brother, incumbent Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, who was allocated the newly created Economic Policies and Planning Ministry. [The Straits Times]
After serving as a Presidential Advisor and Minister for Economic Development in the former Mahinda Rajapaksa administrations, he was arrested in 2015 following allegations of corruption and later released on bail. In November 2020, he was acquitted in the case. [The Hindu]
He is credited with building the ruling Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), the new political vehicle for the Rajapaksas’ return to power in 2019. As chief strategist, it was Basil Rajapaksa who crafted President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s campaign in the presidential poll of 2019 and ensured the party’s landslide victory in the August 2020 general elections.
With Basil’s entry, the Cabinet headed by Gotabaya now has five members of the Rajapaksa family. [The New York Times]
Sitting President Gotabaya Rajpaksa gave himself the additional post of Defense Minister shortly after he assumed office in 2019. He soon put Mahinda, the current Prime Minister, in charge of the Ministries of Religious Affairs and Urban Development. The eldest brother, Chamal Rajapaksa, was named the Minister of Irrigation, as well as the State Minister of Home Affairs and of National Security and Disaster Management.
Several other Rajapaksa family members hold junior minister positions and other key positions in the administration: Namal Rajapaksa, Mahinda’s son, was named Minister of Youth and Sports. He is also the State Minister of Digital Technology and Enterprise Development. Chamal’s son Shasheendra Rajapaksa got a portfolio too long to fit on a business card: He is the minister of state for “paddy and cereals, organic food, vegetables, fruits, chilies, onions and potatoes, seed production and high-tech agriculture.”
Law and Politics in Southeast Asia
Indonesia: Free Papua Movement terrorist fugitive arrested
(dql) A joint task force of the Indonesian police and military captured Gumanggup Enumbi, a terrorist fugitive belonging to the Free Papua Movement (OMP) separatist group, in the province Papua, on his way to an event of the group. Along with Guamggup, two others were also caught suspected to be involved in OMP. [Antara News]
Indonesia: Number of child marriages rising
(dql) According to data released by Indonesia’s Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (PPPA), the number of child marriage dispensations saw a sharp rise in 2020, with 63,383 decisions compared with 23,145 in 2019. [Antara News]
Malaysia: UMNO council withdraws support of PN government
(dql) The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) has withdrawn its support for the Perikatan Nasional (PN) government led by Malaysian Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin and called for his resignation, citing the government’s insufficient handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. UMNO president Ahmad Zahid Hamidi announced the move after a UMNO’s supreme council meeting,
Muhyiddin’s minority government commands 54 seats in the 222-member House of Representatives and relies on the support of former ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) of which UMNO is the largest member party and Zahid is its chairman. UMNO’s status as a partner within the ruling PN government, led by the Malaysian United Indigenous (Party Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu)) under Muhyiddin, has been increasingly called into question. In March, the party had concluded it would halt support for the PN government if there were no indications of a general election within the near future. [Free Malaysia Today]
However, observers believe that Muhyiddin will be able to stay in power given an UMNO-internal split, with UMNO Ministers in Muhyiddin’s cabinet disagreeing with the council’s decision and other parties of both PN and BN expressing their willingness to continue to work with Muhyiddin. [Channel news Asia] [Straits Times] [Bernama] [Malaysia Now]
Myanmar: Junta-appointed Election Commission claims fraud in nearly one-third of 2020 election votes
(mt) Following a months-long investigation, Myanmar’s military-appointed Union Election Commission (UEE) last week doubled down on claims of mass fraud in last November’s general election, saying it found nearly a third of all ballots were tainted. [Bangkok Post] [BNN Bloomberg]
According to the chairman of the UEE, the probe found more than 11.3 million fraudulent votes, citing “a number of irregularities” in advance voting, and noted the previous election commission that certified the poll issued regulations that were “against the law.” In doing so, the findings of the investigation dubiously confirm the crucial reason the military has advanced to justify its coup d'état that deposed State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint earlier in February.
The UEE announced earlier in May that Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) would be dissolved over the fraud allegations and its leaders prosecuted as traitors. The same month, a nonpartisan election monitoring organization found that the results of last November’s election were “by and large, representative of the will of the people,” rejecting the narrative of the widespread electoral fraud that the junta has used to justify its military takeover. [AiR No. 21, May/2021, 4]
Last month, then, the Commission requested Myanmar’s Ministry of Home Affairs to review whether any of the country’s registered political parties has violated the rules stipulated in the Political Parties Registration Law – a move widely considered an attempt by the junta to provide legal cover for dissolving the NLD. [AiR No. 23, June/2021, 2]
Myanmar: Introduction of new evidence in trial against former leader Suu Kyi
(mt) Myanmar’s ousted civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi is facing four additional criminal charges, according to her lawyer. Filed in a court in the city of Mandalay, the new cases could see Suu Kyi tied up in legal proceedings in different cities.
Little information is available about the latest charges, except that they relate to corruption, and both were also brought forward against Min Thu, a former minister in the Suu Kyi-led government. [Al Jazeera]
Already, the deposed leader is on trial in the capital, Naypyidaw, over charges that include two counts of violating the Natural Disaster Management Law for allegedly breaking COVID-19 pandemic restrictions during the 2020 election campaign; illegally importing walkie-talkies that were for her bodyguards’ use; and unlicensed use of the radios. [AiR No. 16, April/2021, 3]
Cross-examination of a prosecution witness on July 12 revealed a raid on Aung San Suu Kyi’s home had been carried out illegally without a warrant. Further, a witness for the prosecution was absent due to a COVID-19 infection. [Bangkok Post]
Before, her lawyers last week argued strongly against the introduction of evidence that had not been formally listed before testimony began on June 15, saying it did not follow established judicial procedures. The hearings pertain to sedition charges, which have also been levelled against ousted President Win Myint and another senior member of Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy [see AiR No. 24, June/2021, 3]. [Eleven Myanmar]
Suu Kyi faces additional charges that have yet to be tried, among them unspecified breaches of the country’s colonial-era Official Secrets Act, and allegedly accepting bribes, which carry a sentence of up to 14 and 15 years in prison, respectively.
Myanmar: Protesters mark 1962 rallies against first military junta, as COVID-19 crisis deepens
(mt) Pro-democracy demonstrators hit the streets across Myanmar on July 7 to commemorate the anniversary of the 1962 protests against the first imposition of military rule on the country, vowing defiance against its latest incarnation. [France24]
Last week’s protests were small and brief but enthusiastic, using the flash mob style that nonviolent demonstrators have adopted since government units began using lethal force to suppress them. [Associated Press]
They were held as the country battles its most severe COVID-19 epidemic since the start of the pandemic, with a high of more than 4,000 daily new cases recorded last week, according to the World Health Organization. [Reuters]
Last year, the country was able to keep the COVID-19 outbreak under control with strict restrictions imposed by then-civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi, plus the use of vaccines from India and China. But since the military takeover, people have been reluctant to go to military hospitals. In addition, healthcare workers have been at the forefront of the country’s Civil Disobedience Movement, placing them in a difficult bind as rising numbers of people seek medical treatment. [The Interpreter] [The Irrawaddy]
Against this backdrop, epidemic controls in the neighboring Chinese province of Yunnan were tightened over the weekend. [Mizzima]
Myanmar: Ethnic armed group suspends key leader in massacre investigation
(mt/lm) A prominent ethnic armed organization (EAO) in Myanmar suspended one of its key leaders last week, as it investigates an alleged massacre of civilians on its territory. [Bangkok Post] [The Straits Times]
The Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed wing, the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) have been fighting for decades in the country’s eastern border region to gain more autonomy from the central government. Since the military takeover, the KNU has clashed sporadically with the Myanmar military along the Thai border. [see e.g. AiR No. 13, March/2021, 5]
State-controlled media on June 14 accused the KNDO of killing 25 construction workers near the border with Thailand after abducting them from a construction site last month - an allegation KNU has said it will investigate. [AiR No. 25, June/2021, 4, AiR No. 24, June/2021, 3]
Myanmar: Head of ethnic insurgent groups’ coordinating body resigns
(mt/lm) The head of the Peace Process Steering Team, a joint body of ten ethnic armed organization, has resigned, the group announced on July 7, the fourth and final day of online consultations between the groups’ stakeholders. [The Irrawaddy]
The PPST was formed in 2016 to negotiate with the ousted National League for Democracy-led government, after both sides the previous year had signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which set the tone for the future establishment of a Burmese federation.
General Yawd Serk assumed the role as the PPST’s leader in March 2019, after the Karen National Union (KNU) leader General Saw Mutu Sae Poe stepped down. He is also the founder and current chairman of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), a signatory to the NCA.
Relations between PPST members have been strained since the military takeover in February, with some holding talks with the junta’s governing body, the State Administrative Council. In early May, KNU chairman Saw Mutu Sae Poe said that his organization would also continue political negotiations and uphold the principles of the NCA [see AiR No. 20, May/2021, 3].
There is a good case to believe that General Serk’s decision was heavily influenced by recent clashes in northern Shan State between the RCSS and the rival Shan State Army-North, the armed wing of the Shan State Progress Party.
Following the resignation of General Yawd Serk, Nai Aung Min, Vice-Chair of the New Mon State Party, was appointed as the interim leader of the PPST, and Colonel Khun Okker and Colonel Sai Ngin were appointed as members. They said they would work to resolve the current political crisis in Myanmar based on the essence of the NCA. [BNI Multimedia Group]
Philippines: Cops charged with homicide over anti-illegal drugs operation that killed a minor
(lp) Ten police officers were charged with homicide this week for killing a minor during an anti-illegal drugs operation last month. The complaint filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office against the ten policemen, including the head of the team of operatives from the Laguna PPO Intelligence Branch PCapt Fernando Credo, was based on the complaint-affidavit of the teenager’s mother. [Manila Bulletin]
Philippines: Supreme Court to decide anti-terrorism law by end of 2021
(lp) The Supreme Court (SC) hopes that the decision on 37 petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 2020 can be handed down by Dec. 2021. The SC had conducted oral arguments on the petitions and had required the parties to submit their respective memorandum, which were received only a few weeks ago. [Philstar]
Singapore: Officials defend CECA trade pact with India amid immigration concerns
(lm) During a nearly four-hour parliamentary debate, Singapore officials last week mounted a fierce defense of a trade pact with India, saying false claims that the agreement allowed unfettered immigration from the South Asian nation were “seductively simplistic” and aimed at discrediting the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP). [South China Morning Post] [The Straits Times]
The agreement is question is the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), a free trade agreement signed between Singapore in India in 2005 to strengthen and enhance the economic, trade and investment cooperation between the two countries. The CECA has become a point of grievance for Singaporeans who believe that a high influx of Indian professionals in fields like finance and information technology has stolen their jobs and is crowding out the local society. [The Week]
These worries have become more pronounced as Singapore battles its worst recession and countries around the world continue struggling to contain the COVID-19 pandemic. This led to various websites and social media channels being filled with disturbingly xenophobic posts on Indian immigrants. This later turned into verbal and physical assaults, against the larger backdrop of an escalating coronavirus situation in India and fears of a new Indian variant [see e.g. AiR No. 20, May/2021, 3]. [Mothership]
Critics include the opposition Progress Singapore Party (PSP) and the Peoples Voice party, which both highlighted the matter in last year’s general election. During last week’s parliamentary debate, they countered by saying the government was being too quick to label them as racists while not publicizing data to back up the official position that the trade deal creates jobs for citizens.
The PSP has said it will table a motion for a full debate on CECA.
Thailand: Charter change committee elects chairman, as big parties push for change in electoral system
(pr) Ruling Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) lawmaker Paiboon Nititawan has been elected to chair the parliamentary committee tasked with scrutinizing a constitutional amendment draft, after the bill early this month was passed by a joint session of Parliament. [Bangkok Post 1]
According to Paiboon, who secured 27 votes in the 45-member committee, the draft should be ready for the second and third readings in Parliament early next month.
Sponsored by the ruling government coalition – save the PPRP – the endorsed bill proposes to amend Sections 83 and 91 of the 2017 Constitution to adjust the proportions of lawmakers from currently 350 constituency MPs and 150 party-list MPs to 400 and 100, respectively. It also seeks to return to the previous election system that involves voters casting to ballots – one for a candidate and one for a political party. [AiR No. 26, June/2021, 5]
The system is believed to benefit large and well-known parties capable of mounting energetic nation-wide election campaigns. Unsurprisingly, then, the country’s two biggest parties, the ruling PPRP and the opposition Pheu Thai Party are both pushing for a required minimum threshold of at least 1 percent of the total votes for political parties to be allocated party-list seats.
The PPRP also seeks to include a provision that requires political parties to field candidates in at least 100 constituencies to being allocated any party-list seats.
This arrangement contravenes the interests of smaller parties which may not meet the proposed minimum threshold and will not be allocated party-list seats. Pichet Sathirachawal, leader of the smaller Prachatham Thai Party, therefore proposed the threshold to be lowered 0.02 percent, or a minimum of 70,000 votes. [Bangkok Post 2]
Committee members from the opposition Move Forward Party, meanwhile, have criticized the charter amendment bill, saying it was flawed and did to warrant further scrutiny. Specifically, they argue that the bill does not seeking amendments to all charter provisions governing the voting system, such as those relating to the method of calculation of party-list lawmakers. [Bangkok Post 3]
Thailand: Even publication of information that is true may violate new pandemic regulation, observers say
(pr) Observers in Thailand have express concerns over the latest set of regulations issued under the Emergency Decree, pointing at a provision they say is aimed at limiting free speech and the free flow of information. [Bangkok Post]
The 2005 Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations, which allows the government to streamline disease-control plans without multiple approvals from various agencies, has been in place since March last year. Since then, several restrictions have been amended or relaxed, expect for those governing the dissemination of news and information.
Regulation No.27 issued under Section 9 of the Emergency Decree was published in the Royal Gazette on July 10 and came into effect two days thereafter. It introduced stricter measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19. [Royal Gazette, in Thai]
According to civil society group Internet Law Reform Dialogue (iLaw), Clause 11 under the latest set of regulations introduces a major change to these restrictions by prohibiting the sharing of news and information “that may cause panic among the public or has the intention to distort information that causes misunderstandings in emergency situations that affect the security of the state, peace and order, or decent public morals nationwide”. [iLaw, in Thai]
Until recently, the regulations had only prohibited the presentation of fake news and false information about COVID-19.
Thailand: Pheu Thai Party to seek new censure debate against government
(pr) The opposition Pheu Thai Party (PTP) has vowed to initiate another vote of no confidence to oust the Prime Minister Prayut-led government over its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. To this end, the party plans to submit a motion by the end of the month to ensure that the floor test takes place before the end of the current parliamentary session, that is, September 18. [Bangkok Post]
Earlier in February, following a four-day censure debate, the prime minister and nine ministers comfortably survived a no-confidence motion brought by the opposition over the government’s mishandling of the vaccine roll-out and economic policies. [AiR No. 8, February/2021, 4]
In May, then, representatives of some opposition parties, including the PTP, petitioned the National Anti-Corruption Commission, asking the body to investigate Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha, in his capacity as director of the Centre for Covid-19 Situation Administration, for his failure to deal with the pandemic. [AiR No. 20, May/2021, 3]
Commenting on the possibility of legal action against the government, Deputy Prime Minister Wissanu Krea-ngam said that a petition may be filed to the Administrative Court. Civil suits for compensation may also be filed. However, criminal action against officials may be barred for actions taken in an emergency situation.
Thailand: Supreme Court confirms sentence of protest leader Jatuporn Prompan
(pr) Thailand’s Supreme Court on July 8 ordered longtime political activist Jatuporn Prompan to serve consecutive prison terms for almost another year for defaming former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, months after he resumed street protests and demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha. [The Straits Times]
Jatuporn is a former top leader of the National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship, also known as the “red shirt” movement, that opposed the 2006 Thai coup d'état.
He was found guilty of defamation in 2017 and sentenced to 12 months in prison without suspension. At the time, Jatuporn was already serving a one-year sentence in a separate defamation case against former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. [Bangkok Post]
Jatuporn appealed against a consecutive sentence order, saying that the ruling deprived him of his rights. He was released in 2018 after completing his first prison term but the former prime minister later contested Jatuporn’s early release. [Thai PBS World]
In February, he emerged as the leader of the Thai Mai Thon (Impatient Thais) group, which seeks the resignation of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha and has since launched a series of anti-government rallies. [AiR No. 27, July/2021, 1 AiR No. 26, June/2021, 5]
Thailand: CCSA announces further restrictions, as protestors demand more vaccine options
(pr) The Centre for Covid-19 Situation Administration (CCSA) has announced stricter measures to further prevent the spread of COVID-19. Since July 12, the measures are being applied in Bangkok, its surrounding provinces, and the four southernmost provinces of Thailand. [Bangkok Post 1]
In contrast to last year where Thailand was able to keep daily infections within two digits, the situation is worsening, and it is facing hospital bed shortages which may led to the collapse of the health care system. The crisis has attracted government criticism, and led to anti-government protests during the past few weeks. [Nikkei Asia] [see AiR No. No. 27, July/2021, 1]
The measures include a curfew from 9:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m.; prohibition of gatherings of more than five people; some businesses have shorter operating hours; and closure of infection-risk businesses, such as spas. Work from home is encouraged, while interprovincial movement is to be avoided.
The Public Health Ministry previously proposed stricter measures to the CCSA to encourage people to stay home, reduce interprovincial movement, and shorten the operating hours of businesses. [Bangkok Post 2]
Thailand: Protesters urge coalition parties to withdraw support from government
(pr) Several groups of anti-government protestors returned to the streets of Thailand’s capital, Bangkok, urging the withdrawal of the Democrat and Bhumjaithai Parties from the ruling government coalition. [Bangkok Post 1] [Bangkok Post 2]
A first protest was held by the Prachachon Khon Thai (Thai people) group, which is led by well-known royalist Nititorn Lamlua. The group seeks to have an outsider or non-lawmaker nominated as a new prime minister as per Section 272 of the 2017 Constitution.
A second protest was organized by the Thai Mai Thon (Impatient Thais) group, led by Adul Khiaoboriboon, chairman of the Heroic Committee of May '35. The group’s previous leader, Jatuporn Prompan, last week was ordered back to prison over an old offense. [see article in this edition]
A caravan led by Sombat Boonngam-anong, a former top leader of the National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship, visited the headquarters of both parties in the afternoon. The protesters also visited the headquarter of the ruling Palang Pracharath (PPRP), where they poured flour, which has come to symbolize PPRP Secretary-General Thamanat Prompow, who had been convicted of drug-related charges in Australia in the 1990s.
Another pro-democracy group, Friend Zone, initiated an online campaign to also pressure some coalition parties to withdraw their support from the government coalition.
The PPRP-led government coalition currently controls 271 seats in the 500-member lower house of parliament. Opposition parties, in turn, are being represented by 212 lawmakers, including 124 from the Pheu Thai Party and 53 from the Move Forward Party.
If both the Democrat (48) and Bhumjaithai (61) Parties were to pull out, the ruling coalition would be left with 162 lawmakers – not enough to pass key legislations, such as the budget bill for the next fiscal year. But what is more, the combined votes of PPRP and the 250 Senators would not suffice to elect a new prime minister, for this would require at least 376 of the 750 votes in a joint sitting of both chambers of parliament.
Thailand: People wrongly prosecuted, detained ‘entitled to compensation’
(pr) Thailand’s Ministry of Justice is currently inquiring into the whereabouts of more than 400 people who were wrongly prosecuted, tried and imprisoned in criminal cases - but later found not guilty and released - to inform them they are entitled to compensation under the law. [Bangkok Post]
Under the law on compensation in criminal cases, those wrongly detained and imprisoned may file a request with the authorities for compensation which include detention compensation, legal expenses, rehabilitation costs, medical expenses and lost income.
The Ministry faces difficulty in locating the released people because they did not return to their domiciles recorded in the register.
Vietnam: Former radio journalist jailed
(lm) Authorities in Vietnam on July 9 sentenced a high-profile journalist to five and a half years in prison followed by five hears of house arrest, in the latest in a slew of arrests of reporters who began working for the state media and were arrested after later choosing to work freely and independently.
According to the Hanoi court’s verdict, the defendant - a former editor of state-controlled radio broadcaster Voice of Vietnam – had used his social media account to share “distorted information that caused social concern” in addition to giving interviews to foreign media outlets. [The Straits Times 1]
Earlier this month, Hanoi police officially announced an investigation against a former editor of Phap Luat (The Law), a state-controlled magazine covering legal issues, one week after he was initially arrested on June 24. The arrest warrants list charges of “tax evasion,” which carrya possible seven-year prison sentence under article 200 of the Penal Code. [Reporters Without Borders]
The same charge of tax evasion was also used to arrest another expert on legal issues, Dang Dinh Bach, on June 30 – more than a month after the journalist had gone into hiding. Dung runs the news channel Chan Hung Nuoc Viet, which reports on corruption allegations and land confiscations. If convicted, he could face a maximum of 20 years in prison. [Voice of America]
In related news, Facebook last week said it had removed a group which had mobilized both military and non-military members to report posts they did not like to Facebook to have them taken down. The group was reportedly connected to Force 47, a at least 10,000-member strong cyber unit established in 2017 to trawl the web and rebut any “wrongful opinions” about Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party. [The Straits Times 2]
International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia
China and US spar over 2016 international tribunal SCS verdict
(dql) Ahead of the fifth anniversary of the international tribunal on the South China Sea on Monday, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken sent a warning to China, reassuring that any Chinese attack on the Philippines would be responded under a US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951. He called on Beijing “abide by its obligations under international law (and) cease its provocative behavior" in the South China Sea. [CNN]
In response, China’s Foreign Ministry reiterated its stance that “China will not accept or participate in this tribunal, will not accept or acknowledge this ruling,” calling the tribunal a “political farce,” and the US the “initiator and mastermind of the farce,” seeking to smear China. [CGTN]
The statements come as the USS Benfold destroyer on Monday passed through the disputed Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. [VoA]
China-US trade relations: More Chinese companies added to US Commerce Ministry’s blacklist
(dql) The US Department of Commerce added 23 Chinese companies to its trade blacklist of which 14 are accused of being directly involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang while five of supporting the Chinese military’s “modernization programs,” and four of violating previous US sanctions by doing business with blacklisted companies. [South China Morning Post] [Quartz]
China-Canada relations: Canadian judge rejects new evidence in Meng Wanzhou extradition case
(dql) Amid already strained China-Canada relations, a Canadian judge last week refused to accept new evidence believed to help Huawei chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou, who is fighting extradition to face fraud charges in the US. The new evidence consists of more than 300 pages of internal HSBC documents which her lawyers received from the bank through a court on Hong Kong and which according to the defense would disprove the basis for the US’ extradition claim. The extradition case is due to begin on 3 August.
Meng was arrested in December 2018 in Vancouver at the behest of American officials accusing her of misleading HSBC about the Huawei’s business in Iran, which is under US economic sanctions. China has since condemned the arrest as a politically motivated move and as violation of international law. [The Guradian]
China-EU relations: European Parliament adopts Hong Kong resolution calling for boycott of Winter Olympics in Beijing
(dql) In an overwhelming vote, the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning the recent forced closure of the government-critical Apple Daily newspaper in Hong Kong and the arrest of its journalists [see AiR No. 26, June/2021, 5] as another step to undermine free society and abolish media freedom and freedom of expression in Hong Kong. It calls on the European Commission and the Council of the EU as well as the member states “to decline invitations for government representatives and diplomats to attend the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics,” as long as the Chinese government fails to show “a verifiable improvement in the human rights situation in Hong Kong, the Xinjiang Uyghur Region, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and elsewhere in China.” It also urges the member states to impose sanctions against individuals and entities in Hong Kong and China for “serious violations of human rights and international law in Hong Kong.” [European Parliament] [France 24]
The resolution is the latest sign in strained China-EU relations over tit-for-tat sanctions over human rights issues that prompted the suspension of the ratification of the China-EU investment deal. [see AiR No. 12, March/2021, 4] [see AiR No. 21, May/2021, 4]
Responding to the resolution, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi underscored in a video conference with his EU counterpart Josep Borrell China’s uncompromising stance towards Hong Kong opposing all kinds of “hypocritical preachers.” He urged the Brussels to clear all obstructions and advance bilateral ties. [Global Times]
EU launches global infrastructure plan to compete China’s Belt and Road Initiative
(dql) The Foreign Ministers of the European Union (EU) agreed Monday to launch an ambitious global infrastructure plan linking Europe to the rest of the world, designed to rival China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The European Commission and High Representative are tasked with “identify[ing] and implement[ing] a set of high impact and visible projects and actions globally, preferably by the end of the first quarter of 2022.” Other steps to be taken by the Commission and High Representative include presenting “coherent and streamlined financing schemes to incentivise sustainable connectivity investments,” mobilizing “the private sector to finance and implement projects,” as well as ensuring “visibility of the EU’s global connectivity actions through coherent strategic communication.” [Council of the European Union]
Commenting on the plan German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said: “We see China using economic and financial means to increase its political influence everywhere in the world. It's useless moaning about this, we must offer alternatives.” [Reuters]
The launch coincides with the conclusion of a deal between Montenegro and three US and French banks enabling the Balkan state to restructure its Chinese loan of nearly 1 billion USD and to reduce the interest rate on the loan from 2% to 0.88% through a hedging arrangement.
The loan refers to a highway project for which Montenegro – a NATO member and in negotiations to join the EU – borrowed 944 million USD from the Exim Bank of China in 2014 to finance the first stretch of the planned 165km highway. The loan has been criticized by Western officials as example of China’s “debt-trap diplomacy” in the frame of its BRI. [South China Morning Post] [VoA]
China, for its part, earlier last month signed with Ukraine an agreement to deepen cooperation in the field of infrastructure [see AiR No. 27, July/2021, 1], with both countries agreeing to encourage domestic enterprises and financial institutions to actively cooperate on road, bridge and rail transit projects, and provide necessary assistance in implementing joint projects.
Taliban sees China as welcome friend of Afghanistan
(dql) As China is preparing to fill the vacuum in Afghanistan left by US and NATO troops, with authorities in Kabul reportedly considering an extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan [see AiR No. 27, July/2021, 1], the Taliban said that they welcome China as a “friend” to Afghanistan and expressed their hope to quickly engage in talks with Beijing about investing in reconstruction work. Claiming that 85% of the country was under their control, they assured that they would guarantee the safety of Chinese investors and workers if they were to return. Furthermore, they assured that China’s Uyghur separatist fighters would no longer allowed to enter the country and that al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group would be prevented from operating there. [South China Morning Post]
It has seldom been so easy to gain a foothold in the backyard of an empire.
Inter-Korean relations: South Korean intelligence agency confirms cyberattack by the North
Last Thursday, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) confirmed to federal lawmakers of the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee that cyberattacks conducted by the North targeted South Korean companies and public institutions. The NIS said it had taken measures to control the damage. The confirmation follows reports by South Korea’s Atomic Energy Research Institute of an alleged hacking attack by Pyongyang in June. Seoul’s ministry for information communication technology and innovation similarly reported last week that South Korea had experienced 78 ransomware attacks in the first half of 2021, indicating a rising trend as compared to previous years.
According to one lawmaker of the intelligence committee, the NIS report found that while attacks on the public sector decreased by 4 percent from last year, cyberattacks on the private sector have increased by 13 percent.
Pyongyang and its intelligence group, the General Reconnaissance Bureau, have supposedly used cyberattacks to the North’s financial benefit as it seeks to battle with international sanctions and the economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. [The Diplomat] [Korea Times]
South Korea-US relations: Top nuclear envoys hold talks as Seoul seeks support for peninsula peace
(nm) South Korea is currently stepping up efforts to attract international support for its efforts to strengthen Korean Peninsula peace. Seoul’s Vice Foreign Minister last week advocated for continued international support during the Ministerial Meeting of the Stockholm Initiative for Nuclear Disarmament, while Seoul’s chief nuclear negotiator, Noh Kyu-duk, similarly held bilateral talks with his United States counterpart Sung Kim. During the Ministerial Meeting, Korean representative Choi reiterated the need for an international nuclear non-proliferation regime in order to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world. The meeting came ahead of the review conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the only binding multilateral commitment to the goal of disarmament by five nuclear-weapon states. [UN]
Noh and Sung similarly discussed measures to implement the agreement reached during the May 21 Moon-Biden summit in which both leaders reaffirmed their efforts towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, President Moon thanked a group of visiting US Congress lawmakers for their support with regards to the promotion of “lasting peace for the Korean Peninsula”. Pyongyang is, however, currently negating any possibility of contact with the United States. [Korea Herald 1] [Korea Herald 2] [Korea Herald 3]
South Korea-Japan relations: Discussions on Moon-Suga summit on the sidelines of the Tokyo Olympics
(nm) With the upcoming Tokyo Olympics and tensions between neighbouring Japan and South Korea still not resolved, government officials from both nations are allegedly working out ways for South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga to hold their first bilateral summit on the sidelines of the Olympics opening ceremony. Seoul government officials, however, have also made clear that while there is potential for Moon to attend the ceremony, his visit would depend on the condition of holding a results-oriented summit.
No South Korean President has travelled to Japan for a bilateral meeting since 2011 and Moon had only visited Tokyo for a trilateral meeting involving China in 2018. While there has been some discussion on Moon attending the opening ceremony, Seoul is now clearly putting the onus on Japan to show efforts in improving ties. Moon has also faced domestic pressure as some politicians have advocated for him attending the ceremony in order to ease tensions, while others are more critical, suggesting that the Japanese side is not showing enough diplomatic efforts. [Korea Times 1]
Japanese-South Korean ties are still at their worst in years following a string of diplomatic, historic, and economic issues, including disagreement over the handling of wartime forced labour, the planned disposal of Fukushima wastewater into the Pacific Ocean, and Japanese export curbs on materials vital for South Korea’s semiconductor industry. Relations have more openly deteriorated ever since the Moon-Suga meeting set to take place on the sidelines of the recent G7-summit was called off by the Japanese side over tensions related to a group of islets that both nations claim sovereignty over. [Nikkei Asia] [Korea Times 2] [Korea Herald 1] [Korea Herald 2]
Adding pressure to the dispute, South Korea’s foreign ministry this week alleged UNESCO recently expressed “strong regret” over Japan not fulfilling its earlier promise to acknowledge the use of forced labour, including that of Koreans, during World War II at its World Heritage Sites. In 2015, some 23 Japanese historical industrial towns had been designated UNESCO World Heritage Site, triggering opposition by South Korea which had pointed at the use of Korean forced labour in those very cities and their character as a building block for Japan’s subsequent Korean occupation. [Korea Times 3] [DW, German]
South Korea and the Netherlands seek cooperation in semiconductor industry
(nm) Against the backdrop of the current global chip shortage and the 60th anniversary of their bilateral ties, the Netherlands and South Korea have agreed to further their cooperation in the semiconductor industry. South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte last week held a virtual summit to commemorate the anniversary and to discuss economic cooperation. Since 2016, the two nations have been sharing a so-called “comprehensive future-oriented partnership” that fosters bilateral cooperation in a variety of fields and is not limited to economic cooperation. The Netherlands is the biggest European investor in Korea and Korea’s third-largest investment destination in Europe. In 2020, trade volume between the two countries increased by more than 20 percent, defying opposite trends during the global pandemic. The chipmaker industry is the heart of the economic cooperation as both Dutch and South Korean companies are among the industry’s major players. Seoul is also currently seeking to reduce its reliance on materials from Japan which is another major actor in the industry and has imposed export curbs on certain vital materials due to bilateral tensions. In addition to chip cooperation, Moon and Rutte also explored cooperation in the fields of green energies, smart agriculture, and the digital economy. [Korea Herald] [Korea Times]
North Korea a “significant” cybersecurity threat, US State Department reiterates
(nds) The US State Department reiterated concerns over North Korea as a significant cyber threat to the US and other countries, highlighting in particular threats to their financial institutions.
In recent years, the United States has worked to combat the cyber threat, most notably by prosecuting several North Korean entities suspected of stealing money from the international financial system. Earlier this year, three North Korean nationals were brought to the United States for trial on suspicion of attempting to steal up to $1.3 billion in cash or crypto-currencies from banks and businesses. [Yohap]
The statement comes after South Korea announced that its state-run atomic energy research institute could have been target of Pyongyang’s cyberattacks for an extended period.
Meanwhile, Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters (CSHQ), a leading Japanese government cybersecurity organization, identified North Korea was one of the main actors (next to China and Russia) threatening the country’s cybersecurity. CSHQ cited for its assessment the growing cyber capabilities of its “military and other institutions,” with cyberattacks conducted to “achieve political aims or obtain foreign currency.” [NK News]
US supports strong, unofficial relations with Taiwan, but not independence
(nds/dql) Speaking at an Asia Society Policy Institute conference, US White House coordinator for the Indo-Pacific Kurt Campbell reiterated and made clear the US position towards Taiwan, saying that the US has strong but unofficial ties with Taiwan and that it does not support Taiwan’s independence. Referring the Chinese government’s actions, he warned that a similar move in Taiwan would be “catastrophic.”
The remarks express strong support for Taiwan without crossing Beijing’s red lines, trying to what Campbell called “a very delicate, […] a dangerous balance,” one that “presents China with both opportunities but also very clear challenges for taking steps that are antithetical to the maintenance of peace and stability.” He added that while coexistence between the US and China was possible, “the challenge is going to be enormously difficult for this generation and the next.” [Kyodo News] [South China Morning Post] [Taiwan News]
Echoing this position towards Taiwan, the White House deleted a twitter post about America’s COVID vaccine donations to the world that included an image of the Taiwanese flag and apologized for its “honest mistake.” [New York Post]
Cross-strait relations: Taiwan tightens regulations on China exchanges
(nds) Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior has amended the “Measures for Permitting People from the Mainland Area to Enter the Taiwan Area.” Under the amendment, Taiwanese companies or organizations will now have to be registered in the country for at least three years before inviting Chinese professionals, compared with one year previously. In addition, Chinese nationals and Taiwanese companies will have to provide documents, including budget and expense reports for the past three years. To prevent fraudulent applications the documents will be reviewed by an interagency to be convened by the Ministry.
The amendment applies to Chinese corporations, non-governmental organizations, temples, and churches taking part in science and technology research, art and literature activities, or providing training assistance to Taiwanese national sports teams. [Taiwan News] [Taipei Times]
Taiwan-Japan relations: Tokyo takes up Taiwan Strait stability in defense report for first time
(nds) In its 2021 defense report, released this Tuesday, Japan for the first time has taken up the issue of stability around Taiwan, concluding that in the light of China’s military activities around Taiwan ‘[s]tabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan is important for Japan’s security and the stability of the international community.” This, in turn, would require to closer observe the military trends of both the US and China in the South China Sea and Taiwan. [Ministry of Defense, Japan)
Japan’s Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso, meanwhile, went a step further by warning: “If a major problem took place in Taiwan, it would not be too much to say that it could relate to a survival-threatening situation [for Japan]," adding that in the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Japan and the United States would have to defend Taiwan together. [Kyodo News]
Aso’s remark refers to Japan’s security legislation of 2014/2015 which allows the use of force “to the minimum extent necessary” as measures for self-defense “when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.” [Government, Japan]
It signals a new high in security ties between Japan and Taiwan, backed by Washington’s and Tokyo’s shared interest in securing peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait. [Observer Research Foundation] [The Diplomat]
Taiwan-Australia relations: Strengthening economic cooperation between the two countries
(nds) Taiwan's and Australia’s trade ministers Wang Mei-Hua and Dan Tehan held an online meeting, during which they reached a consensus on potential cooperation in multiple areas such as liquefied natural gas, biotechnology, finance, and education.
Taiwan is an important trade and investment partner for Australia. However, Australia does not formally recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state, although it supports its participation in international organizations.
The meeting comes amidst trade tensions and frosty diplomatic relations between China and Australia as well as between China and Taiwan. [Taiwan News]
Indian Prime Minister Modi send birthday wishes to Tibet’s Dalai Lama amid strained ties with China
India Prime Minister Modi on July 6 openly sent his well wishes to the Dalai Lama on his 86th birthday, in a move some observers say indicating a shift in New Delhi’s adherence to Beijing’s “One China” policy amid the protracted border stand-off in eastern Ladakh. [South China Morning Post]
China regards the 14th Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso, who has lived in northern India ever since he exiled himself in 1959, as a dangerous “splittist”, or separatist, and frowns on any engagement with him. India, in turn, recognizes Tibet as an autonomous region of China, and its leaders have generally been circumspect about public contact with the spiritual leader to avoid upsetting Beijing.
But more recently – against the larger backdrop of a manifesting stand-off along the Sino-Indian border – a number of retired Indian security officials has begun publicly voicing support for the Dalai Lama. Former National Security Advisor M.K. Nayaranan, for example, in an op-ed for The Hindu in August of last year claimed that restoring the Dalai Lama to his previous level of eminence “should be an important plank in India’s anti-China policy”.
The call could also herald the beginning of improved ties between the Indian federal government and the Tibetan community in the country. For this was the first time that and Indian prime minister has publicly greeted the Dalai Lama on his birthday, and thus, sends a strong message that India backs the Tibetan people.
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Khan willing to hold talks with Baloch insurgents
(ra) Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan has indicated that he is considering reaching out to insurgents in the country’s restive province of Balochistan, who he believes have grown resentful of governmental authorities due to years of neglect by prior governments. [Dawn] [Gulf News]
the scene of frequent militant attacks and a long-running insurgency by small separatist groups that seek independence for the mineral- and gas-rich province bordering borders Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan frequently accuses India of attempting to stir nationalist and sectarian tensions in the province through covert operations, an allegation New Delhi routinely denies.
Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa also emphasized how deeper understanding of Balochistan is necessary to create a path for peace in the restive province. At the same time, COAS Bajwa emphasized how Pakistan’s security forces will continue to maintain peace in the province, defeating enemies that threaten the region’s security. [Geo News]
In related news, security forces killed five suspected militants on July 6 during a raid on their hideout near the Balochistan’s provincial capital, Quetta. [Associated Press]
India claims arrest of two Al-Qaeda-linked operatives
(lm) An Al-Qaeda offshoot in the Indian-administered part of Kashmir planned attacks ahead of the country’s Independence Day, police claimed after arresting two men with alleged links to the terrorist group on July 11. [The Straits Times]
The two men were arrested in Lucknow city, the capital of India’s northern state of Uttar Pradesh. They are suspected of having links to Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind, a Kashmiri wing of Al-Qaeda that is active in the Indian union territory of Jammu and Kashmir.
The group was created by Zakir Musa, a former Hizbul Mujahideen field operational commander who had pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and was killed by Indian government forces in 2019. Earlier this year in April, police in Kashmir said they had killed five suspected militants including the-then chief of Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind, Imtiyaz Shah.
Asia’s highest default risk spotlights Sri Lanka debt worry
(lm) Sri Lanka’s risk premium for a default jumped, reflecting concern that the pandemic is damaging the nation’s ability to fill its foreign-exchange coffers ahead of at least $2.5 billion in dollar debt due in the next 12 months. [Bloomberg]
The country's foreign reserves are currently at $4 billion, down from $7.8 billion in late 2019 when the government of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa came to power promising robust growth.
Sri Lanka tightened capital controls earlier this month, limiting how much foreign currency can leave the country, as it gears up to meet its debt service obligations amounting to $3.6 billion in the next six months. The first test comes July 27, when the South Asian nation must repay a $1 billion bond to investors.
Colombo secured a $1.5 billion currency swap line from China in March, and is expecting inflows including a $250 million swap facility from Bangladesh’s monetary authority and a $500 million loan from South Korea [see AiR No. 20, May/2021, 3], in addition to a $400 million facility from the Reserve Bank of India to bolster reserves.
The country may also need to turn to the International Monetary Fund, which last year prematurely ended a loan program to Sri Lanka after disbursing $1.3 billion of an agreed $1.5 billion facility, leaving the South Asian nation scouting for ways to tide over the pandemic-induced downturn. [AiR No. 10, March/2021, 2].
China was the top lender to Sri Lanka for the first four months of 2021, disbursing $514.9 million, including the second tranche of a $1 billion bailout Colombo sought from Beijing last year [see AiR No. 15, April/2021, 2]. [South Asia Monitor]
Authorities have not yet specified plans for meeting the country’s foreign-currency debt-servicing needs for 2022 and beyond. Two more payments become due next year: a $500 million bond in January, followed by $1 billion of debt maturing in July.
Myanmar junta is committing ‘crimes against humanity’, UN rights expert says
(mt/lm) A United Nations human rights investigator has called for international coordinated action to stem abuse by Myanmar’s military leaders against its people, urging countries to impose economic sanctions on the country’s oil and gas sector to cripple the junta. [Reuters] [Voice of America]
Speaking before the United Nations Human Rights Council on July 7, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, decried the "widespread, systematic attacks against the people" since the military takeover five months ago. Some of the acts, he said, "amount to crimes against humanity", lamenting the fact that more had not been done to rein in the violations. [The Straits Times]
In his report to the Council, Andrews called for forming an “Emergency Coalition for the People of Myanmar”, essentially a group of states which could impose sanctions and "significantly reduce the revenue that the junta needs to continue its reign of terror”. To this end, Andrews proposed a series of five key measures he said would impose significant costs on the junta, and thereby bring the country’s generals into compliance with international human rights norms.
First and foremost, Andrews criticizes that no state so far has imposed sanctions on Myanmar’s oil and gas sector - which he referred to as “a financial lifeline for the junta” - although some had slapped them on military-controlled enterprises and revenue from gems, timber and mining. The junta, Andrews explained, finds itself in need of these revenue streams as it has been experiencing a financial deficit.
These remarks resonate with the findings of a Global Witness’ report published earlier this month, which had advised the international community to place sanctions on Myanmar’s jade trade business. [AiR No. 27, July/2021, 1]. They are also in accord with recent reports, which have suggested that the military junta is now demanding ransom from family members of activists detained on suspicion of involvement in the pro-democracy movement. [The Irrawaddy]
Andrew’s plan also calls for the pursuit of universal jurisdiction cases and filing charges against Myanmar’s senior security officials. Other measures include ensuring that humanitarian aid goes directly to the people of Myanmar, and the denial of any claims of legitimacy by the junta, such as the false claim that it is recognized by the United Nations.
"There is no guarantee that this approach will succeed," he acknowledged, but "there is overwhelming evidence that the current path leads to even greater impunity, a humanitarian disaster, and a failed state".
Singapore says ASEAN to ‘expedite’ Myanmar plan, as grouping remains deadlocked in selection of envoy
(mt) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is working to expedite the implementation of the so-called ‘five-point consensus’ plan reached by their leaders to deal with the crisis in Myanmar, Singapore's Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan reiterated on July 7. [The Diplomat]
Nearly three months after the military coup in Myanmar, the 10 ASEAN member states in April announced a Five-Point Consensus for resolving the country’s state of grinding emergency. Of the five points, three refer to outcomes desired by the grouping: the cessation of violence; the delivery of humanitarian aid through the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance; and the beginning of political dialogue to end the crisis. The other two are mechanisms to achieve these outcomes: the appointment of an ASEAN special envoy and the dispatch of a delegation to Myanmar to meet all relevant stakeholders. [AiR No. 17, April/2021, 4]
But ASEAN leaders failed to agree on a time frame for the implementation of the consensus, and progress has been slow, even on what would appear to be the most straightforward point of consensus: the appointment of a special envoy.
A recent report by Japan’s Kyodo News suggests that there are currently three nominees: Virasakdi Futrakul, a former Thai Deputy Foreign Minister and veteran diplomat; Hassan Wirajuda, a former Indonesian Foreign Minister, and Razali Ismail, a Malaysian who in the 2000s served as the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Myanmar and played a pivotal role in releasing Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in May 2002. [Kyodo News]
Citing ASEAN diplomatic sources, the news outlet claims that each of the three candidates is being pushed by their respective government, and that the choice “appears to have become intertwined with the domestic and strategic agendas of the nominating countries.”
A case in point, Indonesia believes that Hassan could establish momentum towards resolving the situation in Myanmar. But the country’s military seems to be leaning toward the Thai candidate, most notably because the military junta "is [said to be] no longer interested in the Indonesian model of democratic transition but prefers the Thai model where the military wields superior political leverage and policy influence."
Thailand, whose military is said to have close ties to neighboring Myanmar [see AiR No. 20, May/2021, 3], seems to be primarily concerned with ensuring its border security and commercial interests vis-a-vis Myanmar. Bangkok this week reiterated that it does not have the “luxury of distance”, and thus could not afford to be complacent about what is happening in neighboring Myanmar. [Bangkok Post]
United States, ASEAN to hold virtual meeting of foreign ministers on July 14
(lm) The United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will hold a foreign minister’s meeting virtually on July 14, marking the first such high-level meeting between the two sides under the administration of US President Joe Biden. [South China Morning Post]
Both sides were scheduled to hold their first foreign ministers' encounter via videoconference on May 25. But US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who was touring the Middle East at the time, canceled over technical difficulties after keeping his counterparts waiting. Many ASEAN officials viewed the technical glitch as a political slight, a sign Washington had not invested sufficient effort in planning for the meeting and was once again putting off the pivot to Asia by prioritizing other regions in the world—in this case, the Middle East.
Against this backdrop, United States Deputy Secretary of State Wendy R. Sherman last month embarked on an 11-day diplomatic tour that included stopovers in Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand, aimed at signaling that Washington was finally turning its diplomatic focus to Southeast Asia to counter a rising Chinese clout in the region. [AiR No. 23, June/2021, 2]
The rescheduled meeting will be attended by Blinken and all foreign ministers from the 10-member ASEAN, including Myanmar’s junta-appointed top diplomat. Laos, which coordinates the bloc’s “dialogue relations” with the US, had wanted the virtual session to be held back-to-back with the ASEAN Regional Forum on security next month, but Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia were persuasive in preponing it.
ASEAN previously held a foreign ministers’ meeting with China in Chongqing on June 7 [see AiR No. 23, June/2021, 2] and, more recently, with Russia in Jakarta on July 6.
Russia backs ASEAN five-point consensus on tackling crisis in Myanmar
(lm) Speaking during a visit to Indonesia, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov last week expressed his country’s support for the Five Point Consensus agreed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to end the political crisis in Myanmar. [The Straits Times]
The diplomat’s comments assume added significance, coming as they did amid deepening engagement between Russia and Myanmar’s military, even as major global powers sanction its businesses and top leaders and call for a global ban on arms sales to the Southeast Asian country.
Independent news outlet Myanmar Now on July 6 reported that a 20-member Russian delegation led by two high-ranking Navy officers secretly visited Myanmar between June 13 and 19, ahead of its junta leader’s trip to Russia last month, citing a document it said it had obtained. [Myanmar Now, in Burmese]
Myanmar’s junta leader Min Aung Hlaing arrived in Moscow on June 20 to attend the Moscow Conference for International Security, marking only his second known trip abroad since the army overthrew the civilian government in February [see AiR No. 25, June/2021, 4]. His visit followed on a trip to Moscow by a delegation led by the country’s Air Force Chief, General Maung Maung Kyaw [see AiR No. 21, May/2021, 4].
Both visits lend weight to arguments that claim Russia is seeking an avenue to advance its strategic interests in Southeast Asia. Moreover, Moscow – which has seen a steady decline of its weapons exports since 2010 – might consider Myanmar a “gateway” for this lucrative market. For the military junta, in turn, Moscow provides an opportunity to diversify supplies and to reduce its dependency on China, Myanmar’s main weapons supplier.
Vietnam, Canada hold bilateral defense consultation
(lm) The 2021 Vietnam-Canada defense consultation took place virtually on July 7, with both sides agreeing to maintain the annual defense consultation and defense policy dialogue, increase high-level meetings, while also strengthening ties in personnel training, UN peacekeeping operations, and maritime security. [VietnamPlus]
Significantly, Vietnam is one of only two countries in Southeast Asia with Canadian resident defense attaché positions. The two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on defense cooperation in 2019 and Canadian naval ships visited Vietnam’s Cam Ranh International Port for the first time in June the same year.
Even though Ottawa seeks to maintain a healthy separation from US policy – the Royal Canadian Navy does not engage in US freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) – its naval presence in the South China Sea is unmistakably higher compared to years past. A case in point, a Canadian frigate passed by the Spratly Island during a trip from Brunei to Vietnam earlier this year in March, raising the ire of China.
Canada has also upped its partnerships with countries and regional intuitions that govern the South China Sea. In early November of last year, Canadian Minister of Defense Harjit Sajjan presented to the 12th South China Sea International Conference in Hanoi, where he noted that his country “opposes unilateral actions that have escalated tensions in the region and undermined stability in the South China Sea”.
Malaysia-China relations: Chinese vessels contest Malaysian oil and gas development
(dql) According to findings of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), vessels of the China Coast Guard (CCG) have been contesting new Malaysian oil and gas development of the Kasawari gas field, located off the coast of Sarawak since early June. The activity, coinciding with a Chinese military planes’ patrol by near Malaysia, is at least the third time since last spring that the CCG has harassed Malaysian energy exploration, the report says. [AMTI]
Discovered in November 2011, the Kasawari field is believed to contain approximately three trillion cubic feet (tcf) of recoverable gas resources. [NS Energy]
Philippines eyes new law measuring legitimate territories in South China Sea
(lp) Retired Supreme Court (SC) associate justice Francis Jardeleza, along with international law consultant Melissa Loja, professor Romel Bagares proposed a new measure to clearly identify by name and coordinates at least one hundred features being claimed and occupied in the South China Sea. This law would increase clarity for the country’s maritime law enforcers to protect national territory. [Manila Bulletin]
Unlike other cases where confrontation was avoided, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) issued a radio challenge which drove away five Chinese, two Vietnamese vessels from Marie Louise Bank. Just like in May, when the PCG called out and forced some Chinese vessels to disperse from Sabina Shoal. [Rappler]
Moreover, the House Committee on Natural Resources approved House Bill No. 36, which declares a portion of the Philippine Rise as a protected area. However, a fisher’s group protested that this bill is insufficient to uphold territorial rights because it covers less than a quarter of the Philippine Rise and does not provide a concrete plan for the future of this area. Moreover, this bill allegedly would prevent local commercial fishing fleets from fishing, while leaving the area exposed to foreign industrial fishing vessels. [Business World]
Meanwhile, the United States reaffirmed their commitment to the Philippines against armed attack in the South China Sea, according to their 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). Similarly, Canada aired concern over China’s actions in the South China Sea. [CNN] [Mirage News]
Philippines: Assistance after plane crash killed over fifty, injured dozens
(lp) The Philippine Red Cross provides psychological first aid to those affected by the C-130 aircraft that crashed in Patikul, Sulu. Meanwhile, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) will procure more aircraft to improve their fleet. The AFP recently received five million Philippine pesos worth of financial assistance from lawmakers, other stakeholders for the victims of the crash. [Manila Bulletin] [Philippine News Agency]
The United States Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III offered to provide any additional assistance that is possible, including for the crash response and potential identification of victims. [Rappler]
Indonesia seeks further economic cooperation with Australia, and US, advances vaccine diplomacy with Russia
(sa) As Indonesia’s Covid-19 situation intensifies and batters the economy, Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry reached out to countries near and far in boosting its current and future prospects.
On 6 July 2021, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi with her Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, who visited Jakarta, disclosed that they had signed a Memorandum of Understanding in cooperating in human health drugs and equipment, particularly Covid-19 vaccines, therapeutic drugs, and diagnostic equipment. [Antara News]
For the geopolitical signal of Lavrov’s visit to Indonesia (and Laos), see Kavi Chongkittavorn in [Bangkok Post] who argues that “Russia is back in Southeast Asia,” treating the region as “one of its core interests,” and determined to “further integrate its economy with the region's economic dynamics.”
On 7 July 2021, Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto revealed that, after meeting with Australia’s Ministers for investment and trade through the Indonesia-Australia Economic, Trade and Investment Ministers’ Meeting, both sides have agreed to develop their economic cooperation to bolster economic recovery and aimed at revamping the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA). [Vietnamplus 1]
On 8 July 2021, Airlangga Hatarto met with the US Ambassador to Indonesia Sung Kim to discuss avenues for expanding trade. Hatarto noted that even though Indonesia was ASEAN’s largest economy, the US had greater trade flows with other nations with only 30 billion USD in trade with Indonesia. A day later, the White House announced to send 3 million Moderna Covid-19 vaccines to Indonesia, marking one of the Biden administration's largest single shipments yet. [Vietnamplus 2] [CNN]
Indonesia seeks greater role for Italy in ASEAN
(sa) On 7 July 2021, Indonesian Ambassador to Italy Esti Andayani pushed for greater ASEAN-Italy cooperation in sustainable development at the ‘Italy-ASEAN Partnership for Development: A Look at Sustainable Development’. The Ambassador, who is also chief of the ASEAN Committee in Rome (ACR) noted the benefits of post-pandemic cooperation and highlighted the economic impact of Covid-19. [Antara News]
Announcements
Upcoming Online Events
14 July 2021 @ 10:00-11:00 a.m. (GMT-4), Middle East Institute, USA
Saudi Arabia: Economic Outlook and Policy Challenges
This webinar will address the report in the context of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the Saudi economy and assess the government’s policy response. Given the need to diversify away from reliance on oil, what fiscal policy challenges has the volatility in the oil market created? How well are reforms meeting the need to generate more jobs for Saudi nationals in the private sector? How has the trajectory of foreign direct investment flows impacted the transformation of the Saudi economy?
Visit [MEI] to learn more about the event.
14 July 2021 @ 9:30-10:30 a.m. (GMT-4), Center for Global Development, USA
Financing for Pandemic Preparedness and Response
This webinar will discuss the recommendations presented in “A Global Deal for Our Pandemic Age,” the recently released report of the G20 High Level Independent Panel on how finance can be organized, systematically and sustainably, to reduce the world’s vulnerability to future pandemics.
Find out more at [CDG].
14 July 2021 @ 10:00-11:30 a.m. (GMT-4), Foreign Policy Research Institute, USA
Tug-of-War in the Black Sea: Defending NATO’s Eastern Flank
The greater Black Sea region has become more complex than ever before where great power competition over this vital space connecting Europe and Asia has been deepening, with Black Sea states engaging in a perpetual tug-of-war. As the region takes an increasingly anti-democratic turn and Russia’s military presence expands in the Black Sea and the South Caucasus, threats to Western strategic interests only deepen. What should the West do to prevent further strategic losses in the region? How can the transatlantic community more effectively push back on the continued assaults on western values in Europe’s east? Find answers to these and other questions at the webinar.
For further event information, see [FPRI].
14 July 2021 @ 4:00-5:00 p.m. (GMT+2), Wilfried Martens Center for European Studies, Belgium
Israel’s Security and Political Challenges Under the New Government
This online panel will discuss how Israel’s newly established government under Naftali Bennett will address some of the domestic challenges the country faces, including the relationship between Arab and Jewish communities, as well as the secular and religious divide, and examine how the government will manage foreign and security issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its ongoing shadow war with Iran, its relations with Russia and China, but also with its Western allies-the US and the EU.
Visit [Martens Center] for more information.
14 July 2021 @ 1:00-2:00 p.m. (GMT-4), The Heritage Foundation, USA
The 2021 B.C. Lee Lecture featuring Mike Pence
In the online lecture, former Vice President Mike Pence will share his insights into the current status and prospects of the US relationship with the Indo-Pacific.
Find more details at [Heritage Foundation].
14 July 2021 @ 5:30-6:30 p.m. (GMT-4), Stimson Center, USA
Reforming Online Accountability: Can Lessons Be Learned from Across the Globe?
The increasingly tangible impact which the dissemination of online content may have on the offline world has led to calls for more stringent rules for online platforms. This webinar will explore issues as they relate to current and potential legal accountability: Cyber Accountability – Who did it? Is it wrong? Can they be stopped?
If you are interested in joining, please see [Stimson].
14 July 2021 @ 2:00-2:45 p.m. (GMT-4), Center for Strategic & International Studies, USA
The State of Special Operations Forces: A Conversation with Rep. Stephanie Murphy
In this online talk, Congresswoman Stephanie Murphy will offer insight into the state of special operations forces, including the future of the force in the wake of the shift from counterterrorism to competition with states like China, Russia, and Iran.
Find out more at [CSIS].
14-16 July 2021 @ 4:00 p.m. (GMT+2), Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, Spain
1st Summer Course on the European Union “The Challenges of the European Union: An Expert and Institutional Perspective”
CIBOD and the representations of the European institutions in Barcelona are launching their first summer course on the European Union, in which students and anyone interested can learn about current debates and challenges of the European Union, as well as about the analytical tools used to analyse and understand the union in the short, medium, and long term. The first day will explore the Covid-19 and the launch of the Next Generation EU, the second day will focus on the Conference on the Future of Europe, and the third will consider the European Green Deal.
If you are interested in this event, please see [CIBOD] for more information and registration.
15 July 2021 @ 12:00 p.m. (GMT-4), The Heritage Foundation, USA
The Challenge of Fentanyl: The China-Mexico Connection
With the United States still in the grips of an opioid crisis, the number of overdose fatalities has increasingly been driven by a narcotic even more potent than heroin: the synthetic opioid fentanyl. Fentanyl and its analogues are 50-100 times more powerful than morphine; even minute amounts can lead to death. Fentanyl is often added to heroin or cocaine because it is less expensive to produce. China exports the drug (or its precursor chemicals) to Mexico, and the cartels smuggle it into the United States. Law enforcement has struggled to halt that flow, and the recent crisis at the southern border has only exacerbated this issue.
For further information, see [Heritage Foundation].
15 July 2021 @ 10:00-11:30 a.m. (GMT+8), ISEAS, Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): Making Recovery Inclusive, and Bolstering Supply Chains
The webinar will discuss findings from the latest APEC Regional Trends Analysis (ARTA) – the flagship publication of the APEC Policy Support Unit (PSU).
If you are interested in joining, you can register at [ISEAS].
15 July 2021 @ 10:00-11:30 a.m. (GMT+2), Institute for Security Studies, South Africa
From law to action: South Africa’s new Cybercrimes Act
South Africa’s new Cybercrimes Act brings the country into line with international standards and complements existing legislation on the protection of personal information. This webinar will consider implementation challenges and how South Africa can leverage its commitments in regional and international cybercrime engagements.
Visit [ISS Africa] for further events details.
15 July 2021 @ 10:30-11:40 a.m. (GMT+8), Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia
The Impact of the Global Pandemic on Migrants and Refugees in Southeast Asia – One Year On
More than a year on, the global pandemic continues to impact the issues driving forced migration, and the challenges faced by refugees and asylum seekers in Southeast Asia. In what ways has the pandemic affected key refugee communities in Southeast Asia, including in Malaysia? What more could be done by host communities, policymakers and other stakeholders to respond more effectively, specifically with regards to the safety and health of migrants and refugees? This webinar will provide answers to these and other questions.
Find out more at [ISIS].
15 July 2021 @ 2:30-3:30 p.m. (GMT+1), Royal United Services Institute, UK
The FATF Standards and Unintended Consequences: Part 2: Evaluating the Present
This webinar, the second in the “FATF: Past, Present and Future in the Unintended Consequences Debate” series, will explore how unintended consequences resulting from the incorrect implementation of FATF Standards are felt in present-day contexts. Considering the experience of the coronavirus pandemic, our panel will assess the FATF’s work on financial exclusion and how the current unintended consequences working group could mitigate the negative impact of the FATF framework on financial inclusion.
More event details are provided at [RUSI].
15 July 2021 @ 3:00 p.m. (GMT+2), European Centre for International Political Economy, Belgium
The Future of the Transatlantic Relation – Priorities for the Slovenian Presidency
This virtual event on technology and digital trade will take a closer look at the prospects of US-EU relations and the role of the newly established EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), considering the priorities of the TTC, the EU’s recovery plan, and possible problems.
If you are interested in this event, please see [ECIPE] for more information and registration.
15 July 2021 @ 6:00 p.m. (GMT+5,5), Centre for Policy Research, India
Book Discussion | The Light of Asia: The Poem that Defined the Buddha by Jairam Ramesh
Jairam Ramesh’s book weaves together the literacy, cultural, political and social history of the poem “The Light of Asia” that went on to become one of the most consequential poems in Indian history with an unusual narrative of the poet’s, that is, Sir Edwin Arnold’s, life.
For more information on the book discussion, please visit [CPR].
16 July 2021 @ 12:00 p.m. (GMT-4), Hudson Institute, United States
Religious Freedom and a Free and Open Indo-Pacific
The United States’ strategic goal of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” region is a contested concept that allows for differing and competing visions. This event invites General Secretary of the world’s largest Muslim organization, Yahya Cholil Staquf, and former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to discuss their visions of the concept.
For more information, please see [Hudson Institute].
16 July 2021 @ 10:00-11:30 a.m. (GMT+8), ISEAS, Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore
China’s Vaccine Diplomacy in Indonesia: Problems and Prospects
This webinar seeks to throw some lights on the problems and prospects of China’s vaccine diplomacy in Indonesia and how it could shape Indonesia-China relations in the short- and long-run. It will also address the impacts of the vaccine diplomacy on ethnic and community relations in Indonesia.
More information about the event is provided at [ISEAS].
16 July 2021 @ 3:30-5:00 p.m. (GMT+8), East Asia Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore
Infrastructure for Influence: Evidence from the Belt and Road Initiative
This webinar will discuss the question whether China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been effective in shifting the foreign policy preferences of member states closer to that of China.
If you want to know more about the event, go to [EAI].
16 July 2021 @ 11:30 a.m. (GMT+5.30), The United Service Institution of India, India
USI-CAPS, Taiwan joint webinar
This webinar, jointly hosted by The United Service Institution of India and the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, will discuss important questions pertaining to the relations between China and India and China and Taiwan.
For more information, see [USI].
19 July 2021 @ 10:00-11:15 a.m. (GMT+8), ISEAS, Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore
Prisons, Voices and the Pandemic: Challenges in Ensuring the Wellbeing of Excluded Communities in Thailand
In May 2021, several thousands of Covid-infected cases have been reported from prisons around the country, with one of the main prisons in Bangkok recording an infection rate of 95% of its total number of detainees. Using Thai prisons as a case example, this online talk will explore and analyze the implications of political inequality on the wellbeing of excluded communities in Thailand, especially in times of crisis.
Visit [ISEAS] to find out more about the event.
19 July 2021 @ 12:00-12:45 p.m. (GMT-4), Center for Strategic & International Studies, USA
Partnering for Peace in Sudan
This online conversation will discuss Sudan’s political transition and the role of the US in supporting Sudan’s economic revival, peace process, and contributions to regional security.
If you want to join the event, you can register at [CSIS].
19 July 2021 @ 6:00-7:00 p.m. (GMT+10), Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Australia
War Studies Seminar Series 2021
The Australian and American operations to secure the Japanese beachheads in Papua were arguably some of the most difficult of the Second World War in the Pacific. They have become notorious for the ignorance of senior commanders to the challenges faced by forward troops, the grinding brutality of the combat, and heavy casualties. This presentation looks beyond this established narrative. Contrary to the notion that the Allies stubbornly committed to the same clumsy methods and practices, it demonstrates that there was a concerted effort to learn and adapt. Although not always successful, it was this effort that enabled Allied victory.
More information is accessible via [SDSC].
19 July 2021 @ 4:00 p.m. (GMT+9), Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan
Japanese Business and Human Rights Risks in Southeast Asia – Reports from Thailand and Indonesia
Based on research on human rights risks for Japanese business enterprises in Southeast Asia, this panel conference invites those experts and professional organizations conducting the research to share their findings, focussing on Southeast Asia more generally, Thailand, and Indonesia.
Please visit [SPF] for more information. Registration is required by July 16.
19 July 2021 @ 3:00 p.m. (GMT+9), Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Japan
Open burning of waste webinar
This virtual event seeks to bring attention to the harmful burning of waste that can lead to the contamination of the land and water and more widespread risks. Speakers will present and subsequently discuss the motivation for open burning of waste, the risks entailed, and the unintended consequences as well as potential solutions.
For more information, please visit [IGES].
19-21 July 2021, Institute for Public Policy Research, Great Britain
IPPR Oxford Media Convention 2021
In this year’s Oxford Media Convention, participants will come to together to shape a renewed vision for the role the media can play in a healthy democracy, discuss the steps necessary to build a strong and sustainable media ecosystem and to provide stability in the “decade of disruption” ahead.
Please see [IPPR] for more information.
19-23 July 2021 @ 8:30-12:30 a.m. (GMT-4), Wilson Center, USA
The Political Economy of Democracy and Peacebuilding in Africa in the Covid-19 Era
This virtually held conference will gather US and African experts, practitioners, policy makers and stakeholders to assess the impact of Covid-19 on democracy and peacebuilding in Africa, examining the crosscutting roles of gender, youth, technology, non-state actors, and international stakeholders on these issues. They will also identify challenges posed and opportunities created by the pandemic, and explore the way forward for US-Africa relations in the Covid-19 era.
For more details, see [Wilson Center].
20 July 2021 @ 5:00-6:00 p.m. (GMT+10), Australian Institute of International Affairs, Australia
Antarctic Treaty: Nature, Peace, Science
The first meeting of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, the first Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), was held in Canberra from 10 - 14 July 1961. Shortly after, the Antarctic Treaty entered into force on the 23 June 1961. This webinar will look at the Antarctic Treaty and the ATCM over the past sixty years and focus on the successes of the Treaty in managing the geopolitical challenges it faced.
Visit [AIIA] to learn more about the event.
20 July 2021 @ 11:00 a.m. (GMT+1), Overseas Development Institute, UK
ODI in conversation with Preet Gill
In this online talk, Preet Gill, British Labour and Co-operative Member of Parliament and Shadow Secretary of State for International Development, will introduce her new, future-focused vision for an international development agenda. The discussion with her will call for rethinking existing paradigms in global challenges and the UK's international standing, and discuss how high-income countries can make good on their commitments to climate finance and other key issues.
Find out more about the event at [ODI].
20 July 2021 @ 12:00-1:00 p.m. (GMT+1), Chatham House, UK
The future of liberal democracies: In conversation with David Miliband and Kevin Rudd
This online talk will address the following questions: Can liberal democracies re-unite after the tumult of the COVID-19 pandemic and the transatlantic and transpacific divisions of recent years? Can they forge a shared agenda for the future? How should principles of human rights and the rule of law inform foreign policy in liberal democracies? Can shared values give meaning to liberal democracies’ status as allies as well as partners?
If you want attend the event, find out how to register at [Chatham House].
20 July 2021 @ 9:00-10:00 p.m. (GMT-4), Stimson Center, USA
Voices from Japan: US-Japan Defense Cooperation in the Maritime Domain
Against the backdrop of the increasing complexity of challenges at sea in the Indo-Pacific, from freedom of navigation to territorial issues, this webinar will discuss US-Japan relations and maritime cooperation in this region.
Further event details are available at [Stimson].
20 July 2021 @ 4:00-5:30 p.m. (GMT+1), Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, UK
Law-making in Illiberal Regimes
This webinar will explore the inter-relationship between illiberal tendencies in government and the law-making process. Of particular interest will be the following questions: Do illiberal states show evidence of a particular type of law-making process? Or do certain types of law-making process make it easier to have illiberal tendencies in government? In answering these questions, the webinar will draw on experiences from Poland, Hungary, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey and Italy.
Find out more at [Bingham Centre].
20 July 2021 @ 10:00 a.m. (GMT-4), The Dialogue, USA
Reimagining Regional Governance in Latin America
Against the backdrop of Latin America’s struggle to cope with three overlapping crises – devastation from the coronavirus pandemic, severe economic contraction, and heightened political polarization and democratic backsliding – this online panel will discuss the question how regional governance can be productively and creatively reimagined to better tackle the daunting challenges at hand.
Visit [The Dialogue] to learn more about the event.
20 July 2021 @ 3:00-4:00 p.m. (GMT-4), Center for Global Development, USA
Migration, Institutional Context and Global Network Formation: Evidence from Female Scientists in Developing Countries
What role do migrants play in the building of global networks and what factors impact their brokerage? To answer this question, this webinar will introduce a study by Caroline Fry and Jeffrey Furman on the institutional contexts shaping the extent to which female migrants leverage their cross-border networks.
Find more about event details at [CGD].
20 July 2021 @ 3:00-4:00 p.m. (GMT+2), South African Institute of International Affairs, South Africa
Can new leadership transform the DRC’s fortunes?
An analysis of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) human and economic development prospects to 2050 models’ various complementary scenarios. It shows the benefit of boosting infrastructure, improving agricultural production and providing quality education and health care. These gains can, however, only be realised if the DRC’s government builds transparent and accountable institutions and improves public financial management. This seminar will discuss the country’s prospects and challenges.
For further information, see [SAIIA].
21 July 2021 @ 6:00 p.m. (GMT+10), Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Australia
Competing Strategic Imaginaries in Asia
This virtual public lecture will explore three main competing strategic imaginaries of Asia today: the ‘Asia-Pacific’; a revived ‘Greater Asia’ made possible by China’s resurgence; and the ‘Indo-Pacific’ visions. All three will persist for the foreseeable future, and will affect how international actors deal with Asia.
For further information, see [SDSC].
21 July 2021 @ 9:00 a.m. (GMT-5), Hoover Institution, Stanford University, USA
Japan: The Legacy of Japan's Longest Serving Prime Minister
In this online conversation former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will share insights into his service as prime minister, US-Japan shared security challenges, and the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Visit [Hoover] for more information.
21 July 2021 @ 10:00-11:00 a.m. (GMT-4), Center for Strategic & International Studies, USA
Engaging the Private Sector for Innovative Global Development
This online expert panel will examine how innovative private sector engagement can help make a tangible difference in the lives of the world's most vulnerable.
Further information is provided at [CSIS].
21 July 2021 @ 3:00 p.m. (GMT+2), Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Germany
Contested Secularism in Bangladesh
Considering that there are different interpretations of secularism, this event tries to create a classification of the different models and examines in greater depth how secularism is understood in Bangladesh.
For more information, please visit [MPIL].
21 July 2021 @ 4:00 p.m. (GMT-7), Asia Society, United States
Executive Roundtable on The Myanmar Conflict and Crisis
This roundtable discussion invites former US Ambassador to Myanmar Scot Marciel to assess the Myanmar’s current challenges, security issues, the ongoing humanitarian crisis, economic reform, bilateral ties, and governance challenges that have impeded its development.
If you are interested in this event, please visit [Asia Society] for more information.
22 July 2021 @ 3:00 p.m. (GMT+10), Asa Society, Australia
Southeast Asia and COVID-19 Update
As the global pandemic has posed an enormous threat to Southeast Asia’s economic situation, experts ask: What is the outlook for a return to economic recovery? Can Southeast Asia once again contain the pandemic, or could we see infection rates spiral out of control? How are the politics of the pandemic playing out in the region?
Please visit [Asia Society] for more information and mandatory registration.
Recent book releases
Rosemary Foot, China, the UN, and Human Protection: Beliefs, Power, Image, Oxford University Press, 336 pages, May 28, 2021, briefly reviewed in [Foreign Affairs].
Margaret MacMillan, War: How Conflict Shaped Us, Random House, 336 pages, October 6, 2020, with a review in [The Guardian].
Richard Lapper, Beef, bible and bullets: Brazil in the age of Bolsonaro, Manchester University Press, 304 pages, June 25, 2021, reviewed in [Financial Review].
Calls
The International Journal of Transitional Justice invites paper submissions for its 2023 Special Issue “Transitional Justice and Nature: a curious silence?”. Closing date for submission is June 1, 2022. [For more information, see [OUP].
The International Institute of Social History is seeking paper proposals for the 14th European Social Science History Conference, to be held on April 12-15, 2023. Deadline for submissions is April 15, 2022. Visit [ISSH] for further details.
International Political Science Review invites to submit manuscripts for its 2023 Special Issue. Closing date for submission is September 30, 2021. If you are interested, you can find out more at [SAGE].
The Swiss Political Science Association invites paper submissions for its annual congress in 2022, scheduled for February 3-4, 2022, in Lausanne, Switzerland. Deadline for submissions is September 25, 2021. For more details, see [SVPW].
Jobs & positions
The International Monetary Fund is hiring an Administrative/Senior Administrative Assistant for its Monetary and Capital Markets Department. For more details, see [IMF].
The International Labour Organization is recruiting an Economist for its Research Department. Application deadline is August 9, 2021. Visit [ILO] to learn more about the vacancy.
The International Organization for Migration is offering the position of a Senior Program Manager for its Immigration and Border Management Division to be based in Anuja, Nigeria. Closing date for applications is July 22, 2021. Find more about the job offer at [IOM].
The Asian Development Bank is seeking an Environmental Economist for its Environment, Natural Resources & Agriculture Division. Candidates can submit applications until July 23, 2021. For further details, see [ADB].
The World Bank is hiring a Senior Social Development Specialist to be based in Washington, DC to lead regional and country-focused analytical and advisory activities. Deadline for applications is July 30, 2021. More information is provided at [World Bank Group].
The European Commission’s European Climate, Environment and Infrastructure Executive Agency is recruiting a Project Management Coordinator for the energy research unit of the Agency’s Green Research and Innovation Department. Closing date for applications is July 23, 2021. Visit [EPSO] for more information.
Interpol is offering the position of a Chief Information Security Officer to be based in Lyon, France. Application deadline is August 31, 2021. More details are available at [Interpol].
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is hiring a Policy Analyst for its Global Relations Secretariat. Candidates can submit applications until August 21, 2021. Find out more at [OECD].
The African Union is seeking applications for the position of the Head of its Governance and Human Rights Division. Applications are accepted on a rolling basis. If you are interested, you can find further details at [AU].
The United States Institute of Peace is hiring a Senior Expert of its South Asia Programs, responsible for leading substantive research, analysis, thought leadership, and organizing activities on conflict dynamics and national security priorities in South Asia focused particularly on India. Applications are accepted on a rolling basis. Visit [USIP] to learn more about the vacancy.
We would greatly appreciate your feedback! Please send any feedback you have regarding this newsletter to: info@cpg-online.de
Also, don't forget to Like CPG on Facebook, and browse our website for other updates and news!
