Grasp the pattern, read the trend

Asia in Review

No. 35, September/2020, 1

Brought to you by CPG

Dear Readers,

Welcome to this week’s AiR with an expanded ‘Announcement’ section featuring in addition to upcoming events some recommendations on recent books and articles, topic related submission calls for conferences and publications and advertised vacancies and positions. 

We wish you an informative read and a good day! 

Special greetings are extended to readers in Swaziland, Uzbekistan and Vietnam who celebrate their respective Independence Day this week. 

With best regards,

Henning Glaser

Director, German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG)

Webpage: www.cpg-online.de, Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CPGTU

Main Sections

• Law and Politics in East Asia

• Law and Politics in South Asia

• Law and Politics in Southeast Asia

• International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia

• Announcements

Law and Politics in East Asia 

China: Beijing tightens grip on Tibet and Inner Mongolia

(dql) Indicating fresh efforts of the central government to tighten its grip on Tibet, President Xi Jinping, speaking at a work meeting of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee last week, stressed the need for a new strategy to govern Tibet and deepen the promotion of coordinated economic, political, cultural, social and ecological advancement there. To this purpose, he called for the establishment of a "impregnable fortress" to maintain stability in Tibet and protect national unity, underpinned by political and ideological education in Tibet’s schools which "plants the seeds of loving China in the depths of the hearts of the young people," adding that “Tibet’s traditional Buddhism needed to be sinicized.” [Xinhua, in Chinese]

For the geostrategic importance of Tibet for China (and for India) see [AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3].

Meanwhile, in a rare move ethnic Mongolians in northern China have staged rallies to protest against new rules to reduce teaching in the Mongolian language in favor of Chinese in three subjects – including  politics, history, and language and literature – before completely switching to Chinese. [BBC]

The measure deepens fears that Beijing is gearing up its efforts to assimilate the Mongolian minority in China, mirroring developments in Xinjiang and Tibet.

In a related development, Bainu, the only Mongolian-language social media site in China, was shut down last week by Chinese authorities. [Vice]

China: Using high tech to control legal enforcement

(dql) The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, China’s agency overseeing, all legal enforcement authorities, announced plans to use high tech to monitor and supervise the country’s police officers and judges, including big data for an automated system which identifies procedural violations in investigations, trials and enforcement work.

While the Commission said that the plan aims at tackling lax enforcement of the rules, injustices and corruption to strengthen the security system, the announcement comes shortly after launch of an “education and rectification” campaign to purge corrupt cadres in legal enforcement agencies, adding to concerns over a further expansion of China’s controversial surveillance system. [South China Morning Post] [AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4]

China: Hongkongers fleeing for Taiwan on boat captured by Chinese coastguard

(dql) China’s coastguard last week arrested a dozen people fleeing on a speedboat Hong Kong for Taiwan. Among them was an activist arrested earlier this month over suspicion of collusion with foreign forces to endanger national security, a crime under the contentious National Security Law for Hong Kong imposed by Beijing on 30 June. [Channel News Asia] 

Japan: Prime Minister Abe resigns

(dql) Citing health reasons, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe last Friday announced to step down as Prime Minister, after close to eight years in this post, making him the country’s longest serving head of government. 

Abe’s resignation, which had been speculated after two hospital visits within a week, comes one year ahead of the official end of the term and leaves policies he had vowed to complete during his term – such as the amendment to Art. 9 of the constitution and the coronavirus pandemic – to his successor. Potential candidates to succeed him include Fumio Kishida, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party policy chief and a former foreign minister; chief Cabinet secretary Yoshihide Suga, in office since 2012, the year Abe returned to power; and Shigeru Ishiba, a former defense minister and vocal critic of Abe on a number of policy issues. Analysts believe the succession will be a challenge to intra-party unity, hitherto secured by Abe’s leadership, as rival factions will file and push their own candidates. [BBC] [Kyodo News] [Aljazeera] [CNBC]

For other factors than health problems, playing a role in Abe’s resignation, see Aurelia George Mulgan in [East Asia Forum] who in particular points to an unprecedented rapid fall in popularity over his coronavirus policy and the perception of Abe as an indecisive lame duck-leader among the population. 

South Korea: Ruling party has a new leader, main opposition party a new name

(dql) Lawmaker Lee Nak-yon was elected the new chairman of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) after securing a landslide victory against two other contenders at the virtual party convention past weekend. Lee, who is also tipped to become the party’s candidate for the next presidential election in 2022, is a four-term legislator, and was Prime Minister from May 2017-January 2020 as well as Governor of South Jeolla Province from 2014-2017. Before entering politics, Lee, a law graduate, had worked as journalist. [Korea Times] [Korea Herald]

Meanwhile, South Korea’s main opposition United Future Party’s leadership decided to give the party the new name “People’s Power” as part of a broader effort to re-define and re-organize the party after the devastating results in the legislative election in April in which the party together with its sister party Future Korea Party won only 103 seats while the DPK and its sister party Platform Party garnered 180 of the 300 chamber seats. [Yonhap] [AiR No. 16, April/2020, 3] 

Taiwan: Constitutional Court rules KMT asset investigation law constitutional

(dql) Responding to a constitutional interpretation request by the Taipei High Administrative Court, Taiwan's Constitutional Court last week ruled that the Act on Governing the Settlement of Ill-gotten Properties by Political Parties and Their Affiliate Organizations are constitutional on the grounds of a “need to adequately limit a political party's finances for the sake of equal opportunities for different political parties.”

Part of transition justice legislations under President Tsai Ing-wen who assumed office in 2016 and was re-elected this January, the Act was passed by the Taiwanese parliament in 2016 with the majority votes of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and established the Ill-gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee, tasked with investigating and returning illegally obtained assets of political parties and their affiliated organizations during the martial law period in Taiwan (1949-1987). As the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) was the dominant party in that period and once the world’s wealthiest political party with assets worth over 3.4 billion USD, it was the main target of the Act under which almost 50 law suits have been filed. The KMT challenged the constitutionality of the Act before lower courts and hoped for a favorable ruling of the Constitutional Court. 

In response the ruling last week, the party denounced the law as illegitimate and unconstitutional, arguing that the issue had already been settled by courts during the presidency of Chen Shui-bian of the DPP from 2000 to 2008 when KMT assets had already been thoroughly investigated and prosecuted. [Taiwan News] [Focus Taiwan][Taipei Times]

Law and Politics in South Asia 

India: Amnesty International accuses Delhi police of serious human rights violations

(ls) Amnesty International has accused the police in New Delhi of committing serious human rights violations during riots in February this year. The report has gathered evidence of incidents of torture and excessive violence and called for an investigation by the Ministry of Home Affairs. What had started as peaceful protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which demonstrators criticized for its alleged discriminatory content, led to communal violence, causing the death of 53 people and injuring about 500. [The Wire] [Amnesty International]

India: Former President Pranab Mukherjee dies at 84

(ls) Pranab Mukherjee, who was the President of India from 2012 to 2017, has passed away at the age of 84. Mukherjee was a senior leader in the Indian National Congress party and occupied several ministerial portfolios, ranging from commerce and finance to defense and foreign affairs, prior to becoming President. He kept a close relationship with the Gandhi family though he was sidelined for the office of Prime Minister after Indira Gandhi’s death, which led Mukherjee to form his own party for a short period. Though the Indian presidential office is largely consisting of ceremonial duties, he was widely respected for his ability to build consensus on contentious issues. He was often referred to as the indispensable man of India’s coalition-era politics, advocating for pluralism and tolerance. [New York Times] [New Indian Express]

In neighboring Bangladesh, Mukherjee was respected for his support during the country’s struggle for independence from Pakistan in 1971. His wife was born and raised in Bangladesh. For his role as a friend of Bangladesh during the liberation war, he received the Bangladesh Liberation War Honour in 2013. [BDNews24]

India: Symbolic fine for prominent Supreme Court critic

(ls) India’s Supreme Court has imposed a symbolic fine of one rupee on Prashant Bhushan, the prominent lawyer, who had been found guilty of criminal contempt for Twitter posts in which he had criticized senior judges. The case sparked a debate about free speech in India and the judiciary’s openness to criticism. Bhushan was supported by lawyers and members of the general public. [Reuters] [AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4]

Pakistan: FATF-mandated Anti-Money Laundering Bill rejected in Senate

(ls) Pakistan’s Senate, the upper house of parliament where the opposition enjoys a majority, last week rejected the Anti-Money Laundering (Second Amendment) Bill and the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) Waqf Properties Bill, both of which were required by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as a prerequisite to lift Pakistan’s status in order to facilitate international financial transactions. The rejection in the Senate came apparently as a response to what was perceived as insulting remarks of the Leader of the House, where the bills had been approved, against the opposition. Moreover, the government apparently refused to include changes proposed by the opposition into the bill. The government is under pressure also from the military to complete all parliamentary processes involving the FATF’s requirements before the next FATF hearing. Another attempt to pass the laws is likely to be taken this week. [Dawn] [The Diplomat]

Bhutan: Temporary suspension of tobacco sales ban

(ls) Bhutan has temporarily lifted its domestic ban on tobacco sales. The decision aims to curb infections that tobacco smugglers may bring across the southern border with India, where the number of Covid-19 cases have sharply increased in recent weeks. Bhutan’s Tobacco Control Act bans the sale, cultivation, distribution and promotion of tobacco products but does allow limited imports for personal consumption. [Nikkei Asian Review]

Law and Politics in Southeast Asia 

Indonesia: Hacking attacks on media outlets critical of government’s coronavirus response

(lm) A spate of computer hacking attacks on Indonesian media critical of the government's response to the coronavirus has raised concerns over press freedom, the country's leading journalists' association said on Monday. At least four media organizations have been targeted in an “unprecedented” series of digital attacks recently, which could be aimed at "restricting critical reporting and suppressing media freedom" the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) said in a statement. [The Straits Times]

On August 25, the website of major media outlet Tempo was replaced with a black screen with the word "hoax" in bold red font. The same day seven articles, including two critical of the Indonesian intelligence agency’s role in the pandemic response, were removed from the website of tirto.id. Epidemiologist and vocal critic Pandu Riono had his Twitter account hacked after criticizing a government-university research collaboration that he said fell below international standards. [Voice of America]

While it was not clear who was behind the attacks, the Communications and Information Ministry fenced off the allegations that it was behind the digital attacks, saying that a potential third party may intend to pit the government against the public. [The Jakarta Post]

Malaysia: Perikatan Nasional calls off launch in Sabah state

(lm) Less than a month before state-wide elections in the federal state of Sabah, Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin called off on Saturday the highly anticipated launch of his Perikatan Nasional (PN) in Malaysia's easternmost state after the failure to sign-up several Sabah-based parties. [The Straits Times] [Malaysia Chronicle]

Parties that had hitherto officially signed up to PN include Parti Solidariti Tanah Airku (STAR) and Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS). The Malaysian Indian Congress' (MIC) – a Barisan Nasional (BN) component - backtracked on Friday citing the United Malays National Organization’s (UMNO) decision to not join PN. [Free Malaysia Today 1] [Free Malaysia Today 2] [AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4]

The coalition aims to kick-start a new political era by fielding candidates under its multi-ethnic and relatively less Bumiputera (indigenous peoples of Malaysia)-centric banner. Despite this seemingly progressive move, Prime Minister Yassin has hitherto struggled to translate inter-party bonds into a viable electoral arrangement. Unable to assimilate into a genuine cooperative arrangement, many parties find themselves residing within the coalition but asserting independent agendas [see AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4]. [Free Malaysia Today]

This has led to the political scene in Malaysia comprising multiple overlapping coalitions and alliances—PN and UMNO have overlapping parties but still jockeying for primacy, with experts saying that UMNO and PAS are happy to prop up Mr. Muhyiddin for now, while watching for an opportunity to govern on their own. [South China Morning Post]

Meanwhile, in its first test on Saturday, a candidate backed by Perjuang Tanah Air, the new party of former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohanmad, suffered a heavy defeat against an UMNO candidate in a by-election for the state assembly seat of Slim in Perak. [BenarNews]

Malaysia: Anti-graft agency to look into 101 projects under previous administration

(lm) The Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) will look into the allegations that 101 projects worth RM6.61 billion ($1.59 billion) were allegedly awarded through direct negotiations during Pakatan Harapan's (PH) administration. Barisan Nasional (BN) component parties United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) had filed reports against former Finance Minister Lim Guan Eng and asked the anti-graft agency to investigate whether the projects were awarded according to the law. [The Straits Times]

Responding to the allegations, Mr. Lim who is Democratic Action Party secretary-general, issued a challenge on Tuesday to current Finance Minister Seri Zafrul to reveal all projects given done via direct tender during the Barisan, Pakatan and Perikatan Nasional administrations. [Free Malaysia Today]

Philippines: President Duterte rejects call to establish a ‘revolutionary government’ 

(lm) Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte last week rejected a call from a group of his supporters to overturn the constitution and install a “revolutionary government” until the end of his term in 2022. Mr. Duterte – who has on two previous occasions threatened to declare such a government – said on Tuesday that while “many people” were calling on him to do so, he would not because doing so was “not my job”. [South China Morning Post] [Bloomberg]

The announcement comes at a time when rumors about President Duterte’s health have swirled. Recently, reports had claimed he had been airlifted to a medical facility in Singapore purportedly to seek emergency treatment. The President has denied the rumors but has also refused to reveal his medical records or allow his official physician to talk about his health. [The Diplomat]

Singapore: Authorities tighten regulations on employing foreign professionals

(lm) In light of slacker labor market conditions owing to COVID-19, authorities in Singapore seek to assuage domestic political concerns over soaring unemployment in the Asian financial center. Last week, the government tightened criteria for hiring foreign professionals by lifting the minimum qualifying salaries for Employment Pass (EP) holders by 15 per cent to S$4,500 ($3,293) a month and double that for more experienced candidates aged in their forties. In addition, the government for the first time also introduced a sector-specific higher qualifying salary of at least S$5,000 a month for those working in finance. For mid-skilled foreigners on S Passes, the qualifying salary will be raised from $2,400 to $2,500, with the salary criteria for older and more experienced S Pass holders raised accordingly. [Financial Times]

The new regulations come as global companies are considering Singapore as their new regional base, after Beijing introduced national security legislation for Hong Kong. Still, Trade and Industry Minister Chan Chun Sing said the new rules won’t affect Singapore’s status as an “open and connected” business hub. [The Straits Times 1] [South China Morning Post]

Thailand: Cabinet approves fifth one-month extension of state of emergency

(lm) Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha's Cabinet approved another one-month extension of the state of emergency through September 30 to control the COVID-19 outbreak as the country seeks to prolong its streak of going three months without a local transmission. The fifth extension since the initial order in March [see AiR No. 12, March/2020, 4], the extension was justified to stave off a potential second wave of coronavirus infections. The Cabinet also approved a budget of one billion baht (S$43 million) to support production of a vaccine. [Bangkok Post] [The Straits Times]

Thailand: Finance Minister resigns less than a month after his nomination

(lm) Citing health reasons, recently appointed Finance Minister Predee Daochai reportedly resigned from his position on Tuesday, with Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha yet to accept the resignation. [Khaosod English] [The Straits Times]

Previously the co-president of Thailand`s Kasikornbank and chairman of the Thai Bankers’ Association, Mr. Daochai took over the finance portfolio just last month, following a major shake-up in the cabinet involving the resignation of six ministers. [see AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3]

Thailand: Police continue to arrest student leaders over anti-government protest

(lm) On Tuesday, police arrested the president of the Student Union of Thailand, expanding a continued crackdown against political activists who helped organize the anti-government protest in July. As pressure builds against the government, two other protest leaders from the Free Youth Group had been arrested and charged with breaching the emergency decree last week. [Bangkok Post 1] [Bangkok Post 2]

Since July, police have arrested more than a dozen people, including student leaders, rappers and activists, all of which have been released on bail [see AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4] [AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2]. In light of the ongoing crackdown, Human Rights Watch in a statement called on the Thai government “to immediately drop all charges and unconditionally release pro-democracy activists arbitrarily detained for participating in peaceful rallies”. [Human Rights Watch]

Thailand: Authorities vow no relent in their crackdown on social media content deemed illegal

(lm) Thai authorities have vowed to restrict more social media content deemed illegal and are seeking court removal orders relating to content on more than 1,000 more URLs, Minister of Digital Economy and Society Puttipong Punnakanta. After Facebook announced last week it would take legal action over the censorship of a group containing critical remarks about the royal institution [see AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4], Mr. Punnakanta further denied that the page had been removed for political reasons, saying that the ministry “must protect Thailand`s cyber sovereignty” and the law. [South China Morning Post]

Thailand: Royalist rally to support monarchy, PM warns of “national collapse”

(lm) About 1,000 people gathered in a Bangkok sports arena on Sunday, swearing to defend Thailand's royal institution from a student-led mass movement that they believe is a threat to the monarchy`s existence. The fourth group of conservative pro-royalists set up to counter the pro-democracy rallies, "Thai Pakdee" (Loyal Thai) also lodged a letter with the Japanese embassy in Bangkok to demand the extradition of self-exiled Thai political activist Pavin Chachavalpongpunwhose popular FB page ‘Royalist Marketplace’ had just be taken down in Thailand. Further, the group has issued a manifesto in which it pledges to oppose any changes to the 2017 Thai constitution and calls for strict enforcement of existing laws, including the prosecution of individuals who offend the royal institution or members of the royal family. [The Thaiger 1] [NHK World] [Bangkok Post 1] [The Straits Times]

On Monday, a small group of people delivered a letter to the US embassy in Bangkok in which they condemned Human Rights Watch for allegedly meddling with Thai politics. The group was led by Buddha Issara, former key leader of the People’s Committee for Absolute Democracy With the King As Head of State (PCAD) movement which precipitated the 2014 coup d’état. [Khaosod English]

Meanwhile, student leaders from the Free Youth Group on Wednesday submitted their 10-point manifesto on reforming the monarchy to the House Committee on Political Development, Mass Communications and Public Participation for consideration - a move that does not guarantee discussion among MPs but symbolizes the group’s unprecedented resolve. Emerging from a cabinet meeting the same day, Premier Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha accused anti-government protesters of dividing the country, and warned of nothing less than national “collapse” if the pro-democracy rallies kept rattling the country. [The Thaiger 2] [Japan Times] [Bangkok Post 2]

Thailand: Charter amendment

(lm) On Monday, the House Committee on Constitutional Amendment handed in its report to House Speaker Chuan Leekpai. A comprehensive set of proposals aimed at facilitating the transition to a new set of constitutional rules, the report touches on several key areas, including the future role of the senate and changes to the electoral system. Among the suggestions put forward, that is, is the return to the election system previously in place under the 1997 constitution to allow for an easier calculation of list MPs. The system also makes it mandatory for the prime minister to be an MP. Further, the panel found that the role of the coup-appointed Senate is conflicting; while it is supposed to be politically impartial, it is empowered to join MPs in voting for a prime minister. [Bangkok Post 1]

Meanwhile, parties in the ruling coalition government will submit a motion that seeks to amend the constitution to House Speaker Chuan Leekpai on Tuesday, chief government whip Wirach Ratanasate said on Sunday. The motion will center around amending Section 256 of the constitution, leaving chapters 1 and 2, which contain general principles and sections associated with the monarchy, untouched. Section 256 states that at least one-third (84) of the 250 senators has to approve constitutional amendments in two of three readings, and further stipulates that a national referendum is required if a would-be amendment involves the charter amendment process, the chapters on general principles and the monarchy. Members of parliament will meet on September 23 and 24 to consider the motion at its first reading. [Bangkok Post 2]

While all six opposition parties have long agreed that the 2017 constitution has to be amended, the bloc`s two major parties – Pheu Thai Party and Move Forward Party - more recently have developed diametrically opposed stances toward charter amendment pertaining to the role of the senate. Last week, chief opposition whip and Pheu Thai lawmaker Sutin Klungsang dismissed media reports that his party was at odds with the Move Forward Party, over diverging positions on constitutional amendments. [Khaosod English] [Bangkok Post 3]

On Wednesday, the Move Forward Party (MVP) announced to withdraw its support for an opposition-sponsored motion that seeks to revise only Section 256 of the constitution, which had been submitted to the House Speaker two weeks ago. Party secretary-general Chaithawat Tulathon said the party would vote for the motion in the first reading, but would press for changes to the upper house during the second stage reading. Reasoning that the current constitution would still allow the 250 senators to join House lawmakers in voting on another prime minister, in the event of snap elections, the Move Forward Party seeks to limit or even shut down the role of the Senate once the charter amendment motion goes before the parliament. Because a minimum of 98 votes is required to submit an amendment bill in parliament, the Move Forward party, with its 54 lawmakers, relies on Pheu Thai (154 seats) to support the bill. [Bangkok Post 4] 

After Pheu Thai had voted last week not to seek immediate removal of the junta-appointed senate, the party eased its stance a little on Saturday, as opposition parties except Pheu Thai had in the meantime agreed to support the Move Forward Party’s constitutional amendment bill to “switch off” 250 senators before proceeding with a charter rewrite. Pheu Thai had defended its initial decision to focus on amending Section 256 of the constitution as a “realistic” path toward the drafting of a new charter, leaving the future role of the Senate untouched. It is hoping that its version of the bill would win senators’ support and eventually lead to the setup of a constitution drafting council, which may choose to get rid of appointed senators eventually.

Both parties also disagree on the crucial chapters 1 and 2 of the constitution. In order to increase its chance of success, Pheu Thai wants to insert a clause to the amendments that would forbid any changes to these chapters. Move Forward lawmakers, in contrast, argue the Constitution Drafting Assembly should have the authority to make changes to every chapter of the current constitution, including chapters 1 and 2. [The Thaiger 2]

Chapters 1 and 2 of the Constitution contain, however, those principles that are defining the long-established identity of (hegemonic) Thai constitutionalism and the central role of the monarchy within. The diverging approach of both opposition parties regarding the amendment therefore reflects a major policy difference. 

Thailand: Crucial reshuffle in the armed forces and police

(lm) The annual armed forces reshuffle changed the balance of power within the armed forces and featured some surprises with a sudden change concerning Air Force command as the latest, when the hitherto-designated successor to still incumbent air force chief ACM Maanat Wongwat was seemingly sidelined – just days before the Defense Council was scheduled to finalize the promotion of military commanders. [Bangkok Post 1]

Earlier this month, it was reported that Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Maanat had nominated U.S.-trained officer ACM Airbull Suttiwan to succeed him. Although ACM Airbull had strong backing including the approval by Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha, who concurrently serves as Defense Minister, he was not the most senior officer in line. After a former air force chief reportedly had expressed his disapproval over the nomination of a “dark horse” with the Prime Minister, PM Prayut asked ACM Maanat to propose a new candidate. At current three top officers – all ranked ACM – are named as possible candidates so far: assistant air force chief ACM Tharin Punnasri, chief of general staff for the air force chief ACM Saritpong Wattanawarangkul and air force chief-of-staff, ACM Sutthipun Taithong. [Bangkok Post 1] [Nikkei Asian Review]

Concerning the most important command, those of the army chief, incumbent army commander Gen. Apirat Kongsompong has nominated assistant army chief Gen. Narongphan Jitkaewthae to succeed him. Second in line to succeed Gen. Narongphan in 2024 is now Lt Gen Charoenchai Hinthao. Both General Narongphan and LTG Charoenchai belong to the Wongthewan (1st Infantry Division Kings Guard), a Bangkok-based military faction with a rich army pedigree elite and are also linked to the elite Royal Command Guard, which is under direct command of the King.

Another key officer who serves like LTG Charoenchai in the special task force under Royal Command Guard, Maj Gen Songwit Noonpakdee, deputy chief of the 1st Army who was previously a candidate for the 1st Army commander position, will reportedly become deputy army chief of staff instead. [Bangkok Post 2] [Nikkei Asian Review]

Besides, the nomination of Gen Chalermpol Srisawat, currently the armed forces chief of staff, as the new supreme commander, the government on Friday already approved the appointment of Pol. Gen. Suwat “Big Pud” Chaengyodsuk as the next national police chief. Currently the deputy police commissioner, Pol. Gen. Suwat, formerly served as commander of the Special Service Division – a police commando unit tasked with providing security to members of the royal family and carrying out other tasks assigned by King Maha Vajiralongkorn. [Khaosod English 1] 

The force which comprises 1,600 officers, all handpicked based on their “attitude and loyalty [to the monarchy]” and having trained in parachuting, assault tactics and VIP protection has been renamed and integrated in the Royal Command Guard as Ratchawallop Police Retainers, King’s Guards 904. [Khaosod English 2] [Khaosod English 3]

With exception of the surprising change regarding the designated air force commander, the much more important promotions in the army and the police are signs of a rising presence of officers said to be particularly close to the King – and members of his and a rather weakening power base of the Queen’s Guard, the army faction traditionally competing with the King’s Guard for influence. 

While the King himself has once served in the King’s Guard during his military career as a young crown prince, PM Prayuth, Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, and Interior Minister Anupong Paochinda, - all former army commanders who staged the 2016 coup -, have been members of the Queen’s Guard. 

In this light, it is significant that PM Prayuth initially had favored Gen. Natthapon Nakpanich, the deputy army chief, to become the next army commander and Gen. Apirat's successor. Recently, PM Prayuth showed his trust in Gen. Natthapon once more when he placed him on a government committee to contain the coronavirus pandemic. The change to Gen. Narongphan, an officer said to be trusted by the King and Gen. Apirat, might thus be seen as a sign of a declining influence the Prime Minister and former army commander and his allies in the cabinet wield over the army. [Nikkei Asian Review]

Significant on the other hand is also the rising heft of officers aligned to the Royal Command Guard which does not form a part of the regular armed forces or police chain of command within the regular security apparatus. After the King had surprised observers by realigning key army units stationed in the capital under his personal command under the Royal Command Guard, - namely the 11th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Infantry Regiment -, both critical to stage a coup, army and police will now become dominated by officers aligned with this very Royal Command Guard. The well-trained and equipped force comprises around 7,000 troops and could double in the months ahead. [Nikkei Asian Review]

International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia

China continues military muscle flexing

(dql) In a show of force, China has kicked off two sets of military exercises off the country’s east coast in the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Sea. They are part of a series of military war games since the end of July, including at least nine drills, with some involving live rounds, in the South China Sea and East China. [Republic World]

China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier CNS Shandong has begun its first sea trials, while the KJ-600 carrier based airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft performed its first flight, making the country the only one besides the USA to have successfully developed such a platform. [Eurasian Times] [Military Watch Magazine]

China’s first home-grown Type 075 amphibious assault ship, meanwhile, completed its 18-day first-phase navigational trial. The Type 075 would enable the Chinese navy to launch various types of helicopter attacks on naval vessels, enemy ground forces, submarines and to deploy landing craft and troops, in addition to house command and control operations. The warship is expected to join the Chinese navy’s marines next year. [Navy Recognition]

China und USA resume talks of Phase 1 trade deal amid further US sanctions against Chinese companies

(dql) Amid high running tensions over a wide range of issues – including threats of bans on Chinese tech companies, Hong Kong, the South China Sea, Taiwan – China and the USA have resumed talks about the Phase 1 trade agreement which was concluded in January. Both sides confirmed to have made progress and to be committed to the deal. Issues discussed during the talks covered intellectual property rights, impediments to American companies in financial services and agriculture, and forced technology transfer. [BBC]

Meanwhile, Washington imposed sanctions against two dozen Chinese companies and several people banning them from purchasing technology and other products shipped from the U.S. The affected are believed by Washington to be involved in building and militarizing disputed artificial islands in the South China Sea. Among the sanctioned state-owned firms are construction giant China Communications Construction Co., a subsidiary of the China Shipbuilding Group, and a telecommunications company. [VoA]

Despite high running trade and economic tensions between China and the USA and strong decoupling rhetoric on US side, experts view a separation of the world’s two largest economies as unrealistic. Last week, the former president of the International Monetary Fund and the head of the Center for China and Globalization, a leading Chinese think tank, expressed in separate statements their doubts about a decoupling of the economies, citing the close economic ties between the two countries, and arguing that the recent tough rhetoric of US President Trump is much owed to the upcoming presidential election in the USA. [Forbes] [Independent]

For an analysis of China’s grand strategy and its component strategies on the national level in  diplomacy, economics, science and technology, and military affairs, how they will develop over the next decades and what they mean for the Sino-US competition – depending on how successfully China will implement these strategies – see the study at [Rand Corporation].

Canada cancels Covid-19 vaccine development agreement with Chinese vaccine candidate 

(dql) Past weekend, the Canadian government announced that it cancelled its multi-million-dollar development deal with China’s leading vaccine candidate, citing delayed shipment of drugs as reason. While China confirmed the delay, it is speculated whether Ottawa’s move is a snup to China over the arrest of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig who are charged with spying. Canada views their arrest as retaliatory move of Beijing in response to the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer, on a U.S. extradition warrant in December 2018. Since then, Sino-Canadian relations have been increasingly strained, reflected also by Canada’s recent suspension of its extradition treaty with Hong Kong following Beijing’s imposition of the national security law for the former British colony. [Republic World]

In a related development, Canadian Foreign Minister Francois-Philippe Champagne pressed his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi to release the two Canadians citizens in a meeting in Rome during the Chinese Foreign Minister’s visit to Italy last week. Wang in return accused Canada on an “unprovoked detention of Chinese citizens” and demanded that Ottawa “take[s] action as soon as possible to remove impediments to the further development of China-Canada ties." [Reuters]

China-Australia relations worsen further

(dql) Further worsening already strained relations between China and Australia over Canberra’s call for an investigation into the origins of the coronavirus pandemic, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce announced that it has launched an anti-subsidy investigation of some wine imports from Australia, in response to a complaint filed by the China Wine Industry Association. 

Australia is the biggest exporter of wine to China, with more than 800 million USD in the most recent financial year, which ended September 2019. [CNN]

In a separate development, a Chinese-born Australian TV host at a state-run English news channel has been detained in Beijing, with the reason for her detention remaining undisclosed so far. [ABC]  

China-Czech Republic relations strained over Taiwan

(dql) A Czech delegation of 90 business leaders, university presidents, representatives of civic organizations and news media led by the president of the Senate Milos Vystrcil visited Taiwan last week. In a highly provocative move towards China, Vystrcil in his speech at Taiwan’s parliament said: “I am a Taiwanese.”

China responded fiercely, calling the visit “an unendurable provocation for which there will be retribution.” [Deutsche Welle] [Reuters]  

The visit of the Czech delegation comes shortly after the White House sent US Health Secretary Alex Azhar to Taipei in August for the highest level meetings between the two administrations in more than four decades. [AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2]

Cross-strait tensions intensify as Chinese war game commences

(ef) With the Chinese navy mobilizing for its war games in the South China Sea, the Taiwanese marine corps were sent to strategic spots in the South China Sea and the Taiwanese air force began to load Harpoon anti-ship missiles on some of its F-16 fighters. The war games are supposed to take place between the Chinese mainland on the north and the Taiwanese island groups, Pratas and Penghu, in the south and northeast. Taiwanese preparations are perceived as a protective measure against the possibility of the war game turning into an actual invasion. In that event, the F-16 fighters would be the first line of defense. Especially Pratas is perceived as a weak spot; thus, Taiwan sent 200 of its toughest marines to permanently strengthen Pratas’ force. [Forbes]

Meanwhile, a maintenance hub for F-16 fighters was unveiled last week, which enables Taiwan to self-reliantly maintain its air force. The Taiwanese air force currently holds the largest F-16 fleet in Asia, with more than 200 jets. [Reuters] [New York Times ($)]

The Beijing's war games take place in times of high cross-strait tensions underlined also by the recent launching of two Chinese missiles in the South China Sea following the entry of a US spy plane in a no-fly-zone over Chinese live-fire military drills. In addition to the spy plane entering a no-fly-zone, a picture of a US Air Force tanker refueling a Taiwanese F-16 fighter jet was posted on Thursday, showcasing the strengthened military cooperation between the US and Taiwan. [CNN] [CNBC][Focus Taiwan]

Taiwan-USA relations deepen

(dql/ef) Several moves made by the USA and Taiwan in this and last week signal a continuation of warming of relations between the two countries. 

On Monday this week, Washington announced a new annual senior-level economic dialogue with Taiwan to be held annually on a range of issues covering “reorienting technology and medical product supply chains; enhancing investment screening and intellectual property rights protection; and expanding infrastructure and energy sector collaboration." [The Standard]

Washington’s move comes shortly after President Tsai Ing-wen last week declared that Taiwan will ease its zero-tolerance policy toward a feed additive which is banned in Taiwan due to concerns over its safety to both animals and humans, but found in pork and beef imported from the USA. [Focus Taiwan 1]

In another move of symbolic nature and weight, the USA released two declassified cables from nearly 40 years ago with both stating US security assurances to Taiwan. [Focus Taiwan 2] The release of the cables comes shortly after Taiwan finalized a 10-year, 62 billion USD deal with US aircraft manufacturer Lockheed Martin last Friday to purchase 66 new-generation F-16 fighter jets last month. [AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3]

Earlier last week, the USA and Taiwan vowed in a joint declaration to promote awareness about the risks and opportunities of 5G networks. Both nations promised to ensure that relevant networks and services are free from “unauthorized access and interference”. The pledge comes amid Washington’s global campaign against Chinese technology companies with banning Huawei from accessing national 5G networks as one of its core elements. [Taiwan News] [Nikkei Asian Review]

As consequence of the Trump administration’s blacklisting of Huawei [AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3], the company’s domestic rival Xiaomi has overtaken it in its core business segment of smartphones in sales in Europe for the first time in the second quarter this year. Xiaomi’s revenues increased 65% year-over-year as Huawei shrunk 17%, making Xiaomi move up to third place behind Samsung and Apple, while Huawei dropped to fourth. Analysts see prospects for Huawei’s smartphones under Washington’s sanctions as “hopeless”, forcing the company to diversity its product offers and take efforts to strengthen its nascent cloud business. [Forbes] [Financial Times]

For insights into why China has yet not retaliated with its own blacklist despite an announcement of such a list more than a year ago, but is “engaged in an aggressive campaign to sweet-talk big American firms to stay in China,” see Kenneth Rapoza at [Forbes].

Taiwan-Australia relations: President Tsai calls for free trade agreement

(ef) After proposing a free trade agreement with the US last week [AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4], President Tsai Ing-wen called on Australia to back the inclusion of Taiwan in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and to start negotiations on a Taiwanese-Australian free trade agreement. Although Australian exports amount to AUS$ 10 billion annually, Australia has – thus far – consistently declined negotiations on a free trade agreement. [The Sydney Morning Herald]

Inter-Korean relations: North-Korea release pictures to invalidate claims Kim Jong-un being in coma

(dql) Amid claims of a former South Korean diplomat that North Korea leader Kim Jong-un has been in coma since April and reports of South Korean Intelligence that his sister has been given power to partially state affairs after being promoted to the de-facto deputy leader, Pyongyang released images showing him at a meeting of politburo of the Workers Party, discussing the situation of coronavirus pandemic in the country. [Daily Mail] [CNN]

Seoul claims come at a time when the inter-Korean peace progress has seen setbacks in the past month an US-North Korean denuclearization talks have been halted. 

For an analysis of  decision-making with regards to nuclear doctrine in North Korea, see [Rand Corporation].

India-China: New flare-up of border tensions

(ls) On Monday, India and China accused each other of provocative troop movements along the two countries’ border in the Himalayas. Details on the confrontation have not been made public. It also remained unclear whether there were any casualties, suggesting the incident may have been of a minor scale. However, the fact that a statement was issued by India’s Defense Ministry may also indicate more serious fights. China rejected the accusation that People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops had breached the border. In June, a violent confrontation left 20 Indian soldiers dead with unspecified casualties on the Chinese side. [Reuters] [Nikkei Asian Review]

The most recent flare-up followed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call for strengthened border defense at the Central Symposium on Tibet Work, a top-level national meeting dedicated to Tibet, over the weekend. Two weeks ago, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Tibet. [AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3] Meanwhile, India and China have both reinforced their troops along the border. China has held live-fire drills on the Tibetan Plateau. [South China Morning Post]

At the same time, observers have pointed to strategic shortcomings in India’s defense policy and described it as being dominated by an orthodox offensive doctrine of the Indian Army, that propagated using force in large formations. The doctrine may be seen as unfit to meet current strategic challenges as nuclear deterrence has made major conventional war unlikely and new technologies have redefined the military state of the art. In addition, China’s new military might may still need to be included more clearly in the Indian Army’s strategic considerations. [The Print]

Indo-Pacific: U.S. pushes to formalize the Quad

(ls) On the sidelines of the annual U.S.-India Strategic Partnership Forum, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun said that the U.S. was aiming to “formalize” military, economic and development cooperation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or “Quad”, the strategic forum of the U.S., India, Japan and Australia. Though cautioning visions of an Indo-Pacific NATO, Biegun emphasized that the format shall remain open for other countries to join but “align in a more structured manner”. [Japan Times] [Hindustan Times]

India is expected to extend an invitation to Australia to participate in the annual Malabar naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal, which has been delayed this year due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The exercise has been conducted by the U.S. and India since 1992. Japan has been included in 2015. In 2007, India and Singapore joined as well, but refrained from further participation over apparent concerns of antagonizing China. [South China Morning Post]

India’s and China’s vaccine diplomacy toward Bangladesh

(ls) India’s Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla promised neighboring Bangladesh priority access to a Covid-19 vaccine produced by India on the occasion of a visit to Dhaka two weeks ago. The “vaccine diplomacy” comes after China made a similar offer to Bangladesh, and Dhaka allowed Chinese Sinovac to conduct vaccine trials in the country. The case illustrates another dimension of the two great Asian powers’ competition for economic and political influence in South Asia. [Straits Times] [see also AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4]

In a separate development, India and Bangladesh have agreed to open a new element of regional connectivity by expanding the scope of inland water transport mechanisms. The operationalization of new routes is expected to facilitate bilateral trade, with improved reliability and cost effectiveness. [Economic Times]

New round of Pakistan-Afghanistan talks

(ls) Pakistani diplomats met with Afghan officials in Kabul on Monday to discuss bilateral ties and security issues. The meeting was part of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS), which is a platform for bilateral dialogue that was launched by the two countries in 2018. The matters discussed included the war against terror, expansion of bilateral economic cooperation, refugee issues, political cooperation, and the Afghan peace process with the Taliban. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s government has focused on building closer ties with India while relations with Pakistan have long been strained over border tensions, trade issues and alleged Pakistani ties with the Taliban. [Arab News]

Sri Lanka: “India First” while retaining control over foreign investment

(ls) Sri Lanka’s new Foreign Minister Jayanath Colombage emphasized that his government’s strategic security policy will be focused on “India First”. At the same time, it remains open to other key players for economic development. However, he also said the Sri Lankan government would not hand over total control of strategic national assets to a foreign power. This was an apparent reference to the Hambantota port, where 85% of the stakes were given to China Merchant Port Holding for 99 years. In the future, Sri Lanka would retain at least 51% of stakes in any project with foreign investment. [Hindustan Times]

The newly elected Sri Lankan government has given the Foreign Minister “special responsibility” to reassess existing bilateral agreements. This includes the mandate to investigate whether they may have a detrimental effect on the local economy. Such responsibility was not previously assigned to the Foreign Minister in such explicit terms. Observers also expect that there will be a new emphasis on strengthening ties with India, China and other neighboring Asian nations due to the creation of a State Minister for Regional Cooperation portfolio. [Lowy Institute]

Indonesia: police foil terrorist plot targeting shop owners in areas with Chinese communities

(lm) A terrorist plot to attack shop owners in areas of Indonesia that are home to ethnic Chinese communities has been foiled, a senior security source said on Thursday. Between April and August, police arrested 17 suspected members of the al-Qaeda linked terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah, further seizing firearms and bullets.

Jemaah Islamiyah is a militant extremist Islamist rebel group dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. The group was behind the 2002 Bali bombings and was afterwards added to the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 as a terrorist group linked to Al-Qaeda or the Taliban. Since the death of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in 2011, attacks had fallen off. Between June 1 and August 12, a total of 72 terrorism suspects from both Jemaah Islamiyah and Jemaah Ansharut Daulah – an Islamic State affiliate and rival to Jemaah Islamiah - had been arrested.

In recent years, informal extremist charities began to proliferate in Indonesia, offering support for the families of incarcerated or killed members of Islamic terrorist organizations, while government deradicalization programs often failed to succeed. Last week, a woman believed to be the wife of terror fugitive and leader of East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) Ali Kalora had been arrested and charged under the anti-terrorism law for concealing information about a terror fugitive. [AiR No. 21, May/2020, 4] [AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4]

RCEP enters final phase, to be signed without India

(lm) The trade ministers from 15 Asia-Pacific countries negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) made “significant progress” toward the signing of the deal in November, after they had gathered on Thursday for a virtual meeting. Still, prospects for an early agreement remain murky, with participating countries divided on how to respond to India, which remains unwilling to stay on as a member of the framework. [Nikkei Asian Review 1] [The Japan Times]

Under the RCEP, the 15 countries – 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus the bloc`s five major trading partners Japan, China, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand – aim to establish common rules for e-commerce, trade and intellectual property. ASEAN leaders originally proposed the idea of RCEP in 2012, talks began the following year, but the members have missed multiple deadlines. [Nikkei Asian Review 2]

At the ASEAN Summit in Bangkok last November, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi told fellow Asian leaders that India had decided to withdraw from the RCEP over fears the elimination of tariffs would make it difficult to protect domestic industries from China, whose low-priced exports are highly competitive in Indian markets. New Delhi was also absent from the previous RCEP meeting on June 23, which was also conducted online. [AiR No. 45, November/2019, 1] [AiR No. 46, November/2019, 2]

Seeking an early conclusion of the RCEP negotiations, China previously had floated the idea of an RCEP without India, but other countries, notably Japan, have repeatedly called on India to return to the negotiations. If India is included, the envisioned economic zone will encompass a third of the global gross domestic product and half the world’s population. [Nippon] [The Diplomat]

China, Southeast Asian leaders meet to discuss the Mekong`s plight

(lm) At a time when the Mekong River’s health is in dire straits, leaders from China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam gathered on Monday for a virtual summit, the third leader’s meeting for the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) platform. During the summit, Chinese Premier Li Keqian promised that Beijing would henceforth share the Lancang River’s hydrological data with the Lower Mekong countries. [The Diplomat]

Established in 2016, the LMC is a sub-regional cooperation mechanism that brings together the riparian countries of the vital waterway, which begins in China as the Lancang then traverses Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. For a second year in a row, the Mekong River is at a record low, with water levels across the Lower Mekong Basin down by two-thirds and rainfall for the three months of the current monsoon also down by about 70 percent.

Starting in the mid-1980s, Beijing has since constructed 11 giant dams along the mountainous territory of the Upper Mekong to sustain its ever-increasing energy needs. In April this year, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) – representing Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand – refuted a previously published US-funded report that had accused China of deliberately holding back water, significantly contributing to the major drought impacting the Mekong River in Southeast Asia. Despite denying the allegations, however, the MRC did call on China for greater transparency in its water data.

In March this year, five provinces in Vietnam’s Mekong delta region had declared a state of emergency in face of continued extreme drought and salinity. A result of lobbying from international NGOs and internal reporting, shortly thereafter, the Cambodian government announced a decade-long dam moratorium on the mainstream of the river. The Cambodian moratorium leaves Laos, which commissioned two major dams in 2019, as the only Lower Mekong country pursuing hydropower on the mainstream of the river. [AiR No. 12, March/2020, 4] [AiR No. 10, March/2020, 2]

Beyond the Lancang/Mekong River`s plight, leaders on Monday also talked about strengthening their cooperation on public health, food supply chains, and a post-COVID-19 recovery of the region’s tourism industry. [TTR Weekly]

Malaysia rejects Philippines` Sabah claim in new diplomatic note

(lm) Malaysia submitted a note verbale to the United Nations on August 27 refuting the Philippines’ territorial claims over Sabah and the Kalayaan Island Group, which covers most of the disputed Spratly Islands. Lodging the diplomatic note, Kuala Lumpur responded to a note verbal filed by Manila in March, where it protested Kuala Lumpur’s bid to extend the limits of its continental shelf, covering portions of the Kalayaan Island Group, which the Philippines considers part of its Palawan province. [Malay Mail 1] [Malay Mail 2]

This is the second diplomatic note Malaysia submitted to the United Nations this year, following a note verbale issued on 29 July that rejected China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South China Sea “encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash- line’”. [AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2]

Philippines’ Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jnr who via Twitter had revived earlier this month the decades-old territorial dispute between the two countries [see AiR No. 31, August/2020, 1] on Sunday rejected calls for the Philippines to abandon its claim over Sabah. The following day, Mr. Locsin followed-up on his tweet saying that he would revive the Department of Foreign Affairs’ North Borneo Affairs which is dedicated to efforts to reclaim Sabah. [The Inquirer] [Malay Mail 3]

Earlier last week, the Philippines` House Committee on Foreign Affairs had approved a substitute bill seeking to amend the Passport Act by printing a revised version of the country`s map, including its 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and Sabah, on Philippine passports. [Phil Star]

South China Sea: Philippines warn China of invoking Mutual Defense Treaty with United States

(lm) Amid ongoing tensions with China, Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jnr warned on Wednesday that Manila would invoke its seventy-year old Mutual Defence Treaty with the United States in the event of a Chinese attack of naval vessels in the South China Sea. Mr. Locsin further said that the Philippines will continue air patrols over the Spratlys in the South China Sea (SCS), ignoring Beijing`s calls to stop what it had described earlier as "illegal provocations". [The EurAsian Times]

Just days earlier, China had confiscated a Filipino fishing vessel near the Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal which Beijing has occupied since 2012. In response, Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana had called the alleged historic rights invoked by China to justify its maritime claims in the SCS a fabrication. [South China Morning Post] [The Straits Times] [AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4]

Earlier this month, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte had ordered the Philippines` navy not to join US-led military exercises in the South China Sea, with analysts describing it as a move to trade Manila’s maritime claims with a Chinese COVID-19 vaccine [see AiR No. 33, August/2020, 3]. More recent developments, though, seem to reflect Manila’s shifting geopolitical calculations as previous warming-ups with Beijing have proven unsuccessful and China’s strategic opportunism over the past six months has fueled anxieties over Beijing’s expansionism. For an apt analysis of the Philippines change of heart, see Jay L. Batongbacal`s article in [ASEAN Focus pp.24f.]

Thailand to establish land passageway under China`s Belt and Road

(lm) Thailand is looking to construct a land passageway that would permit ships to bypass the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, influencing the new emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. The project would be connected to the various Chinese infrastructure and connectivity projects in the region.

A narrow sea lane along Peninsular Malaysia`s southwest coast and extending east past Singapore, the Strait of Malacca is currently the shortest sea route linking the Asia-Pacific region with India and the Middle East. About a quarter of the world`s traded goods pass through it each year. Moreover, as much as 80 percent of China’s fuel imports currently pass through the crucial maritime chokepoint.

First envisioned in 1677, the establishment of a modern Kra or Thai Canal has been been put forward and dismissed several times over the past few decades. While a canal traversing the narrow isthmus that connects Thailand to Peninsular Malaysia would cut shipping time by more than two days, Thailand plans to build two deep seaports on either side the country`s southern coasts, and link them via highway and rail, according to Transport Minister Saksiam Chidchob. [South China Morning Post]

Thailand: Royal Thai Navi postpones two-submarine-purchase to next year

(lm) After running into vociferous resistance, the Thai government announced on Monday it had decided to temporarily suspend the purchase of two submarines from China, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha - also defense minister - had "requested the navy to consider a delay" in the purchase. [The Straits Times]

Under a 2015 deal, Thailand was one of the first countries to buy Chinese naval hardware and finalized its purchase of three submarines in 2017, with the first one expected to be delivered in 2023. This is the second time the two-sub acquisition is being postponed, after it was initially suspended in April following public outrage over the controversial deal as the kingdom's economy flatlines due to the coronavirus pandemic. [AiR No. 17, April/2020, 4]

An $717 million two-sub acquisition was approved earlier this month by a nine-member parliamentary subcommittee, with panel chairman Suphon Fongngam – a lawmaker for the ruling Palang Pracharath Party - casting the deciding vote to break the deadlock. [Bangkok Post 1]

Pheu Thai lawmaker and deputy chairman of the subcommittee Yuttapong Charasathien said on Sunday he would seek a Constitutional Court ruling on the validity of the two-sub acquisition if the purchase is approved by the House committee. Mr. Yuttapong further explained the procurement may qualify as a government-to-government agreement, and would thus fall under Section 178 of the constitution, which stipulates that any agreement that may “have wide scale effects on the security of economy, society, or trade or investment of the country” requires prior approval from parliament. According to the Pheu Thai MP, no such government-to-government agreement had been submitted to the now-dissolved National Legislative Assembly or to the current elected parliament for approval.

Royal Thai Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Sittiporn Maskasem at a media conference last week had defended the purchase as being critical for the country’s maritime defense and security interests. An accompanying presentation had noted the number of submarines already in service or being introduced by regional navies as justification for a strong submersible fleet. [Bangkok Post 2] [Defense News]

Philippines consider to re-impose martial law after latest bombings

(lm) Following the twin suicide blasts in Sulu province last week that killed at least 15 and injured more than 75 [see AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4], President Rodrigo Duterte will consider recommendations to re-impose martial law. [South China Morning Post] [Bangkok Post]

Martial law was lifted at the end of last year in the southern Philippines’ Mindanao region, which includes Sulu, two-and-a-half years after it was imposed to fight the Abu Sayyaf militants, an Islamic state-inspired group that took over Marawi City. [AiR No. 51, December/2019, 3] [AiR No. 52, December/2019, 4]

Top Chinese diplomat to visit Myanmar

(lm) Yang Jiechi, a member of the Politburo Member and Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, is scheduled to visit Myanmar this week, as China continues to challenge India`s dominance. [ISEAS] [South China Morning Post]

China is currently regarded as playing with fire in relation to two of Myanmar’s insurgent groups. In an implicit reference to Beijing, the Myanmar commander-in-chief alleged in July that domestic terrorist groups were being backed by ‘strong forces’. A military spokesperson later clarified that the army chief was referring to the fact that fighters from the Arakan Army (AA) and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) had used Chinese-made weapons in a 2019 attack. [AiR No. 34, August/2020, 4]

Announcements

Upcoming Online Events

2 September 2020 @ 9:00 am EDT, Center for Strategic and International Studies, USA

After Disruption: Historical Perspectives on the Future of International Order

This discussion will feature a group of international historians that will seek to answer, inter alia, the question as to whether a failing order can be rehabilitated, and how the past can be used to provide insights into the relationship between disorder and order.

For more information and registration, kindly follow [CSIS].

2 September 2020 @ 9:00 am EDT, Center for Strategic and International Studies, USA

Rethinking U.S. Industrial Policy and Innovation Strategy

This event analyses U.S. government intervention to boost domestic production and innovation.

Further details are available at [CSIS].

2 September 2020 @ 10:30 am JST, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan

Preparing for the New Reality: Institutional Mechanisms Addressing Responsible Business Practices in Southeast Asia

This webinar will be the first of a six-partly weekly webinar series that will examine new forms of social projects and responsible practices. This particular event will discuss the state of existing, potential, and future challenges to enhancing institutional mechanisms and coordination for responsible business practices.

Details are available at [SPF].

2 September 2020 @ 10:30 am IST, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, India

Private Military Companies: Indian Outlook

This webinar will examine explore opportunities and challenges to the functioning of private military companies in India. Furthermore, it aims to add to an understanding of their functioning and legal framework.

See [CLAWS] for additional information.

2 September 2020 @ 11:00 am EDT, Center for a New American Security, USA

Virtual Report Launch: Toward a More Proliferated World? The Geopolitical Forces that Will Shape the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

This virtual panel discussion will assess the forthcoming joint report from CNAS and the Center for Strategic and International Studies that focuses on the relative success of the US and its partner at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

For registration details, please visit [CNAS].

2 September 2020 @ 11:00 am IST, United Service Institution of India, India

5th Indo-Afghan Security Dialogue 2020 on Emerging Geo-Political Trends in Afghanistan: Impact on Indo-Afghan Relations

This roundtable will address the US-Taliban Peace Deal, Afghanistan’s national security and defense forces, and the impact of geopolitical developments on Indo-Afghan Relations. 

For further details, please see [USI]

2 September 2020 @ 10:30 am EDT, German Marshall Fund of the United States, USA

U.S. Engagement on Belarus: A Conversation with George Kent

This event will offer insight into how the United States and partners can support sovereignty, independence, freedom, and prosperity of the Belarusian people.

Please find the details here: [GMFUS].

2 September 2020 @ 2:00 pm EDT, Center for Strategic and International Studies, USA

The Scramble for a Vaccine: Putin’s Sputnik V – “Trust me!”

This panel discussion will discuss Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine and its geo-strategic implications.

Follow [CSIS] for further details.

2 September 2020 @ 2:30 pm UTC+10, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Australia

Ending War: Lessons from Somaliland

In this event, Dr Sarah Phillips will explain why Somaliland provides a rare example of peacebuilding without international interference.

Please find the details here: [AIIAVIC].

3 September 2020 @ 10:00 am UTC+10, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Australia

Demographic Change and Security in the Indo-Pacific

This webinar will provide an overview of the national security implications of demographic change for the Indo-Pacific region.

Details are accessible under [AIIA].

3 September 2020 @ 11:00 am EDT, American Enterprise Institute, USA

Meritocracy and its discontents: A book event with Michael J. Sandel

In this book event, Michael J. Sandel will argue that the revolts against the meritocratic establishment are merely a reaction to the exclusion of losers in a meritocratic society.

See [AEI] for additional information.

3 September 2020 @ 5:00 pm EDT, American Enterprise Institute, USA

America’s place in the world: How lessons from the past can guide the future of foreign policy

Robert Zoellick will tackle the question of what history can teach today’s policymakers during this era of immense transformation by examining the traditions forged from American engagement with the world.

Event information is accessible at [AEI].

3 September 2020 @ 2:00 pm CEST, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Norway

Sustainable debt or pending threat? Why transparency matters for resource-backed loans

This event will examine the risks of pre-payment deals, where governments or state-owned enterprises receive funds in exchange for future resource production.

If you are interested in joining the webinar, please find further details at [EITI]

3 September 2020 @ 8:30 pm UTC+8, Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Singapore.

Maintaining Peace in China-India Relations: A Discussion and a Book Launch

The webinar will focus on the launch of the book Routledge Handbook of China-India Relations which discusses the drivers of the China-India relationship and how conflict and rivalry can be managed

For more information, please visit [LKYSPP]

3 September 2020 @ 2:00 pm EDT, Atlantic Council, USA

Sanctions-busting in the DRC

This webinar will feature a virtual conversation on North Korean sanctions-busting in the DRC:

Please find the details here: [Atlantic Council].

3 September 2020 – 4 September 2020 @ 5:00 am UTC, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Japan

International Conference on Science and Technology for Sustainability 2020 “Social Inclusion in the Global Era” – Sustainable post-COVID-19 Society

This conference will discuss how to make the future inclusive and sustainable. The first session will focus on issues in Asia and the role of Japan, whilst the second session will discuss the global challenge and the role of academics.

For further details, kindly refer to [IGES].

3 September 2020 @ 10:00 am EDT, International Institute for Strategic Studies, England

Shared waters of the Middle East and North Africa: conflict and cooperation

This virtual panel discussion will revolve around the issue of the current state of water insecurity in the Middle East and North Africa.

Please find further details here: [IISS].

3 September 2020 @ 10:00 am EDT, Foreign Policy Research Institute, USA

Belarus Post-Election: Political Unrest Intensifies

In this event, experts based in Minsk will weigh in on the situation in Belarus.

To access the discussion, please register here: [FPRI].

3 September 2020 @ 10:00 am EDT, Middle East Institute, USA

Iran, Israel and the Changing Geopolitics of the Middle East

This webinar explores where Iran and Israel stand vis-à-vis each other and in what ways the US and allies can seek to address Tehran’s rejection of Israel as a fellow UN member state.

Please find registration details here: [MEI].

3 September 2020 @ 10:00 am UTC+8, Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore

Under Beijing’s Shadow: Southeast Asia’s China Challenge

This talk will assess how countries in Southeast Asia view Beijing’s long-term political, economic, military and “soft power” goals.

If you are interested in joining the webinar, please find further details at [ISEAS].

3 September 2020 @ 9:00 am EDT, United States Institute of Peace, USA

ASEAN Faces the Future: What to Expect from the 27th ASEAN Regional Forum

This event will deliberate on the ASEAN forum held in early September and how ASEAN can help to build peace and resilience in Southeast Asia.

If you are interested in joining the webinar, please register under [USIP]

4 September 2020 @ 8:30 am UTC+8, Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore

Southeast Asia in the Shadow of a Rising China

This webinar will discuss the legacies of current Vietnamese Party Chief Nguyen Phu Trong, who are likely candidates for new leadership positions, and the implications of this leadership change for Vietnahm.

Please find the details here: [ISEAS]

4 September 2020 @ 4:00 pm IST, Observer Research Foundation, India

Environmental regulation in India: EIA and beyond

This event will discuss the Indian government’s plans to replace the EIA notification 2006. The draft notification has already caused an uproar. Thus, the talk will discuss the critical question as to what the contours of a new EIA law should be.

Details are accessible under [ORF].

4 September 2020 @ 10:00 am GMT+8, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore

Why the Pakatan Harapan Government Fell and Coalition’s Prospects for GE15

This webinar will focus on current issues and upcoming developments in Malaysia following the fall of the Pakatan Harapan government in February.

Registration details are available under [RSIS].

7 September 2020 @ 12:00 pm CEST, Egmont Institute, Belgium

Belgium in the Security Council: Experience after 20 Months

This webinar will discuss Belgium’s involvement in the UN Security Council with Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve.

Please register under: [Egmont Institute].

8 September 2020 @ 9:00 am EDT, Belfer Center, USA

Why We Need More Than a Carbon Price

This seminar will explain why more than a carbon price is needed in order to curb CO2 emissions. 

Details are accessible at [Belfer Center].

8 September 2020 @ 11:00 am EDT, Middle East Institute, USA

Election 2020: Challenges and Opportunities for US Policy in the Middle East

This event will examine the key issues in the Middle East and in what ways the US can achieve its policy goals in the Middle East through diplomacy, conflict resolution, and military engagement.

Please visit [MEI] for details about the event.

9 September 2020 @ 10:00 am CEST, Carnegie, USA

Rising Political Polarization in Southeast Asia

This webinar will examine why polarization is increasing in Southeast Asia, what the political effects are, and how political and civic actors can combat it.

Please find registration details here: [Carnegie].

9 September 2020 @ 11:00 am EDT, Carnegie, USA

The Path Forward: Effective U.S. Foreign Policy for the 21st Century

This talk will assess how the US can adapt to changing global dynamics and reinvigorate its leadership.

If you are interested in joining the webinar, please find further details at [Carnegie].

9 September 2020 @ 11:00 am EDT, Carnegie, USA

The Path Forward: Effective U.S. Foreign Policy for the 21st Century

This talk will assess how the US can adapt to changing global dynamics and reinvigorate its leadership.

If you are interested in joining the webinar, please find further details at [Carnegie].

9 September 2020 @ 3:30 pm UTC+2, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa

The rebirth: Tunisia’s development pathways

In this event, the latest research of ISS on Tunisia’s future prospects until 2040 will be launched. 

Details are accessible under [ISS Africa]

Recent books & articles

Murray Hiebert, Under Beijing’s Shadow, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers/Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 2020, 608 pages. For a review, see [Foreign Policy].

Deborah Cassrels, Gods and Demons: Behind the tourist veneer of Bali and greater Indonesia: a foreign correspondent memoir, ABC Books, 2020, 336 pages, with a short review in [Jakarta Post].

Ngoc Son Bui, Constitutional Change in the Contemporary Socialist World, Oxford University Press, August 2020, 384 pages. [Oxford University Press]

Yvonne Tew, Constitutional Statecraft in Asian Courts, Oxford University Press, September 2020, 272 pages. [Oxford University Press]

Howard Schweber and András Jakab (eds), Constitutional Decline, Constitutional Design, and Lawyerly Hubris, Special Issue of Constitutional Studies (6) (2020), presenting institutionalist explanations of constitutional decline by András Jakab, Will Freeman, Wojciech Sadurski, Han Zhai, Rainer Grote, David Kosar, Katarina Sipulova, Aziz Z Huq, Tom Ginsburg, and Tom Gerald Daly. [Constitutional Studies]

Adhy Aman, “Elections in a Pandemic: Lessons From Asia,” International IDEA [The Diplomat], article, special AiR recommendation.

Sameer P. Lalwani and Gillian Gayner, "India's Kashmir Conundrum: Before and After the Abrogation of Article 370," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, No. 473, August 2020 [United States Institute of Peace].

Tarunabh Khaitan, “Killing a Constitution with a Thousand Cuts: Executive Aggrandizement and Party-state Fusion in India,” 14 (1) Law & Ethics of Human Rights 49; article developing a typology of accountability mechanisms which have been corroded under Modi. [De Gruyter]

Calls

The Comparative Constitutional Law Research Forum of Chinese University of Hong Kong’s Centre for Comparative and Transnational Law calls for chapters for the Handbook of Constitutional Law in Greater China (to be published by Routledge by late 2022). Chapters may be theoretical, historical, empirical, or doctrinal. They may offer comparative insight across two or more of the relevant jurisdictions or focus on a specific issue within a single one. Submissions (abstract of up to 500 words) should be sent to stuart.hargreaves@cuhk.edu.hk no later than October 1st, 2020. For more details, see [CUHK Law]

The International Forum on the Future of Constitutionalism welcomes participants for “The Global Summit” to be held January 12-16, 2021. The first-of-its-kind summit will be both multilingual and multi-time zone, and it offers an opportunity for all-ranks scholars from all over the world to exchange ideas on all areas of constitutionalism. The deadline to submit a proposal for a paper or a fully-formed panel is 8 pm (local time in Ottawa, Canada) on October 1, 2020. More about the event at [Richard Albert].

The Keele Law Review is pleased to announce a call for submissions for its second volume (2021) on the theme of Democracy and Human Rights During a National Crisis or the State of Emergency. For more details, please visit [UK Constitutional Law Assocation].

Union University Law School Review “Pravni Zapisi” invites submissions for the 2/2020 issue. The deadline for application is October 10th, 2020. Applicants may submit papers on topics of a wide spectrum of law areas, with the particular reference to constitutional law, human rights law, international public law and EU law. Further information are provided at [Union University Law School Belgrade].

Jobs & positions

The Department of Legal Studies at Central European University (CEU) invites to submit applications for the position of an Assistant Professor in international human rights law. Applicants with expertise in the United Nations, human rights, protection mechanisms, and interests in the implications of international refugee and migration law are strongly preferred. Deadline for applications is September 30, 2020. Details are available at [CEU].

We would greatly appreciate your feedback! Please send any feedback you have regarding this newsletter to: info@cpg-online.de 

Also, don't forget to Like CPG on Facebook, and browse our website for other updates and news!