Grasp the pattern, read the trend

No. 6, February/2021, 2

Brought to you by CPG

Dear Readers,

Welcome to the Asia in Review coming to you with a new logo which we hope you will like. The new logo is the first novelty we have planned for the Asia in Review in 2021 after we have added our online-event calendar last year. Responding to many of the suggestions of our readers, we expect to finalize the new web-based AiR in its entirety as a more comprehensive and sophisticated media platform with a much bigger team in about two or three months.

As always, I would like to add to our best wishes to each and every reader worldwide our special greetings to all those who will celebrate the Japanese National Foundation Day this week (Feb. 11).

With the best regards of the AiR team,

Henning Glaser

Director, German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG)

Webpage: www.cpg-online.de, Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/CPGTU

Main Sections

• Law and Politics in East Asia

• Law and Politics in South Asia

• Law and Politics in Southeast Asia

• International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia

• Announcements

Law and Politics in East Asia 

China: Revised national security curriculum for Hong Kong schools

(dql) As part of a broader effort to reform national security education in Hong Kong in line with the national security law for Hong Kong, imposed by Beijing last summer, the city’s Education Bureau has issued new guidelines for curriculum arrangements, requiring, among others, primary school pupils to be taught the basic concepts of national security, including subversion, secession, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces, key offenses stipulated in the national security law. Higher classes in secondary schools would receive more in-depth teaching on national security-related offenses. [Straits Time]

For a critical view on the new guidelines, see John Chan in [China Digital Times] who argues that they are aimed at “quashing political dissent in the education system and restricting critical inquiry.”

Michael C. Davis in [Jamestown Foundation: China Brief], meanwhile, provides an account on the continuous rollback of the rule of law and human rights under the national security in the “once-liberal bastion of Hong Kong.”

China: Social media app providing virtual rooms for political discussions blocked, reporters arrested 

(dql) Clubhouse, an on-invitation only US social media app offering virtual rooms for non-recorded discussions has been made inaccessible in China after it saw a sudden rise in Chinese users over the past week discussing politically sensitive topics such as human rights in Xinjiang and Hongkong and Taiwan’s political status. [BBC]

Meanwhile, prominent Hong Kong radio host Edmund Wan Yiu-sing was arrested on charges of actions with “seditious intention,” punishable with imprisonment of two years. He is accused of intentionally fomenting “hatred or contempt,” and “disaffection against the HKSAR government and the government of the People’s Republic of China,” while hosting and talking on an internet program in summer and autumn last year. In February 2019, Wan started an online radio show to discuss the anti-government protest movement and to solicit donations to support young Hong Kong protesters fleeing to Taiwan. [Hong Kong Free Press] [South China Morning Post]

In another case, Chinese-born Australian citizen Cheng Lei, detained since August last year, has now been formally arrested on suspicion of espionage. Cheng was an anchor for China Global Television Network, the state-owned English-language news channel. Her arrest has added fuel to already strained Sino-Australian relations. [CNN]

China: Human rights lawyer’s license revoked

(dql) Chinese human rights lawyer Ren Quanniu, who represented one of 12 Hong Kong activists who attempted to flee by boat to Taiwan in August last year, has been stripped of his license to practice on grounds of “causing negative impact on society” by remarks made while defending Falun Gong practitioners in 2018.

Ren is known for taking up politically charged human rights cases in China, including trials against Falun Gong members and, most recently, citizen journalist Zhang Zhan, who was handed down a four years imprisonment verdict in December for reporting about the city of Wuhan during the early stages of coronavirus pandemic. [Aljazeera]

In an earlier development, Lu Siwei, another lawyer who worked with Ren on that case, had his license revoked, also for exerting “negative impact on society.” [AP]

Japan to set up a new digitalization government agency 

(dql) The set-up of a new government agency in September this year, tasked with promoting Japan’s digitalization, is at the center of reform bills approved by the cabinet. The agency would be headed by Minister while the top administrative post would be given to a person from the private sector. Staffed with around 500 people, more than 100 of whom are expected to be civilian IT engineers. 

Further reform measures covered by the bills seek to expand the use of the My Number social security and taxation identification number system, to unify and standardize core information systems used by local governments, as well as to step up the digitalization of administrative services, an area in which Japan lags behind many other developed countries symbolized by the “hanko”, seals used to identify individuals involved in government and trading, dating back to ancient times. [Nippon] [Kyodo News]

Japan: Lawmaker resigns over vote buying

(dql) Member of Japan’s Upper House Anri Kawai submitted her resignation in response to a court ruling in January which found her guilty of vote buying in the 2019 election, handing out more than 15.000 USD in total to four Hiroshima prefectural assembly members between March and May in 2019. Kawai denied all charges against her, but refrained from appealing the court’s decision. 

Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga strongly backed Kawai’s eventually successful race for the Upper House, appearing at her speeches at the campaign. Her resignation adds pressure on the Prime Minister who is currently low approval ratings of only 33% over criticism of his handling of the pandemic. [Kyodo News] [NHK]

South Korea: Ruling party pushes for new anti-fake news legislation

(dql) South Korea’s ruling Democratic Party announced its decision to step its efforts to introduce legislation within this month to which would increase the burden of responsibility of news media, internet portals, YouTubers and bloggers for fake or false news and allow a victim of fraudulent or illegitimate information circulated online to claim from those responsible for the spread of the information an amount of indemnity three times higher compared to amount under current law. 

The legislative move comes against the background of a torrent unfounded claims or rumors circulated on the internet and other social media platforms have posed challenges to administering state affairs, including curbing COVID-19 pandemic or safeguarding the privacy of individuals. [Korea Herald]

First impeachment of a sitting judge in modern South Korea

(dql) In a historic first, South Korea’s National Assembly led by the ruling Democratic Party voted 179 to 102 to remove Lim Seong-geun, a High Court senior judge for interference in a number of politically controversial trials in 2015 and 2016 when he was serving at a District Court. It is now up to the Constitutional Court to determine Lim’s fate.

Lim stood accused of using his position as a senior judge to step in and influence a libel case filed by the former government against a Japanese journalist in 2015 who published an article in which he questioned the whereabouts of then President Park Geun-hye (2013-2017) at the moment of the deadly sinking of the ferry Sewol a year earlier. In February 2020, a Seoul court acquitted him of the power abuse and other charges while recognizing his "unconstitutional act" of interfering in trials. [Korea Times]

Taiwan: New reservist call-up system to be introduced

(dql) Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced that, beginning in 2022, new rules governing the call-up of reservists will be introduced to improve the combat readiness of the nation’s reserve forces, with call-ups would be for two weeks training compared to five to seven days. Furthermore, the call-ups would occur annually rather than biannually every two years. 

Already in this year, the military will extend the period for call-ups from a maximum of four times in eight years to four times in 12 years after being discharged. [Focus Taiwan]

Law and Politics in South Asia 

India: Government puts Twitter on notice for refusing to comply with directive, threatens prosecution

Representing the latest instance of deteriorating relations between Indian authorities and US social media platforms, the government of Prime Minister Modi has sent a notice to social networking service Twitter, warning the company of “legal consequences” over non-compliance of its demand to block content aimed at inciting violence.[Hindustan Times 1] [The Straits Times 1]

Twitter on February 1 “unilaterally” unblocked 250 accounts it had previously suspended, citing "insufficient justification" to continue the suspensions. Earlier, India’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY) had sought an emergency blocking of content alleging that Prime Minister Modi’s administration was trying to wipe out farmers protesting against agricultural reforms. As of February 3, several Twitter users could be seen using the hashtag “#ModiPlanningFarmerGenocide” that had led the government to call for the ban. [Arab News]

On February 4, then, Twitter received a fresh government order to suspend 1,178 accounts which Indian authorities say were being operated from outside of the country and involved supporters of a separatist Sikh movement. Many of these accounts were sharing and amplifying misinformation and provocative content on the ongoing farmers' protests, according to Indian officials. Twitter did not comment on whether it had complied with the government’s order, but said it would review content under its rules and local laws when it receives a government report about potentially illegal posts. Further, the US company formally requested a meeting with Ravi Shankar Prasad, the Minister of Electronics and Information Technology. [The Straits Times 2] [Hindustan Times 2] [Al Jazeera]

Meenakshi Lekhi, a lawmaker from Modi's Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and chairperson of a parliamentary panel charged with examining the Personal Data Protection Bill, criticized Twitter for disobeying government orders, further saying she has yet to decide whether to summon company executives. [ET Telecom]

India: Tens of thousands of farmers protest new agriculture laws with blockades across the country

(lm) Tens of thousands of protesting farmers held a three-hour blockade of state and national highways on February 6 in a continuation of their months-long protest movement against new agricultural policies. The previous day, farmers in the state of Uttar Pradesh rallied in opposition to the contentious legislation, indicating growing support for protesters’ demand to have the legislation fully repealed. [The Straits Times 1] [South China Morning Post] [Reuters]

The protests had been largely peaceful but turned chaotic and violent on January 26, when thousands of farmers deviated from agreed routes and headed for government buildings in Old Delhi where the annual Republic Day military parade was taking place [see AiR No. 5, February/2021, 1].

Since then, local authorities have erected barricades and concertina wire, and even planted nails and dug trenches on roads leading to major protest site. Moreover, the government intermittently cut off electricity and water supply to one of the farmers’ protest camps, before suspending internet services at all three, and restricted journalists’ access to them. Furthermore, the Indian capital was placed on a high alert on February 6, with authorities closing several metro stations until the blockade call ended, as well as deploying nearly 50,000 security personnel. [France24] [The Straits Times 2] [New York Times]

On February 8, then, Prime Minister Narendra Modi invited representatives of the protesting farmers for a next round of talks, while also assuring that the Minimum Support Price (MSP), a government fixed benchmark designed to incentivize the farmers and thus ensure adequate food grains production in the country, would stay in effect. So far, 11 rounds of talks between the Samyukt Kisan Morcha [Joint Farmers Front], an umbrella body of unions leading the protests, and the federal government have failed to end the ongoing stalemate [see e.g., AiR No. 51, December/2020, 4].

An opinion piece published by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is taking a critical stance on how the federal government has introduced the reforms and the manner in which it conducted the ensuing negotiations. Noting that the outcome of the current dispute would affect India’s commitment to the transition to a more environmentally sustainable and equitable growth model, the author scarifies Modi’s administration for having failed “to communicate its case effectively to those farmers who would benefit from the reforms and who could conceivably have prevented their colleagues from hijacking the narrative". In doing so, the authors go on to explain, it has alienated the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), a center-right Sikh-centric state political party in Punjab and long-term ally of the BJP, that could otherwise have helped handle the reform's fallout. [Observer Research Foundation]

Nepal: Rivalling factions of ruling Nepal Communist Party call for national strike, hold mass protest

(lm) The faction of the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) led by Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli displayed a show-of-strength in Kathmandu on February 5, as tens of thousands of people protested in support of the prime minister’s move to dissolve parliament [see AiR No. 51, December/2020, 4]. [The Himalayan Times 1]

The previous day, the NCP’s faction led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Madhav Kumar Nepal declared a nationwide strike to ramp up opposition after protests had swelled since December, with protesters and police clashing. At least 77 protesters were arrested in the capital for obstruction and vandalism.

Timing and context of the recent protests are noteworthy: On February 3, senior officials appointed to various constitutional bodies, including commissions on human rights and investigations into abuse of authority, were sworn into office. These officials were initially appointed on December 15, during a meeting of the Constitutional Council (CC), a key agency that appoints officials at various constitutional bodies. Earlier that day, Prime Minister Oli had introduced an ordinance on the Constitutional Council Act, enabling the CC to achieve quorum if as few as three of its six members, including the prime minister, attend a meeting [see AiR No. 51, December/2020, 4]. [Anadolu Agency] [Al Jazeera] [The Kathmandu Post 1]

Since then, three separate petitions have been filed at the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the recommendations made by the CC [see AiR No. 2, January/2021, 2]. [The Kathmandu Post 2] [The Straits Times]

Pakistan: Alliance of leading opposition parties to start long march on Islamabad on March 26

(lm) The Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), an alliance of leading opposition parties, announced on February 4 it would commence its long march on the capital, Islamabad, on March 26, in a bid to pile pressure on the federal government of Prime Minister Imran Khan. Leaders of the PDM also said the alliance’s constituent parties would jointly contest the upcoming Senate election. [Hindustan Times]

According to Maulana Fazl, President of the PDM, the opposition alliance will also discuss a proposal by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) to table a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Imran Khan, in addition to using resignations of parliamentarians after the Senate elections. Further elaborating, he said the opposition had rejected the government-proposed constitution amendment bill seeking open Senate vote, saying the movement believed in a comprehensive package for electoral reforms. [Dawn]

Last December, the federal government decided to hold Senate elections later this month and to invoke advisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court on open voting for the polls [see AiR No. 1, January/2021, 1, AiR No. 51, December/2020, 4]. The elections are to be held for 52 seats of the upper house that will fall vacant following the retirement of half of the senators on March 11. Importantly, over 65 percent of the senators who are set to retire next year belong to the opposition parties.

Pakistan: Supreme Court order shifting of released Islamist to government safe house

(lm) The Supreme Court (SC) ordered the release from prison on February 2 of a British-born Islamist who had been convicted in 2002 on charges of kidnapping and murder of an American journalist. In a decision that came under heavy criticism from the United States, the SC recommended that Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh be transferred to a government safe house as a steppingstone to his full release after spending 18 years on death row. [The Straits Times] [Dawn]

Earlier the SC had affirmed a lower court’s decision to acquit Sheikh and three co-conspirators of all charges except abduction. The journalist’s family filed a review petition, thereafter, joining Pakistan’s federal government and the provincial government of Sindh in seeking a reversal of the acquittal. However, the SC on February 1 refused to issue a restraining order, and extended the detention of all four men by one day. [AiR No. 5, February/2021, 1]

Pakistan: Supreme Court scrutinizes approval of development funds for lawmakers

(lm) Pakistan’s Supreme Court (SC) has sought explanation from the federal government over Prime Minister Imran Khan’s decision of approving a $3.1 million development grant for each lawmaker of both national and provincial assemblies. During the hearing on February 3, the bench reproduced a 2013 precedent, which declared that the Constitution does not permit the use or allocation of funds to parliamentarians and provincial assembly lawmakers at the sole discretion of the prime minister or chief ministers. [The Express Tribune] [Geo News]

The move also drew heavy criticism from the country’s two major opposition parties, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), which termed it a “political bribe” weeks before the Senate elections [see AiR No. 50, December/2020, 3].

Sri Lanka: Ethnic minorities hold protest march, while authorities celebrate Independence Day

(lm) Joint by politicians, civil and religious leaders, hundreds of ethnic Tamils began a four-day protest march from the Eastern to the Northern Province on February 3 to demand the release of prisoners and seek information on thousands of Tamils missing since the end of the country's civil war 11 years ago. Police obtained court orders banning the protests, but thousands joined the marches anyway, shouting anti-government slogans and displaying black flags of defiance. [Tamil Guardian]

Members of the Muslim community, the second-largest minority on the island, joined the protests to demand the government to halt its policy of forced cremations of coronavirus victims. Ignoring the World Health Organization’s (WHO) guidelines which permit both burials and cremations, Buddhist-majority Sri Lanka amended its rules on burials and cremations last April, making cremations of COVID-19 victims mandatory [see AiR No. 20, May/2020, 3].

The same day, the government held a military parade in the country’s capital Colombo to commemorate the Sri Lanka’s political independence from British rule in 1948. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa used the occasion to present himself as leader of the ethnic Sinhalese, who make up the largest ethnic group on the island, promising strong security policies and centralized leadership. [AsiaNews]

Law and Politics in Southeast Asia 

Indonesia: Ban of mandatory Islamic attire for schoolgirls

(nd) The Indonesian government passed an edict to stop public schools from forcing female students to wear religious attire. Last month saw an outrage on social media over female students in West Sumatra being forced to wear a hijab. Human rights groups welcomed the decision, with a researcher at Human Rights Watch emphasizing that still more than 20 provinces have mandatory religious attire dress codes. In Aceh, a conservative province on the western tip of Sumatra, the ban will not apply.

The move shows the latest attempt to fight religious intolerance, with religious clothing having been a hot issue in the past. Already in 2016, Jakarta’s former Chinese Christian governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, nicknamed Ahok, called for such a ban. Ahok drew criticism from hardline Islamic groups and was sentenced in May 2017 to two years in prison over blasphemy charges, highlighting the power of Islamic pressure groups. Last Month, recently appointed Minister of Religious Affairs Yaqut Cholil Qoumas vowed to protect the rights of religious minority groups Shia and Ahmadiyah. In December last year, the government banned the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) [AiR No. 1, January/2021, 1] [The Diplomat]

Indonesia: Tesla to officially propose investment 

(nd) Following its public invitation to invest into the country, Indonesia has received an investment proposal from US electric vehicle (EV) maker Tesla. Tesla was looking for new sources and warned that the high costs of batteries remain an obstacle to the spread of EV technology. Another interest of Tesla is a possible SpaceX rocket launch pad on the island of Biak in northern Papua.

Nickel is a key component for EV batteries and Indonesia the world’s biggest nickel producer. In an effort to not only export raw nickel, Indonesia stopped all shipments last year and intensified efforts to develop a nickel supply chain, processing the material into metals and chemicals used in batteries.

This vision has long been pushed for by Chinese investors, focused on developing a fully-integrated supply chain, covering stainless steel, lithium batteries, copper wire and other finished products. Currently, four copper smelters are being built. The Chinese built smelters are $1 billion cheaper than the planned Finnish-designed facility at Gresik in Surabaya, due to technological advancements and a requirement for quick construction. When asked about his concern over the intense Chinese involvement, Chief Investment Minister Luhut Panjaitan responded: “We invited everybody and no-one came, except the Chinese”, adding “Like it or not, happy or not happy, whatever is said, China is a world power that can’t be ignored.” Another large investor in the field is South Korea, with lithium battery-maker LG Chemical and car manufacturer Hyundai announcing an investment volume of $11.3 billion. [Reuters] [Asia Times]

Malaysia: Former Head of Felda sentenced for bribery

(nd) Former politician and chairman of the Federal Land Development Authority (Felda), Mohd Isa Abdul Samad, was sentenced to six years in prison on bribery charges. As head of Felda, he approved a hotel purchase in Sarawak in 2004 without board directory approval and accepted nine bribes amounting to more than 3 million ringgit. Due to the public nature of the offense and his betrayal of public trust, he was fined five times the amount he accepted in bribes. Former Prime Minister Najib Razak made Isa chairman of Felda in 2010. The judge of his case was the one who last year convicted Najib in connection with the 1MDB state fund to a 12-year prison sentence and a fine.

Felda is a state agency set up in 1956 tasked to eliminate poverty among rural ethnic Malay farmers by distributing farmland. Between 1957 and 1990, Felda resettled 112,635 families. [Benarnews]

Myanmar: Coup unfolding

(nd) Following the military’s takeover last Monday, actions of civil disobedience have increased with some wearing red ribbons in protest, medical workers striking, raising the three-finger salute known from the Thai pro-democracy protesters. This marks another extension of the MilkTeaAlliance, an anti-authoritarian hashtag, which was prompted during Hong Kong protests in 2019, and spread to include Taiwan and Thailand, occasionally India over border disputes with China.

Secretary General Antonio Guterres pledged “to make sure that this coup fails” by gathering enough international support. Due to a veto by China, the UN Security Council did not agree on a joint statement. The Group of Seven major economic powers condemned the action and urged the military to reverse it. The G7 comprises Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US.

Meanwhile, the police filed charges against Aung San Suu Kyi, which include breaching import and export laws, and possession of unlawful communication devices, and announced her detention until February 15. President Win Myint was charged for violating protocols to curb the spread of the coronavirus. The access to social media services was blocked for the sake of “stability”. Many used VPNs to circumvent the blockade. The high numbers of users and spread of information are a testament to the liberalization of the telecom sector and press freedoms reached in recent years. [Nikkei Asia] [Reuters] [BBC 1] [South China Morning Post 1]

In the past, China has invested time in both forging ties with civilian and military leaders in Myanmar, although the military is the institution most suspicious of Chinese influence in the country and their support of armed ethnic rebels in the North. Western powers have been reluctant so far to impose sanctions. The US have officially labelled the action as coup, which enables further steps to impose sanctions. Japanese citizens have protested in support of Myanmar and Aung San Suu Kyi, but the government was hesitant to comment on the imposition of sanctions. India did not use the word “coup” but urged to return to the rule of law and democracy. In an effort to counter China’s influence in the region, both countries maintained balanced relationships to both civil and military leaders.

Japan has an increased economic interest and entertains a developed strategic partnership with the military. India in turn needs the Burmese military to contain separatist movements in the Northeast of India and is believed to be the key protector of a US$1.4 billion infrastructure investment to connect India to its regional neighbor states. This makes them unlikely to join US sanctions but rather eyeing for a compromise. With respect to China’s more lenient stand on human rights issues, a further push towards China through another round of sanctions is feared. Past impositions of sanctions have not been successful. Therefore, US reactions to the coup will be the first test for the administration of Joe Biden and his credibility, closely monitored by China taking advantage of possible friction between the West and Myanmar. [South China Morning Post 2] [Foreign Policy] [The Atlantic] [The Diplomat] [Foreign Affairs]

According to observers, the coup happened less for strategic purposes but rather for personal calculations and pride. With a constitution designed to ensure military influence on the country with a guaranteed quarter of parliamentary seats reserved for the military blocking any amendments to it, Suu Kyi’s latest electoral success might have been one too many. When she was hindered from becoming President in 2015 due to her marriage to a foreigner, she herself created the title “State Counselor”. Both in 2015 and now, she had an immense electoral victory, leaving only few seats to the military’s proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Following the military’s claim of electoral fraud, she refused to convene a special session of Parliament for discussion. The independent election commission was also quick to dismiss the complaints, making the rationale of a power struggle very credible. Additionally, Min Aung Hlaing is said to have strong civilian political ambitions, possibly for serving as a President, but was facing retirement this year. An NLD-controlled parliament would have been unlikely to elect him. His former position of Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces would have been appointed by the President in consultation with the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), reminding the military of another potential power loss. Also, Min Aung Hlaing faces international accusations with respect to the crimes against the Rohingyas.

Additionally, the NLD since 2015 sought to reform the 2008 constitution, which safeguards military prerogatives. Last year’s efforts to propose constitutional amendments to limit or revoke these privileges were rejected entirely through the military’s de-facto veto in parliament. It is unclear if the NLD would have been able to push through such amendments but the latest elections did enable them to succeed in former USDP strongholds.

The military might aim to justify the coup as a support of democracy by fighting electoral fraud, which runs against the assessment of international observers. The military has not yet provided evidence to support its claim. Still, for that rationale, the military might point to the single-member plurality voting system, meaning the most voted for candidate wins irrespective of the vote share. This system makes it harder for ethnic and small parties to succeed. It might present leverage for the military to garner support from ethnic minorities, which were promoting the proportional representation system at the latest election.  [Asia Times]  [East Asia Forum 1] [East Asia Forum 2]

Despite the coup, the signatories of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) announced they will continue to implement the peace process with the military government. Experts are still worried about the fate of the ethnic minorities in Rakhine state as well as the Rohingya refugees. [Irrawaddy] [South China Morning Post 3]

Although the access to the internet was blocked increasingly, thousands of protesters gathered nationwide, making them the largest protest since 2007, when thousands of monks demonstrated against the military regime in the so-called Saffron Revolution. The police used water cannons, rubber bullets and fired warning shots into the air. On Monday, a general strike was called, which was followed by tens of thousands in Nay Pyi Taw, Mandalay and Yangon. The protesters include teachers, lawyers, bank officers and government workers. The military regime imposed a curfew and a ban of gatherings of more than 5 people in a beginning crackdown on protesters. [Asia Times 2] [BBC 2] [Radio Free Asia]

Myanmar saw military coups in 1962 and 1988; in the 1990 election the military rejected the landslide victory of the NLD and put Suu Kyi under house arrest for 15 years. Her once excellent international reputation suffered significantly over her defense of the military’s violence against Rohingya Muslims.

Philippines: Further red-tagging, while anti-terror law is on scrutiny

(nd) In the latest demonstration of labelling of alleged communists and sympathizers, infamously referred to as “red-tagging”, Lt. Gen. Antonio Parlade Jr. called out Philippine Daily Inquirer reporter Tetch Torres-Tupas. Nationwide media as well as human rights groups spoke out in support of Torres-Tupas. The report in question was about tribe members asking for the Supreme Court’s permission to join petitions against the anti-terror law. Currently, the Supreme Court is hearing oral arguments for 37 petitions pending against the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 in an effort to declare it unconstitutional. The government argued the law was necessary to fight militant groups, but rights groups both domestically and internationally criticized the increased powers of security forces on mere suspicion and warrantless detention up to 24 days.

Such statement and threats against activists and journalists are not countered by the government. Last year, the free channel of national broadcaster ABS-CBN was shut down, and head of news webpage Rappler, Maria Ressa, was convicted of cyber libel. According to the UN Human Rights Office reporting, at least 248 human rights defenders, legal professionals, journalists and trade unionists were killed due to their work between 2015 and 2019. Last month, an over 32-year-old agreement to ban soldiers from entering the University of the Philippines’ campus was nullified alleging a communist breeding ground, which is recruiting for the New People’s Army (NPA)

Last week, retired judges Antonio Carpio and Conchita Morales were red-tagged for outspokenly opposing the Anti-Terrorism Act, which Parlade referred to as “sedition” in a Facebook post. His post also mentioned left-wing lawmakers Ferdinand Gaite, Carlos Zarate and Sarah Elago by name. It was brought to the Supreme Court hearing as an example of a clear threat designed to intimidate petitioners, which the court “noted”.  

The Philippines harbors Asia’s longest-running communist insurgency, which Duterte pledged to end during his presidential term. [South China Morning Post] [Benarnews]

Philippines: Duterte pushes for charter change

(nd) Fueling speculations President Rodrigo Duterte aims to extend his term past 2022, he has tasked allied congressmen to initiate the constitution amendment process to remove the term limit. The Philippine constitution of 1987 was written after the People Power movement removed dictator Marcos and therefore contains provisions restricting the power of the executive, limiting the terms of president and vice president to a single six-year term. This attempt is not new: Then-President Fidel Ramos introduced a charter change proposal in 1997, which prompted public outrage and massive protests led by the Catholic Church. His successor, rebranded charter change into “Constitutional Correction for Development” to win public support and claimed to only remove nationalistic provisions, like requiring a majority-Filipino ownership of certain assets and investment operations. His successor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her allies in 2009 were aiming at a constitutional amendment without including the opposition-dominated Senate, which also triggered broad protests.

Recently, it was announced Duterte wanted to solely focus on “economic” charter change to push foreign investment and fight repercussions of the pandemic, but will including overhauling the party list system to support the government’s anti-communist campaign. Likely, previous suggestions will be revived, such as the removal of the ban on foreign bases, the ban on nuclear weapons, a prohibition of political dynasties, and to insert “responsible” in the bill of rights with respect to freedom of speech and expression. Despite the pandemic, Duterte’s administration made it its priority to pass an anti-terror law, which saw extrajudicial killings and the shutdown of a critical media network. Therefore, civil society groups opposed a possible charter change, citing the erosion of the checks and balances in government and a possible rise of an authoritarian government. [The Diplomat]

Singapore: Police warning not to hold protests over Myanmar 

(py) The police issued a warning not to protest with respect to “recent developments in Myanmar”. The announcement came as a reaction towards online postings in support of Myanmar, encouraging participation in demonstrations. Police reminded them of the Public Order Act, which carries as an offense to organize or participate in a public assembly without a police permit. Police reminded “foreigners visiting, working or living in Singapore” “to abide by our law” and otherwise will be “dealt with firmly”, having their visas or work passes terminated. Last week’s coup by the Myanmar military saw hundreds of thousands of protesters, including doctors and state employees, taking to the streets and staging civil disobedience. [Channel News Asia]

Singapore: Law to limit scope of TraceTogether data usage

(py) A law limiting the ability to use personal data collected via the app TraceTogether was introduced to Parliament February 1. The legislative move came in response to a public outcry that the Criminal Procedure Code enabled the police to obtain any data under Singapore's jurisdiction for criminal investigations, including data collected by the app. The app was introduced last year with government assuring its data would only be used for contract tracing with respect to the Covid-19 pandemic. The newly introduced bill shall clarify this and foresees to only allow data usage to fight the pandemic and in case of seven categories of serious offences such as with relation to terrorism, drug trafficking and serious sexual offences. The law also includes punishment for unauthorized use or personal contact data disclosure, which is listed as an offence. [The Strait Times]

Thailand: Criminal Court revokes decision against Thanathorn

(nd) The Criminal Court revoked its decision with regard to the founder of the Progressive Movement, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit. Subject was a video containing criticism of the government’s vaccination program, which according to the court’s latest ruling does not violate Section 112 of the Criminal Code. Thanathorn earlier challenged a petition handed in by the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (DES) to authorize the removal of the video. The DES is likely to appeal the latest decision. Siam Bioscience received the right to produce AstraZeneca's Covid-19 vaccine in Thailand. The firm was founded by King Rama IX more than a decade ago. [See also AiR No. 4, January/2021, 4, AiR No. 5, February/2021, 1]

Meanwhile, United Nations human rights experts condemned the rise in charges under Section 112, highlighting last week’s record sentence of 43 years in prison for a former state employee. Still, dozens of protesters’ charges under Section 112 remain pending. Already late last year, the UN human rights office urged Thailand to amend the law, which was not used for two years but reinvoked in a reaction to protesters criticism of the monarchy. [Bangkok Post 1] [Bangkok Post 2]

Thailand: Peace talks with BRN

(nd) After a facilitation by Malaysia, Thailand held online talks with representatives of Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Liberation Front, BRN), the main insurgent group in the Deep South, bordering with Malaysia. There was no high-level talk within a year, with the latest one evolving around technical issues of peace talks during the ongoing pandemic. The first direct meeting between Thailand and BRN after years happened early 2020 but was interrupted by the outbreak of the coronavirus. Three days prior to the meeting, a roadside bomb exploded in far-southern, injuring five. The latest lethal attack was on December 7. The insurgency reignited in January 2004, with more than 7,000 people having been killed linked to it. [Benarnews]

International Relations, Geopolitics and Security in Asia

China-US relations: Biden describes China as “the most serious competitor”

(zh) In his first foreign policy address, US president Joe Biden called China “the most serious competitor” and vowed to confront China in multiple areas including what he called “economic abuses”, human rights, intellectual property, and global governance. Biden also added the US welcomes cooperation with China when “it is in America’s interest to do so.” Biden also told made clear that he would not take a softer stance towards Beijing than Trump, warning China would face “extreme competition”. [Foreign Policy] ][Financial Times] [South China Morning Post]

In an earlier statement, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said the Biden administration’s priority is to “dealing with China’s trade abuses harming American workers”. He also stressed China’s intellectual property theft and warned China’s collection of healthcare data and DNA of Americans would pose “serious risks” to American’s privacy and US economic and national security. [Fox News]

On the same day, in his first call with China’s top foreign policy official Yang Jeichi, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the US would “stand up for democratic values and hold Beijing to account”. He also said the US would press China on Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan issue, and urge Beijing to condemn Myanmar coup. Yang stressed both countries should “manage their domestic affairs well”, saying Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet issues are “China’s internal affairs” and allow no foreign interference. With regards to Taiwan, which “bears on China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”, the US should stick to the One-China principle and the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques. [Reuters] [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China]

In a latest development, the Theodore Roosevelt and the Nimitz carrier strike groups conducted joint exercises in the South China Sea on Tuesday, involving dozens of warships and at least 120 fighter aircraft. The drills came only days after an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer US warship sailed throught the Taiwan strait. [CNN] [Aljazeera]

China-US arms control framework on the way?

(zh) The United States extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia for five years through 2026 and announced that it will pursue an arms control framework involving China, too. In response, China welcomed the bilateral agreement, adding that Beijing is ready to conduct bilateral dialogues on issues related to strategic security with other nuclear-weapon states, including Russia and the US, marking a major shift in policy, as Beijing thus far has shown no interest in joining a nuclear arms agreement. [South China Morning Post] [Reuters]

China provides 10 million vaccine doses to COVAX

(zh) China decided to provide 10 million doses of vaccines to COVAX, a global vaccine sharing distributing scheme backed by World Health Organization (WHO) and the Vaccine Alliance Gavi, an international organization aiming to improve the access to vaccines in poor countries. The WHO is reviewing the applications of three Chinese companies to join the vaccine scheme, including Sinovac Biotech, China National Pharmaceutical Group (CNPG), and CanSino Biotech. The decisions on the approval of Sinovac and CNPG’s vaccines will be released in March. [Reuters]

Apart from COVAX, China also sent half a million doses of vaccines to Pakistan, which is the first batch of Chinese vaccine aid to another country. With Chinese vaccine donation, Pakistan has stated vaccinated frontline health workers. Pakistan also claims China-made vaccine is ineffective to the elderly above 60 and will exclude elderly from the mass vaccination campaign with Chinese vaccine. The Chinese vaccine aids have also arrived in Cambodia and Laos. [DAWN] [DNA] [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China 1]

Other 53 developing counties, including Brunei, Nepal, the Philippines, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Palestine, Belarus, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, and Equatorial Guinea will also receive Chinese-made vaccines as an aid. Vaccines made by CNPG and Sinovac have been exported to countries including the UAE, Morocco, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil, and Chile. Serbia has started vaccination with Chinese-imported vaccines.

With the US thus far being a "non-factor" in Southeast Asia's early vaccine diplomacy, China is eager to push its vaccine diplomacy also in this region. Shortly before Biden’s inauguration, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had toured Myanmar, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines with promises of Chinese vaccine. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China 2] [CSIS]

China-Australia relations: Australian anchor of Chinese news channel host on spying charges

(zh) Chinese-born Australian anchor Cheng Lei of China’s state-owned broadcaster China Global Television Network (CGTN) was formally arrested after months of detention on the charges of “illegally supplying state secrets overseas.” [CNN]             

The arrest comes amid strained China-Australia relations. Last week, China issued a warning to students studying Australia to be aware of a “serious threat” to their safety as “successive vicious incidents of overseas students being attacked in many places in Australia”. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has sent a similar alert in June, urging its students to “be cautious in choosing to go or to return to Australia for their studies”. [South China Morning Post 1]

Since last year, the two countries have been locked trade disputes which include Chinese bans and trade restrictions on Australian imports of coal, sugar, barley, lobster, wine, copper, and log timber. A letter of Australian Trade Minister Dan Tehan inviting his Chinese counterpart to kick start the discussion on trade dispute was left un-responded. Based on the preliminary data released last week, Australia’s total goods exported to China last year reached USD 110.9 billion, only 2.16% less than 2019 despite China’s tariffs and trade restrictions. [South China Morning Post 2] [South China Morning Post 3]

China-EU relations: First high-level environment and climate dialogue

(zh) Chinese Vice Premier, Han Zheng, and the Executive Vice President of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, held the first High-Level Environment and Climate Dialogue via a videoconference call, in which Han promised to peak China’s carbon dioxide emission by 2030 and attain carbon neutrality by 2060.

In response, Timmermans welcomed China's position on climate change affirmed the EU’s willingness to expand and deepen bilateral dialogue and cooperation in the field of environment and climate and to give full play to the role of multilateral mechanisms. [Xinhua]

In an apparent attempt to push the EU away from the US, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, meanwhile, called on the European Union to “make policies independently and autonomously” during a video conference with the EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, who in response said that EU had “strong bonds” with the US, while stressing the need to discuss issues where Beijing and Brussels have disagreements and expressing concerns about Hong Kong and Xinjiang. [EEAS] [Politico]

China-Japan relations: High-level consultation on maritime affairs

(zh) China and Japan held the 12th round of high-level consultation on maritime affairs via a video call to discuss the bilateral consultation mechanism as well as maritime defense, maritime law enforcement and security, and marine economy, with both sides agreeing on maritime search cooperation between the China Maritime Search and Rescue Center and the Japan Coast Guard, combating maritime crimes and promoting exchanges between law enforcement officers. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, in Chinese]

The meeting came amid rising concerns in Japan over China’s new coast guard law which enter into force on February 1 and which permits Chinese coast guards to use military weapons in the waters China claims, when “national sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction are being illegally infringed upon by foreign organizations or individuals at sea.” [AiR No. 4, January/2021, 4] [Japan Times 1]

Days after the consultation, two Chinese coast guard vessels entered the Japanese territorial waters near Diaoyu Islands, the fifth time this year that Chinese vessels have entered Japanese waters and the first under the new coast guard law which came into effect on February 1. [Japan Times 2] [Mainichi]

China-UK relations: Ofcom revokes CGTN’s license

(zh) The British media watchdog, Ofcom, revoked the license for China Global Television Network (CGTN), an international English-language satellite news channel, to broadcast in the UK arguing that the news channel is “ultimately controlled by the Chinese Communist Party”. [BBC] [CNN]

In response, China threatened to take retaliatory measures, accusing the UK of “political oppression” and demanding Britain “correct its mistakes” on Friday. [Daily Mail]

Cross-Strait relations: Guyana scraps plan for Taiwan embassy over China’s pressure

(zh) Bowing to pressure from China, Guyana called off an agreement with Taiwan on opening a representative office in Guyana’s capital, Georgetown, just hours after Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced signing of the agreement. [Focus Taiwan] [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan 1]

Rich in oil and located next to Venezuela, a major Chinese ally against the United State in South America, Guyana has become an important country for China. Both countries established diplomatic relations in 1972 and has been maintaining close ties. Following the signing of the agreement, China’s Foreign Ministry was quick to urge Guyana to stick to “One China” policy and to “earnestly take steps to correct their mistakes”. Within hours, Guyana’s Foreign Ministry said it adheres to “One China” principle and terminated the agreement with Taiwan, citing “miscommunication” about the agreement.

Taiwan strongly condemned the Chinese government’s interference, accusing it of bullying Taiwan in the international society. [CNN] [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China] [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan, 2 in Chinese] [PTS, in Chinese] [Reuters]

The US is worried about China’s deepening influence in the Caribbean and Latin America, with both regions traditionally hosted the biggest bloc of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies. However, facing Chinese fierce isolation, three Latin American countries, El Salvador, the Dominican Republican, and Panama, had cut the diplomatic ties with Taiwan within two years. Currently, Taiwan only has formal diplomatic relations with 14 countries, including four of the Caribbean and five Latin American countries. [NPR]

Meanwhile, two Chinese J-16 jet fighters entered Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ) for a fifth consecutive day on Monday, marking the 34th day so far this year that Chinese aircraft intruded Taiwan's ADIZ. [Taiwan News]

Japan-ADB cooperation agreement on ASEAN energy projects

(dql) In a move to strengthen its footprint in Southeast Asia against China, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has reached an agreement with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) under which both sides will cooperate on clean energy projects in the frame of the Cleaner Energy Future Initiative for ASEAN (CEFIA), covering areas of renewable energy, energy conservation and efficiency, and other technologies for low carbon energy transition.

Established in 2019, the CEFIA seeks to accelerate the deployment of sustainable energy and low carbon technologies in Southeast Asia. [Modern Diplomacy]

South Korea’s 2020 Diplomatic Paper calls Japan “closest neighbor”, again

(dql) Reflecting a fresh push for improving ties with Tokyo frayed over wartime issues, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry has resumed the designation of "closest neighbor" for Japan in its 2020 Diplomatic White Paper, saying that "Japan is South Korea's closest neighboring country that we should work with not only for bilateral relations but also for the peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and the world." The 2019 version called Japan only a "neighboring country," compared to "the closest neighbor geographically and culturally" and a "partner" as the 2018 White Paper.

Both countries’ relations have sharply cooled down after South Korean courts in 2019 ruled in favor of Korean victims seeking damages from Japan and Japanese companies over wartime sexual enslavement and forced labor. Tokyo retaliated with export restrictions against Seoul. [Korea Herald]

South Korea-US relations: Moon and Biden agree to deepen countries’ ties

(dql) During a phone talk last week, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and US President Biden agreed to further deepen the alliance, which thus far has been focusing on peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region, into a more comprehensive partnership capable of contributing to enhancing democracy, human rights and multilateralism beyond Asia. Furthermore, the two leaders reaffirmed their common goal of denuclearized Korean Peninsula and pledged to swiftly draw up a joint North Korea strategy. They also agree to jointly strengthen efforts to improve relations between South Korea and Japan as part of building stronger trilateral ties. [Korea Herald]

US President Biden calls India’s PM Modi, as Washington plans for first Quad summit

(lm) US President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi agreed in a telephone call to strengthen the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a loose strategic coalition of Japan, India, Australia and the United States that is seen as a potential bulwark against China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Lending further credence to the affirmation, Washington as reportedly proposed an online meeting with the leaders of the other Quad members. [Kyodo News] [South China Morning Post] [Reuters]

Reports about the virtual summit also follow on a telephone conversation between Japan’s Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi and his newly appointed US counterpart Lloyd Austin held last month. Back then, both officials had reasserted the importance of the Japanese-US alliance as well as cooperation with partners outside the region for a free and open Indo-Pacific [see AiR No. 4, January/2021, 4].

Speculation about Washington’s interest in exploring a new framework for Indo-Pacific cooperation, dubbed the “Quad Plus”, received a boost in September, when then-Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun said that the US was aiming to ‘formalize’ the groupings’ military, economic and development cooperation. Though cautioning visions of an Indo-Pacific NATO at that time, Biegun also emphasized that the format shall remain open for other countries to join to “align in a more structured manner” [see AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1, AiR No. 35, September/2020, 1].

In November, then, the navies of the four countries jointly conducted the Exercise Malabar, which marked their largest joint naval drill in over a decade [see AiR No. 47, November/2020, 4]. While the exercise was formally independent of the Quad consultation mechanisms, observers back then considered Canberra’s participation after 13 years of absence a clear sign of the increasing strategic convergence of the four nations in the face of China’s vast military and economic power in the region [see AiR No. 43, October/2020, 4].

India releases details about new defense budget, increases defense capital budget by nearly 19 percent

(lm) India increased its defense budget by about 3 percent for the fiscal year 2021-22, causing experts who had expected a robust increase in response to the protracted military standoff with China, to question the timing of the country’s military modernization program. Overall, the new defense budget totals $47.4 billion, but most of the funds allocated for defense forces go toward the salaries of about 1.3 million serving personnel, pensions, infrastructure development, and repairs. [The Diplomat] [South China Morning Post]

It is noteworthy, however, that capital expenditure, which is meant for fresh arms procurement and existing liabilities, witnessed an increase of about 16 percent from the previous year’s $15.91 billion, now valued at $18.48 billion. But what is more, existing liabilities could eat up to 90 percent of the new capital expenditure, according to Indian officials, indicating a high number of previously conducted defense contracts. [Defense News] [Anadolu Agency]

Moreover, as attentive observers have remarked, India obfuscates its military expenditure by shoving provisions for quasi-military organizations such as Industrial Reserve Force and Border Security Force, alongside expenses for dockyards and border infrastructure, in civil estimates. Hence, the actual military expenditure may be much higher than the initial estimates. [Modern Diplomacy]

India plans for revolution in defense manufacturing, says Defense Minister Singh at aviation exhibition

(lm) India is planning to spend $130 billion on military modernization to advance towards its vision of Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant or self-sufficient India), Defense Minister Rajnath Singh said on February 3 while delivering the opening words at the 13th edition of the country’s premier air show, Aero India. Following on the announcement of India’s defense budget for the next fiscal year, the remarks were also an attempt to stymie observers who had found fault with an “negligible increase” in military spending [see articles this edition]. [The EurAsian Times]

Singh also inaugurated the second production line for light combat aircraft at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), a government-owned aerospace and defense company which is also behind the development of the multirole light fighter HAL Tejas. The defense minister said several countries had already expressed interest in procuring the M1A version of the aircraft, adding that the indigenously developed HLA Tejas was better than its foreign equivalents on several parameters. Earlier this month the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi approved the purchase of 83 advanced HAL Tejas to bolster the Indian Air Force’s combat potential. [Hindustan Times] [India Today] [The Indian Express]

Moreover, HAL on February 4 unveiled a developmental air-teaming system that will incorporate the HAL Tejas with unmanned aircrafts. As part of the Combined Air Teaming System (CATS), future variants of the multirole light fighter will act as a parent aircraft controlling four stealth unmanned aerial vehicles known as CATS Warrior to perform autonomous missions (e.g., scouting or absorbing enemy fire if attacked) using artificial intelligence. [Flight Global]

Iranian Defense Minister visits India, indicates deepening cooperation between New Delhi and Tehran

(lm) As US President Joe Biden is breaking away from key foreign policy hallmarks of the previous administration, India’s diplomacy vis-à-vis Iran is regaining momentum. Earlier this month, India’s official heading the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran Division in the External Affairs Ministry embarked on a two-day trip to Tehran to meet with key officials in the administration Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. [Asia Times] 

During his visit, the Indian official inquired about the development of Chabahar Port, the only Iranian port with direct access to the Indian Ocean that can be easily accessed from India's western coast, bypassing Pakistan. Against the backdrop of signs that the White House under President Biden might re-engage with Tehran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the port is being increasingly seen as a fulcrum of connectivity to Central Asia through Afghanistan and Tajikistan [see AiR No. 51, December/2020, 4]. [India West]

Shortly thereafter, Iran’s Minister of Defense Amir Hatami arrived in India on February 3 to meet with Indian Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat. During his visit, the Iranian official also participated in the opening ceremony of India’s premier air show, Aero India [see article in this edition]. Since a decade-long UN arms embargo on Iran that barred the country from purchasing conventional weapons like tanks and fighter jets expired last October, Tehran is looking to purchase military equipment from non-Western countries, especially India and China. [Tehran Times 1] [Tehran Times 2]

In an opinion piece published by the Observer Research Foundation, the author convincingly argues that the reason behind New Delhi’s increased engagement with Tehran may not be energy security or the geopolitical wrangling in West Asia, but an increasingly challenging situation in Afghanistan. [Observer Research Foundation]

Sri Lanka pulls out of three-party agreement with India and Japan for operating Eastern Coast Terminal

(lm) Scuttling a 2019 trilateral agreement with India and Japan, the Sri Lankan government has decided that the strategic Colombo Port's Eastern Container Terminal (ECT) will be exclusively operated by the state-owned Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA). A cabinet meeting held on February 1 further decided to offer the West Container Terminal to India for possible investments, instead. [The Hindu 1]

India and Japan consider their presence in the Colombo Port a strategic necessity in the face of China’s presence in the adjacent Colombo Port City project, a flagship $1.4 billion project in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) [see AiR No. 40, October/2020, 1]. According to the 2019 Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC), which was signed by the administration of then-President Maithripala Sirisena, the tri-nation project was to be developed with 51 percent ownership by Sri Lanka’s government and the remaining 49 percent as an investment by Indian multinational conglomerate Adani Group and other stakeholders, including Japan.

India has an additional reason to seek a foothold in Colombo Port as approximately 70 percent of the throughput at Colombo port is accounted for by Indian transshipment. But what is more, observers believe New Delhi’s assertive role in Sri Lanka to be part of larger efforts to regain strategic ground India has lost to China in its own backyard. Thus, the project has figured in talks at the highest levels, including when Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited Colombo in January, laying down unequivocal terms for the Indian-backed development of a container jetty in the port [see AiR No. 1, January/2021, 1]. [Nikkei Asia]

A week later, Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa told agitating trade unions that his government decided to take forward the 2019 triparty MoC after it had reviewed “regional geopolitical concerns” [see AiR No. 3, January/2021, 3]. The concessions came at a time when Sri Lanka has been holding out a virtual begging bowl for a nearly $2 billion financial lifeline - a $1 billion currency swap arrangement and $960 million debt moratorium - from India to service its multibillion-dollar international debts and to run a current account deficit estimated at $1.1 billion annually [see AiR No. 42, October/2020, 3].

However, twenty-seven trade unions instigated by the Sinhalese nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna [People's Liberation Front] (JVP) have been agitating against the deal on the grounds that it is a “sellout” of a national asset to India. The JVP and the trade unions are exploiting the fact that the ruling Sri Lanka People’s Freedom Alliance (SLPFA) had come to power in the 2019 Presidential election and last year’s parliamentary elections after campaigning on a platform aimed at stoking ethnic Sinhala nationalism, promising not to barter away national assets like ports and airports to other countries [see e.g., AiR No. 47, November/2019, 3].

Such a pledge was given following the SLPFA’s trenchant criticism against the leasing out of another deep seaport located in the south of the island after the port was operating at a loss and could not generate enough revenue to repay the loan the country had received to build it. The $1.12 billion deal, first announced in July 2016, allowed a Chinese state company to take over the port in Hambantota, which straddles the world’s busiest east-west shipping route, on a 99-year lease [see AiR December/2017, 3].

Soon after the Sri Lanka government succumbed to pressure from the trade unions, India asked all sides to abide by the existing understandings and commitment of the trilateral agreement. Further, India’s High Commissioner to Sir Lanka met with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa and Foreign Minister Dinesh Gunawardena on February 3. [Economy Next]

On February 5, then, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) refused to provide the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) a further extension of a $400 million currency swap facility set to expire on February 1, saying that the rollover would require Colombo having a successfully negotiated staff-level agreement for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) program. Commenting on reports that the denial of an extension was retributive, India’s High Commission to Colombo explained that the initial $400 million currency swap facility was provided last year for an initial period of three months and a 3-month rollover was provided lasting till the 1 February 2021 [see AiR No. 30, July/2020, 4]. [The Hindu 2] [Tamil Guardian]

In light of Colombo’s change of heart, another event assumes added significance: As early as on January 18, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa selected a Chinese company to set up hybrid wind and solar energy projects on three Sri Lankan islands only 45 kilometers off the coast of Tamil Nadu, a state in southern India. Back then, India had lodged a strong protest Sri Lanka government, citing the project site’s proximity to the Indian coastline. [The Hindu 3] [The Indian Express]

Sri Lanka rejects UN report, calls human rights body “tool for vanquished terrorists”

(lm) The Sri Lankan government rejected on February 3 a report from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, saying it contained “speculative, presumptive and unsubstantiated opinions.” [Tamil Guardian 1] [News First]

The report was mandated by Resolution 40/1 (2019), which directed the high commissioner to assess progress – or actually the lack thereof – on the implementation of the HRC’s recommendations related to reconciliation, accountability, and human rights in Sri Lanka. Published on January 27, the report inter alia puts emphasis on the continued impunity, retrograde trends on human rights and transitional justice, in addition to increased militarization and the re-emergence of ethno-nationalist rhetoric. The high commissioner also calls for the International Criminal Court to investigate the commission of international crimes during the civil war and the entrenched impunity [see AiR No. 5, February/2021, 1].

In 2019, Sri Lanka withdrew its co-sponsorship from the council’s landmark Resolution 30/1 (2015) amidst a deteriorating human rights situation on the island [see AiR (3/3/2019)]. As such, it was at first anticipated that any resolution to come out of the HRC this year would be contested (and thus subject to a vote). But new reporting suggests that the bloc of countries known as the Core Group on Sri Lanka –the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, North Macedonia and Montenegro – is working to negotiate a consensus resolution [see AiR No. 4, January/2021, 4].

Moreover, in his first address to the UN General Assembly on February 28, Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York accused the UN HRC of being a tool for terrorists. In remarks that invoked a strong response from UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, the permanent representative accused the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) of collaborating with “vanquished terrorists“ who allegedly appeal to the UN HRC to “unleash a different kind of terrorism.” [Tamil Guardian]

UN Human Rights Council picks Fiji in first-ever presidential vote, over Russian and Chinese opposition

(lm) While the UN Human Rights Council (UN HRC) is gearing up to launch its 46th session virtually on February 22, the Pacific island nation of Fiji on January 15 won an intense and secretive geo-political battle to take control the UN’s top human rights body. Fending off last-minute challenges from Bahrain and Uzbekistan, the Pacific island nation won decisively, with support from 29 countries in an unprecedented secret ballot of the Human Rights Council’s 47 members. [New York Times]

The council's presidency rotates each year among the regions and the candidate is typically agreed upon by a consensus within each regional group. However, this year, the regional members could not agree on a candidate, so a vote was required. In the Council, Fiji had backed investigations into reported abuses in Venezuela, the Philippines, Belarus, Syria and Yemen. Those positions had initiated a shadowy proxy battle waged by China, Russia and Saudi Arabia, which were seeking to install a more compliant candidate to avoid having their own human rights records scrutinized. [Deutsche Welle]

Pakistan’s machinery of bureaucracy slows down implementation of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

(lm) Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi has expressed concerns over the slow progress being made on implementing projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), cautioning that the delay should not affect the strategic nature of the bilateral relationship between Islamabad and Beijing. Previously, a meeting of the cabinet body responsible for overseeing the implementation of CPEC projects, ended prematurely, because some ministries had failed to remove administrative obstacles for execution of the projects. [The Express Tribune] [Profit By Pakistan Today]

Lending further credence to the gravity of the situation, China continues to be reluctant to schedule the next meeting of CPEC’s principal decision-making body, the Joint Cooperation Committee. While both sides are certainly willing to keep the narrative of continued progress alive, Beijing and Islamabad are embroiled in their most serious disagreement so far, causing some observers to believe that the agreement was derailing.

A case in point is the debate about the construction of the Mainline-1 (ML-1) project, the single-largest project to date under CPEC which involves upgrading and track-doubling railway lines in the Peshawar – Lahore – Karachi corridor [see AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2]. In light of the strategic importance of the project, Islamabad expected Beijing to provide up to 90 percent of the financing, further assuming that China was ready to accept a 20-years repayment period. However, citing Pakistan’s weakening financial position, China sought additional guarantees before sanctioning a $6 billion loan for the construction of the ML-1 project, and proposed a mix of commercial and concessional loan, notwithstanding Islamabad’s desire to secure the cheapest lending [see AiR No. 52, December/2020, 5].

Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates retain $2 billion financial lifeline for Pakistan

(lm) While holding a telephone conversation, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan and Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, agreed to strengthen bilateral ties between Islamabad and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The talk came after Saudi Arabia and the UAE earlier last week had extended cash support worth $2 billion, indicating a thaw in relations between Islamabad and the two Gulf nations. [The Express Tribune] [Dawn]

Last year, Saudi Arabia initially decided to withdraw its cash-support to Pakistan, withdrawing 2$ billion in loan and cancelling investment commitments of another $20 billion in Pakistan. At the time, China had come forward and extended $1 billion in loan to help Islamabad avoid any adverse impact of the partial withdrawal of the Saudi lifeline [see AiR No. 32, August/2020, 2]. Riyadh also asked its ally UAE to choke Islamabad economically by suspending work visas to its citizens [see AiR No. 51, December/2020, 4].In the face of dwindling foreign exchange reserves and a struggling economy, Islamabad last April [see AiR No. 16, April/2020, 3] then had entered into negotiations with 21 creditor countries for debt suspension under the G-20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) amounting to $1.7 billion. After Pakistan successfully concluded rescheduling agreements with 19 bilateral creditors, including members of the so-called Paris Club group of major creditor countries, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were the only two countries that were yet to ratify debt suspension agreements [see AiR No. 2, January/2021, 2].

Talks between on Rohingya repatriation deferred due to military coup in Myanmar

(lm) A long-awaited meeting of a working committee on the Rohingya repatriation between Bangladesh and Myanmar has been adjourned indefinitely, after the military overthrew Myanmar’s democratically elected government and declared a year-long state of emergency. Earlier this month Dhaka its neighbor to resume the repatriation process this year, after Myanmar had earlier said it was committed to the repatriation as per the 2017 bilateral agreement, in spite of two failed attempts in the past [see AiR No. 1, January/2021, 1]. [Dhaka Tribune 1]

Furthermore, the new administration has explained in writing to Bangladesh the reasons for the coup, citing alleged discrepancies such as duplicated names on voting lists in scores of districts in the national election held in November last year [see AiR No. 2, January/2021, 2]. [The Daily Star]

What is more, Bangladesh last week turned down a proposal to import 100,000 metric tons of rice under a government-to-government agreement from Myanmar, at a time when Dhaka is trying to replenish its depleted reserves after floods last year ravaged crops and sent prices to a record high. In December last year, Bangladesh agreed to buy 150,000 tons of rice from the National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India (NAFED), one of the largest procurement and marketing agencies for agricultural products in India. [Dhaka Tribune 2]

Pakistan, United Kingdom inch closer towards inking extradition treaty

(lm) Pakistan and the United Kingdom have advanced towards signing an extradition treaty, after Pakistan’s Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed assured on February 2 the British High Commissioner that Islamabad did not intend to use the treaty for politically motivated extradition. [Dawn]

At present, no formal extradition treaty exists between Pakistan and the UK, although Section 194 of the UK Extradition Act 2003 contains provisions for special “ad hoc” extradition arrangements. Islamabad has been seeking to sign an extradition treaty with London for a long time, but the British government had routinely expressed its reluctance to ink any such accord on the grounds that it does not sign extradition treaties with the countries subjected frequently to military rule.

Islamabad’s renewed efforts are taking place against the larger backdrop of its failure to convince London to repatriate former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who has been residing in the UK since 2019, after a court granted him indefinite bail to seek medical treatment [see AiR No. 1, January/2021, 1]. The former prime minister is facing several corruption charges in Pakistan and is considered by the courts to have absconded. He is also facing sedition charges for accusing the military of political interference [see AiR No. 41, October/2020, 2, AiR No. 37, September/2020, 3].

Pakistan: Police foils terrorist attack in Karachi

(lm) The Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) of Pakistan’s Sindh province has killed one and arrested five suspected militants, foiling a potential terrorist attack in Karachi involving guns and explosives. During the intelligence-based operation, weapons, bomb-making materials, and suicide jackets were recovered. [Dawn] [Gulf News]

Earlier Pakistan had arrested a “most wanted” militant linked to the Followers of Zainab Brigade, a pro-government brigade fighting in Syria composed of members of the Pakistani Shiite community. According to investigators, the arrested terrorist had received military training in neighboring Iran, and was named in the Red Book, a publication prepared by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) that lists human traffickers and high-profile terrorists. [Arab News]

Pakistan successfully conducts training launch of short-range ballistic missile

(lm) Pakistan successfully conducted on February 3 a flight test of its ballistic missile Ghaznavi, which could carry both nuclear and conventional warheads to a range of 290 kilometers. Earlier this month Islamabad carried out a flight-test of its Shaheen-III ballistic missile in the Northern Arabian Sea [see AiR No. 4, January/2021, 4]. [Dawn]

Sri Lanka launches CONEX-21 naval exercise

(lm) The Sri Lankan Navy on February 7 launched the third iteration of its annual Colombo Naval Exercise CONEX- Conducted off the coast of Colombo, the exercise will also involve both naval and air assets of the Sri Lanka Air Force to enhance the interoperability over the maritime domain. [South Asia Monitor] [Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense]

India, United States take part in joint military exercise in Rajasthan

(lm) Since February 8, troops from the Indian and the US armies participate in the 16th iteration of the 'Yudh Abhyas' land drill, a regularly-scheduled bilateral exercise which allows for an exchange of knowledge between the two militaries using a UN peacekeeping scenario. Taking place in the northern Indian state of Rajasthan, the two-week exercise involves around 250 soldiers from each side. [Business Standard]

Nepal: Government plans to set up six industrial zones across the country

(lm) Nepal’s Finance Ministry will be providing funds for the establishment of six industrial zones across the country, the finance minister said earlier this month. While half of the zones will be paid for by the government, Kathmandu will seek funding from foreign investors to construct the remaining three. [The Kathmandu Post]

The announcement comes at a time when Kathmandu has made public its intentions to establish four cross-border economic zones – two each along the borders with India and China –to boost trade and investment with the two neighboring countries. [AiR No. 3, January/2021, 3]

Water levels on Mekong River along Thai-Lao Border fails to bounce back

(py) End of December last year, Chinese authorities have announced to significantly reduce water levels due to equipment testing at China’s upriver Jinghong Dam. Although the equipment testing was supposed to have ended on 24th January, the water level has not been restored yet. Analysts commented the extreme low might be temporary, with China’s dry season releases usually to begin around this time of year. China has been criticized for creating water shortage for downstream countries, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, through its 11 mega-dams on the Mekong river. China agreed to share its data with the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in October 2020. [Radio Free Asia] [Reuters]

ASEAN, Indonesia to intervene in Myanmar

(nd) Following a bilateral meeting, Malaysian Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin and Indonesian President Joko Widodo announced to talk to current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Brunei, to convene a special meeting on the coup in Myanmar.

 While ASEAN disposes of a Human Rights Declaration and the Charter calls for the strengthening of democracy, good governance and rule of law, at its core understanding lie the overarching principles of non-interference and sovereignty. Since democracy as such is no prerequisite for the membership in the bloc, its backsliding does not warrant for a response. Such is mimicked in the statement by ASEAN chair Brunei, “noting” the commitment to democracy and the rule of law but calling for a dialogue and the return to normalcy. The Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia referred to the principle of non-intervention and labelled the coup an internal matter. Vietnam called for a stabilization and Malaysia for a discussion to ‘avoid adverse consequences’ of the coup. Indonesia voiced the strongest opposition, referring to uphold the ASEAN charter and use legal mechanisms to resolve the issue. Given the intentionally non-enforceable commitments to democracy in the charter, forging a common stance seems difficult.

Historically though, Indonesia assumed the position of a role model for Myanmar, which according to analysts warrants for a heightened responsibility now. Indonesia itself successfully transitioned from dictatorship to democracy. A significant role within Myanmar’s transition to democracy was assumed by former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Indonesia’s first directly elected president. Besides assisting Myanmar with minority conflicts, drafting of laws and education on democratic institution, the presence of himself and former military allies who turned into democratic reformers were the most obvious message sent. In contrast to current president Widodo, whose agenda is focused on domestic issues, SBY was looking for an international statesman position with a democracy-infused diplomatic agenda. Therefore, some suggested SBY to function as Indonesia's envoy to Myanmar to advocate credibly for military reforms. 

Any intervention in Myanmar is shadowed by a fear of Myanmar gravitating further to China if pressured too much. As well as the muted bloc’s response carries the fear of further coups and authoritarian takeovers in the region. [Reuters] [Benarnews] [East Asia Forum]

Indonesia, US to meet over VFA

(nd) In an effort to straighten out differences over the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), the Philippines and US announced to meet. This comes amid rising tensions with China in the disputed South China Sea. Last year, President Rodrigo Duterte’s unilateral decision to terminate the VFA in February was suspended in November for a second time. Duterte’s decision came amid the US denying a visa to a senator, who was involved in Duterte’s infamous war on drugs.

The VFA outlines legal guidelines for US troop to operate on a rotational basis in the Philippines. According to experts, other bilateral defense agreements, like the Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT), cannot be implemented without a valid VFA. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized this correlation in his reaction to the Philippine’s protest of a Chinese Law allowing its coats guard to open fire on foreign vessels. China claims almost the entirety of the South China Sea for itself, despite the rejection of such claims in a 2016 international tribunal ruling. [Reuters] [See also AiR No. 5, February/2021, 1] Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. commented the Philippine would not contest the newly enacted law, in an effort not to re-open litigation on Chinese territorial claims. [Benar News]

Indonesia: Sovereign wealth fund without China

(nd) Indonesia’s sovereign wealth fund, called the Indonesia Investment Authority (INA) has appointed advisory board members and received investment commitments from Japan, US, Canada, Netherlands and Australia. Eventually, investors will be able to choose to either invest in the “master fund” or “thematic fund”, which can be a particular industry or project. The fund will be used to finance President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s infrastructure projects, with an initial volume of US$5 billion, and an eventually planned US$20 billion. China’s absence in the round of initial investors has led to the suspicion Indonesia intentionally left China out. One reason is to avoid Chinese control over key Indonesian infrastructure, although the majority sum for the projects will come from foreign capital. A second reason is the aim to diversify its portfolio by including different countries. In 2020, China was Indonesia’s second-biggest foreign investor with an investment volume of US$4.8 billion, following Singapore with US$9.8 billion, according to Indonesia’s investment board (BKPM). Since 2015, Chinese investment in Indonesia grew by 559% and included over 10,000 projects in various industries. Both reasons resonate well with an ongoing anti-China sentiment in the country.

A major obstacle for the sovereign wealth fund will be securing trust of international investors. The legal proceedings with regards to the Malaysian 1MDB fund were just settled. Also, two of Widodo’s cabinet ministers, Edhy Prabowo, former fisheries minister, and former social minister Juliari Batubara, were forced to resign over graft charges. Indonesia slipped 17 places in Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index. According to analysts, it is also central to establish checks and balances, reporting guidelines and transparency mechanisms to distract investor’s worries about the management of the fund. Additionally, experts argue sovereign wealth funds are usually installed when a country has a big surplus and disposes of foreign-exchange reserves or has big natural resources, all of which is lacking in Indonesia.

About US$450 billion shall be spent on infrastructure projects through 2024, including the new capital construction in East Kalimantan, with 30% coming from national sources. [South China Morning Post]

Myanmar, New Zealand to suspend contact; Australian Turnell remains detained

(nd) Following the military coup in Myanmar last week, New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern announced to suspend all high-level contact with Myanmar and the imposition of a travel ban on its military leaders. Additionally, New Zealand will scrutinize their aid programs and projects do not benefit the military. The aid program has had a value of about NZ$42 million ($30 million) between 2018 and 2021. New Zealand urged the military regime to release all detainees and restore civilian rule. Last week, the economic advisor to Myanmar State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Australian national Sean Turnell was abducted. His family has called for his immediate release. [Reuters] [Irrawaddy]

Singaporean investor to cut ties to Myanmar military

(nd) Singaporean businessman and co-founder of Hong Kong-listed gaming group Razer, Lim Kaling, announced to cut economic ties to Myanmar’s military, following last week’s coup. Lim was a minority shareholder (49%) in Virginia Tobacco Company through RMH Singapore Pte Ltd, with the rest held by Myanmar Economic Holdings (MEHL). MEHL is one of the two conglomerates run by the military, which have connections to nearly every industry and sector in the country. Local advocacy group Justice For Myanmar welcomed the step and urged Lim to persuade RMH Singapore to end their business with MEHL. Earlier, Japanese beverage producer Kirin announced to end its long-standing joint venture with MEHL, following pressure by activists. Such moves were promoted by human rights groups to foreign investors for years. 

Myanmar’s economy, already hit by the repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic, is likely to suffer more from last week’s coup, with Western sanctions lurking. Sen. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing in a televised speech was eager to present stability, saying this coup would be “different”, foreign investors are invited and all development projects would continue. Although adverse reactions of foreign investors after the Military’s crimes against the Rohingya Muslims of western Myanmar in 2017 were largely inexistent, the latest coup is likely to see stronger repercussions, for its definite end to Myanmar’s era of political reform. [The Diplomat]

Announcements

Upcoming Online Events 

10 February 2021 @ 1.00 p.m. (GMT-5), Center for a New American Security, USA

Virtual Fireside Chat: India, China, and the Quad: The Future of U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the world’s economic and geopolitical center of gravity. This region has become the central theater in the competition between the United States and China to shape the course of the 21st century, while at the same time the nuclear and conventional threat posed by North Korea remains a flashpoint for major-power war. Lisa Curtis, the inaugural CNAS Indo-Pacific Security Program Director will be joined by Demetri Sevastopulo, U.S.-China Correspondent for the Financial Times, to explore these challenges.

For more information and registration, please visit the website [CNAS]

10 February 2021 @ 10.30 a.m. (GMT+1), European Council on Foreign Relations, Germany

The EU, Japan and the US in Indo-Pacific – a conversation with Prof Nobushige Takamizawa

In 2016, Japan published its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, underscoring the importance of a rules-based order in the region. Europe, on the other hand, has been more cautious in the adoption of this concept. But the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for Europe to recalibrate the status quo and actively expand its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. This event will explore the Japanese understanding of FOIP, the efforts to bring it about and potential for closer cooperation with Europe and the United States.

For more information and registration, please visit the website [ECFR]

10 February 2021 @ 10:30-11: 30 am EST, Atlantic Council, USA

A conversation with the President of the European Council Charles Michel in 2021

This event will discuss the question how Brussels and Washington can tackle shared challenges like COVID-19, the economic recovery, climate change, and a more volatile geopolitical environment? What are concrete steps to reshape and upgrade transatlantic cooperation? How can the two sides overcome differences on issues like trade?

For more detail see, [Atlantic Council]

12 February 2021 @ 11:30 - 1:00 pm ET, Freeman Spogli Institute for International, US 

Studies, Incomplete Struggles and Evolving Trajectories in Egypt 

The panelists reflect on a variety questions including: How have political developments in Egypt and elsewhere in recent years informed our understanding of the January 25 Uprising and its significance? In what ways have authoritarian institutions adapted in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising and how have they shaped the prospects for political change and/or stability? Where are the sites of political contestation and resistance in today’s Egypt?

Please register here: [FSI]

12 February 2021 @ noon (GMT-5), Hudson Institute, United States

Corruption in International Sports: Delivering Justice with the Rodchenkov Act 

As a reaction to the widespread and state-sponsored doping discovered at the Olympics in Sochi 2014, US Congress passed the Rodchenkov Act in 2020 to extend U.S. Law enforcement jurisdiction to international sport competition with connection to the U.S. In the moderated panel discussion, experts will elaborate on how its enforcement is able to tackle doping fraud in international sporting events.

For more information and registration, please visit the website [Hudson Institute]

15 February 2021 @ 6.15 p.m. (GMT+11), Lowy Institute, Australia

The year ahead (Canberra)

This panel discussion will cover the key issues likely to dominate Australia’s international agenda in 2021, including our relations with China and America, the COVID and climate-change agenda, and how the new US administration will approach the region.

For more information and registration, please visit the website [Lowy Institute]

16 February 2021 @ noon (GMT-5), Hudson Institute, United States

One Belt One Road and Great Power Competition: A Conversation with Eyck Freymann

In this expert conversation, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow Nadia Schadlow and Asia-Pacific Security Chair Patrick Cronin will discuss with Eyck Freymann, author of the “One Belt One Road: Chinese Power Meets the World”. The participants will discuss the strategy and tactic behind China’s ambitious infrastructure program and shed light on the U.S.’s possibility to compete with it.

For more information and registration, please visit the website [Hudson Institute]

16 February 2021 @ 3.30 p.m. (GMT+1), Institut Montaigne, France

The CAI Effect: Upending the Notion of a Systemic Rivalry with China?

By the end of last year, the European Commission and China concluded discussions on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), which resulted in an intense debate in Europe and the US. This moderated panel discussion, co-hosted by the Institut Montaigne and the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) follows the publication of “Wins and losses in the EU-China Investment Agreement (CAI), a policy paper by Francois Godement, Senior Advisor Asia, Institut Montaigne and will also highlight consequences for the EU’s relation with both China and the US.

For more information and registration, please visit the website [Institut Montaigne]

16 February @ 16.00 p.m. (GMT +9), Institute for Global Environment Strategies (IGES), Japan 

Recent Developments in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement towards Carbon Neutral

This moderated panel discussion will elaborate on global development with respect to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. In order to accomplish Japan’s goals to be carbon-neutral by 2050, this event provides information to prospective partners to participate in its “Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM)”.

For more information and registration, please visit the website [IGES]

16 February 2021 @ 3:30 - 4:30 pm IST, Observer Research Foundation, India

Green transitions: Catalysing India-EU relations for a green future 

This event will discuss how India and the EU can work together to realise the future of a greener world. How will India and the EU lead multilateral efforts and become role models for others to support green transitions?

Please register here: [ORF]

16 February  2021 @ 18:30 - 19:30 pm AEST, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Australia

The growth of the far right in the United States and its implications for Australia 

The United States has thoroughly tested the mettle of its own democracy. While a new president sits in the Oval Office, the country remains in the grips of multiple and linked crises: a health crisis, an economic crisis, a national security crisis and a crisis of truth. The growth of the far-right permeates them all. How did the situation with the far right deteriorate to the level of a failed insurrection? How will these forces evolve after the departure of President Trump? And how will this all impact Australia? 

For more information, see [NSW]

17 February 2021 @ 5.00 p.m. (GMT+1), The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden

American Politics: The Future of the Democratic Party and Politics of the Biden-Harris Administration

This panel discussion will explore the key challenges for the Democratic Party and the Biden-Harris administration. Seth Masket, professor of political science and director of the Center on American Politics at the University of Denver will be joined by Elizabeth Walentin, founder and CEO of Crimson Clarke.

For more information and registration, please visit the website [SIIA]

18 February 2021 @ 6.00 p.m. (GMT-5), Hudson Institute, United States

Patent Litigation in China: Navigating a Changing Environment 

This moderated panel discussion will present the latest development in patent litigation in China, which has been growing fast in recent years and has strong implications on international business operating in China.

For more information and registration, please visit the website [Hudson Institute]

18 February 2021 @ 15:00 - 15:45 EET, Carnegie Middle East Center, Lebanon

Where is the MENA Economy Headed? A Conversation with Jihad Azour 

This event will discuss what lies ahead on the path toward recovery as well as Azour’s latest IMF blogpost, Cooperation Critical to Reduce Divergent Paths to Recovery in Middle East and Central Asia.

For more information, see [CMEC]

23 February 2021 @ 6.00 p.m. (GMT+11), Lowy Institute, Australia

The year ahead (Sydney)

This panel discussion will cover the key issues likely to dominate Australia’s international agenda in 2021, including our relations with China and America, the COVID and climate-change agenda, and how the new US administration will approach the region.

For more information and registration, please visit the website [Lowy Institute]

23 February @ 4.00 p.m. (GMT +0), Institute for Public Policy Research, United Kingdom

Webinar: 'The truth about modern slavery' with Emily Kenway

This event marks the launch of a new book by Emily Kenway, a former policy adviser to the UK's first Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner. “The Truth About Modern Slavery”, reveals how modern slavery operates as a political story, created by those in power to cloak the harms of the 'hostile environment' towards migrants, legitimize big brands' exploitation of the poorest workers and oppress those most marginalized in society.

For more information and registration, please visit the website [IPPR]

26 February 2021 @ 9.30 a.m. (GMT+1), Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade (IFAT), Hungary

Economic cooperation and investment between Hungary and Japan

This moderated panel discussion will shed light on investment opportunities and possibilities of economic cooperation between Hungary and Japan. 

For more information and registration, please visit the website [IFAT]

Recent book releases

Maria Bartiromo, The Cost: Trump, China, and American Revival, Threshold Editions, 304 pages, October 27, 2020, reviewed in [thecostbook].

Jonathan Kaufman, The Last Kings of Shanghai: The Rival Jewish Dynasties That Helped Create Modern China, Viking, 382 pages, June 2, 2020, reviewed in [Forbes]

Isabel Wilkerson, Caste: The Lies That Divide Us, Penguin Random House, 496 pages, September 15, 2020, reviewed in [The Guardian].

Calls

The University of Constanta is inviting interested scholars to submit research papers for publication in the prospective issue of Annals of the „Ovidius” University of Constanta – Political Science Series (AUOC-SP), vol. 10/2021. The submission deadline is June 1, 2021. For more details, see [AOUC].

The Radical History Review is seeking to contribution for its special issue on political imprisonments and confinements. The submission deadline is September 1, 2021. Further information are available at [Radical History Review]

Jobs & positions

The Netherlands Institute for the study of Crime and Law Enforcement is offering a position of researcher to participate in fundamental scientific research in crime and law enforcement. The closing date of submissions is March 7, 2021. For more details, see [Academic positions]

The Goethe University Frankfurt is hiring a position of research assistant to participate in academic collaboration with the International Centre for Insurance Regulation. The closing date of submissions is March 15, 2021. For more information, see [ICIR]

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