Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (Sergei Bobylev\TASS via Getty Images)

Despite Xi Jinping’s seeming neutrality towards Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin's actions threaten China's short- and long-term ambitions. As Russia wants to be globally relevant and China want to be globally dominant, what will this mean for Beijing and Moscow's uneasy partnership? Hudson's experts weigh in below. 

Join us next week as Professor Yasuhiro Matsuda, one of Japan's leading security experts, offers his assessment of how Russia's invasion will affect China, Taiwan, and cross strait relations, and sign up for our special edition Re: Ukraine newsletter series. 

China and Russia's Uneasy Partnership

1. China Seeks to Defang Russia [Miles Yu]

Russia wants to be globally relevant; China wants to be globally dominant. There is a clash of ambitions here between the two. China has long undermined Russia by making sure that Putin's ambitions, especially his pet scheme, the Eurasian Economic Community, would not work. China started to undercut Russia some 20 years ago with typically CCP-style strategic wiles: first with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), then through the Belt and Road Initiative and other programs, luring Russia into a trap where the CCP would eventually dominate. 

As for Ukraine, China riled Russia tremendously for wooing Ukraine into a "strategic partnership" with Beijing without Moscow's approval. Russia is also angry at China for having obtained many Russian-designed big-ticket weapons from Ukraine at a fraction of the Russian price tags. 

As of now, China is the only country that has a treaty pledging nuclear umbrella protection for Ukraine in case Ukraine is under a nuclear threat by a third country, meaning Russia. This may be one of the reasons why Putin was conducting a nuclear test with Belarus days before the Ukraine invasion. Someone should ask China whether it intends to honor its nuke pledge for Ukraine. The promiscuous relationship between Kyiv and Beijing has played an important role in Russia's strategic calculation.

2. Putin's Actions Threaten China's Economy [Thomas Duesterberg]

Xi’s decision to back Putin will weaken China’s near- and long-term economic outlook, which in turn could have domestic political consequences for his attempt to remain ruler for life.

As an importer and place to invest, Russia offers little of enduring value to China.  Around one percent of China’s huge goods export machine, $49 billion in 2020, goes to Russia. In 2009 Putin agreed with Jiang Zemin on a list of more than 200 infrastructure and development projects as something of a precursor to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Five years later only 10 percent of those projects were even started, even though Putin continually notes the need for massive infrastructure improvement. 

China is already in danger of a downward economic spiral due to its high levels of debt and real estate crisis. In these circumstances, it can ill afford to further alienate Western nations by siding with Putin’s reckless adventurism on the borders of Europe. China has little to gain economically from an entente with Russia, and much to lose from Western sanctions. The Russian incursion into Ukraine, and the Western response to that aggression, will make Chinese economic recovery even more problematic. 

3. China's Ties to Russia Will Win Out [William Schneider]

Chinese and Russian long-term interests are too mutually dependent to become divided. Xi and Putin have met 37 times since Xi came to power which reflects agreement on a wide set of shared interests and activities that will be played out over the next few decades. China and Russia have concluded almost identical economic and military cooperation treaties with Iran that will facilitate, and perhaps accelerate their collaboration in the Middle East and Africa now that the U.S. has abandoned its position in the Gulf region.

China and Russia's “Joint Statement on International Relations” at their Olympics Summit on February 4 has been an enabler of Chinese support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China was aware of Russia’s plan for the invasion, and successfully appealed to President Putin to defer the invasion until after the Beijing Olympics concluded on February 20. China also agreed to help offset the effects of the Western sanctions on Russia. 

The Sino-Russian dimension of the Ukraine conflict is crucial and extends far beyond the immediate exigencies. China is Ukraine’s largest trading partner. The U.S. has been trying to block China’s acquisition of the Ukrainian aircraft engine manufacturer, Motor Sich, to prevent Beijing from gaining access to their metallurgy for advanced military aircraft engines—a task that will be rendered easier when Russia takes over in Kyiv. The events in Ukraine are an expression of Sino-Russian collaboration that we are likely to see repeated elsewhere as President Putin attempts to morph the former Soviet Union into a 21st century Russian Empire.

Quotes may be edited for clarity and length. 

Go Deeper

***Correction: The subject line preceding Peter Rough’s excerpt in yesterday’s Re: NATO and Nuclear newsletter should have read: As Russia Moves West, NATO Will Come East.