NEWS WRAP

Bloomberg for president?

• Former NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg has two dominant obsessions: defeating Donald Trump and becoming the 46th president. He will not head the effort to attain either, according to Non-Resident Senior Fellow Bruce Wolpe, who weighs in on Bloomberg's recently announced candidacy. READ MORE HERE.
   

• President Trump has referred to the press as the “enemy of the people”, yet spends a lot of his time consuming news content and broadcasting favourable items on Twitter. So, is he getting a rough deal out of the mainstream media compared to previous administrations? Former White House Assistant Press Secretary Kim Hoggard, now a USSC non-resident fellow, joins the 2020Vision podcast this week to share her thoughts on this White House's relationship with the media, the impeachment process and the 2020 election. LISTEN HERE.
   
• The US dollar remains the dominant currency for international trade and investment, but contrary to popular myth this dominant role owes very little to its status as a so-called "reserve currency", according to USSC Trade and Investment Director Stephen Kirchner. He's written an extensive report on the US dollar’s current and future role in the world economy. READ MORE HERE.
   
• However much Indo-Pacific countries worry about the United States, and especially the White House’s erraticism, the more pressing question for the region is how to deal with a rising and increasingly assertive China, writes Senior Fellow Charles Edel in The Australian Financial Review. Edel's piece comes off the back of the East Asia Summit in Bangkok last week. READ MORE HERE.
   
• Hundreds of emails sent by White House senior adviser Stephen Miller to a former Breitbart news editor prior to the 2016 presidential election show that he recommended white nationalist websites and literature, according to a new report by the Southern Poverty Law Center. Miller is largely regarded as the architect of the Trump administration’s hardline immigration policy. READ MORE HERE.

ANALYSIS

Nuclear deterrence and the US-Australia alliance

Stephan Frühling, Andrew O’Neil, and David Santoro

Speaking at the Hudson Institute in Washington DC two weeks ago, Defence Minister Linda Reynolds affirmed Australia’s readiness to play a more active role in supporting US deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Her remarks come at a time when the United States is demanding more burden-sharing from its allies, fiscally and strategically. Although Australia has so far escaped Donald Trump’s fixation on other allies’ low defence spending, the Morrison government is acutely aware of the need to step up, and to do so publicly.

But what does supporting US deterrence entail in practice? Deterrence rests on the credible threat that the United States is able and willing to use conventional and, ultimately, nuclear weapons to prevent a conflict with China and, if that fails, to manage its escalation. Australia shares these objectives, but to contribute to deterrence in the alliance raises difficult questions for both the United States and Australia, and their relationship as allies.

The scope for cooperation between Australia and the United States in deterring great power conflict in Asia is greater than it has been in decades. Canberra and Washington share a view of China as the main regional threat, and have agreed to jointly examine how long-range US air and naval operations from Australia could support common allied interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Both countries have been content so far with the low profile of nuclear weapons in the alliance. Yet in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States articulated in greater depth the relevance of nuclear weapons for the management of great power competition. There is a growing realisation among Australia’s strategic community that nuclear deterrence will become more relevant for Australian defence policy, and that increased allied contributions are required if the United States is to play the long-term stabilising role that Australia wants.

Still, allied agreement on the need for deterrence does not erase different perspectives on the relative costs and benefits this would entail. To date, the “joint facilities” are the only area relating to nuclear weapons where US and Australian assessment of these costs and benefits overlap sufficiently to enable practical cooperation. Neither Australia nor the United States are so far seeking deployment of US nuclear weapons to Australia, but this does not mean that the current, limited role of nuclear weapons in the alliance exhausts the potential for further cooperation:

First, in the next AUSMIN summit communique, Australia and the United States should start to regularly affirm the value and role of nuclear deterrence for strategic stability. Negotiating common formulations will help Canberra and Washington engage on underlying policy assumptions and frame discussions during crises. Talking about nuclear weapons demonstrates that both allies are considering the demands from great power conflict at the most senior levels of government. Not doing so cedes the field to the advocates of the ‘Ban Treaty’ and unilateral disarmament that would undermine the alliance and regional stability.

Second, Australia and the United States should have a frank discussion on the role of arms control in international security. The Trump administration’s cavalier attitude to arms control is not what allies want to see from a reliable ally, and serious discussion of a future nuclear arms control agreement should provide a basis for useful strategic dialogue with Beijing.

Third, Australia and the United States should use a mix of official, think tank and academic dialogues to draw out the views of Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries on a more explicit posture of regional deterrence, including the role of nuclear weapons in international stability. How Indonesia reacts to competing narratives of strategic stability from the ANZUS allies and from Beijing is crucial not just for Australia, but also for the United States to nest its regional deterrence in a narrative for Indo-Pacific stability.

Finally, Australia and the United States should explore practical cooperation in conventional long-range strike operations to signal the possibility Australia may consider increased cooperation, including in relation to nuclear forces, should China significantly raise its threat to regional stability. Australian Joint Strike Fighters could, for example, provide suppression of enemy air defences for US long range bombers in exercises; and Australia could support long-range targeting capabilities to enable US strike operations, including by new US intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles.

Neither Australia nor the United States have any interest in deploying US nuclear weapons in Australia. But we cannot assume this will pertain into the future. Whether we like it or not, deterrence will be central to the strategic shape of things to come in the Indo-Pacific, and it is time for Australia to step up.

Stephan Frühling, Andrew O’Neil, and David Santoro are the authors of 'Escalating Cooperation: Nuclear Deterrence and the US-Australia Alliance'. 

DIARY

The week ahead

• Wednesday, 13 November: President Trump will host and give a press conference with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
   

• Wednesday, 13 November: Deadline for 2020 Democratic presidential candidates to qualify for November debate.
   

• Thursday, 14 November: President Trump will meet with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg.
   

• Wednesday, 20 November: Democratic primary debate in Atlanta, Georgia hosted by MSNBC and The Washington Post.

EVENT

Impeachment: The Insider’s Guide

We are on the precipice of the third presidential impeachment in United States history. No US president, however, has ever been removed from office. Will President Trump be the first? What impact will impeachment have on US policymaking? What are the lessons from past impeachments? How will impeachment affect US foreign policy in 2020 and what can US allies expect from the United States heading into next year's election?

Please join us to discuss these issues at the launch event of “Impeachment: The Insider’s Guide”, a compilation of analysis by United States Studies Centre experts. The compilation features essays on impeachment from diverse angles, including:

• US public opinion by Professor Simon Jackman, United States Studies Centre CEO and a leading expert on political science and polling
• History by Dr. Charles Edel, a senior fellow at the United States Studies Centre who served on the US Secretary of State’s policy planning staff from 2015 to 2017
• Foreign policy by Dr. Gorana Grgic, a University of Sydney Lecturer in US Politics and Foreign Policy
• Partisan bias by Mia Love, a non-resident Senior Fellow and former Republican member of Congress
• Political implications by Bruce Wolpe, a non-resident Senior Fellow who was a Democratic staffer in Congress and chief of staff to former Prime Minister Julia Gillard.

The event will feature coverage of these topics by Professor Jackman, Dr Edel, Dr Grgic and Mr Wolpe.

DATE & TIME
Wednesday, 27 November
6pm–7pm

LOCATION
USSC Boardroom, Institute Building, City Road, Darlington, University of Sydney

COST
$10 general admission

VIDEO

Pete Buttigieg reflects on his tour of duty during Veterans Day address 

THE WEEK IN TWEETS

#Transcripts