No images? Click here 29 SeptemberCan the closer close?After a historic month in foreign policy, the Biden administration now faces an October that holds the potential to derail President Biden's ambitious domestic agenda. In addition to navigating a potential government shutdown and unprecedented government default, the Biden administration is also staring down the rejection of both bipartisan and Democratic infrastructure bills. Amid lengthy, complex and often confusing congressional negotiations, the central tension on infrastructure debates remains unchanged: President Biden and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi want to enact infrastructure legislation but the size and scope of it has yet to be agreed upon by all congressional Democrats, let alone even a majority of Republicans. Few came to the White House with more legislative experience than Joe Biden – after all, he played a central role in congressional negotiations when he was Vice President in the Obama administration – yet it remains unclear if he has the ability to successfully pass ambitious legislation in such a polarised political environment. To discuss whether these potentially catastrophic political impasses are simply the new normal for US politics or the harbinger of worse to come, please join our conversation with two preeminent experts on US politics, the Brookings Institution's Sarah Binder and Thomas Mann. WEBINAR | 7 OctoberThe future of US politics: A conversation with the Brookings Institution's Sarah Binder and Thomas MannDuring the 2020 presidential campaign, then-candidate Joe Biden famously predicted that a loss by President Trump in the November 2020 election would force Republicans to have an “epiphany” and turn away from Trump. This prediction was not dissimilar from President Obama’s comments during the 2012 presidential election, in which Obama predicted “I believe that if we’re successful in this election, when we’re successful in this election, that the fever may break…because there’s a tradition in the Republican Party of more common sense than that.” But has the Democrat-projected epiphany occurred? Can Biden’s track record for bipartisanship change the course of polarisation? Can one of the most experienced presidents in US history buck historical trends and bring about an era of bipartisanship? What are the implications for Australia if US political divide worsens? To discuss these issues, please join the United States Studies Centre (USSC) for a webinar featuring Sarah Binder and Thomas Mann, Senior Fellows in Governance Studies at The Brookings Institution in conversation with USSC Non-Resident Senior Fellow Bruce Wolpe. WHEN: COST: You can also subscribe to have event invitations and reminders sent straight to your inbox, so you never have to miss an event! NEWS WRAPShutting down
![]() I know a lot of you in the press, particularly, doubt that unity is possible, that anything bipartisan is possible. It’s hard, but it’s necessary. And it can get done. ANALYSISQuad must be a seagoing deterrentTom Corben Unlike last week’s AUKUS surprise, the Quad Leaders’ Summit in Washington, DC, is set to focus on geoeconomics, critical technology, health security and climate change. These are pressing regional issues over which Australia, India, Japan and the United States must work to increase their capacity for collective action. But the four leaders must also find time to discuss the rapidly deteriorating strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific – and return this issue to the top of their agenda. Time is not on our side. Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines will play a significant role in upholding a favourable balance of power towards the end of the 2030s. That’s a very long time to wait. In the intervening decades, it’s critical that Australia gets its security partnerships and high-end defence networks such as the Quad working better to meet the military challenges China is posing today. This requires the Quad to sharpen its focus on the maritime domain. A second summit in just eight months shows the Quad’s leaders are ambitious about taking their policy agenda up a gear. Progress on cyber security, critical technologies, health and supply chain security will signal the Quad is serious about providing public goods for the Indo-Pacific – and competing with China for influence in the process. But maritime security remains a primary point of convergence between the Quad members’ regional strategic interests. All are concerned about China’s fast-growing navy, expanding strategic presence and capacity to coerce regional nations and erode freedom of navigation. All have also expressed a desire to collectively deter Beijing from military adventurism – an objective that is beginning to evolve into reality. Major maritime drills such as the annual Malabar exercises – Australia has been included since 2020 – have become important fixtures for Quad nations to deepen interoperability. There’s also been a proliferation of “Quad minus” exercises among a subset of members focused on anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness. The Quad should now translate these exercises into peacetime deterrence operations. Coordinated naval and anti-submarine warfare patrols in key regional waterways from the Indian Ocean to the East China Sea would send a powerful message of the Quad’s collective resolve and readiness to act in the event of a Chinese provocation. Such operations should leverage the advanced air and naval capabilities of all four partners to full effect. Quad militaries operate increasingly sizable and sophisticated maritime forces, including derivatives of the advanced P-8 maritime patrol aircraft as well as surface ships outfitted for theatre defence and anti-submarine warfare. This is an excerpt from an article first published in the Australian Financial Review.
![]() BY THE NUMBERSWhy Democrats are in a rush to get legislation passed Sarah Hamilton As the 2022 midterm elections loom, President Biden and the Democrats will seek to pass as much legislation as possible through Congress while they still hold a slight majority. Currently, the Democrats hold 220 seats to the Republican's 212 in the House. And while the Senate is at a 50-50 split, the Democrats have control with Vice President Kamala Harris as leader of the Senate. Midterm elections typically result in a loss of seats for the presiding leader's party. In the 2010 midterm elections under President Obama, the Democrats lost 64 seats and the majority in the House and nine in the Senate. Similarly, during the 2018 midterms under President Trump, Republicans lost two seats in the Senate and 41 in the House, resulting in a GOP minority in the House of Representatives. THE ALLIANCE AT 70 | TRADE AND INVESTMENTThe Alliance in an economic context The following is an excerpt from The Alliance at 70 In November 2002, US Trade Representative Bob Zoellick visited Canberra and formally announced America’s intention to negotiate an FTA with Australia. Initially, an FTA was viewed more as a way to inject some of the closeness of the security Alliance into the countries’ economic relationship and not so much as a means to seek traditional trade benefits for certain sectors. Indeed, agricultural issues remained a sticking point through negotiations and even upon signing. In particular, sugar was saccharine. ‘The sugar lobby in the United States is a terribly protectionist lobby,’ Zoellick explained. ‘Because in the Senate, you’ve got two senators, we’ve got a lot of sugar states because of sugar beets as well as sugar cane and I couldn’t run the risk that those guys would hold this up. So, I couldn’t include any sugar even though the prime minister made his best efforts for Queensland and others.’ Vaile noted this agricultural impasse specifically when outlining the arguments for a deal beyond the economic gains: additional US investment to Australia; greater integration of business between the two markets; and the demonstration effects of ‘competitive liberalisation’ for other WTO members. Specifically, he noted an FTA ‘would help engender a broader appreciation – in both countries – of our alliance and our common role in helping underpin the stability and prosperity of East Asia and the Pacific’ which was ‘now doubly important given the nature of the threats to security – and especially to Western interests – in the region.’ The first round of Australia-US FTA negotiations began in Canberra the following March and Australia’s contribution to the US-led invasion of Iraq accelerated American interest to do a deal. Prime Minister John Howard enthused in 2004 the FTA was a ‘once-in-a-generation opportunity to link the Australian economy with the greatest economy the world has ever seen.’ Yet the agreement attracted criticism. Some argued it would weaken Australia’s desire to push for multilateral trade liberalisation under the WTO and was a retrograde move away from the anticipated bounty of Asia’s economic future. And the United States didn’t appear to be giving up as much as it had in other bilateral agreements, particularly in agriculture. Cultural diplomacy won the day, as Zoellick tells it. ‘At the end of the day, while we were going to have difficult issues, we knew that if we could pitch this as voting for a country, as opposed to a deal, that we were in good shape.’ The unique US-Australian relationship was enough to secure the deal. Australian Ambassador to the United States Michael Thawley later said, ‘My commission from the legislative affairs part of the White House was 80 Democrat votes,’ and he made it. As President George W Bush signed legislation for the first bilateral preferential trade and investment agreement between the two countries on 3 August 2004, it was apparent the wider consequence for the Alliance was essential. Bush recalled ‘for nearly a century, our two nations have been allies in war and partners in peace’ and ‘our commitment to political and economic freedom remains firm.’ He added, the FTA ‘expands our security and political alliance by creating a true economic partnership.’ VIDEOShadow Foreign Minister Penny Wong at USSCDid you miss last week's webinar? The United States Studies Centre hosted a virtual address and in-conversation event with Senator the Hon Penny Wong to launch the United States Studies Centre report “Correcting the course: How the Biden administration should compete for influence in the Indo-Pacific.” If you missed the event, the full replay is now available to stream. Tune in HERE. Catch more analysis on the United States on the USSC YouTube channel. Manage your email preferences | Forward this email to a friend United States Studies Centre |