No Images? Click here 4 DECEMBERImpeachment report lands as Trump touches down in LondonDemocrats controlling three House committees have released their impeachment report, alleging President Trump acted to solicit foreign interference in US elections and impeded Congress' investigative efforts. The 300-page report draws its conclusions from a comprehensive record of more than two months of testimony from US diplomats, officials, whistleblowers, witnesses and experts. “The impeachment inquiry into Donald J. Trump, the 45th president of the United States, uncovered a months long effort by President Trump to use the powers of his office to solicit foreign interference on his behalf in the 2020 election," the report reads. The report was formally approved by the House Intelligence Committee and now goes to the House Judiciary Committee, where specific articles of impeachment are expected to be drafted. The report landed the day after President Trump touched down in London for NATO talks. Lecturer in US foreign policy and politics Gorana Grgic joined Radio National's 'A Foreign Affair' program to discuss how the genesis and process of these impeachment proceedings intersect with US foreign policy under President Trump. Experts from across the United States Studies Centre, including Dr Grgic, recently published a collection of essays on the history, politics and popular support for impeachment. READ MORE HERE NEWS WRAPHarris bows out
![]() "We’re at war. If you’re our strategic partner, then you can’t go blocking anything for us. I think that’s just about fairness. It’s not about a quid pro quo. It just goes without saying." Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky ![]() ANALYSISEbbing opportunity: Australia and the US National Technology and Industrial BaseBrendan Thomas-Noone The US defence industrial base is failing to draw upon one of Washington’s greatest strengths: its global network of trusted allies. In response, the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) — a US legislative framework — was expanded by Congress in 2017 to include Australia and the United Kingdom. The two countries joined Canada, which was added in 1993, the year of the NTIB’s formation. The addition of Australia and the United Kingdom was a key allied component of a broader effort to equip the US Department of Defense with the tools necessary to maintain a conventional military-technological advantage in an age of growing strategic competition. It was premised on a strategic assumption that only some in the US system fully appreciate; namely, that for the United States and its allies to maintain a military-technological edge vis-à-vis great power adversaries, Washington must aggregate the research and development (R&D) and industrial bases of its allies, and incentivise the co-development of new capabilities. But since 2017, efforts to implement the legislation, break down decades-old export control barriers with allies, and establish projects beyond the bare minimum have been limited. The result is Australia and Australian industry face real and growing opportunity costs which hamper Canberra’s ability to maintain its own competitive military advantage and serve as an effective US ally in the Indo-Pacific. Australian leaders should elevate NTIB progress to the political level and further efforts to make the strategic case in Washington as to why more extensive and ambitious implementation of the original vision of the NTIB is needed. The NTIB’s congressional authors intended for it to be a political platform for a renewed push for US defence industrial base and defence export reform, with the objective to emulate a “defence free-trade area”. But to-date, the NTIB has only managed to facilitate some limited bilateral cooperation between members, far from the progressive multilateral framework it was intended to be. The NTIB is defined as encompassing the people and organisations that are involved in national security and dual-use R&D, production and sustainment — or the defence industrial bases of the member countries broadly defined. But the actions to be taken under the NTIB, as it is written in legislation, are fairly narrow. The direction from Congress given to the US Department of Defense only states the requirement to submit a status report on the members’ collective defence industrial bases as well as propose new initiatives — like export control reform — for Congress to legislate on. Importantly, the expansion of the NTIB in 2017 did not make any material or legal change to Australia and the United Kingdom’s existing defence export relationships or joint-R&D efforts with the United States. Based on previous export control efforts, forming a defence free-trade area will take time, effort and political actors willing to bear some cost. But until then, the NTIB is in effect a framework with some utility, but significant unrealised potential. Yet, while the United States moves slowly in facilitating greater integration with its allies, the opportunity costs for Australia and Australian industry are growing. The longer serious progress on implementing the NTIB takes within the US system — either due to bureaucratic inertia or political resistance — the more Australia and other member nations will lack incentive to co-research, co-develop and integrate with the United States altogether. This is largely due to the extraterritoriality of the US defence export control regime and its ambivalence towards trusted allies. Ultimately, it is in the strategic interests of all NTIB members to quickly transform the existing minimal framework into a practical and effective multilateral defence cooperation zone. This is an excerpt of Brendan Thomas-Noone's recent report: Ebbing opportunity: Australia and the US National Technology and Industrial Base Manage your email preferences | Forward this email to a friend United States Studies Centre ![]() |