Read the latest update from MPI on work to prepare for HPAI H5N1
Issue 5, 7 July 2025
Egg farmers get one-on-one support to prepare for H5N1
MPI and the Egg Producers Federation (EPF) are working together to help egg farmers prepare for biosecurity threats such as high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1.
There are around 130 commercial egg farmers in New Zealand, with flocks ranging in size from hundreds of thousands of birds to just a few hundred. Putting good biosecurity measures in place now will help these farmers to protect their flocks if HPAI arrives.
MPI’s Chief Veterinary Officer Dr Mary van Andel says biosecurity will be an essential first line of defence against HPAI H5N1 if it arrives here.
“If HPAI H5N1 arrives in New Zealand and starts to spread in the wild bird population, we won’t be able to eradicate it from wild birds.
“We know from our visit to the UK last year that investing in biosecurity measures and preparedness now will pay dividends in our ability to withstand and respond to an HPAI incursion.”
Regional advisors from MPI’s On Farm Support team are working one-on-one with egg farmers to help them develop a tailored biosecurity plan for their farm. Having a tailored plan is the best way for farmers to ensure they have the right biosecurity measures in place for their farm’s size, needs and situation.
Feedback from farmers has been positive.
"We’ve found the process both informative and reassuring. It’s been helpful to receive confirmation that, while things may not be perfect, we’re doing a good job overall.”
“The assessment highlighted a few key areas where we could improve biosecurity or mitigate hazards with some additional planning.”
"We had a good meeting with Kerry and she was very knowledgeable. Our meeting highlighted the difficulties that us smaller pasture raised free range egg producers may have if [H5N1] gets to NZ."
This free assistance from On Farm Support is available to any commercial egg farmers, whether or not they are members of EPF. Farmers are encouraged to access this free support by emailing onfarmsupport@mpi.govt.nz with their farm’s location and contact details, and with ‘Poultry Biosecurity Support’ in the subject line.
Guidance for managing sick or dead wild birds with HPAI
MPI has developed guidance for landowners, the public and wildlife rescues on managing sick or dead birds in an HPAI H5N1 outbreak.
If HPAI H5N1 reaches New Zealand and becomes established in the wild bird population, it’s likely that landowners and the public will come across sick or dead birds.
The guidance aims to answer questions that MPI and our One Health partner the Department of Conservation have been receiving from a wide range of people and organisations about how to deal with sick or dead birds that might be infected with HPAI H5N1 if the disease spreads to New Zealand, particularly wild birds.
The over-riding message is that handling any sick or dead birds can expose people and other wildlife to the risk of disease, and the best approach is to leave them alone and give them space.
“We know that many New Zealanders will instinctively want to help sick wild birds by taking them to a wildlife centre, veterinarian, or even by caring for them at home. Unfortunately, treatment is very unlikely to help and will put more stress on the bird,” says the Department of Conservation wildlife veterinarian Dr Kate McInnes.
“Our advice is not to handle or move birds that might be infected with HPAI – instead, give them space and keep your distance.”
HPAI H5N1 is highly contagious and is spread by both direct and indirect contact with infected birds.
Taking a sick bird with HPAI to a wildlife centre or veterinary practice risks spreading the disease to other birds or animals and can put your own health at risk.
There are two guidance documents available so far:
Guidance for landowners and the public:
Guidance for wildlife rescue and rehabilitation facilities:
MPI is working with Te Uru Kahika, Regional and Unitary Councils Aotearoa, to develop specific guidance for local authorities.
Joint workplan for HPAI H5N1 endorsed by industry and MPI leaders
Poultry industry bodies and MPI have endorsed a joint industry/MPI workplan for HPAI H5N1 that prioritises prevention and ensuring industry is well placed to manage H5N1 in the long term.
MPI has been working with industry bodies the Poultry Industry Association of New Zealand and Egg Producers Federation to ensure New Zealand’s egg and poultry meat industries are prepared for the possible arrival here of HPAI H5N1.
Key actions in the plan to be delivered in the coming months include:
- develop a national framework for an industry-led, MPI-supported approach to HPAI H5N1, from initial response through to long-term management
- develop and implement an industry-led operating model for high priority readiness components, including depopulation, disposal and decontamination
- scope and evaluate options for long-term industry management and leadership of HPAI H5N1
- continue to build biosecurity preparedness at farm, region and industry level.
MPI and industry have been negotiating an operational agreement under the Government Industry Agreement for Biosecurity Readiness and Response (GIA), a partnership between government and industry for improving New Zealand’s biosecurity. The operational agreement identifies priority pests and diseases and supports joint industry and government efforts to prepare for and respond to any incursions that occur.
Joint decision-making and cost-sharing helps to ensure that industry organisations have a formal decision-making role, alongside government, in managing their biosecurity risks.
HPAI H5N1 readiness science reports
As part of work to prepare for the potential arrival of HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, MPI commissioned a series of technical reports that are informing the approach to planning for H5N1 should it arrive here.
The reports examine the likelihood of the H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus arriving in New Zealand, establishing and spreading in free-living birds, and of owned birds being exposed to the virus from free-living and other owned birds.
Owned birds are more likely to become exposed to HPAI H5N1 indirectly – such as through contamination of the environment, water and feed – rather than by direct physical contact with free-living birds.
The reports highlight the importance that biosecurity will play in reducing the impact of H5N1 if it arrives here. Owned birds are more likely to be exposed to H5N1 if they are free-ranging outdoors, or in outdoor enclosures and are not protected by strong biosecurity practices.
The reports are available on our website:
Ducks linked to spillover to US dairy cattle
Mallard ducks, or more specifically, their faeces, are believed to be a key source of H5N1 infections in dairy cattle in the United States (US) – the only country in the world to have reported spillover to dairy cattle.
If H5N1 arrived in New Zealand, we consider the likelihood of spillover from wild birds to cattle or other livestock to be low, because our farming methods are very different from those in the US. In addition, the Biosecurity Act 1993 gives us the ability to impose movement controls to limit the spread of disease.
Ducks are very effective carriers of H5N1 2.3.4.4b, often displaying few clinical signs of illness, but able to shed large amounts of the virus through their faeces. We have heard from colleagues in the US that high environmental contamination with faeces or other materials from infected wild ducks coming into contact with an intensive dairy operation was the most likely scenario for the first known spillover of H5N1 into dairy cattle that occurred.
Here in New Zealand, we recommend that dairy and livestock farmers practice good biosecurity, including:
- fencing off water ways, ponds and duck nesting areas so cattle or other livestock don’t have access to these areas of high environmental contamination
- minimising potential for feed to be contaminated by wild birds, rodents and other pests
- maintaining good hygiene practices for milking and housing to reduce the risk of introduction of any virus or bacteria into the mammary tissue.
If HPAI H5N1 is detected in New Zealand, MPI will advise against actively culling or dispersing wild birds because it can increase the spread of the virus. Disturbing groups of wild birds might cause them to scatter and spread the disease further. Other birds will quickly move into the vacated space and may bring the virus with them.
HPAI detections overseas
In May, Brazil, the world's top poultry exporter, confirmed its first outbreak of HPAI in commercial poultry, in the town of Montenegro in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. Following full disinfection of the farm, Brazil underwent a 28-day bird flu observation period before declaring itself free of HPAI on 18 June. The outbreak triggered trade bans from multiple countries.
In the United Kingdom, H5N1 has been detected in commercial poultry premises in Wales and northern England. A 3km protection zone and 10km surveillance zone has been declared around each of the premises. Mandatory stringent biosecurity measures remain in place nationwide.
www.gov.uk/government/news/bird-flu-avian-influenza-latest-situation-in-england
Movement restrictions and other controls have been lifted in Victoria, Australia, following no new cases of H7N8 high pathogenicity bird flu since late February 2025.
In Antarctica, HPAI H5N1 is considered widespread on the Antarctic Peninsula. No detections have been made on the Antarctic continent beyond the Antarctic Peninsula to date.
Data published recently by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) shows the global distribution of avian influenza with zoonotic potential in the current wave, including our own H7N6 detection
The FAO website also lists the 551 wild bird species and 93 mammals affected by H5 strains of HPAI, alongside 13 farmed bird species.
www.fao.org/animal-health/situation-updates/global-aiv-with-zoonotic-potential/en
