Developments in Eastern Europe are fast-moving and concerning. Hudson experts are following the situation closely, and we will be sending analysis as events develop. To begin, below are ten things to look for from long-time Defense Science Board member and Hudson Senior Fellow Dr. Bill Schneider, followed by the latest commentary from our experts:

What to Look For

By Dr. Bill Schneider

1. Germany: “One of the sub-texts in the Ukraine drama is the manner in which Russia has been able to divide the alliance in Europe based on German dependence on Russia’s supply of natural gas. While efforts to mitigate this risk have been a dimension of alliance energy policy since the 1980s, a combination of diplomatic and energy policy choices have magnified German dependence. Germany’s decision to eliminate nuclear energy from its energy mix and increase its investment in renewable energy has proven to be an unwise choice. These realities of Germany’s energy policy may account for the new governing coalition to retreat so rapidly from developing and sustaining an alliance response to Russia’s efforts to create a sphere of influence over the independent states of the former Soviet Union as well as the former Warsaw Pact States.”
    
2. Allied Options: “Also over the weekend, the Financial Times reported that Russia is increasing its troop strength in its basing infrastructure surrounding Ukraine – a measure that will enable Russia to fully employ the equipment they have been deploying over the past few months. Germany is attempting to block allied arms shipments to Ukraine and refused to sell Ukraine combat helmets and protective vests. The impact of Russia’s ability to manipulate the decisions of affected governments may not have been fully anticipated in Europe. Politico also published a useful article on sanctions policy underscoring their modest capacity to affect the outcome of the Ukraine crisis.”
    
3. Russian Troop Movements: “This has been underway since the spring of 2021 and should have prompted the U.S. to undertake the diplomatic and military preparations necessary to improve its diplomatic leverage and deterrence. For context, Russia established a basing infrastructure around the Ukraine border in 2014-16 following its annexation of Crimea. It has had 87,000 troops routinely stationed at these bases since then. In the spring of 2021, it increased its deployment to ~ 120,000 as well as deploying additional equipment to support the larger force complement. By June 2021, Russia only withdrew 12,000 troops from the force structure buildup that had been underway since the spring. Russia resumed its build-up around October 2021. The buildup is now nearing completion as six amphibious assault ships may be headed for the Black Sea from their Baltic naval bases, and Russia completes its deployment of Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile batteries. The Russian buildup in the spring of 2021 has been described in a CSIS publication The Russian and Ukrainian Spring 2021 War Scare.”
    
4. Russia-Iran Relations: “This week, there will be an Iran-Russia agreement that will closely parallel the China-Iran agreement on defense, space, and energy that will exploit a similar power vacuum in the Middle East as the U.S. withdraws from the region. The cumulative effect of these developments in Europe and the Middle East will be difficult to reverse.”
    

5. Land Invasion: “If Russia takes the kinetic option, getting the land-bridge to Crimea is the most likely. A more aggressive Ukraine response would be to drop the Kerch Strait bridge to recover their access through the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea. Doing so would reduce the strategic depth of Russian forces in Crimea, since the 49th CAA in the Caucuses would be unable to provide back-up to the Russian forces in Crimea."

6. Weapons Systems: “The Russian Ministry of Defense gave a briefing to selected journalists earlier this month and suggested that Russia would also include its Smerch 300 mm MRL in the exercise – a very destructive weapon system. The Smerch was used to destructive effect in the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh as its cargo payload delivered 72 submunitions. One other possibility for a Russian attack vector is Transnistria. Russia has 1,500 troops deployed there as part of an agreement with Moldova – ostensibly to protect the 'Russian population' (whom Stalin deported to Moldova from other parts of the former Soviet Union). Recent Russian operations in Kazakhstan using its airborne forces proved effective in the swift projection of Russian military power."

7. Allied Disunity: “The disunity among U.S. allies is a serious limitation on the allied deterrent. Germany seeks to block military aid to Ukraine; it refused to ship helmets and personal protective armor to Ukraine. The Chief of the German Navy was fired by the Ministry of Defense this weekend for advancing the notion that the Ukraine crisis was a result of the allied nation’s refusal to give Putin “respect.” Germany is also strongly opposed to President Biden’s proposal to exclude Russia from the SWIFT financial communications network – the most powerful financial sanction available. It was the only sanction mentioned in his now famous press conference.  Most of the trade and travel sanctions have already been imposed on Russia and key officials by the U.S. and the EU as a consequence of the Russian annexation of Crimea. As the U.S. (and most West European allies) have ruled out the introduction of military power, trying to improve the outcome of the crisis via diplomatic means compared to the result of a Russian invasion seems to be the course of action most appealing to the Western alliance.  None dare call it appeasement.”

8. Russian Propaganda: "There has been significant change in the tone of Russian propaganda associated with Ukraine. As Russia has increased tension by its large deployments of air, naval, army and marine forces around Ukraine, the focus on their propaganda has been on justification for its territorial claims and its demands for its creation of a Monroe Doctrine-like sphere of influence to encompass the independent States of the former Soviet Union and the former Member States of the Warsaw Pact.  Now Russian propaganda is more like classic 'war propaganda' including the Eurasia Reconquista argument made by Putin’s Eurasianist advisor, for Russia to seize their group of independent States of the former Soviet Union as well as Eastern Europe re-creating a Russian-dominated Eurasia. The internal messaging in Russia is a significant departure from how they have managed Ukraine. Their success in Kazakhstan and its domination of Belarus underscore the emerging cohesion between propaganda and policy.”

9. Belarus: "Concerning the deployment of Russian forces to Belarus this week,  Russian journalist and military commentator Pavel Felgenhauer noted the limited ability of Russia to move mechanized infantry and armored formations through the large marsh area–104,000 square miles along the Belarus-Ukraine border. This marsh area is known as the Pripet Marshes or the Polesie (Woodland) Marshes. The Pripet Marshes were the scene of an intense and brutal conflict between Soviet partisans following the German invasion in June 1941. It is also close to the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. The delivery of air-to-surface munitions, artillery, mortar, and multiple rocket launcher fire in the Belarus-Ukraine border area could also disperse radioactive debris in the soil. Hence, it may be less likely that the Russian and Belarusian forces engaged in Allied Resolve 2022 exercise will actually be involved in military operations in Ukraine.”

10. NATO Response: “As mentioned, the only sanction President Biden explicitly identified in his press conference was excluding Russia from the SWIFT financial communications system. However, the President may have over-reached. Reuters picked up the Handelsblatt report indicating that the German government will not support including SWIFT in the NATO/EU sanctions. The NATO/EU scope for agreement apparently only extends to imposing sanctions on 13 Russian banks. Most trade- and travel-related sanctions imposed on Russian products and services exports of official travel were imposed following the Crimea annexation in 2014. It affirms that the ability of NATO/EU to impose ‘crippling’ sanctions has been overstated, and hence its deterrent value is limited. The Russian demands are concrete and specific which will make the promised US and allied written response challenging if scope is to be provided for continuing negotiations since the administration has ruled out alternative approaches to resolving the conflict."

Recent Ukraine Commentary by Hudson Experts:

• In his latest column "History Forces Biden’s Hand" for The Wall Street Journal, Walter Russell Mead warns that adversaries like Russia and China are advancing together while the West grows ever more divided and incoherent in retreat, not seen since the Carter administration. 
   
• In an interview on Fox & Friends First, Hudson Senior Fellow Peter Rough observes that America’s current approach amounts to “bringing economic sanctions to a knife fight,” and writes in the New York Post, “to stop Putin, it’s time to embrace the tried and tested methods of military deterrence.”
   
• At a recent Hudson Institute event, Bryan Clark explored alternative gray zone operations that could be deployed to increase the costs of invasion, and Marshall Billingslea pointed out the folly of entering into arms control negotiations with a serial violator of the relevant treaties.