Senior Fellows Richard Weitz and William Schneider outline five possible scenarios to watch for in the brewing Ukraine-Russia crisis.

5 Scenarios Re: Russia and Ukraine

1: Partial Withdrawal and Strategic Uncertainty [William Schneider]

"Russia has reported that it has withdrawn some of its forces from the Ukraine border region, but this has not been verified. The U.S. continues to claim that there is no evidence of a Russian withdrawal. However, there may be some confusion about the data since the U.S. insists on withdrawal of unit equipment, not only the return of the forces to their bases. For example, more than 60% of the tactical forces normally deployed in the Eastern Military District in the Russian Far East have been redeployed to Belarus and the Ukrainian border region. These forces are unlikely to permanently return to their bases without bringing their equipment back.

"It's also worth noting the deployment of dual-capable (conventional and nuclear) Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems and 2S7 self-propelled howitzers. It is illegal under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for a nuclear state to threaten a non-nuclear state—a jarring outcome when one notes the intense disputes underway within the Biden administration on the text of the Nuclear Posture Review about ways in which the US 'can reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its foreign policy.'"

2: "Sudetenland" Solution from the Immediate Crisis [Schneider]

"The notion of 'persuading' the Ukraine government to renounce its aspiration of becoming a NATO member could provide the Biden administration with a ‘peace-in-our-time’ exit from the immediate Ukraine crisis. The administration can separate itself from a decision they will be able to assert was taken by Ukraine, and not forced on them by the U.S./NATO. Putin’s underlying aim is the absorption of Ukraine, as he described in his interpretation of Russia’s historical incorporation of Ukraine into its territory, so this diplomatic resolution could be a politically useful “Sudetenland” solution to the immediate crisis.

"The administration has gone out on a limb in forecasting a Russian invasion—even giving a specific day when it would occur (National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan suggested Thursday, 16 February). Although Russia is taking measures to increase the readiness of forward deployed forces, skepticism remains that Russia will do so, both in Kyiv and elsewhere. Russia may be fishing for a better deal which they may be able to extract as they ratchet-up tensions. "

3: Conquered Ukraine [Richard Weitz]

"Moscow may undertake a massive military attack against unoccupied Ukraine to eliminate the country as an independent state. Launched from Russian and Belarusian territory as well as Crimea and the Black Sea, its goal would be to annex all or most Ukrainian territory. The Kremlin might try to decapitate the current Ukrainian government and replace it with a puppet regime under the leadership of pro-Moscow politicians who would restore Russia as Ukraine’s leading economic and security partner while confirming Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

"Besides its ideological value, adding more Ukrainian territory and people could augment Russia’s demographic power and economic resources as well as provide forward bases for further conquest. Despite the high near-term economic and human costs of an invasion, these could decline in a few years after Ukraine is pacified and the West relaxes its sanctions."

From Weitz' analysis, "Putin’s Political and Military Options in Ukraine and Beyond"

4: Subservient Ukraine [Weitz]

"A more limited Russian goal would be to launch a preventive war against Ukraine to keep the country weak and under Moscow’s control. The Russian military might accordingly try to seize critical industrial areas of Ukraine, spur massive refugee flows to generate humanitarian pressure, and sustain a long-term deployment of Russian forces in Belarus and eastern Ukraine as a permanent knife at Ukraine’s throat. Russia could also strive to enlarge the territory and secure formal recognition by Kyiv of the Russian-controlled enclaves of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR). Russia might also try to cut Ukraine’s access to its Black Sea ports by occupying its southern coast. Empowering these and other regions would enfeeble the central government and give Moscow future opportunities to exploit Ukrainian cleavages."

5: Weaken the Western Bloc [Weitz]

"Russia might also attack Ukraine to enhance Moscow’s position while weakening the Western bloc. This objective would be broader than Ukraine but achieved through Russian military action in Ukraine. The goal would be, at a minimum, enforcing a 'Putin Doctrine' of no additional NATO members or alliance activities in the former Soviet republics. Putin rails about alleged Western pledges not to expand its membership into the former Soviet bloc, claiming that NATO 'duped' Moscow in the 1990s and now exploits Ukraine’s anti-Moscow stance to weaken Russian power in Europe. Russian leadership might expect that a successful Russian military operation in Ukraine would weaken the credibility of NATO security guarantees, already atrophied by the non-enforcement of the pledges to Ukraine made in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and by the 2021 military withdrawal from Afghanistan."

See More:

• FRIDAY: Congressman Mike Turner (R-OH), a prominent voice in the U.S. House of Representatives on defense policy and transatlantic security issues, offers his perspectives on the Ukraine crisis in a conversation with Kenneth Weinstein, Hudson's Walter P. Stern distinguished fellow.
   
• In The Wall Street Journal, Walter Russell Mead argues that the chief danger facing American foreign policy is not that Russian revisionism will cause policymakers to prioritize Europe over Asia, but that the U.S. has yet to address the national-strategy deficit that currently undermines our position around the world.