Why Hasn't Putin Unleashed Major Cyber and Electronic Warfare in Ukraine?

1: The Relative Absence of Russian Cyber Operations in Ukraine [William Schneider]

"There have been many surprises in Russia’s conduct of its campaign. The poor performance of the Russian armed forces, the impact of inadequate training to support anticipated Russian air operations, the absence of Russia electronic warfare operations, Russia’s poor expeditionary logistics, etc. 

"Among the most 'surprising surprises' is the relative absence of Russian cyber operations, and especially major cyber-attacks. Some of the success is almost certainly attribute to the NSA’s ‘defend forward' concept of contesting and disrupting adversary cyber operations. This capability was established in a series of policy changes culminating in a shift in the U.S. cyber strategy in 2018. These activities have built on indigenous cyber capabilities in Ukraine, and more recently aggressive private Ukrainian cyber hacking operations as well." 

2: Russia Faces Deconfliction Issues [Bryan Clark]

"They’re having a lot of coordination problems. Part of what you’re seeing is that the Russians’ coordination of the invasion has been flawed, which is part of why they get bogged down.

"The Russians now have to worry about deconfliction. They can’t just start jamming and exploiting signals as aggressively as they were because now they've got to use the spectrum a lot more to manage their own operation. I think they’re saying 'we’re going to prioritize, maintain our comms open,' which means 'we’re going to probably reduce the amount of jamming that we tried to employ' because they don’t have good electromagnetic management."

3: Russia's Electronic Warfare Strategy Moving Forward [Bryan Clark]

"The lack of electronic warfare use by Russia seems related to their concept of operations. Russia’s capabilities are not well-aligned to the tactics they are now facing against the Ukrainian military, which is fighting more like an irregular militia, dispersing its forces and reducing their electronic signatures by mixing in with civilian communications. As a result, Russian electronic warfare forces are having difficulty detecting Ukrainian troops and risk jamming other Russian units if they conduct electronic attacks.

“Russian forces will adapt, however, as they have throughout their operations in the Donbas and in Syria. Russia will likely ramp up its jamming as the invasion progresses and Ukrainian forces necessarily collapse into urban centers or bases. Russia may also be able to afford some jamming of their own communications because troop formations are closer together and logistics begin to catch up with them, making operations easier to coordinate.

"To detect Ukrainian forces via their emissions, we will likely see more use of drones by Russian forces, which can enable rapid attacks against Ukrainian units using rocket artillery. During the past decade’s gray-zone operations, this tactic was devastating against Ukrainian troop formations in eastern Ukraine.”

4:  How the US Military Can Help Ukraine [Bryan Clark]

Electronic Warfare:

"The U.S. military should get involved in the conflict in ways that are reversible, deniable or peripheral. Electronic warfare was one of the U.S. military’s asymmetric advantages in the Cold War and could slow or confuse Russian forces using reversible effects and without causing direct casualties.

"U.S. Army MQ-1 Gray Eagle UAVs and Air Force or Marine Corps MQ-9 Reapers could fly from Romania or Poland into Ukrainian airspace to disrupt Russian communications using jammers, such as the Marine Corps Intrepid Tiger electronic attack pods. These systems could also be employed against Russian naval forces on the Black Sea to degrade their ability to coordinate amphibious operations along the Ukrainian coast west of Crimea."

Cyber Operations:

"Like electronic warfare, cyber operations such as denial-of-service attacks can create temporary disruptions. Like high-power microwave, cyber can also create permanent damage. The United States and Russia have refrained from cyberattacks on civilian targets, but they could be employed more aggressively against Russian military forces.

"Russian logistics are already not keeping up with its maneuver units, slowing the Russian advance. The United States should further degrade Russian troops’ support by disrupting the computer networks used to manage supply inventories and movements from depots. These networks are unlikely to be as well-protected as Russian operational networks, and hitting them would not be as escalatory as attacking Russian command and control directly.

"U.S. Cyber Command is finding success in its confrontations with bad actors on the internet using the persistent-engagement approach. The United States should apply it more broadly to discourage adversaries such as Russia and China."

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