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NATO’s summit in Madrid resulted in several changes that promise to strengthen the alliance. Yet fissures remain. Lithuania’s enforcement of European Union sanctions against Russian goods crossing its soil into Kaliningrad has elicited threats from Russia and opposition from Germany. If the United States fails to convince Russia of its commitment to NATO members’ sovereign decisions, Moscow could miscalculate. Similarly, the US must convince China that it will defend its vital interest in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific and the security of its regional territories. For deterrence against these adversaries to hold, America must have the resolve to defend those nations with whom it has a commitment and convince adversaries of that resolve.

-Rebeccah Heinrichs
Director of KDI & Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

 
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Hudson Highlights

 
 
 

Hudson Distinguished Fellow and the 70th US Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo gave a speech at Hudson Institute. In this clip, Secretary Pompeo outlines Americans’ interests in Ukraine’s war of survival and sovereignty, as well as the growing axis between Russia and China:

“By aiding Ukraine, we undermined the creation of a Russian-Chinese axis bent on exerting military and economic hegemony in Europe, in Asia, and in the Middle East. This would further devastate the lives of Americans and our economy here at home. Indeed, by empowering Ukraine, we demonstrate to China the cost of invading Taiwan. Or frankly exerting its influence in nations all across the world, thus helping to thwart an assault that would rupture the living standards of the world by crippling supplies of goods, such as semiconductors. Look, we must act in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, lest we undercut America’s self-interest. It is a deeply American mission.”

Watch
 

NATO Must Back Lithuania against Russian Coercion

Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Timothy Walton | RUSI

 

“If the US fails to convince Moscow and Vilnius that it has the resolve and ability to back the Baltic states, NATO could end up in the very situation that the Biden administration and the whole Alliance have sought to avoid: direct military confrontation with Moscow.”

Read
 

How to Equip Ukraine to Break the Black Sea Blockade

Bryan Clark and Peter Rough | Foreign Policy

 

“After supplying Kyiv with HIMARS and MLRS, the transfer of UAVs would not dramatically alter the US approach of providing security assistance. It is important to note that the recent transfer of more potent weapons to Ukraine by the United States, France, and other Western countries has not prompted Russia to escalate the conflict to NATO.”

Read
 

Thinking the Unthinkable Part II: What if Putin Wins the War in
Ukraine?

William Schneider | Hudson Institute

 

“Now, we are supposed to be in the deterrence business, and we're not. We're allowing Russia to do so. The failure to provide unmanned aerial systems is really perhaps the most fundamental bad choice. The Air Force has more than 300 of the MQ-9 Reaper aircraft that it no longer wants in its inventory. The Army has large numbers of the Gray Eagle, but to refuse to provide it because an agency within the DoD is concerned about the compromise of the technology in the aircraft suggests something other than technology security. It's part of this broad reluctance to enable Ukraine to win.”

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Fight for Guam—Don't Just Defend It

Bryan Clark | Hudson Institute

 

“Because undermining the confidence of PLA leaders in their plans is an objective of the 2022 US National Defense Strategy’s (NDS) lines of effort for Campaigning and Integrated Deterrence, US forces should use diverse concepts and capabilities to conduct the missions associated with operational challenges like sustaining air operations from Guam.”

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Fortifying America's Western Pacific Territories

Timothy Walton | Hudson Institute

 

“With prudent investments in a resilient set of passive and active defenses and sustained leadership over the coming years, there is a major opportunity to field a new architecture in the Marianas that can serve as a fulcrum to advance our nation’s approach to [air and missile defense] more broadly and to help deter conflict.”

Read
 
 

Key Insights

 

Deterrence is Not Rocket Science: It is More Difficult

 
 

Keith Payne | National Institute for Public Policy

 

“For the application of deterrence, generalizations are less helpful than an understanding of the opponent’s worldview, priorities, calculations and definition of reasonable behavior. As Kurt Guthe has observed, ‘In matters related to deterrence, generalizations can be useful, but specifics are essential. The questions that must always be kept in mind are: Who is being deterred? From what action? By whom? For what reason? By what threats? And in what circumstances?’”

 
 
 

Defense of Guam: Don’t Let an Asset in Deterring a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan Become a Liability

 
 

Matthew Costlow | Hudson Institute

 

“And the worry I have with Ukraine is that China is watching that conflict in a similar way that it watched the Gulf War and learning that they should probably make nuclear threats more explicit, much earlier, and do it against the homeland, perhaps Guam to start.”

 
 

Putin’s Nuclear Threats Worked against Biden—We Must Act before China Gets the Same Idea

 

Lt. Gen. Henry Obering III (USAF ret.) and Amb. Robert Joseph | New York Post

 

“The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a clear failure of deterrence. It has demonstrated the shortcomings of what some have called ‘deterrence by detection’ or ‘deterrence by disclosure.’ Simply telling Russia we knew what they were up to by publicly releasing information about their military buildup on Ukraine’s borders was clearing inadequate to prevent them from invading. Nor did the threat of severe sanctions serve as an effective deterrent.”

 
 

Deterring Putin: Denial and Jeopardy

 

Paula DeSutter and Henry Cooper | 19FortyFive

 

“We must therefore reverse our history of undercutting our own capabilities to defend and deter. Our strategic offensive forces, including our nuclear weapons, have been undermined by neglect, lack of will, and the mistaken view that ineffective and unverifiable arms control measures are a substitute for nuclear deterrence.”

 
 
 
 

Top Reads

Russian President Vladmir Putin’s Speech
St. Petersburg International Economic Forum Plenary

Congress Poised to Shoot Down Biden’s Nuclear Rollback
Lawrence Ukenye and Connor O’Brien | Politico

Iran Nuclear Deal Faces Uncertain Future as Tehran Sells Weapons to Russia
Mike Brest | Washington Examiner

US Warns China It Stands Behind South China Sea Ruling and Is Committed to Philippine Defense
Jennifer Hansler and Brad Lendon | CNN

NATO Holds Its Most Important Summit for Decades
The Economist

NYC Mayor Defends Nuclear-Attack PSA: ‘Better Safe than Sorry’
Bryan Pietsch | The Washington Post

B-2s Deploy to Australia for Bomber Task Force Mission
Greg Hadley | Air Force Magazine

Why Iran Cracks Down at Home, Cozies Up to Moscow
Isabel Debre | Associated Press

In Escalation, Iran Enriches to 20% with New Centrifuges at Fortified Site
Associated Press

 
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