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Xi Is Sticking with Putin, and the US Should Adapt Accordingly
In mid-September, a month before securing an unprecedented third term at China’s Twentieth Party Congress, Xi Jinping disembarked in Central Asia on his first trip outside China in over two years for a convening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). On the summit’s sidelines, Xi met privately with his junior partner Vladimir Putin. The meeting occurred at a pivotal moment in Putin’s war of choice against Ukraine as Ukrainian forces had begun to make substantial inroads in regaining and liberating territory—momentum that continues—with the help of weapons systems from the US and other Western countries. Though Putin tried to ease some of Xi’s “questions and concerns” about his war in Ukraine, the People’s Republic of China continues to underwrite the Russian economy through oil purchases and has deepened its economic and military “strategic partnership” with Russia. The meeting also occurred a week after Russia concluded the Vostok 2022 military drills, which China participated in despite Xi’s purported “questions” over Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin has doubled down on its nuclear coercion campaign in Ukraine, threatening to end the world’s eight-decade nuclear taboo, while also employing drones made by another US adversary, Iran. Nevertheless, Chinese state broadcasters continue to provide a platform to analysts who insist that, by supplying weapons to Ukraine, the United States is to blame for the lack of a ceasefire in Russia’s war of aggression. And once again, the Biden administration is communicating to the Kremlin what the US will and will not do in defense of Ukraine. If the US and our allies are to uphold the nuclear taboo, deter Putin in Ukraine, and consequently show his partner in Beijing that there is no benefit to employing a nuclear weapon on the battlefield—if Xi were to consider utilizing one in a campaign to seize Taiwan—the Biden administration needs to back Ukraine to victory by providing the means for a sharp, effective counteroffensive. For deterrence to hold, the US should seek to convince Moscow that our strategy comprises all tools and technologies available to the United States, which includes refusing to rule out a retaliatory nuclear response if Putin were to unadvisedly choose that path.
-Rebeccah Heinrichs
Director of KDI & Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Hudson Highlights
Rebeccah Heinrichs | Hudson Institute
“While China’s strategic culture is disinclined to embrace national partnerships or alliances, Beijing has publicly embraced Russia as a key ‘friend.’ Indeed, at the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, just days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the two powers signed an agreement in which they pledged a partnership with ‘no limits.’ Since Russia’s decision to escalate its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has become much more dependent on China. This development is consistent with China’s aim of not sharing power in a multipolar world, but of dominating the world order and replacing the US-led order with the China model. Maintaining an equal partnership with Russia—a country with an economy that is a tenth the size of China’s and a conventional military force that Ukraine has greatly diminished—would be at odds with Xi’s modus vivendi.”
Arthur Herman | Wall Street Journal
“Space will be the next great commons, a shared global resource like the oceans or cyberspace. History shows that these great commons are inevitably a source of competition and conflict, not voluntary cooperation. Whoever dominates space will determine the future of nations. We have to abandon the globalist fantasy that the US, China and Russia will work together to keep space rules-based, free and open.”
H.R. McMaster | Hudson Institute
“In the Cold War, we had this idea of triangular diplomacy in the United States, and it’s really pioneered by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, the idea that you could have a closer relationship with China and Russia than they had with one another. And I think those days are gone, right? I think that’s not feasible anymore, right? I mean, they’ve professed their enduring love for one another.”
Walter Russell Mead | Wall Street Journal
“The Samarkand summit made clear that Mr. Putin is getting shorter while Mr. Xi is standing tall, at least for now. That doesn’t mean Mr. Xi is preparing to dump Mr. Putin. Hitler grew to despise Mussolini—his grandiosity, his bad strategic choices, his weak army and his pathetic economy. But when Mussolini fell from power, Hitler stepped in to prop him up. China doesn’t have so many allies that it can afford to throw Russia under the bus.”
Rebeccah Heinrichs | Ben Domenech Podcast
“We do know that with the Russians and the Chinese, there is a convergence there. The Chinese have given rhetorical support to Russia’s war against Ukraine. They have continued military training together… The Chinese are watching everything the Russians do, and they’re learning. They are learning what different things will cause or elicit different reactions from the West… I’m very worried that because the Russians have so successfully caused the Biden administration to be deterred and to only supply Ukraine with certain weapons on these lower levels of escalation, I’m concerned that that message has been sent to China, that brandishing your nuclear weapons works against the United States.”
Key Insights
Dr. Keith Payne | Remarks at Hudson Institute
“The United States must consider the possibility that Russia and China will coordinate their actions to advance their respective goals in confrontations with the United States. The danger of a coordinated Sino-Russian “entente” is real and growing and presents the possibility of Russia and China confronting the United States with two simultaneous and coordinated regional wars. This is a deterrence contingency that US conventional and theater nuclear capabilities may be unprepared to meet given the great reduction in US forward-deployed forces since the end of the Cold War and the apparent near elimination of US forward-deployable theater nuclear weapons.”
Matthew Johnson, John Pomfret, and Matt Pottinger | Foundation for Defense of Democracies
“Xi will stand by his partner in Russia, and Putin will reciprocate, because both are seeking a force multiplier in their long-term strategies to erode Western power. For Xi, Putin is the central partner in the creation of his authoritarian bloc. For Putin, Xi is the indispensable backstop keeping Russia’s economy afloat while the country weathers sanctions… All things considered, Xi’s solidarity with Putin goes far beyond a marriage of convenience between authoritarian powers looking to secure spheres of influence from US intervention. Putin’s grievances, and the background of Soviet collapse and post-Soviet dysfunction that brought Putin to power, form the bedrock of Xi’s own worldview, which he has consistently inculcated in Party cadres and the Chinese public since he rose to power a decade ago.”
Matthew Kroenig | Atlantic Council
“[Russian nuclear use] would also break a nearly eight-decade taboo on nuclear use. It may make future nuclear use more likely if states (e.g., China) perceive that nuclear weapons can help them achieve their goals without resulting in serious military retaliation from the United States and its allies. Further, it could cause nuclear proliferation if states fear that nuclear weapons might be used against them or if US allies believe that Washington will not respond to a nuclear attack.”
Matthew Costlow | National Institute for Public Policy
“The expanding number and sophistication of missile-based threats to the US homeland is bringing into sharp relief a reality that Americans are reminded of only episodically: that adversaries can strike the US homeland with devastating effect. The attacks of December 7, 1941, and September 11, 2001, should serve as calls to action as Russia and China pursue strategies of coercion backed by missile capabilities against the US homeland, designed to limit the options of US leaders during a crisis or conflict, and potentially deter, degrade, disrupt, or even defeat US efforts to defend allies overseas against their aggression.”
Dr. Keith Payne and David Trachtenberg | National Institute for Public Policy
“Equally important is that two of those great powers, i.e., Russia and China, see a third, i.e., the United States, as preventing the realization of their respective expansionist goals. In short, Russia and China have external goals that are inimical to long-standing US interests and deterrence goals. Both have worked assiduously to find ways to defeat US deterrence strategies. As one Washington Post writer has rightly put it: ‘The idea that the United States can choose between confronting Russian aggression or Chinese aggression is attractive, until it meets reality. In truth, these two expansionist dictatorships are working together to undermine our security, prosperity and freedom. Moscow and Beijing view their struggles against the West as intertwined, so we must acknowledge that connection as well.’”
Top Reads
US Commanders Wary of Growing Nuclear Alliance between China and Russia
Bill Gertz | The Washington Times
Putin Says China's Xi Is ‘Close Friend’, Hails ‘Unprecedented’ Partnership with Beijing
Reuters
China to Stand by Russia—Xi “Cannot Alienate Putin”
John Feng | Newsweek
How Far Will Xi Go to Help a Desperate Putin?
Craig Singleton | Foreign Policy
Xi and Putin Discuss Ukraine War at Meeting
Frances Mao | BBC News
Putin’s Taiwan Support Outweighs Any Xi Concerns about Ukraine
Bloomberg News
When Putin and Xi Meet, It Is Beijing Coming Out on Top
Jennifer Jett | NBC News
China-Russia Military Ties Boosted by Invasion of Ukraine
Henry Ridgwell | Voice of America
Putin Ally Deepens Russia’s “Strategic Partnership” with China
Reuters
Ukraine and Taiwan Build Common Ties, Defying Pressure from China
William Yang | DW
