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Understanding the Post-New START Environment
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expired on February 5, 2026, following Russia’s suspension of compliance three years earlier. In announcing its decision, President Vladimir Putin cited the “connection between strategic offensive weapons” and the “conflict in Ukraine” and what Moscow described as “other hostile Western actions.” Despite the substantial costs associated with Putin’s ongoing, unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, the Kremlin has continued to devote significant attention and resources to its nuclear program.
In November 2024, Putin released an executive order announcing revisions to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, signaling a potential shift in circumstances under which Moscow would consider the use of nuclear weapons. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russian officials and figures close to Putin have issued repeated, not-so-veiled nuclear threats. These threats appear intended to deter the United States and other NATO military, economic, and diplomatic support for Ukraine.
Simultaneously, the People’s Republic of China is engaging in a historic expansion of its nuclear forces. Beijing is rapidly increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal while diversifying its delivery systems across land, sea, and air. According to US Department of Defense estimates, China could possess up to 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035. In February 2026, US officials publicly acknowledged for the first time that China is conducting yield-producing nuclear tests.
For the first time in its history, the United States must confront the challenge of deterring two nuclear-armed peer competitors simultaneously. In October 2025, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would resume nuclear weapons testing “on an equal basis” with other nuclear-armed states. Subsequent official statements have reaffirmed the Trump administration’s commitment to modernizing the US nuclear deterrent.
In the post-New START environment, strategic threats continue to intensify, while US adversaries remain committed to weakening American resolve and undermining Washington’s commitment to its allies. To address this evolving security landscape, the United States should work closely with its allies to adapt deterrence strategies, strengthen credibility, and identify opportunities to mitigate risks posed by shared adversaries.
“We are aware of yield-producing nuclear explosive testing in China. . . .On June 22, 2020, we are aware that China conducted a nuclear explosive test. The probable explosion occurred right near the Lop Nur nuclear test site. . . .[At] 09:18 Zulu/Greenwich Mean Time [at] Kazakhstan station PS23, [we] detected a 2.75 magnitude [explosion] in Makanchi, Kazakhstan. . . .It is quite consistent with what you would expect from a nuclear explosive test of some certain yield—that would be obviously supercritical, and not sub-critical as the United States tests currently. . . .As far as equal basis, that’s really up to the president. What I can say is that, the basis, at least, is that we know that they were preparing tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tons, so that’s a basis. What the president decides to do with that is up to him.”
— Christopher Yeaw
Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Nonproliferation
“A nuclear test like this, done in secret, is extremely dangerous and worrying to the United States. . . .What we’re concerned about, Stuart, is, again, it’s the size of the [Chinese] nuclear force in the midst of a strategic breakout. It’s the biggest, most rapid nuclear expansion in world history. And the Chinese, unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, [are] not communicating with the United States about intent. So, what the Trump administration is trying to do is to get both the Russians and the Chinese to talk to the United States, and to try to get some other diplomatic solution to stabilize the situation. Because otherwise, Stuart, the United States must adapt our nuclear force because it’s only designed to deter the Russians, not the Russians and the Chinese.”
— Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Director, Keystone Defense Initiative
Hudson Highlights
Marshall Billingslea | Newsmax
“[The Chinese] clearly intend to achieve, or surpass us, in nuclear parity before they’re going to be willing to sit down at the table, and that should be very concerning. . . .We’re faced with two peer competitors with as many nuclear weapons, potentially, as we have. . . .When you look at the Russian numbers and you look at the New START treaty, that treaty limited about 40% of the Russian arsenal—they have thousands of weapons that are in the short and theater range (the ones they were menacing Ukraine with, for instance). It limited about 90% of all US nuclear weapons and 0% of the Chinese. . . .The US certainly doesn’t need to have double the arsenal that we have today to account for Russia and China, but we do urgently need to take steps to expand and diversify our nuclear arsenal to deal with the fact that the Chinese have now entered the scene in a very dangerous and disruptive way.”
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs | Strategic Simplicity
“The ongoing hostilities between the United States and Russia and NATO just creates an environment in which we don’t have the required environment to be able to have some trust there to have these [nuclear] negotiations. . . .Until we understand our own deterrent needs and requirements, we’re not in a position to begin negotiating. . . .As it was negotiated the first time, [I] was looking forward to roping in some of these other things that were not included in the New START treaty, like theater nuclear weapons, and we’re nowhere near even beginning to do that. So, I think it would be prudent to let the New START treaty expire at this point. . . .I think extending New START would take away a lot of that optionality that you want to have for the president to make decisions, especially on something so important as our role as the nuclear guarantor for NATO.”
Aaron MacLean | School of War
“They [the Chinese] have this advantage that they are testing, so they know what’s working and what doesn’t work in their systems. That contributes to their ability to deter. That contributes to their confidence that, should it come to an exchange, their stuff’s going to work. And that’s why, I guess, the [US] president has said he wants to test. . . .The real significance of the week is it punctuates, and emphasizes, trends that have been developing for years now. But, all of a sudden, we woke up last week and it’s all just real that we are in this new age of, at this moment, legally unconstrained nuclear competition with Russia and China—not to mention the North Koreans, and there’s other factors.”
Key Insights
Marco Rubio | United States Department of State
“Russia ceased implementing the New START treaty in 2023, after flouting its terms for years. A treaty requires at least two parties, and the choice before the United States was to bind itself unilaterally or to recognize that a new era requires a new approach. Not the same old START, but something new. A treaty that reflects that the United States could soon face not one, but two, nuclear peers in Russia and China. . . .We have made our standards clear, and we will not compromise them to achieve arms control for arms control’s sake. . . .Russia and China should not expect the United States to stand still while they shirk their obligations and expand their nuclear forces. We will maintain a robust, credible, and modernized nuclear deterrent.”
Thomas G. DiNanno | United States Department of State
“New START and its central limits have expired. The treaty allowed for a one-time, 5-year extension which was enacted in 2021. The treaty could not legally be further extended. . . .An arms control architecture designed nearly two decades ago for New START does not allow the United States to credibly uphold both our strategic deterrence commitments to the American people and our extended deterrence commitments to our allies. . . .China remains on track to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, and Russia is supporting this build-up by helping China develop the weapons-grade fissile material necessary for its expansion. . . .The US Government is aware that China has conducted nuclear explosive tests, including preparing for tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tons. The PLA sought to conceal testing by obfuscating the nuclear explosions because it recognized these tests violate test ban commitments. China has used decoupling—a method to decrease the effectiveness of seismic monitoring—to hide their activities from the world.”
Admiral Richard Correll | House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
“Driven by President Xi’s directive for military preparedness, China is heavily investing in its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seeks a larger and more diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multi-megaton yields. . . . Moscow views its nuclear weapons program as the cornerstone of Russian sovereignty and its military doctrine allows for nuclear use and signaling to manage perceived existential nuclear and conventional threats, to forestall theater defeat, and to compel an end to conflict on terms acceptable to Russia. . . .China, Russia, and North Korea are actively developing theater-range nuclear weapons to counterbalance the conventional military advantage of the United States and its allies and partners. . . .Through the modernization of the nuclear triad, the enhancement of NC3 [nuclear command, control, and communications] systems, and the development and integration of advanced capabilities such as hypersonic weapons and counter-unmanned systems, USSTRATCOM is addressing the threats of today while preparing for the challenges of tomorrow.”
Elbridge Colby | United States Department of Defense
“For the United States, our responsibility is to be clear, candid, and consistent. We will continue to provide the US extended nuclear deterrent. And we will also continue, in a more limited and focused fashion, to provide conventional capabilities that contribute to NATO's defense. . . .This future will not be achieved by declarations alone. It will require sustained political will, investment, and follow-through. It will require uncomfortable conversations and difficult trade-offs. And it will require a shared understanding that the essence of NATO is not symbolism or cloud-castle abstractions, but, rather, deterrence and, if deterrence fails, effective defense that leaves all our peoples better off. The United States stands ready to walk this road with you.”
James Goodrich | Hudson Institute
“The [Chinese] central government has really spared no expense and is moving at breakneck speed to build out these [nuclear science] facilities. . . .This is going to give China tremendous capability both on the civilian science to understand everything from astrophysics to fusion energy (because recreating the conditions of hotter than a sun helps in many different ways) but it’ll also help China strengthen its nuclear deterrence. [They will] be able to build stronger materials for shielding against radiation effects, hardening all their systems against electromagnetic pulse and simulating and verifying some of their codes to ensure that their next generation warheads’ designs—that could be lighter and higher yield and more potent—actually work.”
Top Reads
Three Truths About the End of New START and What It Means for Strategic Competition
Heather Williams | Center for Strategic and International Studies
If You Want Peace, Don’t Lose the Nuclear Arms Race
Tom Cotton | Wall Street Journal
The Necessity of Testing Our Nuclear Weapons
Robert Peters | The Heritage Foundation
Nukes Without Limits? A New Era After the End of New START
Erin D. Dumbacher | Council on Foreign Relations
No Extension of the New START Treaty? Trump Made the Right Decision
Mark B. Schneider | National Institute for Public Policy
Finland to Lift Full Ban on Hosting Nuclear Arms, Government Says
Johan Ahlander, Anne Kauranen, and Essi Lehto | Reuters
The Dangers of a More Crowded Nuclear World
Kyle Balzer | American Enterprise Institute
No New START
Eric S. Edelman and Franklin C. Miller | Foreign Affairs
China May Be Preparing for Nuclear War. Trump Can’t Ignore It.
Robert Peters | The Heritage Foundation
Chairman Wicker Leads SASC Hearing on Strategic Competition in a Post-New START Treaty Environment
Roger Wicker | Senate Armed Services Committee
Fischer: We Cannot Allow Credibility of US Nuclear Deterrent to Erode
Deb Fischer | Senate Armed Services Committee
