1. Air Defense [William Schneider]
Specifically: 200 Stinger launchers and 400 Stinger missiles (currently blocked by the State Department). Russia is using helicopters extensively
for both close air support and the transport of troops to points where they are engaged with Ukrainian Armed Forces. These targets can be effectively engaged with Stinger man-portable surface-air-missiles
2. Anti-Armor Infantry Weapons [William Schneider]
Specifically: 1,000 Javelin missile
launchers and 5,000 Javelin missiles and 5,000 Next Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapons. Russian forces are organized in Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG). A BTG usually is based around an infantry battalion’s three motor-rifle infantry companies (each with 11 BMP tracked fighting vehicles or BTR-80/82 personnel carriers) and are reinforced by a fourth tank company with 10 tanks, typically T-72B3s. For tank BTGs, that ratio is reversed. The massive presence of armored vehicles (tanks and infantry fighting vehicles) needs to be defeated with modern anti-armor weapon systems. The UK has supplied a significant number of NGLAW, but more are needed.
3. Sniper Rifles (anti-personnel and anti-material) [William Schneider]
Specifically: 4,000 Barrett .50 semi-automatic sniper rifles and associated ammunition. Sniper weapon systems are needed to tactical reconnaissance and surveillance, engage adversary personnel and material targets and contribute to the effectiveness of tactical maneuver units.
4. Tactical Communications [William Schneider]
Specifically: Barrett HF and VHF tactical radios. Russian BTGs are equipped with organic electronic warfare systems that include a capability to jam local commercial and some military HF and VHF communications. Anti-jam tactical radios, such as those produced by Barrett, are needed to facilitate tactical communications.
5. Personnel Protective Equipment [William Schneider]
Specifically: 15,000 sets of body armor. Russia’s abundant rocket and tube artillery as well as automatic weapons fire necessitates body armor for Ukraine’s troops.
6. Man-Portable Rocket-Launchers [William Schneider]
Specifically: 5,000 Shoulder-Launched Multi-Purpose Assault Weapon (SMAW) or man-portable rocket launchers are used for anti-armor and bunker-defeat applications. There are several types in the U.S. inventory used by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps that could be transferred from stocks in Europe.
7. Tactical UAVs [Timothy Walton]
Specifically: 500 RQ-11B
and 250 RQ-20A and other tactical UAVs. Russian attack operations have neutralized much of Ukraine’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Ukraine has fielded a small number of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UAVs, which can detect targets and engage them with small munitions. Encouraging Turkey to allow Turkish company Baykar to accelerate new deliveries of TB2 UAVs to Ukraine (and transfer Turkish government ones to replace losses) would improve Ukrainian ISR and targeting capabilities, and the transfer from U.S. Army Prepositioned Stock of legacy hand-launched RQ-11 and RQ-20 UAVs would enhance the ISR of Ukrainian units at the company and battalion level.
8. Loitering Munitions [Timothy Walton]
Specifically: 1,000 Switchblade 300 and 250 Switchblade 600. Ukrainian units lack air support to interdict maneuver formations, and anti-tank units armed with weapons like Javelin can be suppressed at the point of attack. Loitering munitions (aka lethal UAVs or kamikaze UAVs) can enable Ukrainian units to precisely localize and immediately attack Russian vehicles and personnel at ranges of up to 10 km for the Switchblade 300 and 80 km for the Switchblade 600. The transfer from U.S. Army Prepositioned Stocks of
Switchblade 300 systems can quickly enhance the ability of Ukrainian units to attack enemy forces farther from the line of contact. The transfer from U.S. Special Operations Command stocks of Switchblade 600 munitions would allow Ukrainian units to not only attack personnel and light vehicles, but also defeat armored vehicles.
9. Replenishing Munitions Stocks [Timothy Walton]
Specifically: Surplus European stocks of weapons and munitions and 10,000 US 155 mm shells, e.g., M107, M110, M449, and M483 projectiles. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are generally equipped with Soviet-standard munitions, and Ukraine faces major ammunition shortfalls. The United States should request that NATO and other states urgently transfer any surplus munitions and weapons, especially small arms and 152 mm artillery shells to Ukraine. The United States should contract Polish, Czech, Bulgarian, and Slovakian firms that produce relevant munitions to maximize their rate of production and deliver stocks to Ukraine as commercial sales. Lastly, Ukraine is equipped with one class of 155 mm (NATO standard) artillery piece, the 2S22 Bohdana. The transfer of 155 mm shells from US Army Prepositioned Stocks would increase Ukrainian inventories.
10. Camouflage Netting [Timothy Walton]
Specifically: 5,000 camouflage nets, such as Ultra Lightweight Camouflage Net System (ULCANS). Ukrainian forces face high levels of observation from Russian ISR, and the density of Russian ISR may increase in the coming days as Ukrainian air defenses are targeted. To hide from observation, Ukrainian forces will take cover in buildings, but this will
be impractical for many units. The transfer of U.S. Army Prepositioned Stocks camouflage netting can improve the passive defenses of Ukrainian forces and will be increasingly important as Russian attacks intensify.
11. Additional Steps [Timothy Walton]
The United States should fuse space, airborne, accessed civilian sensor (such as traffic and security cameras), and other ISR
information and transfer it in real-time to Ukrainian forces using distributed, secure communications systems. This information will be critical to allow Ukrainian forces to respond to rapidly moving Russian armored and air assault forces and counterattack when appropriate. It will also enable Ukrainian air defenses to remain concealed and not radiate and only activate to target aircraft when commanded, which can enhance their survivability. Improved targeting can allow Ukrainian artillery to use their limited stocks of munitions more efficiently and remain concealed as much as possible.