18 March 2026

Two and a half weeks after the United States and Israel launched their attack on Iran, President Trump sought to build a coalition of support for efforts in the Gulf, only to reverse course and insist the United States could go it alone after requests for help were rebuffed. In a stark contrast to prior wars, where presidents secured support before the outset, both domestically and with the international community, the war with Iran was waged with little, if any, advance warning, let alone consensus building.

In response to the strikes, Iran has exercised its major asymmetrical advantage, threatening ships in the Hormuz Strait and choking off 20% of the world’s supply of oil.

Posting on Truth Social on the weekend, President Trump specifically called upon China, France, Japan, South Korea and the UK to “send Ships to the area so that the Hormuz Strait will no longer be a threat by a Nation that has been totally decapitated.” After most of the countries named in the post turned down this request, President Trump again posted to Truth Social saying he always considered NATO “to be a one way street” and said, “we no longer ‘need,’ or desire NATO Countries’ assistance – WE NEVER DID! Likewise, Japan, Australia, or South Korea.”

Here’s a roundup of what we have (or haven’t) heard from some of the countries he mentioned:

China: There has been no direct statement from China, but the Trump administration has started flagging that they will need to defer the upcoming summit between President Trump and Xi Jinping, saying, “I have to be here…we’ve got a war going on.” China was not mentioned in the second social post.

United Kingdom: Prime Minister Keir Starmer was singled out by Trump’s ire for his equivocation over sending ships to the Strait. At a press conference, Starmer said, “It’s a discussion. We’re not at the point of decisions yet. It’s obviously a difficult question, that goes without saying, in relation to how you safeguard maritime traffic.” President Trump told reporters, “I was not happy with the UK. I think they’ll be involved, maybe, but they should be involved enthusiastically” and then criticised Starmer’s stalling in another press conference, saying, “I said you don’t need to meet with your team, you’re the prime minister.”

France: At a defence council meeting French President Emmanuel Macron said, “France will never take part in operations to open or liberate the Strait of Hormuz in the current context,” but would consider involvement when things were “calmer.” When asked about this at a press conference, President Trump brushed it off saying, “Well, he’ll be out of office very soon.”

Japan: Japanese leaders said the threshold for involvement in the Strait would be “extremely high” and remarks from Prime Minister Takaichi have been noncommittal. She said, “We are currently examining what can be done to protect Japan-related vessels and the lives of their crew, though of course it will be within the limits of Japan’s laws.”

South Korea: South Korean officials said they are carefully considering President Trump’s broad request for countries in Asia to get involved and declined to say whether there was a direct request on a phone call with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun told a parliamentary committee, “The ⁠question of how we're going to respond to an ally's demand is a very important one…As we make ​a decision, I assure you we will act according to the constitution and the law.”

Australia:  While not mentioned in President Trump’s original social post, Australia’s Transport Minister said, “we won’t be sending a ship to the Strait of Hormuz.” This seems to have caught the attention of the Trump administration and Australia was criticised in the second post.

The Trump administration is dealing with diplomatic friction and channelling energy and effort into negotiating with allies and partners while juggling soaring oil prices and diminishing returns on their efforts. As USSC Director of Research Jared Mondschein said on our recent USSC Briefing Room episode, “the Iranian regime is just playing for time….and they think time is on their side.

Lead photo by Jim Watson via Getty.

"In fact, speaking as President of the United States of America, by far the Most Powerful Country Anywhere in the World, WE DO NOT NEED THE HELP OF ANYONE!"

President Trump in a post on Truth Social   |  17 March 2026

Recent content from us

In the news

By the numbers

US missile production shortfalls

Recent reporting has zeroed in on the high volume of precision attack and air defence missiles fired by the United States in the war against Iran over the last two weeks. Apart from a focus on the unfavourable cost comparison between inexpensive Iranian drones and costly US interceptors — a ratio as dire as 1:200 —  commentators have also highlighted the risks that a protracted campaign against Iran could undercut America’s preparedness for a potential high-end conflict in Asia.

The reality, however, is that the campaign against Iran is but the latest episode in a series of Middle East operations since 2016, but particularly since 2022, that have taxed US military readiness and strained already low stockpiles of both offensive and defensive munitions that would be essential to any prospective high-end conflict in the Indo-Pacific. In our March 2025 report Federation is deterrence: The US defence industrial and technology integration agenda in the Indo-Pacific, USSC non-resident fellow Sophie Mayo and I showed how “unanticipated and increasingly protracted military operations” in the Middle East in the preceding three years had put further pressure on a defence industrial base already stretched by competing global security commitments, growing demand from US allies and partners around the world, and historical maintenance and production backlogs that remained unaddressed. Those problems are only magnified by the Iran campaign.

With respect to munitions in particular, the problem has been as much a failure to anticipate the scale of future demands as it has been to replenish depleted inventories. For instance, the number of Tomahawk land attack missiles fired by the US Navy in the opening days of operations against the Houthis in December 2023 amounted to 145% of missiles procured in the previous financial year, while the Pentagon replaced only 80% of the 125 Tomahawks used in its 2017-2018 strike campaigns against Syrian Government targets in the department’s 2018 and 2019 budgets. Procurement of missile interceptors has spiked in the aftermath of unexpected military operations, only to seemingly return to business-as-usual rates in the years thereafter. The result is that at the moment of greatest urgency, American inventories are low.

There are plans to increase US production capacity for long-range strike weapons and missile interceptors to replace used munitions and to get ahead of future demands, but these will take years to reach completion. Several strategic framework agreements between the White House and US defence primes over the last two years have focused on greatly expanding production for exactly the sorts of precision missiles and interceptors being exhausted in the conflict with Iran, including many models which Australia is also seeking to buy. Some of these munitions, like the PAC-3 interceptor, had already been the subject of production expansion initiatives since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Others, like the Precision Strike Missile and Standard Missile 3, have only recently been combat-proven and their recent expenditure and forecast production rates are less apparent from public information. In any case, the expansion of existing factories, let alone the construction of new facilities, will likely take several years to complete, and there are few specific timelines for when projected increases in missile production are likely to hit their peak.

Upcoming events

Manage your email preferences  |  Forward this email to a friend

United States Studies Centre
Institute Building (H03)
University of Sydney NSW 2006

​www.ussc.edu.au  |  us-studies@sydney.edu.au