May 6, 2025

Recent Changes and Important Decisions Concerning Admiralty and Maritime Law in Louisiana

     During the course of representing our clients, we occasionally call their attention to changes in the law and recent decisions that may be of interest. As a courtesy, we write to update you on some recent decisions regarding Admiralty and Maritime Law that could impact future litigation and/or your marine business interests.

JONES ACT & PERSONAL INJURY

Seaman Status

Santee v. Oceaneering Int'l, Inc., 110 F.4th 800 (5th Cir. 2024)

U.S. Fifth Circuit takes a broader approach to determining seaman status.

     A remote-operated vehicle (ROV) technician, who allegedly sustained injury to his shoulder and neck while servicing an ROV while aboard a vessel, brought a state-court action against his employer, the company that serviced the vessel aboard which technician was injured, and the company that had contracted with the employer and the vessel servicer for underwater exploration and drilling services, asserting claims under the Jones Act, general maritime law, and the Saving to Suitors Clause under theories of negligence and unseaworthiness. The suit was removed, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas entered an order denying the technician’s motion for remand, a second order denying the technician’s motion for reconsideration, a third order granting employer’s motion for summary judgment, a fourth order denying the technicians motions to compel discovery and for a continuance of the summary-judgment submission date, and entered a fifth order granting the reaming defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The technician appealed. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit found that the technician’s Jones Act claims were not fraudulently pleading, rendering denial of the technician’s motion to remand to state court a reversible error. In its reasoning, the Fifth Circuit found that the district court did not discuss all relevant inquiries as to seaman status. 

     This holding is significant in that the Fifth Circuit took a broader approach to evaluating seaman status. It reinforces Jones Act protections for maritime workers with a land-based employer and owe allegiance to a vessel. Because of this broader approach, the case law precedent may allow for more claims to be brought under the Jones Act.

Edwards v. InterMoor, Inc., No. 23-30727, 2024 WL 3983332 (5th Cir. Aug. 29, 2024)

Anchor handler deemed not a seaman under Santee analysis.

     The plaintiff was injured aboard a vessel during a particularly stormy night in the Gulf of Mexico and sued his employer and the purposed owner of the vessel in Louisiana state court. The defendants removed the case to federal district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, alleging that the plaintiff fraudulently pled that he was a Jones Act seaman to keep his suit in state court. The district court agreed and denied the plaintiff’s motion for remand. Eventually, all claims were dismissed, and the plaintiff appealed. Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. Although the Court cited Santee (above) and noted its significance in application of the seaman status, it was ultimately inapplicable to the facts here, as the plaintiff could not demonstrate seaman status as an anchor handler.

In re M/V Ram XVII, No. 6:22-CV-0998, 2024 WL 5082045, at *1 (W.D. La. Dec. 11, 2024)

Insufficient connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels.

     Before the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana was a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff was not a seaman. Rather, he was a maritime worker covered under the LHWCA. The defendant submitted that it was entitled to summary judgment in its favor, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for unseaworthiness. Ultimately, the Court granted the defendant’s motion, reasoning that the plaintiff only went out on vessels occasionally and was an employee of a land-based entity rather than the owner of a vessel. The plaintiff did not qualify as a Jones Act seaman.

Bradley Shead v. C-DIVE, LLC, No. CV 24-2655, 2025 WL 65841 (E.D. La. Jan. 10, 2025)

Insufficient connection to a vessel or fleet of vessels.

     The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that the defendant vessel charterer was barred from removing a Jones Act case because the plaintiff met the seaman status test. The Court denied the plaintiff’s motion. The Court found that the plaintiff was not a seaman, as he was a transient worker employed to perform a specific, short-term job onboard a vessel. Once the project was complete, the plaintiff’s connection to the vessel ended.

Unseaworthiness

Tisdale v. Marquette Transportation Co., LLC, 727 F.Supp.3d 553 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2024)

Summary judgment denied due to disputed material facts related to employee training.

     A seaman filed suit against his employer under the Jones Act and general maritime law after being injured while picking up a wet lock line on a barge. The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and unseaworthiness, to which his employer filed a motion for summary judgment. The Court held that there were disputed fact issues as to whether the employer had height and weight limits regarding lifting by deckhands, whether the seaman was trained as to these limits, and whether the positioning of the lock line was an unreasonably unsafe condition. Because of these disputed issues of fact, summary judgment was denied.

Burgess v. C&J Marine Servs., Inc., No. CV 23-5230, 2024 WL 1655135 (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 2024)

Dispute as to root cause of unseaworthy condition that caused alleged accident.

     The plaintiff sued his alleged employer and vessel after a fall aboard the M/V EMILY ALEXIS. The plaintiff's complaint asserted that, on August 7, 2023, the plaintiff reported issues with the M/V EMILY ALEXIS, including the need to replace the turbo on the starboard main engine. On August 8, 2023, the starboard main engine turbo caught fire. When the plaintiff was notified of the fire, he alleged that he proceeded downstairs toward the engine room. The plaintiff's complaint states that he turned around to retrieve the nearest fire extinguisher and slipped on the wheelhouse floor, sustaining injuries from the fall.

     The plaintiff alleged that he sustained injuries as a result of the fall and claimed negligence and/or unseaworthiness against the defendants. The employer of the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that it did not breach any duty to plaintiff. With respect to plaintiff's unseaworthiness claim, as mentioned, the employer argued that, because the plaintiff could not demonstrate that the turbo fire legally caused his alleged fall, partial summary judgment should be granted with respect to this claim. In response, plaintiff argued that the wheelhouse floor was the cause of his injuries but that the turbo fire was relevant for the jury to consider when determining proportionate responsibility with respect to defendants’ allegation that plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Ultimately, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana found there was genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer breached its duty.

Maintenance and Cure

Ellison v. Marquette Transportation Co. Gulf-Inland, LLC, No. CV 23-1849, 2024 WL 4188890 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 2024)

Punitive damages sought for failure to pay maintenance & cure.

     Plaintiff brought suit against the defendant under the Jones Act and general maritime law. Plaintiff alleged that he was a member of the M/V ST. PEREGRINE's crew when a collision occurred between two barges while the M/V ST. PEREGRINE was building a tow. Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of whether it could properly be assessed punitive damages for delaying maintenance and cure payments. The Court found that there existed adequate evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find that the plaintiff demonstrated to the defendant that his injury was caused or at least aggravated by his work on the M/V ST. PEREGRINE. With these facts, a reasonable factfinder could further find that the defendant exhibited callous, arbitrary, and bad faith behavior in refusing to pay maintenance and cure for over two years. Thus, the Court found there were genuine issues of material fact in dispute that precluded summary judgment on the punitive damages.

Moran v. Signet Mar. Corp., No. CV H-21-4214, 2023 WL 2971768 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2023)

Analysis of alleged arbitrary/capricious basis for failure to pay maintenance & cure

     In September 2021, Charles Moran, a 30-year boat captain, reported to work and was informed his vessel’s departure was delayed. After leaving to get a haircut, he tripped and fell in the parking lot salon, breaking his ankle. Moran filed a petition seeking recovery of unearned wages and maintenance and cure from his employer, Signet Maritime Corporation (“Signet”).

     The issues of liability and damages were bifurcated: liability was tried before a jury and damages were tried before the bench. The jury found Signet liable for maintenance and cure, determining that Moran was acting in the service of the vessel at the time of his injury. The Court then held a one-day bench trial to determine damages.

     First, Signet was ordered to pay Moran $16,300.00 in unpaid wages for the 28-day hitch he was scheduled to begin on the day of the injury. The court ultimately determined that $75 per week was a reasonable food expense. Next, the court evaluated Moran’s lodging expense claim. Moran lived on a boat until August 2020 when the boat was damaged by Hurricane Laura, at which time he moved in with his brother. The parties did not dispute that Moran’s lodging expenses when he lived on the boat totaled approximately $1,600.00 per month. However, Signet argued that Moran’s lodging expense claim should be reduced by 50% because he was cohabitating with his brother at the time of his accident. The court rejected this argument, holding that no authority was submitted “suggest[ing] that a move or partial move necessitated by a natural disaster should result in diminished maintenance expenses.”

     In Spring 2022, Moran purchased a camper trailer, and his boat was repossessed in mid-May 2022. The court held that Signet was not obligated to pay living expenses related to the purchase of the trailer, because Moran was already living part-time at his brother’s house and had not yet lost his boat. Moran was unable to persuade the court that maintenance should cover his vehicle, cell phone, and internet expenses. On the issue of punitive damages, the judge held that Signet’s failure to pay maintenance and cure was not arbitrary or capricious, and thus, Signet was not liable for punitive damages.

CONTRACTUAL DEFENSE AND INDEMNITY

Earnest v. Palfinger Marine USA, Inc., 90 F.4^th 804 (5^th Cir. Jan. 11, 2024)

Classification of contract for purposes of determining defense and indemnity provisions.

     In 2019, a lifeboat detached from an Auger Tension Leg Platform owned and operated by Shell 130 miles of the coast of Louisiana, killing two workers and injuring another. The question before the 5^th Circuit was whether the Purchase Contract to inspect and repair lifeboats on the platform located on the Outer Continental Shelf was a maritime contract. If so, the indemnity obligations are enforceable. If not, the indemnity obligations would be unenforceable under the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act.

     In 2018 Shell and Palfinger entered a Purchase Contract for goods and services pertaining to Shell’s lifeboats on the platform. Under the Contract, Palfinger agreed to provide annual inspections, maintenance, and repair of the lifeboats including 5-year recurring cable change outs. The contract also contained indemnity provisions whereby Shell agreed to indemnify Palfinger for liabilities resulting from the death, injury or disease of any Shell employee.

     The District Court held that the contract was not maritime. In reversing, the 5^th Circuit applied the test for a maritime contract set forth in In Re Larry Doiron, Inc. 879 F.3d 568 (5^th Cir. 2018). The test requires: 1. Does the contract involve services to facilitate the drilling or production of oil and gas on navigable waters; and 2. Do the parties expect or does the contract provide that a vessel would play a substantial role in completion of the contract?

     The focus of the opinion was on the second element. The 5^th Circuit held that the primary purpose of the contract was the maintenance and repair of lifeboats, which are vessels. The fact that the lifeboats “use” was not the primary purpose of the contract was an improper application of the Doiron test. Instead, the proper inquiry is whether it was contemplated that a vessel would be necessary to perform the job. In reversing, the 5^th Circuit held that a contract for maintenance and repair of a vessel inevitably gives the vessel a substantial role in completion of the contract.

MARINE INSURANCE

Champagne v. A&T Maritime Logistics Incorporated, 124 F.4^th 620 (5^th Cir. Feb. 4^th, 2025)

Whether conditions of insurance policy met to trigger defense and indemnity coverage.

     Owners of waterfront property brought maritime action against insured vessel’s owner and operator in personam, and vessel in rem, seeking to recover for damage caused when vessel lost control and allided with embankment located on property. Vessel owner filed cross-claim against operator, and third-party demand against marine insurer, seeking defense and indemnification for defense costs. Insurer filed counterclaims against vessel, its owner and operator, seeking declaration it had no duties to parties in connection with allision.

     Court of Appeals held that: (1) insurer was “actually prejudiced” due to operator’s failure to notify it about allision in violation of policy’s prompt notice warranty, notice of loss warranty, and general notice provisions and, thus, coverage was properly denied for owners’ action; (2) policy’s “cross liabilities clause” did not provide coverage to owner of vessel, as additional insured, in connection with maritime action; (3) policy’s “privilege to name additional assureds” clause in marine hull and indemnity policy did not provide coverage to owner of vessel, as additional insured, in connection with maritime action; and (4) insurer had no duty to reimburse vessel owner and vessel operator’s defense costs in maritime action.

Barrios v. Centaur, LLC, 121 F.4th 515 (5^th Cir. Nov. 15, 2024)

Whether P&I policies provide coverage to crew-employee for personal injuries.

     Employee, who alleged that he was injured while transferring portable generator from crew boat to barge leased by employer for use in dock construction project, brought personal injury action against employer and contractor that provided boat, asserting claims under general maritime law and the Jones Act. Contractor then filed cross-claim against employer seeking indemnity and insurance. Contractor was found to be 100% at fault for accident after bench trial and $3.3 million judgment was imposed. Contractor and its insurer satisfied judgment and brought claims against employer under master services contract for breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries.

     The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, and held that escape clauses in worker’s compensation and protection & indemnity (P&I) insurance policies that provided coverage for crew-employee personal injuries, interpreted according to their ordinary meaning, were mutually repugnant and therefore both policies were liable for claim.

Great Lakes Insurance SE v. SEA 21-21, LLC, 757 F.Supp.3d 1279 (S.D.Fla. 11/12/2024)

Analysis of whether a material misrepresentation voided coverage under the policy.

     In this matter, an insurer brought action against insured limited liability company, seeking declaratory judgment that marine insurance policy was void due to alleged misrepresentations by insured regarding purchase price of vessel and cost of improvements made to vessel. The insured filed counterclaim for breach of contract and declaratory judgment for coverage for vessel’s total loss and for payment due under policy.

     After a bench trial, the Court held that: (1) greater weight of evidence showed that insured vessel’s gross purchase price was $450,000 and minimum amount of insured’s investment in vessel was at least $400,000; (2) conflict between stated purchase price and insured’s real investment in vessel was not material to insurer; (3) insured’s failure to provide all receipts and invoices supporting $50,000 repair credit did not establish misrepresentation; (4) insured misrepresented amount of verifiable improvements made to vessel to warrant increase in coverage under policy to $560,000, and that documents and receipts existed that would support costs of work performed; (5) insured had duty to produce receipts of improvements; (6) endorsement, and misrepresentations that prompted increased coverage amount in endorsement, could not be severed from original policy; and (7) misrepresentations as to value of improvements to vessel and their available documentation were material to underwriter’s decision to bind additional coverage.

Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC, 601 U.S. 65 (2024)

Interpretation of choice of law provisions in maritime contracts.

     Years after Raiders Retreat Realty purchased an insurance policy for its vessel from Great Lakes Insurance, it submitted an ill-fated insurance claim after the vessel ran aground in Florida. Great Lakes denied coverage for the claim, asserting that Raiders breached their insurance contract by failing to maintain a fire-suppression system on the vessel, voiding the contract in its entirety. The system’s maintenance was unrelated to the accident. The insurance contract included a choice-of-law provision specifying New York law would govern any future disputes between the parties, despite the fact that Raiders was a Pennsylvania business, and Great Lakes was a company organized in Germany with headquarters in the United Kingdom.

     Great Lakes sought declaratory relief against Raiders in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the theory that Raider’s breach of contract allowed Great Lakes to deny coverage in full. In response, Raiders advanced other contract claims under Pennsylvania law; Great Lakes then countered that Pennsylvania law did not apply to the dispute, despite initiating declaratory relief in that state. Great Lakes asserted that New York state law applied, and the District Court agreed, reasoning that federal maritime law presumes choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts to be valid and enforceable, and rejecting Raiders’ contract claims.

     Raiders appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which vacated the judgment because, while there is a presumption of enforceability for choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts, such contracts must defer to state law when the state’s public policy rationale is strong enough. Here, Raiders wanted the Third Circuit to enforce Pennsylvania’s strong public policy protecting insured parties against “bad faith and unfair trade practices by insurance companies.” The Third Circuit remanded the case, and before the District Court could decide the question, Great Lakes appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. The United States Supreme Court held that choice of law provisions in maritime contracts are valid and enforceable, with certain narrow exceptions, because there is an entrenched rule in general maritime law that choice-of-law provisions are valid in maritime contracts.

     The United States Supreme Court muddied the waters with their unanimous decision upholding choice of law provisions in maritime insurance contracts. While the decision creates uniformity and predictability for future questions of enforceability and resolves decades of conflict over choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts, the Court’s decision also highlights an opportunity for insurance providers to take advantage of state laws that are more attractive to their business purposes, potentially to the detriment of smaller insurance policy carriers. First, the procedural history of the case indicates that Pennsylvania law could have reasonably controlled. The United States Supreme Court’s reliance on The Breman is flawed because the direct relevance of the language in its holding suggests that the Court should have allowed the strong public policy of Pennsylvania, the forum in which the suit was brought, to supersede. Second, the lack of connection between New York state and the parties in the case should have alerted the Court, and while the venue requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) are met, the effect of analogizing choice-of-law provisions to forum selection clauses and holding them to the same standard of review is to allow companies with infinite resources to forum shop endlessly to the detriment of smaller policyholders. Finally, although the Court has not ruled on choice-of-law provisions directly in recent history, and their interests in uniformity, predictability, and efficiency are admirable, in the interest of the greater good, the Court has promulgated a certainly bleak landscape for individual policyholders with disputes against large insurance companies. In fact, the Court misguidedly moves away from seventy-one years of precedent in holding that choice-of-law provisions are presumed enforceable, and it asserts that the understanding of general maritime law from 150 years ago is more relevant than understanding as recent as 1991.

CARGO

AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. M/V Imabari Logger, 2024 WL 3928867 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2024)

Application of Harter Act vs. COGSA.

     The Court provided a detailed history of the interplay between the COCSA and the Harter Act, which explained the delineation of when the Harter Act applies, as follows:

     Both the Harter Act and COGSA compulsorily apply to shipments of goods to and from the United States. The Harter Act, enacted in 1896 applies to a carrier engaged in the carriage of goods to or from any port in the United States. It regulates, among other things, a shipper's contractual limitation of liability, and imposes on the carrier a duty of proper loading, stowage, custody, care, and proper delivery. The Harter Act has the effect of preserving the common law duty of a carrier to exercise due care in all handling of cargo, even when there are contrary contractual provisions. Under the Harter Act, although carriers cannot completely escape liability for their negligence in handling the cargo, they can effectively limit their liability to a sum well below the actual damage suffered.

     COGSA, enacted forty years later in 1936, represents the codification of the United States' obligations under the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, and applies by its own force during the period of time from when goods are loaded on a ship to when they are discharged from the ship. In contrast to the Harter Act, COGSA prescribes a carrier's limitation of liability in the event of damage to or loss of cargo to $500 per package ... or ... per customary freight unit ... unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.

     COGSA, however, does not regulate cargo carried on the deck of a vessel. COGSA applies to goods, wares, merchandise, and articles of every kind whatsoever, except live animals and cargo which by the contract of carriage is stated as being carried on-deck and is so carried.

     The Harter Act provides, in relevant part, that a carrier may not insert in a bill of lading or shipping document a provision avoiding its liability for loss or damage arising from negligence or fault in loading, stowage, custody, care, or proper delivery.

     Although the Harter Act does not permit a carrier to exonerate itself from liability, it does permit a carrier to limit its liability. As such, the Harter Act will apply to on deck cargo instead of COGSA and under the Harter Act a carrier may limit its liability but cannot completely escape liability for its own negligence. 

LHWCA

Santee revisited as to LHWCA and 905(b) vessel claim.

     In 2024, the Fifth Circuit issued two significant opinions in Santee v. Oceaneering International, Inc., offering important guidance on the application of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). The decisions underscore the complex legal distinctions that offshore workers must navigate when their duties blur the line between Jones Act seamen and LHWCA-covered employees.

     The plaintiff, Shanon Roy Santee, was employed by Oceaneering International as a Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) supervisor. He suffered a shoulder injury while working aboard the Deepwater Conqueror, a drillship operating on the Outer Continental Shelf. Santee filed suit in Texas state court against Oceaneering, Transocean (the vessel owner), and Chevron (the operator), asserting claims under the Jones Act, general maritime law, and the Saving to Suitors Clause, alleging both negligence and unseaworthiness. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). Santee sought remand, claiming seaman status, which would preclude removal. The district court disagreed, found his Jones Act claim fraudulently pleaded, and later granted summary judgment, ruling Santee was not a seaman and was limited to remedies under the LHWCA.

March 2024 Decision – Santee v. Oceaneering International, Inc., 95 F.4th 917 (5th Cir. 2024): Seaman Status Denied, § 905(b) Bars Unseaworthiness Claim

     In its first opinion, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings. The court concluded Santee did not qualify as a Jones Act seaman but rather was a LHWCA-covered worker. This classification triggered the limitations of § 905(b), which explicitly prohibits employees covered under the LHWCA from bringing unseaworthiness claims against vessel owners. The court reinforced that Santee’s sole remedy was a negligence claim. The court also rejected Santee’s reliance on Rivera v. Kirby Offshore Marine, distinguishing that case because the worker there was an independent contractor, not an LHWCA-covered employee. The court emphasized that even if a worker performs traditional seaman’s tasks, § 905(b) strictly bars unseaworthiness claims if LHWCA coverage applies.

August 2024 Decision – Santee v. Oceaneering International, Inc., 110 F.4th 800 (5th Cir. 2024): Remand Granted, Unseaworthiness Claim Revived

     In a notable shift, the Fifth Circuit partially reversed course in a second opinion issued later that year. Upon further review, the court found that the district court erred in denying Santee’s motion to remand. The court held that Santee had plausibly alleged Jones Act seaman status, and the claim was not fraudulently pleaded. This reopened the door to his unseaworthiness claim, because if Santee is ultimately found to be a seaman, § 905(b) would not apply. The court stopped short of ruling on seaman status but emphasized that this factual question should not have been resolved at the removal stage. The key takeaway: when seaman status is credibly asserted, the case must proceed, and § 905(b) cannot be used as a categorical bar at the pleading stage.

     These back-to-back rulings underscore the critical importance of worker classification in maritime liability. The March decision reaffirmed the narrow remedies available under § 905(b) for LHWCA-covered employees, while the August opinion signaled that Jones Act allegations, if plausible, must be taken seriously. For offshore employers, this means careful attention must be paid to the nature and consistency of a worker’s vessel assignments. Misclassification not only affects potential liability but may also influence where and how a case is litigated. If a worker is ultimately deemed a seaman, unseaworthiness claims (and broader vessel owner liability) may come into play.

Barrosse v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc, 70 F. 4^th 315 (5^th Cir. 2023)

Whether LHWCA preempted state law.

     The plaintiff, Lynn Barrosse, worked as an electrician helper/electrician at Avondale Shipyard from February 1969 to June 1977. Barrosse was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma in March 2020 and filed a state-law tort suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. He alleged that his exposure to asbestos at Avondale Shipyard caused his illness. The central issue was whether Barrosse's state-law tort claims were preempted by the U.S. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Huntington Ingalls, holding that the claims were preempted by the LHWCA. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, holding that neither express nor conflict preemption applied. The court emphasized that the LHWCA does not explicitly preempt state-law claims and that concurrent jurisdiction is acceptable.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Limitation of Liability

In re Osage Marine Services, Inc., 2025 WL 212310 (E.D.Mo. 1/16.2025)

Whether Flotilla Doctrine applied to expand limitation fund.

     Owner-operator of motorized harbor tugboats which were used to move barges into and out of barge fleets pursuant to fleet operating agreement brought action under Limitation of Liability Act, seeking to limit its liability to value of tugboat aboard which deckhand was working when he fell into river and died. Owner-operator filed motion for summary judgment that limitation fund could not be increased to value of all tugboats subjected to agreement pursuant to flotilla doctrine.

     The presiding District Judge held that: (1) tugboats were not operated pursuant to common contractual enterprise, and thus could not be added to limitation fund pursuant to flotilla doctrine; (2) harbor tugboat on which deckhand was working before he began working on tugboat off which he fell was not involved in accident, and thus could not be brought into limitation fund on such basis; and (3) barges were not subject to common ownership with harbor tugboat off which deckhand fell, and thus could not be included in limitation fund.

JURISDICTION

Thibodeaux v. Bernhard, No. 23-30405, 2024 WL 3181458 (5th Cir. June 26, 2024)

Whether maritime jurisdiction existed over a dispute involving a lake where crawfish farmed.

     The Fifth Circuit addressed whether a U.S. District Court could exercise admiralty jurisdiction over a dispute that occurred between commercial crawfishermen Thibodeaux (Plaintiffs) and landowners Bernhard (Defendants) in Louisiana’s so-called Lost Lake within the Atchafalaya River Basin.

     As a “perched lake,” Lost Lake’s bottom sits above the regional water table. Around one-third of the year, coinciding with crawfish season, Lost Lake is connected to the Atchafalaya River, which flows into the Gulf of Mexico. Plaintiffs attempted to harvest crawfish using traps in the waters of Lost Lake when Defendants allegedly harassed the Plaintiffs, intercepted their skiff, and contacted a sheriff’s deputy who then issued criminal citations for trespass. While the depth of Lost Lake at the time of the dispute was five feet, the land under Lost Lake is owned by the Defendants.

     Under the “saving to suitors” clause, federal courts may hear any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. However, under Grubart, the party seeking the invocation of such jurisdiction must satisfy a two-prong test consisting of a “location” requirement and a “connection to traditional maritime activity” requirement.

     Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, citing loss of income and conversion of their crawfish traps. In their complaint, Plaintiffs asserted that the court had admiralty jurisdiction over the case because both requirements were met. While the magistrate judge recommended a dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court judge rejected that recommendation after a de novo review.

     On remand, the magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine the navigability of Lost Lake and the location of the dispute in question. The magistrate judge ultimately recommended that the court had the authority to hear the case through federal-question jurisdiction due to the possibility of federal navigational servitude of the waters of Lost Lake, but declined to decide whether the court could exercise admiralty jurisdiction over the case.

     The district judge then accepted the factual findings of the evidentiary hearing but held that Lost Lake was a navigable body of water and that the court did possess admiralty jurisdiction over the case.

     The Defendants appealed, though they offered no argument regarding the connection requirement as applied to the dispute. Since that requirement is not waivable, the Fifth Circuit analyzed both the location and connection requirements to resolve whether the district court could exercise admiralty jurisdiction over the case. In a per curiam decision that illustrates the principle of “seasonal navigability,” the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district judge’s finding of admiralty jurisdiction, holding that Lost Lake “is and has historically been used to commercially harvest crawfish on small watercrafts,” its temporary accessibility with the Atchafalaya River “coincides with the most commercially viable period for crawfishermen,” and that “a ten to twenty foot wide drainage canal” connects Lost Lake with the river.

Deno v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. 4:24-CV-1094-P, 2025 WL 790956 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2025)

Whether a land-locked lake is considered navigable under admiralty law.

     Before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas were motions to dismiss filed by insurers on the issue of jurisdiction. The case arose from the petitioner’s yacht catching fire and exploding while docked on Grapevine Lake. The petitioner filed a petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability under Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501, et seq., and Rule F of the Supplementary Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 30529 provides, in general, for an owner to bring action before a district court for limitation of liability. The petitioner contended that this Court had subject-matter jurisdiction based on admiralty law.

     The insurers moved to dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The insurers argued the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Grapevine Lake is not considered navigable within the meaning of admiralty law. Specifically, the insurers argued that the petitioner failed to allege (1) that Grapevine Lake is navigable water under the “location” test and (2) whether the incident has the potential to impact maritime commerce and a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity under the “connection with” test.

     The Court found that the petitioner did not provide any evidence that Grapevine Lake is navigable. Moreover, the Court found that Grapevine Lake is not navigable because it is landlocked, located entirely within the State of Texas, and primarily used for flood-control and recreation. Because the petitioner did not meet his burden of evidence, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice.

NEGLIGENCE OF A VESSEL

In the Matter of Aries Marine Corporation, et al., 2023 WL 346306 (E.D. La. 2023).

Whether punitive damages are available under 905(b).

     In Matter of Aries Marine Corporation, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied a motion for summary judgment that sought to dismiss claims under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 905(b))—including claims for punitive damages.

     The case arises from the 2018 sinking of the lift boat RAM XVIII after an alleged failure in preloading procedures. Aries Marine argued that punitive damages were unavailable under maritime law, especially outside U.S. territorial waters. However, the court, consistent with prior rulings in the Eastern District, held that punitive damages may be recoverable under § 905(b) where conduct amounts to gross negligence or willful disregard. The court emphasized that the Fifth Circuit has not definitively ruled on the issue, leaving the door open for claimants to proceed if they can show reckless or willful conduct.

     Although § 905(b) traditionally provides injured longshoremen and similar workers with a limited negligence claim against vessel owners, this decision highlights the uncertain but expanding scope of damages available in vessel negligence claims. As courts continue to recognize punitive damages in § 905(b) cases, maritime employers should ensure strict compliance with safety procedures and training protocols to mitigate risk.

Reed v. Maersk Line, Ltd., 649 F. Supp. 3d 428 (S.D. Tex. 2023)

Whether the offending vessel violated the Inland Navigational Rules.

     The parties involved in this case are Jana Reed, acting individually and on behalf of her children as plaintiffs, and Maersk Line, Limited and M/V Maersk Idaho, a large container ship, as the defendants. During that sunny day with calm waters, Christopher Reed, a Kemah Police Chief, was in his twenty-foot fishing boat in the Houston Ship Channel in Galveston Bay with his wife, Jana Reed, embarking on a fishing adventure. Whilst on the Channel, the Reeds encountered wake formed by the vessel, causing him to fall and unfortunately drown by lack of usage of a life jacket or any throwable personal-flotation device. Jana Reed then proceeded to file a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas against Maersk Line, Limited and M/V Maersk Idaho, due to negligence, wrongful death, survival and a bystander claim, all based on an alleged failure to follow the Rules of Inland Navigation by the defendants.

     The Inland Navigation Rules, codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, 33 C.F.R. § 83.01, et seq., provide the “rules of the road” for vessels navigating on the inland waters of the United States, including the Houston Ship Channel. The broad purpose of these rules is to prevent incidents on the waterways. After the trial and the appropriate depositions, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove the actual negligence in the duty of the defendants. Expert witnesses properly stated that the container ship had not failed in following the Rules of Inland Navigation, and that they did not create a dangerous wake for other smaller vessels. The plaintiffs were unable to present evidence of what a safe speed would have been for the M/V Maersk Idaho on the date of the incident. The defendants possessed no liability for the death of the decedent in this case, and the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims. Because the court had found the defendants committed no negligence on June 7, it was not necessary to determine whether either Chief Reed or Jana acted negligently. Nevertheless, the court noted that had it reached that question, it would have found neither that Chief Reed was impaired on June 7 nor that Jana's conduct had anything to do with his death.

     In sum, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that the defendants violated 33 C.F.R. § 164.11 or Rule 5 or 6 of the Inland Navigation Rules or were otherwise negligent, let alone that any negligent conduct by the defendants legally caused the occurrence that resulted in the drowning death of Chief Reed.

CONCLUSION

     As our clients continue to navigate the ever-evolving legal landscape of admiralty and maritime law, staying informed and proactive is key. The insights shared in this edition highlight both challenges and opportunities, underscoring the importance of adaptability and strategic action. We look forward to bringing you more admiralty and maritime updates and perspectives in our next newsletter.

Sidney W. Degan, III

Managing Partner 
E-Mail: sdegan@degan.com

DEGAN, BLANCHARD & NASH 
A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
NEW ORLEANS | BATON ROUGE | LAFAYETTE
WEBSITE: WWW.DEGAN.COM

DEGAN, BLANCHARD & NASH ADMIRALTY & MARITIME PRACTICE GROUP

     Our Admiralty and Maritime Practice Group includes eight (8) partners and nine (9) associates who concentrate on providing advice regarding complex issues of admiralty and maritime law to both marine industry and related insurance clients.

     The firm has diversified from its traditional role primarily in the Louisiana and Texas “brown and blue water” maritime issues defending personal injury and longshore claims into one that provides advice pertaining to environmental/pollution incidents, marine terminal damages, cargo misdelivery and/or damage, regulatory compliance, administrative matters involving the U.S. Coast Guard, vessel finance, as well as contracts and vessel documentation.  The firm’s approach is to consistently reflect our attorneys’ broad knowledge and deep understanding of admiralty and oilfield-related law, together with effective representation of our clients. We advise marine businesses and insurers through the efficient, effective handling of litigation, including the defense of marine liability claims, and also the recovery of subrogation amounts.  

     The firm’s broad maritime practice includes the handling of matters arising under the Jones Act, U.S. Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), Defense Base Act and Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, as well as third party marine tort lawsuits, marine products liability claims, terminal operators, ship repair/dry dock, maritime casualties, cargo, marine environmental, pollution and toxic exposures. In addition, we have considerable experience in insurance coverage and contractual disputes involving the marine and oilfield industries, as well as governmental, administrative matters with the U.S. Coast Guard. 

     The Admiralty and Maritime Practice Group attorneys are also known for their representation of and dealings with marine insurers, ocean carriers, offshore platform owners and suppliers of transportation equipment to the marine industry.  We represent clients in connection with disputes arising from the construction and reconstruction of vessels, fixed platforms, marine related equipment and maritime contracts. 

     Importantly, the firm’s attorneys have experience in conducting investigations of serious maritime casualties and pollution incidents, including interviewing the vessel’s crew, preserving evidence and liaising with state and federal authorities – a critical first step to minimizing risk and losses. In addition, the firm has experience with vessel financing, loan refinancing, due diligence, vessel documentation and certification, as well as contract drafting and review.

     In addition to the practical experience, our attorneys regularly participate in legal and maritime industry related seminars and continuing education programs as panelists. Our Admiralty and Maritime Practice Group members also prepare articles on relevant topics of law that are routinely published in newsletters and journals.     

     The attorneys of DBN’s Admiralty and Maritime Practice Group who contributed to this update include: Sid Degan, Phil Brickman, Richard Schwerdfeger, Emma Dedman, Nick Danna, Alina Pagani, Shavon Fletcher, Lisa Maher, Jordan Amedee and Turk Clay.

www.DEGAN.com