Media Contribution: ‘Labour abuses - sometimes akin to slavery - detected on European fishing vessels’ (Euronews)

Dr Ioannis Chapsos was interviewed by the Euronews network on his research findings on human trafficking, forced labour and modern slavery in the fishing industry. His contribution informed the respective article published on 19^th November 2023. Here, among other things, he highlighted the need to raise awareness within the international community and for collective action to combat this crime that occurs at sea and which is far less visible than similar land-based crimes. Dr Chapsos also argued that the international community should reconsider the definition of slavery and what differentiates it from modern slavery to make better use of the tools provided by the UNCLOS [articles 99 and 110] and their respective provisions on combating slavery and slave trade.    

To read the full article, please click here.

Maritime Cybersecurity Presentation to Indonesian Police in Coventry

On 13^th and 14^th November 2023 a delegation of 14 senior Indonesian police officers from the National Police Academy attended a two-day training event covering a range of topics relating to peace and security delivered by the Centre for Trust, Peace, and Social Relations. As part of the training, Dr Adam J. Fenton delivered an interactive session on maritime cybersecurity focussing on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. It was a lively discussion covering the various current cyber threats, threat actors such as terrorist, pirate and TOC groups, their cyber capabilities, and governance responses from the littoral states. This was the second of the training courses for Indonesian national police (POLRI) and plans are in progress for the third iteration in 2024.  

Presentation to SHADE conference, Bahrain

Dr Robert McCabe presented at the 51st Shared Awareness and De-Confliction (SHADE) Conference that was held in Manama, Bahrain in October. His presentation focussed on how environmental factors drive maritime insecurity in the western Indian Ocean and how this impacts naval operations in the region. The presentation also emphasised the need to consider coastal communities as key stakeholders and not just arbitrary receivers of capacity building or passive adherents of top-down regulations. SHADE is chaired by the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) and EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta and brings together representatives from over 40 nations to discuss maritime security issues in the western Indian Ocean.

How does climate change, environmental degradation and resource exploitation drive maritime insecurity? How can states build resilience to manage these threats? Untangling the connections between these traditionally disparate areas of enquiry has gained prominence in recent years yet the linkages between security and the marine environment remain underdeveloped. 

Environmental drivers are more prominent in analysis of maritime insecurity in other regions, such the Gulf of Guinea, given the preponderance of the oil industry and the impacts this has on the ecology of the marine environment and the livelihood of coastal communities.  Environmental drivers in the western Indian Ocean are less well understood despite the prominence that access to marine resources and grievances over governance of maritime spaces have in relation to incidences of maritime insecurity and criminal disorder. 

Environmental factors are rarely the sole cause of insecurity or criminal disorder, but they can  increase the severity and duration of criminal activity and complicate the resolution of conflict. The cumulative impacts of climate change (e.g. sea level rise and ocean acidification), environmental degradation (e.g. the discharging of hazardous waste materials), and resource exploitation (e.g. overfishing) combined with other factors, provided a justification for piracy within disadvantaged coastal communities, damaged prospects for the sustainable development of Somalia’s ocean resources, and undermined trust in national institutions and international capacity-building efforts. Such issues evoked a sense of grievance in disenfranchised Somali coastal communities and - according to the UN Security Council - not only inspired many pirates but also served to legitimize their activities in the eyes of their communities, which allowed organised criminal networks to expand. 

Other factors, such as changing weather patterns combined with sea-level rise, also have the potential to drive higher numbers of displaced persons, which provides opportunities for people smuggling networks to flourish. This adds pressure on maritime police and prosecution authorities to target and deal with offenders. In addition, sea level rise may eventually result in the recalculation of some maritime boundaries that has the potential to escalate existing maritime territorial disputes linked to access to offshore resources and competing maritime territorial claims.  

In terms of building resilience against environmental issues and maritime insecurity are three key areas to consider. (1) Environmental governance, aimed at protecting the ecology and sustainability of maritime spaces through policy, regulation and planning. (2) Enforcement and monitoring, to counteract environmental related crimes at sea, such as IUU fishing as well as enforcing regulations in newly designated zones. (3) Building resilience measures to strengthen the blue economy, increase food and income security in the context of environmental stressors, and support sustainable livelihoods to deter coastal populations from criminal activities.  

While multiple governance initiatives have been designed to improve regional states resilience against environmental and security threats, it is clear significant gaps still exist in terms of institutional, technical and human capacity. In addition, most capacity-building initiatives are designed either externally without input from local end-users or at a national level without input from neighbouring states. Attempts to adopt a more integrated regional approach have tended to be disjointed and would likely require far-reaching structural changes. Given the siloed and narrow sector-oriented nature of many national marine sectors and agencies in the western Indian Ocean (and indeed elsewhere), integration and harmonisation is a significant challenge.  

A core issue with the designation of marine protected zones is the lack of capacity for prosecution and monitoring, control and surveillance. Increasingly, traditional naval operations represent only a small fraction of the commitments African naval forces must meet. A much larger part of their activity is coastguard in nature and relates to law enforcement, environmental protection, and maritime safety obligations. A critical part of being able to counteract maritime criminality and enforce marine regulations is having the capacity to know what happens at sea. Achieving Maritime Domain Awareness is difficult even for countries with large, well-resourced maritime law enforcement capacities, and so it is an acute challenge for western Indian Ocean states with less well developed naval capabilities. Despite this, by effectively incorporating the right mix of both human intelligence and technology, states can gain a clearer maritime situational picture.  

It is clear that a core factor in the spread of maritime insecurities, violence, and crime is the welfare of coastal communities. As the case of Somali piracy graphically illustrates, problems related to poverty and the environment are increasingly evolving into traditional international security risks. A secure marine environment is therefore unlikely if coastal communities do not benefit from blue economic development, new coastal governance architectures, and international capacity building projects. The accelerating impact of climate change has the potential to increase pressures on already vulnerable coastal populations in the future, leading to an escalation in the movement of people across maritime frontiers and with it increased transnational criminality. These issues need to be approached in a comprehensive way if policy and operational responses are to be effective and sustainable.  

By providing littoral states with the capacity to exploit, but also protect, the ocean environment and build resilience against environmental shocks, coastal communities can directly benefit from the blue economy in a more meaningful way, and therefore be less likely to pursue alternative criminal lifestyles. It is important that coastal communities become key stakeholders and not just arbitrary receivers of capacity building or passive adherents of top-down regulations often at odds with established local ways of doing things.  

If you are interested to know more about the issues discussed in this briefing, please contact Dr McCabe at: robert.mccabe@coventry.ac.uk

In each issue of our newsletter, we highlight published research involving a member or members of CTPSR’s maritime security team. In this issue, we look at:

McCabe, R. and Flynn, B. 'Under the radar: Ireland, maritime security capacity, and the governance of subsea infrastructure'. European Security (2023). You can download an open access copy of the article here.

Abstract

Subsea infrastructure is typically out of sight, but in recent times, seldom out of mind. The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in October 2022 has magnified the vulnerability and critical importance of subsea infrastructure. It also exposed a lack of understanding on how subsea networks operate, how they are regulated, who controls them and how they are protected. Ireland matters in this context. Despite its official policy of neutrality, Ireland occupies an important strategic position in terms of transatlantic telecommunications cables between the United States, Britain and continental Europe. The conflict in Ukraine has amplified tensions in this context in terms of the increased threat of grey-zone/hybrid warfare activity. This article will consider for the first time how a global connectivity hub on the western periphery of Europe governs critical underwater infrastructure. It will discuss the context and agencies involved in subsea cable governance in Ireland and identify the gaps in this protection before formulating suggestions for the long-term improvement of Ireland’s maritime security capacity. The Irish case is important as it can help inform defence policy and security practice in other island states with large maritime jurisdictions and in particular states with small navies.

And finally...

If you have any questions about the content in this newsletter, want to know about the Maritime Security team’s research, or wish to discuss training and consultancy services, please email: james.malcolm@coventry.ac.uk 

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