And speaking of a pinch and a punch brings me to a back and forth tribunal barney in the case of the Maritime & Coastguard Agency v Groom (2026), in which the ET and EAT slogged out whether a volunteer was actually a worker.

You may recall we previously covered this earlier: warnergoodmanllp.createsend1.com/t/y-e-mtylddt-l-tl/. 

Mr Groom was a Coastguard Rescue Officer who provided services to the Maritime & Coastguard Agency over a number of years. CROs were described by the MCA as volunteers and operated under a Volunteer Handbook rather than a written contract of employment.

Following disciplinary proceedings in 2020 and the termination of his role, Mr Groom sought to exercise the statutory right to be accompanied by a trade union representative at a disciplinary appeal hearing. The MCA refused, asserting that Mr Groom was neither an employee nor a worker and therefore had no such entitlement.

Mr Groom brought a claim in the Employment Tribunal, arguing that despite the “volunteer” label, the reality of the relationship meant he qualified as a worker under section 230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

The ET rejected Mr Groom’s claim and found that he was not a worker. In reaching its decision, the ET placed weight on the following factors:

• The documentation governing the relationship consistently described CROs as volunteers.
• There was no overarching contract and no obligation on Mr Groom to accept or perform work.
• Although CROs could claim payments in certain circumstances, these were viewed as expenses or discretionary allowances rather than remuneration forming part of a contractual bargain.

The ET concluded that there was no mutuality of obligation and no intention to create legal relations, and therefore no worker status. Mr Groom’s claim was dismissed.

Mr Groom appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. As discussed in our earlier case summary, the EAT allowed the appeal and overturned the ET’s decision. The EAT held that the ET had misdirected itself in law, particularly in its approach to contractual intention and remuneration. Key findings included that:

• The term “volunteer” has no legal status in employment law and is not determinative.
• The correct question was whether a contract arose on each occasion Mr Groom undertook activities for which payment could be claimed.
• Where Mr Groom performed services personally and was entitled to payment in return, this gave rise to mutual obligations and demonstrated an intention to create legal relations.

The EAT concluded that Mr Groom was a worker during periods when he carried out remunerated activities, and that he was therefore entitled to the statutory right to be accompanied at his disciplinary appeal.

The MCA appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the EAT had erred in law by:

• Treating optional or claimable payments as remuneration.
• Finding contractual intention in circumstances where the overarching relationship was expressly voluntary.
• Concluding that worker status could arise in the absence of a single, continuous contract.

The central issue for the Court of Appeal was whether the EAT had been entitled to find that discrete contracts arose each time Mr Groom undertook paid activities, notwithstanding the absence of a wider contractual framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the MCA’s appeal and upheld the EAT’s decision in full. In its judgment, the Court confirmed that:

• The reality of the working relationship must take precedence over labels or descriptions used by the parties.
• An entitlement to payment, even where the individual can choose whether or not to claim it, is capable of constituting remuneration for the purposes of worker status.
• A contract does not need to govern the entire relationship. Instead, a contract can arise on a task-by-task or engagement-by-engagement basis.
• Mutuality of obligation may exist for the duration of each paid engagement, even if there is no obligation to offer or accept future work.

The Court concluded that whenever Mr Groom undertook activities for which payment could be claimed, he did so under a contract for personal service and therefore met the statutory definition of a worker.

This case is a significant and practical reminder that employment status is determined by substance, not terminology. For employers, particularly those engaging volunteers, casual staff, or individuals in hybrid roles, the key lessons are clear:

• Calling someone a volunteer does not prevent worker status from arising.
• Payments described as allowances or discretionary sums may still amount to remuneration.
• Worker status can exist intermittently, attaching to individual tasks or activities rather than the relationship as a whole.
• Misclassification risks exposing employers to unexpected statutory rights, including rights relating to disciplinary procedures, pay, holiday entitlement, and minimum wage.

This case reinforces the importance of regularly reviewing working arrangements and ensuring that contractual documentation accurately reflects how roles operate in practice. Employers who rely on labels without examining the reality of the relationship do so at their own risk.