And speaking of knock-on effects brings me to the convoluted case of London Ambulance Service NHS Trust v Garrett 2026, and whether a denial of systemic racism is in itself racist.

Mr Garrett, who identifies as white British, was employed by the London Ambulance Service NHS Trust in 2015. By 2020, he was working as part of an emergency ambulance crew.

In January 2020, during a heated exchange with a black colleague, Mr Omar Joe, he used the term “roadman”. Following internal communications in early June 2020 addressing racism and allyship after the death of George Floyd, a discussion took place in the mess room during which Mr Garrett rejected the concept of systemic racism, citing examples from friends’ experiences; a colleague overheard these comments and complained the same day.

In August 2020 an investigation was opened into the January and June incidents, and Mr Garrett was suspended on full pay. The investigator did not interview Ms Sonal Shah, the person directly conversing with Mr Garrett in June. A disciplinary hearing led to findings that the “roadman” remark was abusive but not racial, that the disputed comments were made, and that Mr Garrett had inappropriately mimicked Mr Joe. A final written warning was issued, alongside requirements to complete unconscious bias training, a black allyship workshop, and a written reflective practice. It was determined, however, that the misconduct was the offensive manner of expression, not the mere denial of systemic racism.

Mr Garrett brought claims of direct discrimination because of belief and race to the Employment Tribunal, arising from the investigation, disciplinary process and sanctions.

At a preliminary stage, the ET recorded Mr Garrett’s protected belief as a “treatment belief” that all people are one race and should be treated equally and with respect, and it treated his “no systemic racism” stance as a manifestation of that belief. By a majority, the ET found that three acts amounted to direct discrimination because of the manifestation:

• concluding the investigation without interviewing Ms Shah;
   
• discounting evidence Mr Garrett offered to support his stance on the systemic-racism issue; and
   
• requiring a written reflective practice that, it said, aimed to change his belief.

The ET also upheld the direct race discrimination complaint in relation to the discounting of evidence, inferring that similar evidence from a nonwhite employee would not have been dismissed without engagement; it awarded £3,750 for injury to feelings.

The Trust appealed the decision to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, arguing that the ET had misapplied the law by treating Mr Garrett's views on systemic racism as a manifestation of his protected belief and by finding direct race discrimination without sufficient evidential support.

The EAT allowed the Trust’s appeal. The EAT held the ET made a fundamental error in treating the rejection of systemic racism as a manifestation of the “treatment belief”; the two were not “intimately linked” in the legal sense, so the belief based discrimination findings could not stand. In regard to the investigation step, the ET had not properly considered whether the true reason was the view that Mr Garrett had used racially charged language, rather than any manifestation of belief.

On the allegation that Mr Farmer, who oversaw the disciplinary proceedings and subsequent outcomes, failed to consider Mr Garrett’s evidence, the EAT found the ET failed to engage with a nondiscriminatory explanation recorded in the decision letter, namely the lack of academic rigour in the materials Mr Garrett had cited. On the reflective practice requirement, the ET failed to grapple with its own earlier finding that Mr Farmer’s concern was the offensive manner of Mr Garrett’s conduct, not his denial of systemic racism. The race discrimination finding was perverse because there was no proper basis to infer that race materially influenced the treatment, and the ET wrongly said no nondiscriminatory reason was advanced.

The EAT quashed the ET’s findings upholding direct discrimination because of belief and race and the £3,750 award, and substituted dismissal of those complaints with no remission.

This case underlines that drawing a line between a protected belief and the manner of its expression is crucial; sanctions can lawfully address objectionable expression if reasons are properly evidenced and proportionate.

Tribunals will scrutinise whether a “manifestation” is genuinely and closely linked to a protected belief; conflating normative and descriptive positions invites error.

Ensure investigations engage with central evidence and record clear, nondiscriminatory reasons, including methodological concerns about materials; avoid statements suggesting belief-based disagreement is itself misconduct. Finally, be cautious in inferring race-based causation; document the actual rationale and comparators to mitigate the risk of adverse inferences.