CHINA MONTHLY ENERGY UPDATE NOVEMBER 2025

Authored by Caroline Wang, China Lead, Climate Energy Finance 

Previous CEF monthly updates here. 

Got questions or feedback? Please reach out: caroline@climateenergyfinance.org     

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CHINA POWER STATISTICS – OCTOBER 2025 

China added 398 GW of new power capacity in the first ten months of 2025 — and overwhelmingly driven by zero-emissions energy. Renewables accounted for 83% of all new additions, with solar power alone contributing 253 GW, or 64% of total growth. 

Wind power added a further 70 GW (18% share), expanding rapidly at 53% YoY, while hydropower additions remained modest at 8 GW amid resource limits and project maturity. Nuclear added 2 GW, consistent with phased commissioning schedules. 

In October 2025, China installed 31.1 GW, of which 73% (22.7 GW) was zero-emissions capacity. Solar and wind together made up 70% of the month’s new builds, reflecting ongoing momentum in utility-scale deployments and distributed rooftop systems. Fossil additions (8.4 GW) rose 54% YoY, but their share of new capacity remains structurally low at 16% YTD and 27% in October, aligning with the shift toward system-wide clean power integration. 

Key takeaway: 
China continues to deliver one of the fastest clean-energy build-outs in history. Year-to-date figures show a structural acceleration in solar and wind deployment, consolidating China’s position as the world’s primary driver of zero-emissions capacity growth. 

Figure 1 

China’s total installed power capacity reached 3,752 GW by October 2025, up 18% YoY. The composition of the system is undergoing rapid structural transformation: renewable energy capacity now accounts for 58% of the national fleet, and zero-emissions technologies account for 60%. 

Solar power saw the strongest expansion, rising 44% YoY to 1,140 GW, reflecting record manufacturing output, falling module prices, and rapid grid-scale deployment. Wind power reached 590 GW (+21% YoY), consolidating its role as the second-largest zero-emissions source. 

Hydropower, at 444 GW, grew incrementally (+3%), while nuclear capacity expanded to 62 GW (+8% YoY) as new reactors entered service under China’s long-term nuclear program. 

Fossil power capacity still represents 40% of the total grid (1,515 GW), but its share continues to decline despite a 6% YoY increase in installed coal capacity — a reflection of China’s grid-balancing strategy and ongoing retirement/replacement of older units. 

Key takeaway: 
China has crossed a structural threshold: non-fossil capacity now dominates the national power system, driven by record additions of solar and wind. The overall capacity mix is shifting from fossil-anchored to renewables-centred, supporting China’s 2030 and 2035 emission-reduction goals and laying the foundation for accelerated system-level decarbonisation. 

Figure 2: 

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CHINA’S POWER GENERATION MIX IN JANUARY–OCTOBER 2025

China generated 8,674 TWh of electricity in the first ten months of 2025, up 5.4% year-on-year, with growth driven overwhelmingly by zero-emissions sources.  

Clean power generation reached 3,614 TWh, expanding 14.3% yoy and lifting the zero-emissions share of total generation to 42%, compared to 39% a year earlier. 

Fossil Power – Flat for the Year, Rising in October 

Fossil generation totalled 5,060 TWh (–0.2% yoy), confirming the broader pattern of plateauing fossil output despite increasing power demand. 

• Coal: 4,809 TWh (–0.3% yoy), 55% of total generation 

• Gas: 237 TWh (+1.7% yoy), 3% share 

• Other fossil: 14 TWh (+1.2% yoy) 

By contrast, October saw a sharp short-term rebound: fossil generation rose 7.6% yoy to 499 TWh, driven by a surge in electricity consumption due to parts of southern China experiencing heatwaves in early October, with daily temperatures exceeding 38°C, under La Niña conditions. The first ten days of the month saw the highest temperatures on record for the same period, followed by lower-than-average temperatures in the middle and latter parts of the month.  

Hydropower – Strong Recovery Through October 

Hydropower reached 1,143 TWh, up 2.6% yoy supplying 13% of national generation. 
In October alone, hydro output jumped 29.1% yoy to 136 TWh, owing to increased rainfall. 

Solar Power – Fastest-Growing Source in 2025 

Solar generation surged 40.5% yoy to 1,012 TWh, now providing 12% of total electricity.October output reached 87 TWh (+26.1% yoy), reaffirming solar as the strongest structural driver of China’s clean-energy growth. 

Wind Power – Double-Digit Growth, but Seasonal Dip in October 

Wind generation rose 12.1% yoy to 898 TWh, accounting for 10% of total electricity. 
October output was 80 TWh, down 7.4% yoy, reflecting monthly variability. 

Nuclear – Steady Expansion 

Nuclear power generated 397 TWh, rising 8.7% yoy, maintaining a 5% share. 
October output grew 4.4% yoy to 39 TWh, consistent with incremental commissioning and strong utilisation. 

Variable Renewables and Zero-Emissions Power 

• Variable Renewable Generation (solar + wind): 
  1,911 TWh (+25.5% yoy), supplying 22% of total generation. 

• Zero-Emissions Generation (hydro + nuclear + solar + wind + bioenergy): 
  3,614 TWh (+14.3% yoy), 42% system share. 

Key takeaway: 

China’s January–October 2025 power data confirms an ongoing trend: all net growth in electricity generation is coming from clean sources, while fossil output remains broadly flat. Solar continues to lead with exceptional growth, wind and hydro provide strong complementary increases, and nuclear expands steadily. The clean-power share has now reached 42%, anchoring China’s system-level transition toward its 2030 and 2035 climate goals. 

Figure 3 

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CHINA AT COP30 – PERSPECTIVE FROM CHINA’S CLIMATE ENVOY

COP30 marked the first time in history that the US Federal Government was absent, resulting in growing attention on China’s role – can China step up as leader?  

See China Briefing 13 November 2025: COP30 special for an explainer.  

For a Chinese perspective on the COP30 outcomes, have a read below of the translated transcript from an exclusive interview by The Paper (澎湃新闻) (China’s Shanghai-based, state-owned digital news outlet) with Liu Zhenmin, China's Special Envoy for Climate Change: 

The US Absence: Impact on the COP30 Negotiation Landscape and Funding Issues 

The Paper: This year, the US federal government was absent from the climate conference for the first time. During my interview at the conference with Christiana Figueres, one of the main architects of the Paris Agreement, she suggested that the US absence might be for the better, as it would prevent them from interfering in the negotiations. How do you assess the specific impact of the US absence, as observed so far, on the COP30 negotiation process, political dynamics, and key issues? 

Liu Zhenmin: The Trump administration announced its second withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in January of this year, but it will not take effect until a year after notification to the United Nations. Therefore, legally speaking, the United States is still eligible to participate in the COP30 conference this year. However, due to President Trump's personal stance on climate issues—his opposition to the climate change agenda and his domestic abolition of the department in charge of climate change affairs—the United States did not send a delegation this time. 

One point of concern is that the US sent a delegation to the International Maritime Organization meeting in July this year, deeply intervening in international maritime emissions reduction management negotiations, which had a very negative impact. Therefore, the statement that "the US's absence from COP30 may not be a bad thing" reflects this context. 

Of course, from a broader perspective, the US absence is not accidental. If Trump is absent for all four years of his second term, it will severely impact the integrity of the multilateral climate change process. The US is a major power, and its absence does indeed affect COP30 negotiations—most directly in terms of funding. Without the US, climate finance aid from developed countries to developing countries, as well as coordination of climate negotiations and multilateral cooperation, all face difficulties. Without a leader, coordination weakens. Therefore, this conference encountered significant difficulties in funding negotiations. 

This also means that COP30 is unlikely to see a significant increase in financial support. However, as long as countries can maintain existing consensus and continue to implement their commitments, especially the "new collective quantitative financial targets" reached at COP29, it is still a viable solution in the current international political climate. Of course, developing countries will be disappointed. 

The Paper: Although the US federal government didn't attend this time, many local governments, business leaders, and former officials did. To what extent do you think this effort from a "non-federal system" can fill the gap at the federal level? Can this force still enable the US to continue playing a role on the international stage? 

Liu Zhenmin: We have indeed seen representatives from many state governments, think tanks, universities, and businesses in the United States, especially the delegation led by the Governor of California. I myself have also met with many American friends, including old friends who were deeply involved in climate negotiations in the past, such as former US Climate Envoy Stern, as well as representatives of faculty and students from Stanford University and other schools, and representatives from various think tanks. 

Their arrival demonstrates to the international community that American society is not monolithic on climate change, and not everyone supports President Trump's anti-climate stance. There are at least two opposing viewpoints within the United States, and according to some American friends, most state governments continue to support the energy transition and American participation in global climate change action. 

In that sense, their arrival is indeed important. But as you said, no matter how many local governments and people from all walks of life come, they cannot replace the functions of the federal government. 

The Paper: During my interview with former US Special Envoy Stern at the conference, he predicted that "the United States will return to global climate negotiations in the next election cycle." What is your opinion on this? 

Liu Zhenmin: Whether the United States will rejoin the multilateral process on climate change in the future depends on its domestic policies, elections, and political changes—something the outside world cannot determine. However, we have repeatedly expressed to our American friends that climate change is a global challenge, and the United States cannot be absent. We hope that the United States can rejoin the Paris Agreement and return to the multilateral cooperation process. 

The debate over fossil fuel transition roadmap 

The Paper: You previously mentioned that the focus of this conference is to advance the COP28 UAE consensus. Within this framework, how does China view the "fossil fuel transition roadmaps" proposed by some countries? 

Liu Zhenmin: In accordance with the requirements of the Paris Agreement, all countries must submit their new round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for 2035 this year. More than 120 countries have already submitted theirs, which is a significant achievement and proves the success of the Paris Agreement and the UAE consensus. 

The core of this round of NDC is energy transition, and countries have submitted their own energy transition goals, plans and measures. 

From China's perspective, we hope that all countries will continue to support the implementation of the UAE consensus and refrain from proposing alternative roadmaps. This is because, in terms of global energy transition and addressing fossil fuel issues, the UAE consensus currently represents the most comprehensive solution. 

The UAE consensus proposes to initiate a just, orderly, and equitable global energy transition process that gradually moves away from fossil fuels. Its core is to encourage countries to increase the development of non-fossil energy and renewable energy to gradually replace fossil fuels—which is consistent with China's "establish before dismantling" approach. 

Some countries have proposed roadmaps that only target the "phasing out of fossil fuels" without simultaneously considering the development of renewable energy. This is not feasible and will seriously affect the energy security, economic growth, and social stability of various countries. 

Therefore, China's position is: to uphold the consensus reached in the UAE and continue to advance the global energy transition process. 

The Paper: How do you respond to the view held by some international voices that "China's NDC still has room for improvement"? How does China balance its own development stage with global temperature control goals when updating its NDC? 

Liu Zhenmin: I think these voices come from some foreign politicians or media outlets, which shows a lack of understanding of the reality in China or political bias. 

On September 24 this year, President Xi Jinping announced China's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for 2035 at the United Nations General Assembly, stating that China will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 7%-10% from peak levels and strive to do even better. This is the first time that China, as a developing country, has proposed a quantified absolute emission reduction target, covering the entire economy. 

Industry insiders generally believe that this is a very ambitious goal. China's emission reduction rate even exceeds that of some developed countries after they peaked their carbon emissions. 

In addition, China has proposed that the proportion of non-fossil energy consumption should exceed 30% by 2035, and that the installed capacity of photovoltaic and wind power should strive to reach 3.6 billion kilowatts (3,600 GW). Currently, we only have 1.6-1.7 billion kilowatts (1,600-1,700 GW), which means that China's new energy will grow significantly in the next ten years and will continue to maintain its leading position in the global new energy field. 

The Paper: At this conference, many aspects mentioned China's leading position in green technologies and industrial chains, highlighting its significant contribution to the global low-carbon transition. However, some also pointed out that China remains a major producer and consumer of fossil energy. How should we view this coexistence? 

Liu Zhenmin: People who raise such questions may not necessarily understand the industry or the technology. We need to listen to the opinions of industry insiders. China's current situation also precisely illustrates the difficulty of energy transition. 

Replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy requires first improving equipment capabilities, restructuring the power grid, and undergoing a long technological transition period. 

For example, when China achieved nationwide poverty alleviation in 2020, it simultaneously achieved "every village connected" to the power grid—a world miracle. However, the power grid had just been built when it had to face the deployment and volatility of new energy sources, posing entirely new challenges and requiring reconstruction and expansion—something many foreign politicians simply cannot understand. 

Over the next decade, as we achieve carbon peaking by 2030, China will gradually shift from "primarily controlling carbon emission intensity" to "primarily controlling total carbon emissions." This is a significant change and will be a crucial milestone in China’s energy transition. 

Trade tensions and funding difficulties 

The Paper: Another important trend at this conference was trade issues. The trade discussions at this conference were very heated, and the latest text contained many statements opposing unilateral measures. How do we view COP30's increasingly close link between trade and climate, especially regarding the development of unilateral trade restrictions promoted by developed countries? 

Liu Zhenmin: One important change at this conference is that many developing countries have reached a consensus: they firmly oppose unilateral measures promoted by developed countries—especially the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). 

Why oppose it? Because the world has just entered an era of energy transition, and unilateral measures will hinder the flow of technology, investment, and products, increase costs, raise prices, and are very detrimental to the energy transition. 

Therefore, developing countries emphasize the need to unite against unilateral measures and demand that developed countries refrain from such actions from the perspective of supporting the global energy transition. 

This conference sent at least one important signal: the world is beginning to pay attention to the harm that unilateral measures pose to the future energy transition. We note that the COP30 outcome document, reached this morning after a day and night of intense negotiations by representatives from various countries and to be adopted at today's closing session, places great emphasis on opposing unilateral measures. COP30 requires its subsidiary bodies to hold dialogues over the next three years, including with the World Trade Organization and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, to propose new approaches to the opportunities, challenges, and obstacles facing strengthened international cooperation. 

The Paper: Another question concerns funding. Funding has been the focus of almost all the disagreements this year. Do you think it's possible to break the deadlock now? What are China's proposals for future funding reforms? 

Liu Zhenmin: Funding is indeed a key and challenging aspect of this conference. Developing countries urgently need funding for both mitigation and adaptation to climate change. This is an obligation that developed countries must fulfill under the Paris Agreement. 

In recent years, many financial mechanisms have been reached under the COP framework, especially the New Collective Quantitative Finance Target (NCQG) reached in Baku last year, which requires developed countries to take the lead in providing and mobilizing $300 billion annually for developing countries by 2035. 

However, securing funding this year has encountered significant difficulties. Due to the absence of the United States, internal divisions in Europe regarding climate policy, complex global geopolitics, and a weak global economy, increasing financial assistance to developing countries has faced unprecedented challenges. We hope that developed countries will take the funding needs of developing countries seriously, fulfill their commitments, and not back down. We note that the COP30 outcome document, reached just this morning, only specifically addresses adaptation funding, reiterating that adaptation funding will double by 2025 and at least triple by 2035, and urging developed countries to increase their collective provision of climate adaptation funding to developing countries. 

The Paper: What are your expectations for the final outcomes of this conference? 

Liu Zhenmin: The COP30 Climate Conference is a pivotal event, building on past achievements and paving the way for the future. It holds a very important position in the more than 30-year history of global climate governance. As we celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Paris Agreement, COP30 needs to send a positive signal of unity and cooperation to the world. 

First, climate action and international cooperation over the past decade have prevented worse climate scenarios. Second, the rapid development of clean and new energy technologies over the past decade has significantly reduced the cost of energy transition, and countries should continue to leverage these advantages. Third, the global energy transition has begun and is irreversible; countries need to continue to consolidate consensus and maintain the momentum of the transition. 

Regardless of the differences between countries, the COP30 conference should reach a meaningful outcome document to send a positive signal to the world. 

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