And speaking of overheated situations brings me to the extraordinary case of The Attorney General v Ms Sandra Messi [2026] and a claimant who just couldn’t stop claiming.

After scores of assorted tribunal claims from Ms Messi, across nearly a decade, the Attorney General finally applied to the Employment Appeals Tribunal, under Section 33 of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996, for a restriction of proceedings order — on the grounds that Ms Sandra Messi had engaged in vexatious litigation.

Ms Messi had, since 2017, issued more than 50 claims in the Employment Tribunal, including a significant number within a single year. These claims commonly involved allegations such as discrimination, whistleblowing detriment and unpaid wages. None of the claims had succeeded or resulted in settlement on the materials before the EAT. Many had been struck out on the basis that they had no reasonable prospect of success, dismissed following non-attendance, or withdrawn.

Ms Messi had also repeatedly failed to comply with tribunal directions and had made multiple unsuccessful applications for interim relief, particularly in whistleblowing cases. This pattern of litigation was accompanied by extensive and, at times, aggressive correspondence, as well as allegations of fabrication and procedural unfairness.

The Attorney General’s application for a restriction of proceedings order required the EAT to consider whether the statutory criteria were met; namely whether Ms Messi had habitually, persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings or made vexatious applications.

The EAT found that the statutory test was satisfied. It concluded that Ms Messi’s conduct demonstrated a clear pattern of instituting proceedings and making applications that were vexatious, habitual and without reasonable grounds. The EAT granted an indefinite restriction of proceedings order. This required Ms Messi to obtain permission from the EAT before instituting or continuing any proceedings or making applications, other than an application for leave under section 33 itself. The EAT rejected arguments that the application was affected by bias or procedural impropriety and found no evidence of fraud.

However, it declined to extend the order to prevent Ms Messi from acting as a McKenzie friend, (a person who assists an individual representing themselves in court) concluding that it had no jurisdiction to do so under section 33 and that, in any event, there was no evidence that she had acted in that capacity.

In its reasoning, the EAT emphasised that such an order operates as a filtering mechanism rather than an absolute bar on access to justice. It is intended to strike a balance between protecting respondents and the tribunal system from abusive litigation, while preserving the ability of the individual to bring claims that have arguable merit. The decision highlights that repeated, unmeritorious claims, persistent procedural non-compliance, and the misuse of applications such as interim relief, may collectively justify the making of a restriction order.

The case also illustrates the broader practical impact of vexatious litigation on employers and the tribunal system. Serial claims of this nature can impose significant burdens, including costs, disruption to witnesses, and the diversion of resources. The EAT’s reasoning underscores the importance of maintaining clear documentary evidence, adhering firmly to procedural requirements, and, where appropriate, seeking costs orders in response to unreasonable conduct. In more extreme cases, it demonstrates that a restriction of proceedings order may be an available and effective mechanism to address persistent abusive litigation.

This case shows employers that the tribunal system will intervene in extreme situations where an individual brings repeated, unmeritorious claims and behaves unreasonably, but only where there is clear evidence of a persistent pattern. It reinforces the importance of maintaining good records, complying with procedural requirements, and documenting conduct across multiple claims, as this can support findings of vexatious litigation. At the same time, it highlights that the threshold is high, and restriction orders are a last resort rather than a routine solution.