And speaking of a little controlled ranting brings me to the case of Bibescu v Clare Jenner Ltd t/a Jenner’s (2026), the Employment Appeal Tribunal determined whether the Employment Tribunal erred in its approach to protected disclosures.

Miss Bibescu was employed by Clare Jenner Limited as an accountant from November 2018 until her dismissal in June 2020.

Performance concerns were raised from August 2019 and continued into early 2020, including emails in April and May 2020 highlighting mistakes and issues with attitude. A subcontractor, Mr Grimes, was asked to peer review Miss Bibescu’s work, which she resented.

On returning to the office in May 2020, she received a verbal warning about standards. Ahead of a meeting in June 2020, Miss Bibescu checked Companies House and identified that Mr Grimes was disqualified from being a director yet appeared as a director of a company linked to his wife, and that he was not an ACCA member; she raised these points with management by email the same day. She was then given further files and instructions, but errors and friction continued until she was dismissed by letter referring to performance and inability to work with Mr Grimes.

Miss Bibescu then brought claims of automatic unfair dismissal for whistleblowing (section 103A ERA), whistleblowing detriment (section 47B ERA), and automatic unfair dismissal (section 100(1)(d) ERA) to the Employment Tribunal.

The ET dismissed the claims under sections 103A and 100(1)(d). It also found against the section 47B claim, although it did not clearly dispose of one aspect of this particular claim in its formal judgment, even though it addressed it in its reasoning.

On the disclosures themselves, the ET concluded that Miss Bibescu’s information about Mr Grimes was not made in the public interest. It also found that none of the statutory conditions for a protected disclosure were satisfied.

In relation to dismissal, the ET held that the main reason for dismissal was performance concerns and difficulties in working relationships, rather than any protected disclosures.

Miss Bibescu then appealed the decision to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, focusing on the whistleblowing aspects (sections 103A and 47B). She argued that the ET made errors in how it assessed:

• whether the disclosures were made in the public interest,
   
• whether Miss Bibescu had a reasonable belief in what she was reporting, and
   
• whether the decision on dismissal was properly reasoned.

CJL did not attend the appeal hearing but relied on written submissions supporting the ET’s decision.

The EAT upheld the ET’s decision on unfair dismissal under section 103A. It agreed that the ET was entitled to find that the real reason for dismissal was performance and workplace relationship issues. That finding was considered properly open to the ET based on the evidence.

However, the EAT found legal errors in the ET’s handling of the whistleblowing detriment claim under section 47B.

In particular, the ET:

• failed to properly assess Miss Bibescu’s own belief about whether her disclosures were in the public interest,
   
• wrongly focused on whether the alleged wrongdoing was actually proven rather than whether Miss Bibescu reasonably believed it was, and
   
• substituted its own view of reasonableness rather than assessing Miss Bibescu’s perspective.

The EAT also noted issues with the clarity of the ET’s judgment, including that the section 47B claim was not properly dealt with in the formal outcome section.

The appeal against the unfair dismissal finding was dismissed.

However, the appeal relating to whistleblowing detriment succeeded. The EAT sent the section 47B claim back to a fresh ET to be reheard, due to the legal errors identified and the passage of time.

This case is significant because it reinforces that the reason for dismissal under section 103A ERA remains a question of fact for the ET, which must determine the principal reason for dismissal based on the evidence before it. It also clarifies that, when considering whether a disclosure is protected under section 43B, ETs must assess both the worker's subjective belief that the disclosure was in the public interest and the objective reasonableness of that belief, rather than substituting their own view or requiring the alleged wrongdoing to be proven. The case further highlights the importance of separately determining and adequately reasoning detriment claims under section 47B. For employers, the decision underlines the value of maintaining clear records of performance concerns, decision-making processes, and responses to whistleblowing disclosures.