And speaking of small but many things brings me to the case of Simpson v Cantor Fitzgerald Europe [2019], and the veracity of one man’s 37 whistleblows.

Mr Dray Simpson worked for Cantor Fitzgerald Europe as a managing director on its Emerging Markets Desk from February to December 2015. He had previously enjoyed a senior career in the bond markets. During his short time at the company, Mr Simpson repeatedly raised concerns about trading practices, including a suspected practice known as "front-running", a colleague allegedly trading without regulatory clearance, and clients being dealt with without proper checks.

He raised these concerns, in various forms, to his line manager and to the compliance department. However, colleagues found him difficult to work with, frequently complaining and lacking focus on generating business. Despite his manager initially resisting calls to move him, matters escalated in autumn 2015, and following an investigation by a separate manager, Mr Simpson was suspended and, in December 2015, dismissed.

Mr Simpson then took Cantor Fitzgerald Europe to the employment tribunal for unfair dismissal, arguing he had been let go because of his whistleblowing.

The Employment Tribunal found that none of the 37 alleged disclosures identified amounted to protected disclosures, as they lacked sufficient factual detail, were largely speculative, and appeared to be motivated by Mr Simpson’s concerns about his own commission payments rather than any genuine public interest. The Tribunal went further, describing it as "utterly fanciful" to suggest that whistleblowing was the reason, or even a contributing reason, for his dismissal. Instead, it found that Mr Simpson had been dismissed because his manager had lost trust in him, citing his confrontational attitude, poor timekeeping, and his refusal to hand over personal notes he had been compiling about his colleagues.

Mr Simpson appealed to the EAT on several grounds, including that the Tribunal should have considered his disclosures collectively rather than individually, and that it had failed to properly direct itself on the relevant law. The EAT dismissed the appeal, holding that whether to aggregate disclosures was a question of fact for the Tribunal, and that there was no clear basis on which the various communications should have been grouped together.

The EAT also confirmed that the Tribunal had correctly applied the test for reasonable belief and public interest, and had not wrongly treated Mr Simpson’s self-interest as automatically ruling out a public interest element. While the EAT criticised the Tribunal for failing to set out a clear summary of the relevant law, it found that the judgment as a whole showed the correct principles had been applied, and upheld the original finding that Mr Simpson’s dismissal was not connected to any whistleblowing.

This case shows that simply labelling a complaint as a "disclosure" is not enough; the information given must be specific and detailed enough to support a genuine, reasonable belief that wrongdoing has occurred or is likely to occur, and must serve a wider public interest rather than the employee’s own pocket. It also serves as a useful reminder for employers and tribunals alike that, even where an employee has raised numerous complaints over time, each must still be properly examined to determine whether it qualifies for protection, and that clear, well-reasoned judgments will always be best placed to withstand appeal.